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How do hearers recognize when someone is speaking figuratively, and how do
they recover the content–whatever it is–of an utterance? “Speaking Indirectly”
explores this question in Indian philosophy, showing along the way that it is
a helpful conversation partner with Western philosophy of language. Focusing
on the debate between ninth-century Indian philosophers Mukulabhaṭṭa and
Ānandavardhana about competing explanations of non-literal meaning, I ar-
gue that Mukulabhaṭṭa’s proposal can be understood in the spirit of Gricean
pragmatics, and is broadly successful. I also show that he tacitly appeals to
reasoning known as arthāpatti to explain the interpretive process, a process
which I conclude is a version of inference to the best explanation. I also em-
ploy contemporary conceptual tools, such as the theory of sort-shifting, to
illustrate the plausibility of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s analysis of non-literal speech. A
significant aspect of my dissertation is a new, philosophically informed, En-
glish translation of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s Sanskrit text, the Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛkā
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“The list says...when you are finished in the living room, put out
the lights. Oh–I’ll just unscrew all of these bulbs and put them on
the clothesline outside.”
Amelia Bedelia
“When I use a word,” Humpty said in a rather scornful tone, “it
means just what I choose it to mean–neither more nor less.”
“The question is,” said Alice, “whether you can make words mean
so many different things.”
“The question is,” said Humpty Dumpty, “which is to be master–
that’s all.”
Through the Looking Glass
We frequently use a single expression in multiple ways.1 A person who doesn’t
recognize this capacity of language would quickly find herself in the position
of Amelia Bedelia, the literal-minded protagonist of children’s books. Asked
to draw the drapes, she sketches a picture; told to dress the turkey, she puts it
in fancy clothes. But despite language’s flexibility, it isn’t a magic wand that
1Portions of this chapter appeared as “Mukulabhaṭṭa’s Defense of Lakṣaṇā: How We
Use Words to Mean Something Else, but Not Everything Else” in The Journal of Indian
Philosophy. Keating 2013a.
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we can use to convey any and all meanings we’d like, in whichever context we
please. Though Humpty Dumpty says he “pays a word extra” when he makes it
do a lot of work, his uttering “glory” to mean a “nice knock-down argument”
isn’t evidence of his mastery of language but a profound confusion. Many
factors, not all under the speaker’s control, constrain the power of speech to
convey meaning. Indian philosophers distinguished between two powers: the
primary and the secondary, or ‘mukhya’ and ‘lakṣaṇā.’2
The distinction between primary and secondary capacities of language in clas-
sical Indian philosophy is, generally speaking, the distinction between literal
and non-literal meaning, respectively. In future chapters, we will see how
both of these distinctions are not without complications, but as a first pass,
we can say that the literal meaning of a sentence token is composed of ordinary
word-referents, properties, and the like with the help of some basic contextual
rules. In contrast, non-literal meaning goes beyond ordinary reference—which
is grounded in a language that pairs expressions to objects. Another way to
get at this contrast is to say that literal meaning is encoded into a particular
utterance through linguistic rules whereas non-literal meaning is grounded in
broader principles having to do with speaker aims, conventions, and the like.
In classical Indian philosophy, primary meaning is usually characterized as be-
2The word ‘lakṣaṇā’ is often translated as “indication,” or “secondary meaning.” I will
leave it untranslated, in part because no single English word captures the range of its
meaning. In addition, lakṣaṇā plays a central theoretical role in what is to come, and I prefer
to leave open precisely what it is, and allow exposition of the Sanskrit texts to fill in the
concept, rather than the connotations attached to an English translation. Throughout the
dissertation, I will use English words instead of Sanskrit wherever possible, with footnotes
to give more etymological and conceptual background.
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ing direct whereas secondary meaning is indirect, depending in some way upon
the primary meaning but going beyond it. We can also apply this distinction
to words: when Humpty Dumpty says of “glory” that it means a “nice knock-
down argument,” he is stipulating a non-literal meaning. The literal meaning
of “glory” is determined by wider conventional use, and not Humpty Dumpty’s
personal decision. However, with Alice, we might express doubt that even the
non-literal meaning of a word (or a sentence) can be simply stipulated by a
speaker. Thus we might like to know how it is that non-literal meanings can
be expressed.
In classical Indian philosophy it is lakṣaṇā which is the śakti, or power which
causes a hearer to entertain a non-literal meaning. However, they do not agree
on how to explain it. One problem is to avoid the “Humpty-Dumptification”
of words and to define principled constraints for non-literal meaning, but to
do so in a way that does justice to the rich nuances of human language use. In
this dissertation, I argue that a plausible, if not completely successful, model
of lakṣaṇā emerges from the interaction between the Grammarian, Mīmāṃsā,
and Alaṅkāra schools found in the work of ninth-century Kashmiri thinker
Mukulabhaṭṭa.3 In the confluence of these traditions we find attention to the
lexical and syntactic requirements for sentence meaning, to the interpretive
3In classical Indian philosophy, major philosophical divisions were marked by textual
traditions called ‘darśana’, or “ways of seeing.” While they are given names like the Gram-
marian school, the Mīmāṃsā school, and so on, there was dispute within the particular
schools and they were not entirely unified. However, insofar as they can be viewed as a
history of texts commenting upon earlier texts, and they share major philosophical commit-
ments, they are usefully described as “schools.”
3
unity guiding a communicative act, and to the nuances of creative language
use found in poetry, for instance.
Mukula’s positive arguments for the centrality of lakṣaṇā originate as part
of an attack on another Kashmiri thinker, Ānandavardhana, who wrote the
highly influential Dhvanyāloka, or The Light on Suggestion.4 In this text,
Ānanda argues that the existing linguistic capacities (which include lakṣaṇā)
are insufficient to explain the full range of linguistic meanings. He posits a
new power, suggestion (dhvani), which he claims is responsible for such things
as discourse-length figures of speech, implied facts, and emotional moods. His
focus is upon poetry, where suggestion is the predominant meaning, the mean-
ing intended by the author or speaker, above and beyond the strictly literal
meaning of the sentences. While his arguments for suggestion were not uni-
versally compelling—for instance, the philosophical tradition represented by
the Nyāya, Mīmāṃsā, and Buddhists largely ignored them—in the field of po-
etic theory (alaṅkāra-śāstra), his work was responsible for a paradigm shift.
Subsequent thinkers would, on the whole, accept his view that suggestion is
a central feature of linguistic communication and the primary aim of poetry,
in particular the evocation of something called ‘rasa,’ which we will discuss
below.5
4Throughout the text I will frequently refer to Mukulabhaṭṭa as “Mukula,” and to Ānan-
davardhana as “Ānanda.” While the latter is less formal, it is common in print, especially
when the audience is English speakers, for whom lengthy Sanskrit names can be a mental
stumbling block. However, note that while in the original texts, “Bhaṭṭa” is a term indicat-
ing respect and separable from “Mukula,” Ānanda’s entire name is “Ānandavardhana.”
5At the outset, it’s important to flag that there is a tradition of interpreting Ānanda’s
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However, there were early dissenters, including Mukulabhaṭṭa, who argued
that suggestion could be understood within the existing framework offered
by lakṣaṇā. His text is an attempt to build a unifying theory of language
which counters the theory of suggestion. Beginning with language’s important
role in guiding action through knowledge of the world, Mukula then sets out
a lexical semantics, distinguishes between two linguistic functions (vyāpāra)
suggested meaning as something that is beyond reason and has religious connotations. One
example of this approach is that of Anand Amaldass, who says, “Dhvani (suggestion) is not
a meaning among other meanings. It is rather a meaning-fulness or Significance attained
through meaning...Dhvani is not merely an indirect way of conveying a meaning for the
sake of charm...not a rational process where meaning and its implications are arrived at in
the logical order. Dhvani is the Significance that a meaning brings about to a person in
the context of a deeper experience (Amaladass 1984, 207, capitalization in original).” Of
this “deeper experience,” Amaldass says that it is due to suggestion which “enables one to
overcome the subject-object duality in cognition and to reach the unity of consciousness
and language.” (Amaladass 1984, p. 22.) Amaldass is influenced in his analysis by Francis
X. D’Sa, whose work finds the notion of “Significance” in the Mīmāṃsā as well. See D’Sa
1980 and a critical review by Taber, Taber 1983. However, while Ānanda’s commentator,
Abhinavagupta, was Kashmiri Śaivite whose own aesthetic theory was explicitly linked to
Tantric metaphysics, these elements are not explicitly found in Ānanda. (Kashmiri Śaivism
is a term for a group of cultic practices which focus on worship of Śiva (hence “Śaivite”),
and emphasize the religious practitioner’s personal power and transcendence of ordinary
reality. One central metaphysical claims made by many, though not all, Śaivites, is that
reality is non-dual, and that the goddess Shakti is part of the god Shiva, and that all of
reality emanates from them. See Muller-Ortega 1989 and Sanderson 2004 for discussion of
Kashmiri Śaivism and Abhinavagupta and Baümer 2008 for discussion of the relationship
between Abhinava’s aesthetics and religious views.) However, as Edwin Gerow has forcefully
argued in his comments on Amaldass, this (in his terms) “mystico-religious view of language”
runs counter to what Ānanda himself is arguing: “that dhvani belongs to the province
of ordinary language, and is its most characteristic and expressive function.”Gerow 1986,
p. 855. While Amaldass’ work is useful where he summarizes the Dhvanyāloka and its
historical context, his missteps in analysis are a warning to those who follow about the
pitfalls of comparative philosophical work. Gerow, in his criticism of Amaldass, points out
that using ambiguous terms like “hermeneutics” in cross-cultural interpretation is fraught
with potential for obfuscation. Thus, in what follows, I strive to clarify in what sense
I intend terms such as “meaning,” “suggestion,” and the like, and carefully distinguish
between Ānanda’s views (as best as I can reconstruct them), the views of contemporary
Anglophone philosophers, and my own.
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of language, and systematically, case by case, explains the logical structure of
these functions. Along the way, he discusses topics such as what contemporary
philosophy would call “the unity of the proposition,” the relationship of frozen
metaphors to their primary or literal meanings, the cues that interpreters use
to recover what a speaker intends, and how to differentiate between figures of
speech such as irony, puns, metaphor, metonymy, and hyperbole. At the heart
of his proposal is an exploration of how lakṣaṇā functions when the primary
meaning of an utterance is blocked. My thesis is that, as Mukula presents it,
lakṣaṇā is profitably understood as interpretation guided by inference to the
best explanation.
In what follows, I argue that not only is Mukula’s attack on the theory of
suggestion largely successful, but it is is a useful account of how inference to
the best explanation explains the simultaneous flexibility and normatively con-
strained nature of figures of speech and the like. I also argue that Mukula’s ar-
guments in his Fundamentals can be understood as an early defense of Gricean
pragmatic implicature, coupled with what contemporary linguists would call
metonymic sort-shifting. To demonstrate this, I give a careful account of the
conceptions of inferential reasoning at play in the Indian debate over non-
literal speech. For instance, I demonstrate how Ānanda’s arguments against
inferential reasoning in The Light implicitly support the role of inference to
the best explanation.
The structure of the dissertation is broadly topical. I begin with the his-
torical and intellectual context for Ānanda and Mukula. Along the way I
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observe where their inquiries overlap with contemporary philosophical ques-
tions. Where classical Indian philosophical inquiries overlap with Western
thinkers, I bring their insights to bear on current projects. Where the two are
orthogonal, I use the divergence to question presuppositions on both fronts.
My final chapter is a brief conclusion of what contemporary philosophy can
learn from this ninth-century dialectic where I also lay out avenues for future
research.
In the rest of this chapter, I situate the dispute between Ānanda and Mukula
historically. I argue that not only has Mukula’s treatise been overlooked as an
important reply to Ānanda’s influential theory, the extent to which Mukula is
focused upon epistemology has not yet been recognized. I demonstrate that
this focus is important for fully appreciating his arguments. After a survey
of the early textual tradition of poetics and dramaturgy to which Ānanda is
significantly indebted, I introduce the Mīmāṃsā tradition which informs his
and Mukula’s work.
1.1 Mukulabhaṭṭa: An Overlooked Minority Voice
Despite being one of the earliest substantial replies to the Light of Ānandavard-
hana, Mukula’s ninth century Abhidhā-vṛtta-mātṛka, or, Fundamentals of the
Communicative Function, has not been addressed in much detail until recently.
This is regrettable, since it was influential in Sanskrit poetic theory and is a
unique interdisciplinary text. In its original context, the treatise was influen-
tial: Mammaṭa, a tremendous figure in Sanskrit poetic theory, borrowed parts
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of the Fundamentals verbatim for his twelfth century Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra.
Mukula had at least two students, Pratīhārendurāja and Sahadeva, who both
cite their teacher as not only the source of their knowledge, but as respon-
sible for rediscovering the work of Vāmana, an important earlier theorist.6
Abhinavagupta’s famous commentary on the Light indicates his awareness of
Mukula’s work, as it deals with the objection that dhvani should be understood
as lakṣaṇā.
Further, not only was the Fundamentals influential in the study of literary
theory and linguistic communication in South Asia, the text is a unique com-
bination of philosophy, literary theory, grammatical analysis, and incorpo-
rates a wide array of natural language examples. As McCrea points out, for
a philosophical work to devote this much attention to poetry was unheard of
in Mukula’s day.7 In fact, just how to categorize the Fundamentals is unclear.
While the degree to which Indian philosophy admits of “schools” with clearly
identifiable and firm boundaries has been overstated, typically there are tra-
ditional vectors of intellectual effort which originate from a “root” text, or
sūtra. Members of these schools tend to share certain commitments, as well as
a certain set of earlier texts from which they will draw upon, in addition to the
root text. Thus, for example, the Mīmāṃsā school, which we will investigate
in more detail later, has as its root text the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra of Jaimini, and
6McCrea 2008, p. 265.
7McCrea 2008, p. 264. A later work, the Vyaktiviveka of Mahimabhaṭṭa, is similar in its
philosophical breadth (its author relies upon the work of Buddhist logician Dharmakīrti)
and a wide range of sources, including Mīmāṃsā, Grammarian, and possibly Śaivite schools.
See Rajendran 1991, p. 47-49.
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later works, however original they may be, are typically presented as com-
menting on Jaimini or his commentators.8 The Mīmāṃsaka philosopher will
cite their opponents, Nyāya or Buddhist as well, but it would be unusual to
cite texts from the poetic tradition, for instance. However, Mukula draws on
the Grammarians, the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā (two Mīmāṃsā sub-
schools with diverging views), as well as the poetic tradition. Further, Mukula
does not entirely align himself with any one of these intellectual traditions.
Thus, the neglect of his Fundamentals is to the detriment of our understand-
ing how disciplinary boundaries in classical Indian intellectual thought were
porous.
Those authors who have taken up Mukula’s work generally fall into two cat-
egories: those who recognize his importance yet give a cursory study of the
text, and those who overlook his importance due to the long shadow cast by
Ānanda’s Light in Sanskrit literary theory. Among the latter, there are a few
who even mistake Mukula as a supporter of the theory of suggestion, rather
than a critic. Unfortunately, the only existing English translation we have of
The Fundamentals falls into this final group, at least to a large extent. In
his 1977 translation, published in the Journal of Indian Philosophy, K. Venu-
gopalan recognizes that Mukula’s goal is to subsume the putative function
of suggestion within lakṣaṇā, but he also claims that at some points Mukula
8Even poetry in the Sanskrit tradition has commentaries, and the tradition itself encour-
ages poets to write richly complex works that require some commentary for readers to fully
understand. Tubb and Boose 2007, p. 2.
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“definitely accepts the view of Dhvani [suggestion] indirectly.”9 His reason for
this interpretation seems to be the following: Ānanda has already established
that lakṣaṇā and suggestion are “poles apart,” and, since Mukula has not
been able to refute this view, his analysis (of a particular sort of suggestion)
is an indirect way accepting of suggestion. However, while a translator must
do philosophical work in order to understand and faithfully represent a text’s
arguments—and perhaps to take a position on the success or failure of those
arguments—one’s own philosophical commitments ought not obscure the ex-
plicit commitments of a given text. That is, while perhaps Mukula’s view is
nuanced to the degree that he accepts suggestion in some areas, and rejects it
in others, we must look for textual cues that this is, in fact, his view. (In what
follows I argue that this is not his view.) Simply appealing to the (supposed)
failure of an author’s argument is insufficient to show that an author is indi-
rectly accepting a contrary view. In any case, whether or not Venugopalan’s
work is entirely faithful to Mukula’s project, as it stands the translation has a
number of errors.10 Thus, part of my dissertation is a new English translation,
which I hope will do justice to Mukula’s philosophical commitments and be a
useful reference for future work.
The other existing editions of The Fundamentals are accessible only to Sanskrit
and Hindi scholars. The 1973 Sanskrit edition, edited by Dvivedi, is printed in
9Bhaṭṭa 1977, p.262.
10The transliteration is also filled with typographical errors, and there are no clues as to
which manuscripts or editions guided his decisions for emending the text. I hope to address
this problem in future work.
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Devanāgarī with a Hindi commentary.11 There is also a more recent 2008 edi-
tion, also printed in Devanāgarī, containing a Sanskrit commentary as well as
a Hindi commentary.12 While Venugopalan’s English footnotes form a helpful,
though sparse, commentary, the only other available English commentary is
in a short text entitled Abhidhā. This 76-page monograph, taken from lectures
given by Tapasvi Nandi, outlines the major elements of Mukula’s work in a gen-
erally sympathetic and constructive manner.13 Nandi summarizes Mukula’s
text, correctly identifying the central thrust of his work as an attempt to refute
Ānanda’s theory of suggestion.14 However, while Nandi’s summary of Mukula
is thorough, it is not analytical, nor does it address in what ways Mukula’s
arguments might be understood as directly responding to Ānanda.
Apart from these efforts—and the recent work of Lawrence McCrea—to which
I will turn in a moment, few contemporary scholars working in either poetic
theory or philosophy took note of Mukula’s criticisms of Ānanda’s theory of
suggestion. Among the major early writers on Sanskrit literary criticism—De,
Kane, Krishnamoorthy, and Gerow—none spend any significant energy on even
summarizing his work. Krishnamoorthy does not mention him at all, Gerow
erroneously places him before Ānanda, and Kane and De only mention him




14He also correctly remarks that, although Mukula uses terms like ‘abhivyañjatā’, which
might seem as if he is endorsing the existence of the suggestive function of vjañjanā, he
means simply “making it manifest.” See Nandi 2002, p. 3.
15See De 1960, Gerow 1977, Kane 1961, and Kirhsnamoorthy 1968
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of Ānanda’s dhvani theory, he devotes a scant three sentences to Mukula’s
work.16 Even Ingalls’ translation of Ānanda’s Dhvanyāloka mentions Mukula
only in passing, and not as someone who is responding to Ānanda.17
Recently, Lawrence McCrea’s chapter in The Teleological Poetics of Medieval
Kashmir has begun to rectifiy this relative neglect of Mukula’s work.18 The
chapter moves beyond mere summary to analysis that recognizes the role of
the theory of suggestion in motivating the text.19 McCrea establishes the
importance of Mukula’s work as the first example of a new sub-genre within
Sanskrit literary theory. He also carefully distinguishes between Mukula’s
agreement with Ānanda on the nature of poetry and his disagreement about
the explanation for linguistic phenomenon, a distinction not clearly made in
earlier efforts.
My own aim in the next few chapters is to continue to contextualize Mukula’s
philosophical work, focusing in particular on the epistemological implications
of his arguments. This has not yet been addressed in any of the literature
I have surveyed. However, not only does Mukula’s work itself open with an
appeal to an epistemic motivation for his work (concerning which, see below),
16Raja 1993, p. 295.
17Ingalls characterizes the Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛka as “concerned with the nature of denota-
tion and the secondary use of words,” which, while true, misses the dialectical nature of his
interest in secondary use, or lakṣaṇā. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 29.
18In the same year as McCrea’s book was published, another treatement of Mukula was
also published in Linguistic Traditions of Kashmir (Agrawal 2008, pp. 28-40.) This short
piece by M.M. Agrawal is consistent with the earlier discussions of Mukula’s work, in that it
primarily emphasizes the dhvani theorist’s response to his arguments (in this case, through
the Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra of Mammaṭa).
19McCrea 2008, pp.260–310.
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but more generally, the philosophy of language in classical Indian thought has
been part of the study of epistemology. For both of these reasons, I conclude
that our understanding of his work would benefit from a careful analysis of
the relationship of his arguments to epistemology of language. Not only will
this benefit our understanding of this particular text, but insofar as Mukula’s
arguments succeed or fail, we can draw general lessons about epistemic access
to non-literal meaning.
1.2 Linguistic Communication and Interpretation
The central focus of these next chapters is epistemological. Human commu-
nicative acts are complex, and hearers recover multiple elements in any given
utterance.20 For instance, one might come to understand the referents of con-
20There is a further complexity: the relevant differences, if any, between oral and written
communication. While we might argue that, as a system of representation abstracted from
actual speakers or writers, language is indifferent to the medium of transmission, it is plausi-
ble that agents recover meaning differently depending on the medium. Further, in the history
of Sanskrit literature and philosophy, there were important distinctions drawn between the
oral and the written. The Vedas were originally transmitted orally, and, even after they were
written down, it was an essential part of their nature (for the Mīmāṃsā hermeneuticists, at
least) that they were authorless and timeless. In contrast, poetry (kāvya) is a quintessential
act of a historically-bound author setting intention into written form, even if it is to be
performed orally and publicly. (Pollock 2006, pp. 75-76.) However, despite drawing distinc-
tions between the genres of the Vedas and poetry, theorists applied hermeneutic approaches
originally meant for Vedic interpretation to the analysis of poetry. (McCrea 2008.) Thus,
while it may be correct, as Pollock observes, that poetry was self-consciously understood as
a “new phenomenon entirely different from all earlier language uses” (a phenomenon that
was said to begin with Vālmīki’s Rāmāyaṇa), Sanskrit thinkers employed both new and old
conceptual tools for the task of analyzing poetic language. (Pollock 2006, pp. 77.) The
reason I draw attention to this distinction—between the oral and the written—is that one
might think it is a category mistake to draw upon theories originally intended to explain
only the phenomenon of poetic meaning encoded in writing as a way to explain non-literal
meaning in general, whether conveyed orally or in writing.
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stituent words and expressions, the literal sentence meaning, the meaning the
speaker intends to convey with that sentence, as well as other kinds of speaker
aims. A speaker could aim for her hearer to enter a certain emotional state,
appreciate particular aesthetic features (of the utterance or of the world), or
perform a particular action. Whatever we conclude, from a philosophical van-
tage point, about the status of the elements in this list in a theory of meaning,
such human activities are the starting point for our investigation.
In the words of Mukulabhaṭṭa, the certainty (niścaya) that we have about,
for example, the objects of words is what enables our utterances to be part
of everyday use (vyavahāra), and this certainty depends upon there being an
accessible connection between our words and their meanings.21 At its most
However, there are three reasons that I think this is too limited a conception. First, as I’ve
already suggested, the historical philosophical investigation cuts across genre boundaries.
This is especially apparent in Mukula’s work, where he draws upon more than just poetic
examples, appealing to ordinary speech as well as Vedic speech. Such a willingness to cross
genre boundaries demonstrates that he thought his explanation was not limited simply to
the written texts of kāvya. Second, even though there are certain aspects of kāvya which
may require it being written (for instance, the complex double meanings known as śleṣa
required multiple readings), it was originally intended for a public audience and was still
part of a culture which privileged orality. See, for example, the story of Dhanapāla, whose
poem was recited from a manuscript that was subsequently lost, but then partially recovered
through the memory of his daughter (Pollock 2006, pp. 87.) The relationship between oral
and textual meaning is thus complex, even within the original historical context. Third,
even if the original philosophical project did aim to explain a very narrowly understood
genre which was grounded in the written word, this is not a principled obstacle to drawing
upon insights which may be expanded to other areas. Naturally, we must be careful not to
import this expansion into our representation of the original arguments, but the task of the
philosopher, as opposed to the historian, is to draw out what is entailed by certain claims.
Where it is relevant, I will distinguish between “hearer” and “reader,” but on the whole, as
my project is the exploration of non-literal meaning in general, I will assume that hearers
are readers and vice versa.
21See [1.7] in the appended translation: “ato niścaya eva teṣāṃ pada-arthānāṃ vyavahāra-
uparohe nibandhanam. niścayaś ca śabda-sambhedena-arthaṃ go-cari-karoti; And it is
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basic level, this amounts to the fact that, without some way for speakers and
hearers to converge on the same meanings, language would not be a useful
tool. However we want to characterize the object of this convergence (Is it
a proposition? A state of affairs?), and however we want to characterize the
convergence itself (Do we share the same thought? Merely coordinate our
actions?), this observation is a starting point for theorizing about language.
The observation brings us to wonder, among other things, how it is that we
are able to recover such objects. It is with this principle that Mukula opens
the Fundamentals of the Communicative Function and from which he develops
his model of both literal and non-literal speech.
As I’ve noted, the Indian philosophical tradition identified linguistic “powers,”
or ‘śakti’, which were responsible for producing in a hearer an understanding
of a meaning. Indian philosophers called this understanding a ‘viśiṣṭa-jñāna’,
or “cognitive state of an entity which is apprehended as qualified.”22 I will
through knowledge sources that there is the comprehension of things referred to by words—
things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincar-
nation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these. Therefore, it is only on the basis
of certainty regarding what things words refer to that there is appropriateness for everyday
purposes.” The term ‘artha’ is used to mean objects, meanings, things, and aims. As a word
with a wide semantic range, it can play the dual role of describing the things in the world
that words might point to, as well as the “things in the head” which hearers and speakers
entertain while speaking.
22A qualificative cognitive state, as Matilal calls it (Matilal 1998, p. 19ff), is essentially
when a thinker entertains a thought about an object, where the object is thought about
as qualified by something else, like a property. Examples traditionally are things like, “a
blue pot,” which can also be expressed sententially as, “This pot is blue.” The Indian
tradition puts emphasis on the individual who has the qualificative cognitive state as a
result of hearing an utterance. However, the cognition has a structure which maybe viewed
as analogous to the structure of a proposition. Putting a qualificative cognitive state into
formal terms, we can represent it as Q(a,b ), or, “a is qualified by b.” Note that there is not
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use “cognition” as shorthand to refer to this understanding, which can be
loosely characterized as the grasping of a proposition on the part of the hearer.
Another term for this capacity of language is its “function.”23 For instance,
according to some Grammarians, the denotative function is responsible for
our understanding that “cow” refers to a general class of bovine animals, that
“white” refers to a quality which inheres in physical objects, that “David”
refers to an individual human being, and that “s/he cooks” refers to the action
of heating food. Of course, our favorite semantic theories might specify that
“cow” doesn’t pick out a general class but an individual instead, and we might
have a different analysis of action-words, names, and so forth. Whatever the
particulars, the reason for describing denotation as a “function” is that, given a
speaker’s uttering a word, a hearer will subsequently entertain the appropriate
proposition, or have the correctly corresponding cognition. Given an input (a
word), there is an output (a cognition). While there are many interesting
questions to do with the referents of words, this is not primary focus in the
next several chapters.24 The focus is, instead, on the times when the cognition
associated with the literal sense is problematic.25 Perhaps it does not cohere
always a one-to-one correspondence between the qualifier, b, and the grammatical predicate
of a sentence.
23Sanskrit: ‘vyāpara’, ‘vṛtti’, or ‘prakāra’.
24As in Western philosophy, there are a variety of theories about reference. Most Indian
philosophers of language are direct-reference theorists of a kind. Buddhists, whose views I
will only touch upon here, are the exception, arguing for a kind of conceptual intermediary
between the speaker and her referent. See Raja 1993 for a broad overview of the territory,
and Ganeri 1999 and Ganeri 2006 for a useful introduction to Nyāya philosophy of language
with regard to theories of reference.
25In fact, as we will see later, given enough difficulty with the literal sense (and here I use
“sense” in a rough manner, not as a technical term), it is possible that a hearer may not be
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with what we expect from the speaker, given our background knowledge of her
character. If Sally says,
(1) Justin Bieber is amazing
but we know that she hates pop music, we might suspect she isn’t telling us
that Justin Bieber is amazing. The sentence itself, as uttered, is syntactically
acceptable, but we are hesitant to accept its apparent meaning.26
Alternatively, perhaps there is some problem with the constituent parts in
combination with each other. If Justin Bieber sings,
(2) Smile on your face even though your heart is frowning,
the attribution of frowning to someone’s heart is a problem if taken literally,
since hearts do not have mouths which frown or smile. In the Indian tradition,
as said above, the purpose of a sentence is to cause a structured cognition in the
hearer. Here, the hearer may be unable to cognize anything, since she needs to
have appropriate qualifier–qualificandum relationships communicated. How-
ever, in this case, the heart ought to be qualified by frowning, but such a
relationship is, prima facie, impossible.
able to entertain a cognition at all.
26This hesitation could be explained by any number of reasons. Perhaps we think accept-
ing the sentence’s straightforward meaning would require us to explain Sally’s utterance by
the assumption that she is lying or that she has become irrational. In either case, the mere
fact of Sally lying, or of her being irrational is reason to reject the literal meaning against
a background of other beliefs we have: that we think Sally is truthful, or we think she is
rational.
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In the Indian tradition, the function lakṣaṇā, referred to earlier, is responsible
for generating cognitions which replace or augment the literal meaning.27 In
(1), by lakṣaṇā, we may get something like “Justin Bieber is not amazing”
from Sally’s utterance. In (2), we may get something like, “(There’s a) smile
on your face even though you are sad.”
Just these two examples hint at the complexities involved in an account of
lakṣaṇā. How, for instance, do we know that Sally means to communicate that
Justin Bieber is not amazing, and not to communicate that she has changed
her mind about his skills? If she is being ironic, is she wanting to communicate
a particular thing (say, the negation of the literal meaning of her utterance)
or just to get us to share the distaste for Bieber that she has? In the case of
Bieber’s lyrics, are we to understand some specific state of affairs by the phrase
“your heart is frowning,” or to experience an emotion, like sadness? Perhaps
we are to have an aesthetic experience, like an experience of beauty?
27There is an ambiguity here, which is present throughout the tradition, and which we
will explore in more detail as we investigate inferential reasoning in Chapter Three. This is
the ambiguity between lakṣaṇā as something like a function which yields an output given
a certain input, and lakṣaṇā as something which hearers actively perform. While Siderits’
claim that Indian philosophy did not have “anything remotely resembling formal seman-
tics” may be overstated, he is right that they paid much attention to “the psychological and
social processes involved in language acquisition, production, and comprehension” (Sider-
its 1991, p. 5). Ganeri emphasizes the epistemological context of the Indian analysis of
language (Ganeri 1999, p. 13ff.) He points out that there is a normative aspect to language-
processing: understanding language is a matter of obtaining knowledge, given the right
conditions. In this sense, one can abstract away from the hearer and speak simply of the
conditions necessary for a sentence to yield a proposition (the content of a cognition). How-
ever, Indian philosophers are aware, and emphasize, that this language-processing takes
place in human interpreters, and that the pairing of meanings with sentences is a human
faculty, like perception (and also like inferential reasoning).
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This last possibility in particular is part of Ānandavardhana’s motivation in
writing the Dhvanyāloka. He argues that while denotation in combination with
lakṣaṇā, can explain some aspects of communication, they leave unexplained
how we succeed in a wide swath of communicative goals, including aesthetic
aims. These goals are attained through our linguistic activities, so Ānanda
thinks they need an explanation that is also rooted in the capacity of language
which I will call a“linguistic function.” By this term I intend to distinguish
the processes of language comprehension and production from the perceptual
and inferential processes on the part of either hearer or speaker. The word
“function” is intentionally ambiguous between function qua human ability and
qua abstract relationship between input and output.28 Ānanda argues for a
third function (in addition to denotation and lakṣaṇā) called ‘dhvani’, or “sug-
gestion.” Suggestion is the function responsible for a hearer understanding a
speaker’s aims. These aims can include getting a hearer to have an emotion
or aesthetic experiences, perform an action, or other perlocutionary effects,
just as has been described already. Ānanda characterizes all these aims as
‘artha’, the Sanskrit term whose semantic range encompasses meanings, ref-
erents, and objects. He argues that suggestion is a linguistic function in the
same sense that word denotation and lakṣaṇā are functions, but that it is a
distinct function.29
28These functions are commonly called “semantic powers” by translators, but they include
what analytic philosophy would consider semantic as well as pragmatic functions. In a loose
sense, one could understand denotation as semantic and lakṣaṇā as pragmatic, but as in
Western philosophy, this is not a distinction without problems.
29See appended translation, DV 3.33o ‘sarvathā prasiddha-śābda-prakāra-vilakṣaṇatvaṃ
19
In response, Mukula rejects this third function, arguing that everything sug-
gestion does can be explained by appeal to lakṣaṇā, a function already accepted
by all of the major Indian philosophers. His treatise, the Fundamentals of the
Communicative Function, aims to demonstrate that what Ānanda identifies
as being the function of suggestion is really just the function of indication.
I argue that Mukula’s response to Ānanda is in many ways successful. He
shows that many of the purportedly “suggested” meanings can be understood
using the principles which govern recovery of indicated meaning. In the In-
dian tradition, indicated meaning is understood through hearers relying on
what I argue is essentially inference to the best explanation. Thus we can
give an explanation as to how interpretations count as rational explanations
of non-literal speech. In contrast, the function of suggestion is explanatorily
inadequate.
1.3 Poetics and Dramaturgy
1.3.1 Early Texts: Taxonomies of Emotion and Figuration
To understand the school of Indian poetics which began with Ānandavard-
hana’s Light on Suggestion (Dhvanyāloka) in the mid ninth century CE, it is
necessary to appreciate the intellectual histories of grammar, philosophy, po-
śabda-vyāpāra-viṣayatvaṃ ca tasya asti iti na asty eva avayor vivādaḥ’; “What is claimed
on our part is there is a word-function whose characteristic mark is possessing suggestion,
distinct from the denotative function or secondary function.” Dhvanyāloka 3.33 in Ānan-
davardhana 1990b, translation mine.
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etics, and dramaturgy which preceded him.30 The term ‘dhvani’ was originally
employed by Grammarians to refer to the sounds of utterances, sounds which
“reveal” their meaning.31 Ānanda uses the word to refer to the specific “sug-
gested sense” or “implied charm” which poetry has and which is predominant
in comparison with the literal sense. While suggested meaning as described
by Ānanda is often a property of poetry, the function that produces suggested
meanings is not unique to poetry. There are two Sankrit terms used for this op-
eration: ‘dhvani’ and ‘vyañjanā.’ I translate the first, “poetic suggestion” and
the second, “ordinary suggestion.”32 Analogous to the Grammarian notion of
dhvani, Ānanda’s dhvani reveals the meaning of a poem. The Dhvanyāloka by
Ānandavardhana was the first Sanskrit text to propose this aesthetic function
30Ānanda lived at the end of Kashmir’s dominant era in Asian history, during the ninth
century CE. He wrote his own poetry as well as works on philosophy and Buddhism. We have
lost many of these works, but do have some quotations citated in other works. The original
title of the Dhvanyāloka was probably the Sahṛdayāloka, or A Light for Connoisseurs,
since Abhinavagupta’s commentary is titled the Sahṛdaya-loka-locana, and his is the oldest
commentary. There is no critical edition of his work. It has three parts: the Kārikā, Vṛtti,
and Udāharaṇa. Despite some dispute about whether Ānanda is the author of all three
parts, most scholars think that he is, especially since Abhinava quotes all three parts as if
they were authored by the same person. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 12.
31There are two kinds of dhvani according to the Grammarians: prākṛta-dhvani and
vaikṛta-dhvani. The latter refers to the sound patterns of an individual person’s utterance
of a word while the former is an abstracted class of typical sound patterns for a word.
The two of these together result in knowledge of a letter/word/sentence, understood as
something different from the sounds which make up an event of utterance. This is similar to
the distinction in modern linguistics between the objects studied by phonetics (individual
utterances), and phonology (utterances as an abstract class). See Raja 2000, p. 14-15 and
Bhattacharyya 1994, p. 75.
32NB: The two are often found interchangeably in Ānanda’s work and elsewhere, and it
is contextual cues that indicate which concept is meant. In fact, ‘vyañjanā’ is not found in
the Dhvanyāloka at all, although terms using the verbal root pvyañj are. I make another
distinction not explicitly present in Sanskrit: the same word, “dhvani,” can refer to the
function which produces meanings as well as the resultant meaning. To avoid ambiguity, I
will say “suggested meaning” to refer to the latter, and “suggestion” to refer to the function.
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of poetry.
The early textual tradition of poetic investigation (alaṅkāra-śāṣtra) was pri-
marily concerned with taxonomies of figures of speech and with practical ad-
vice on how to make poetry beautiful, which was understood as the goal of
poetry. There was also a textual tradition of dramatic investigation (nāṭya-
śāṣtra) focused on dramaturgy.33 Initially, poetic investigation and dramatic
investigation had different aims. The goal of drama was to inculcate a certain
emotional and aesthetic state in the characters on stage, termed rasa (a word
literally meaning “taste,” “flavor,” or “relish”). Texts about drama gave in-
structions for which plays could generate appropriate such emotions on stage,
through employing appropriate plot devices, movements, stage settings, and so
on. The text called the Nāṭya-śāstra, a circa sixth-century text attributed to
Bharata, is generally considered the starting place of Indian investigation into
aesthetics.34 Eventually the two goals, the cultivation of rasa and the creation
of poetic beauty, would be brought together into a unifying theory, but not
in early texts. The aesthetic flavor of rasa was thought to arise from a precise
combination of elements within a play: objects of emotions (circumstances in
33The term ‘alaṅkāra’ means “ornament” (literally, “making beautiful”), referring to fig-
ures of speech. ‘Nāṭya’ means “drama” or “representation.” A ‘śāstra’ essentially refers to
a textual tradition or school of thought, or a scientific textbook.
34We have no firm date for the text, nor any biographical information about its author.
The name, “Bharata,” is that of a Vedic tribe. References to a sage of the same name who
taught dance are found in Kālidāsa. It is likely that the name is symbolic and not historical.
As well, it’s likely that the text is a compilation of earlier texts which are not extant. See
Bhattacarya and Sarkar 2004. This text, and later texts like it, cannot be categorized simply
as “aesthetics.” Art in general was never an abstract concern, taken independently of its
embodiment in drama and poetry.
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the plot), bodily manifestations of emotions (on the part of the actors), and
temporary emotional moods (attributed to the characters).35
The Nāṭya-śāstra compares this combination to a cook’s recipe which, when
followed properly and prepared for persons of culture, yields satisfaction. Thus
there is a normative aspect to rasa in its creation (one must combine the
elements appropriately) and in the requirement of a skillful audience member
(not just anyone is satisfied by gourmet food without having a trained palate).
Originally, theorists identified eight kinds of rasa (the erotic, comic, pathetic,
furious, heroic, terrible, repugnant, and wonderful), but eventually added a
ninth to the list, the peaceful. Despite there being eight kinds identified,
theorists claimed that there is a unified aesthetic experience underlying each
case. What differs is the set of components leading to the experience.
The task of dramaturgy was to identify what the appropriate objects of emo-
tions are which yield, in combination with facial movements and other bodily
manifestations, a certain temporary emotional mood. This mood would then
undergo a transformation into a transcendent universal emotion, incapable of
being completely described and oriented at something beyond simply the ac-
tors and the plot. Just what constitutes the object of rasa is contentious, but
all agree that it is not the particular events of a play.36 In order to create this
35The famous verse defining rasa is: ‘vibhāva-anubhāva-vyabhicāri-saṃyogād rasa-
niṣpattiḥ’, or “Rasa is brought about due to the combination of objects of emotions, mani-
festations of emotions, and temporary emotional moods.” Translation mine. Bharata 1926,
p. 274.
36Later theorists, such as Abhinavagupta, would argue that rasa is a kind of blissful,
transcendent, and even religious experience.
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rasa, a playwright would need to be careful not to write plots which combine
the wrong classes of people with certain gestures, or conflicting emotions. So,
for example, the temporary emotion of fear (bhaya) is described in this way
for women and “persons of the inferior class”:
Fear relates to women and persons of the inferior class. It is caused
by determinants (objects of emotions) such as acts offending one’s
superiors and the king, roaming in a forest, seeing an elephant and
a snake, staying in an empty house, rebuke...It is to be represented
on stage by consequents (bodily manifestations of emotions) such
as trembling hands and feet, palpitation of the heart, paralysis,
dryness of the mouth...37
When it comes to men, the text states,
Fear in men arising from terrifying objects should be represented on
stage by actors (lit. dancers) with slackened limbs and suspended
movements of the eyes.38
Other emotional states are identified as relating particularly to “persons of the
superior type,” such as the energetic (utsāha). Not only were plot and acting
techniques part of the Nāṭya-śāstra, but so were topics such as music, stage
design, and local styles. Dramatic theory was focused on rules for putting on a
successful play (which would be embedded in a larger celebration or festival).
While the Nāṭya-śāstra does discuss figures of speech in one of its thirty-six
37Bharata-Muni 1967, p. 125. Parentheses are my insertions.
38Bharata-Muni 1967, p. 125.
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chapters, it surveys only four: simile (upamā), metaphorical identification
(rūpaka, referring specifically to the form “A is B”), parallelism (dīpaka), and
repetition (yamaka).39 It is up to later writers to examine figures of speech in
more detail, and in a strictly verbal context as opposed to dramatic.
Like dramaturgy, early reflection on poetry described rules for writing suc-
cessful poetry, which was understood as creating beautiful figures of speech.
If the metaphor for a successful drama was a recipe, the metaphor for a good
poem was a beautiful lady.
The words and meanings which make up a poem are described as its
“body” (śarīra), while those phonetic and semantic factors which,
when introduced into poetic language, render it more beautiful are
called “ornaments” (alaṃkāras).40
Emphasis in literature about poetics was on these ornaments, their kinds and
relations to one another, and not the structure of the metaphorical body. The
concept of rasa does not have a central organizing place until the work of
Ānandavardhana.
1.3.2 Turning Point: Ānandavardhana’s “Light on Suggestion”
Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka proceeds by citing passages which are gener-
ally accepted to have various kinds of poetic effects, and then by analyzing
how these effects are attained. As said earlier, his major thesis is that there is
39Gerow 1977, p. 227.
40McCrea 2008, p. 35-36.
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an additional power of words, called “suggestion” (dhvani) in addition to the
commonly accepted two: denotation and lakṣaṇā. When suggestion is a way of
conveying the aesthetic emotional state, or rasa, described or intimated within
a poem, it is called rasa-dhvani. Ānanda tries to give an account of when it is
that suggestion causes poetic beauty, and argues that rasa is the proper aim
of all poetry. It is important to mark that, for Ānanda, rasa is found within
the text, and not the reader. The reader simply comes to have a cognition of
the text’s rasa. Thus it is easily understood as artha, or meaning, and not a
reader’s emotional state. After Abhinavagupta’s commentary on Ānanda, the
emphasis shifts onto the reader’s emotive experience, and how to understand
rasa in relation to other kinds of artha becomes more difficult.41
To recap, denotation is the capacity of words to refer, and/or for sentences
to be syntactically unified wholes. There are competing theories of sentence–
meaning which we will address later, and they differ over whether words can
be said to refer outside of a particular sentence-type. Most broadly, though,
denotation has exhausted its meaning, lakṣaṇā will sometimes function to
provide a meaning that is connected to the denotation (whether of word or
sentence), but goes beyond it. The idea is that lakṣaṇā functions when is it
impossible to take the word’s natural meaning as what is meant, or to combine
words to generate a complete, meaningful sentence, despite the sentence’s
constituent parts being syntactically acceptable. I will discuss both of these
“functions” in more detail later. Denotation would be responsible for the
41See Pollock 2001, especially pp. 200–203.
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meaning of this English sentence:
(3) The pot is blue.
Through denotation, the hearer would come to have a cognitive state which is
of the pot as qualified by blue. This cognition, or jñāna, is, as noted earlier,
a mental state whose content has a structure. However, for sentences where
the denotation cannot produce such a cognition, it is through lakṣaṇā that a
cognition can be arrived at. For instance:
(4) The newspaper called.
Suppose “newspaper” ordinarily refers to a physical object, and a cognition
of this physical object would normally be the result of denotation. We might
then say then there is a problem with the hearer coming to have a cognition.
This is because while we might be able to conceive of an anthropomorphized
newspaper calling someone (presumably with a telephone), it is nonsensical,
given what we know about the world. Just how to characterize the problem
is an important question, one which Indian philosophers disagreed about, and
a question we will investigate in more detail later.42 The general point here
is that, through lakṣaṇā, there is a “transfer” of meaning from newspaper as
physical object to newspaper as person representing an institution, and that
this is the function of lakṣaṇā, not denotation.43
42See Raja 2000, p. 259-260 for some of the views in play.
43How this transfer works is the topic of Chapter Six.
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The village is on the Ganges.
The literal meaning of this sentence would be that there is a village which is
placed directly on top of a river, according to Indian theorists.44 The word for
“river” is in the locative case, and this relationship is part of the meaning of
the locative. Because such a sentence would be problematic if taken literally,








The village is on the bank of the river.45
Like earlier writers, Ānanda develops a typology of figures of speech (in which
metonymy would be included), but unlike his predecessors, he explicitly con-
nects poetics with rasa, understanding it as the goal of poetry. Even though
many things may be suggested (figures of speech, facts), the ultimate aim of
dhvani or suggestion in the poetic context is to suggest rasa. Returning to
44The locative case is used for a wide range of relationships, and in ordinary Sanskrit is
not used only for the “directly upon” relation. However, the sense of “literal” here is not
taken to encompass whatever is used in ordinary life, but a much more restricted sense,
perhaps only those uses sanctioned explicitly by Pāṇini and other grammarians.
45See the introduction to my translation of The Fundamentals for more details about this
example and my translation choices.
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the example of (15), Ānanda argues that there is a reason why someone would
choose to utter (15) and not (6). The purpose is to communicate the connec-
tion between the holiness and purity of the Ganges river and the village which
is situated very nearby.
Now, because lakṣaṇā only works to remove the problem with the literal mean-
ing, it cannot also function to communicate these further meanings. This is
because of the principle that each function has a single effect. This is why
suggestion is required. In the case of (15), suggestion operates after both
denotation and lakṣaṇā, but both functions are not always necessary for sug-
gestion. Ānanda says that the word ‘gaṇga’ itself can communicate purity
without being in a metaphorical or otherwise figurative context.46
Ānanda’s work, then, presupposes and responds to existing philosophy of lan-
guage in his argument for suggestion. His thesis is drawn in explicit contrast
to the already accepted functions of denotation and lakṣaṇā. Not only does he
analyze poetry (and some everyday speech) in a manner traditionally accept-
able for a literary critic, he engages in philosophical argumentation with views
from several prominent classical Indian traditions. It is to these traditions to
which I now turn.
46Raja 2000, p 298. Further, whether or not lakṣaṇā is employed, suggestion which
produces rasa is understood to be the final aim of poetic language. And even in non-poetic




While there were quite a number of philosophical schools focusing on lan-
guage prior to Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana, I will focus primarily on
the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā.47 Philosophy of language in classical Indian traditions
was embedded within discussion of epistemology and sources of knowledge. A
source of knowledge, or pramāṇa, is authoritative because it gives us structured
cognitions which are true and have epistemic warrant.48 These knowledge
sources, which vary in number among philosophical schools, include inferen-
tial reasoning, testimony, and perception. Consider inferential reasoning, for
example, which is a knowledge source nearly universally accepted.49 Suppose
I perceive smoke rising from a mountain, but see no fire. Through inferential
reasoning, I am entitled to conclude there is fire on the mountain with the
following reasoning:50
1. Thesis to prove (sādhya): There is fire on the mountain.
47As noted earlier, I am leaving aside the Buddhists. I also do not take up the rich
tradition of the Nyāya, or Logic school. While Ānanda does engage with their views of
language in the Dhvanyāloka, they are less relevant to Mukula’s primary aims. Finally,
and perhaps most importantly, for now I set aside the dispute between the Prābhākara and
Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, although it does play a role in aspects of Mukula’s theory. I will address
it in detail in Chapter Four.
48Skt. pramāṇa is from pra and pmā, meaning “to measure”. Recall that “cognition,”
as I am using it here, is short-hand for “cognition of an entity as qualified.” It is a “bit
of knowledge” which originates from a pramāṇa. Also note that instead of adding an “-s”
to the end of a Sanskrit term to make it plural, I will use ‘pramāṇa” for both plural and
singular.
49This is to exclude the Lokayata, who were skeptical about inferential reasoning for what
might be understood as generally Humean reasons. They argued we do not have a proper
account of causation that allows us to infer the connection required for claims like “If p then
q.”
50inferential reasoning, or anumāna, will also be discussed in more detail later.
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2. Reason (hetu): This is because there is smoke on the mountain.
3. Pervasion (vyāpti): Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire, such as in
the case of a kitchen.
4. Application of rule (upanayana): This case is like the kitchen.
5. Conclusion (nigamana): Therefore, there is fire on the mountain.51
These five items are not steps in a proof, but five parts of what could oth-
erwise be presented as a single sentence. The reason for this formulation is
that it is thought to be the best way to prompt one’s interlocutor to draw
the correct conclusion and come to knowledge herself. Thus, unlike the order
of premises in Western formal logic, the order of the elements is important
because they have causal efficacy in this structure. The general idea behind
inferential reasoning (though there is a vast and sophisticated literature dis-
cussing its nuances) is that when I have knowledge of an inferential mark H
and knowledge of a pervasion V between the inferential mark H and an ob-
ject of inference S, I am warranted in my claim to knowledge of the object
of inference S. An example of an inferential mark is smoke in the inference
above. An inferential mark H is evidence for the presence of an object of in-
ference S if there is an appropriate pervation relationship between the two, V.
So smoke is evidence for fire if there is the right kind of relationship between
them. Indian philosophers call this “pervasion” because they talk about the
51These five sentences are understood to form part of a unified mental act on the part of
the reasoner (sva-artha-anumāna). It is for the benefit of other people that they are broken
into five component parts (para-artha anumāna).
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relationship between properties and property-bearers in terms of loci. Fire is
said to be the locus of smoke.52 “Pervasion” means that in all cases where
there is H, there is also S. (It does not necessarily mean the converse, that
where there is S, there is also H.)53 The pervasion of fire by smoke in step (3)
is crucial for the efficacy of inferential reasoning. Suppose we object to the
reasoning here, pointing out that it is not true that everywhere there is smoke,
there is fire. For instance, when heating oil in a pan to a high temperature,
there is smoke but no fire.54 Indian philosophers were aware of the role of
such counterexamples in disproving claims of pervasion. They required that,
for inferential reasoning to be sound, there must be an invariable, universal
concomitance between the inferential mark (such as smoke) and the object of
inference (such as fire).55 This invariable connection is the crux of inferential
reasoning, and it also plays a significant role in theorizing about language, to
which I now turn.
Language is thought by Indian philosophers to be a valid means of knowledge
for a number of reasons. For one thing, words are responsible for causing
52Matilal 1998, pp. 24–30.
53The pervasion relationship is not equivalent to the material conditional, H) S, however.
This is because the truth table for H ) S yields true for the statement in cases where H is
false. Indian philosophers reject such cases, as they are not concerned primarily with what
Western logic knows as “formal validity,” since their context is epistemological. However,
Indian philosophers were well aware of the sort of hypothetical reasoning that underwrites
these relationships, as is shown by their study of tarka, or “speculation,” “conjecture.” See
Chakrabarti 1997a for an excellent discussion of misconceptions about Indian rationality.
54In fact, the traditional illustration of smoke and fire is more complicated than presented
here. Wet fuel is frequently taken to be necessary for the existence of smoke, in addition to
fire.
55See Mohanty 2000, pp. 21-24 and Stephen H. Phillips 2009, pp. 16-20 for more discussion.
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cognitions of the objects of knowledge. Since they do so in a reliable manner,
we can use them to make valid inferences. Without the reliable connection
between “fire” and fire, “smoke” and smoke—and so on—the sentence “Ev-
erywhere there is smoke, there is fire” could not be used to present inferential
reasoning to others.56 The person who hears the inference represented by the
five steps above needs to understand for herself the relationship between smoke
and fire. If, on hearing the words “Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire,”
she did not have the right cognition, of fire being qualified by smoke, she could
not come to have knowledge that there is fire on the mountain.
As well, we often come to true beliefs on the basis of trustworthy speakers.
I could come to know that there is fire on the mountain if someone who is
a reliable witness were to tell me, “There is fire on the mountain.” Such a
person would need to be appropriately knowledgeable about the fire, through
observation of her own, or reliable testimony of another. To be a cause of
knowledge, her utterance would need to be syntactically well-formed, so that
her hearer could have a cognition.
Finally, in the Indian context, the Vedic scriptures were thought to be infallible
by the Mīmāṃsakas. More specifically, they were an infallible guide to action—
both ritually action and right action more generally. These texts were both
descriptive and prescriptive, explaining the rituals required of various people,
56Since the Nyāya, for instance, think that even animals are capable of inferential rea-
soning, the kind of representation involved in at least some kinds of anumāna falls short of
full-fledged language.
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as well as the metaphysical basis for these rituals.57 Thus we also need an
explanation as to how we come to religious knowledge on the basis of language.
The case of the Vedas is a bit different than the cases of inferential reasoning
and testimony above, since their origin was thought to be supra-human. There
was debate about the relationship between the language of the Vedas and the
ordinary language of human beings.58
For all these reasons, Indian thinkers were concerned with how human utter-
ances can prompt true cognitions. The members of the philosophical school
of Mīmāṃsā are also scholars of the Vedas. These scriptures are not always
strictly literal in their use of language, and thus the Mīmāṃsā are concerned
with the distinction between literal and non-literal speech, metonymy and
metaphor, through their efforts to interpret the Vedas. Take for example, a
sentence like:
(7) The grass-bedding is the master of the sacrifice.59
Given the supposition that the Vedas are inerrant, we cannot prima facie ac-
cept the literal meaning of the sentence, since it is false to ascribe agency
to grass bedding. In writing about this passage, the Mīmāṃsaka Kumārila
Bhaṭṭa points out that sacrificers are later instructed to throw the grass-
57“The Vedas” refers to a collection of sacred texts transmitted orally and later recorded,
somewhere around 600 BCE. See, for example, Gonda 1975 for their history.
58See, for example, Chari 1978 and Verpooten 1987 for details.
59‘yaja-mānaḥ prastāraḥ’ in Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 441.
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bedding into the fire.60 If this means that we are to throw the master of the
sacrifice into the fire, it would bring the entire process to a halt—and the per-
formance of these Vedic sacrifices are the means of obtaining heaven or release
from the cycle of rebirths, so this cannot be the correct interpretation.
Therefore the Mīmāṃsā must have a way of assigning a meaning to a sen-
tence that is true and also consistent with the other parts of the scriptural
injunctions. In this particular case, Kumārila concludes that the sentence is
a metaphorical way of praising the grass-bedding and emphasizing its impor-
tance. Crucially, for Kumārila, the metaphor is not just an “ornament” or
superfical way of making a truth-conditional statement aesthetically pleasing.
Rather, for him, religious persons must understand the metaphor as conveying
a truth about the role of the grass-bedding.61
Further, Mīmāṃsā hermeneutics are structured around an analysis of verbs
(known as bhāvanā), and, as this hermeneutic is arguably central for Ānan-
davardhana’s theory of dhvani, we might expect Mukula to take a position
on these details, but he does not. The Mīmāṃsā emphasized the continuity
between action and linguistic practices. While in part this was due to their
philosophical roots in Vedic interpretation (the Vedas seen as instructions for
60The construction “Mīmāṃsaka” from “Mīmāṃsā” is equivalent to adding an “–ist” or
“–er” on the end of a word in English. It simply means a member of the Mīmāṃsā school.
61Because the Vedas are understood to be authorless, there is an asymmetry between
explanations of their meaning (both production and interpretation) and explanations of
ordinary language. Intentions cannot play a role either for interpreter or the speakerless text,
whereas ordinary, fallible, communication involves them. My reconstruction of Mukula is not
focused on the solution to the religious problem, and his own view is a hybrid of Mīmāṃsā
and Grammarian philosophical views, so I sidestep this admittedly complex issue.
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ritual action), and while they do have differing conceptions of Vedic and human
language (the former are authorless and therefore we do aim to understand
an intention), the Mīmāṃsā were essentially recognizing that language is a
goal-directed action. Speakers have aims and they use language to achieve
them. Thus, when interpreting utterances, we are asking about the sentence
is aiming to achieve.
While the particulars of this framework are complex, the basic idea is this: a
sentence token is unified by the action represented through the verb.62 (For an
overview of Sanskrit grammar, see Appendix 2). Specifically, the verbal affix
conveys the aim, and the verbal root (usually) the means by which the aim is






The verb “cooks,” or ‘pacati’, is made up of the root ppac and the present
indicative third person singular ending, -ti.63 To understand this sentence, we
ask three things:
• What is being produced? (aim)
• By what means is it being produced? (instrument)
• How is it being produced? (procedure)
62For much more detail on this topic, see Mazumdar 1977, pp. 37–61, McCrea 2008,
pp. 55-97, and Ollett 2013.
63See Appendix 3 a basic overview of Sanskrit grammar.
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Question 1 is answered through a reformulation of the sentence in which the
logically relationship between agent, action, and result is made more explicit.
The verbal root ppac is transformed into an instrumental and the verb re-
placed with a causative conjugation of the verb pbhū, meaning “to become,”
or “to produce.” The result is that the surface grammar’s case-endings illumi-







Rice is caused to be by cooking.64
While we have the instrument of producing rice, we do not have the process,
so one might look to the context—perhaps another sentence—or to our back-
ground knowledge. This requirement that answer to all three questions must
be found is called “expectation,” or “need” (‘ākāñkṣā’), and in some ways par-
allels the contemporary Western notion of an “unarticulated constitutent.”65
The aim of the speaker, represented by the verb, is what tells us, for instance,
what procedure is followed, or what instrument is used. Fully articulating what
these expectations are allows us to act upon the sentence.66 The transforma-
64One might wonder if this view results in an infinite regress, since the verb ‘bhāvayati’
now must be analyzed in a similar manner as ‘pacati.’ Kumārila anticipates and responds
to this objection, saying that the suffix ‘ti’ is essentially a placeholder, and that according
to convention, it is inappropriate to use only the verbal root without a suffix. Mazumdar
1977, p. 43.
65For discussion, see, for instance, Recanati 2002.
66McCrea 2008, p. 68. In the contemporary literature, there is an emphasis upon the
relationship between so-called “unarticulated constituents” and the truth conditions of a
sentence. So, Recanati says that the time of someone’s breakfast, which is not part of
the sentence meaning of “I’ve had a very large breakfast” is nevertheless part of the truth-
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tion is not totally determined by the syntax of the sentence. For example,
if the accusative ‘odanam’ were missing, and the sentence were simply “She
cooks,” then what is being produced could be the act of cooking—so that the
verbal root is transformed into a substantive in the accusative case: ‘pākam.’
What the Mīmāṃsā are looking for is the logical structure of the sentence,
which may not map directly onto the syntax. (What is in the instrumental
case grammatically may not be the instrument of the action, as in “The book
is being read by me.”)67
In any case, what is essential is that there not be a “sentence–splitting,” or
two unrelated actions represented by a sentence. There must be a way to unify
all of the sentential elements under a coherent conception of a single purpose.
Such unification requires a hierarchical organization, in which a central action
conditions of that utterance, since without the time of the breakfast being specified, the sen-
tence cannot generate the implicature, “I am not hungry” as a reply to the inquiry whether
one would like to eat lunch. Recanati 2002, p. 300. Whether the semantic/pragmatic
distinction under dispute in contemporary literature maps onto a distinction made in the
Indian literature is a large question. Further, Indian thinkers tend to speak in terms of
ability to act upon a sentence, or a sentence being a source of knowledge, and not in terms
of truth conditions. Still, the notion of truth-conditions is certainly at play in these other
concepts, even if it remains to be worked out precisely how (we might think that a sentence
can only be a source of knowledge if it is true, or that acting on a sentence requires its
truth.)
67There is an interesting question as to why the Mīmāṃsā resort to such sentential re-
interpretation or transformation, given their strong claim that the Vedic sentences are infal-
lible. While the transformation process is not from natural language into formal language,
as often occurs in contemporary philosophy of language, a similar question might be asked
of both enterprises. If the meaning of the “surface grammar” is preserved in the transfor-
mation into the “deep structure,” we might ask why the transformation is necessary. But if
there is a difference in meaning between the two, then why would we prefer the transformed
over the original meaning? (This question is especially acute for the Vedic philosophers
committed to infallibility.) See Stokhof 2007, p. 13.
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is qualified by other actions.68 So, in the earlier example of rice-cooking, while
there may be many actions involved in the process of cooking (lighting the fire,
heating the water, putting the rice into the pot, etc.), all of these actions are
aimed at the goal of transforming rice into a softened or cooked state. When
this unification is impossible with only the literal meaning of the words of a
sentence, then we are warranted in making a non-literal interpretation, as in
the case of (7) above.
1.5 Philosophy of the Grammarians
The other school of thought which was important to both Mukulabhaṭṭa and
Ānandavardhana in their theorizing about language was the Grammarian tra-
dition. In Sanskrit, the word for grammar is ‘vyākaraṇa’, which also means
“distinction,” “separation,” or “analysis.” Grammarians were concerned with
explaining the formation of words and sentences that they observed in ordi-
nary language. For instance Pāṇini’s Aṣṭādhyāyī, the world’s first generative
grammar text, is a set of rules for constructing Sanskrit words from more basic
parts.69 Pāṇini explains how to form the present tense using a verb root and a
68See McCrea 2008, p. 75ff for a discussion of this point.
69While not the first Sanskrit Grammarian (he was pre-dated by others, whose works we
do not have), he is certainly the pre-eminent. While his dates are debated, scholars put
him somewhere between 350 and 700 BCE. (See Belvalkar 1976 for discussion.) The most
recent translation of the Aṣṭādhyāyī is Pāṇini 1987, although its transliteration is subject
to numerous typographical errors. It is of historical interest that the discovery of Indian
grammarians is in large part responsible for Western forays into what is now known as
linguistics. For a discussion of the Indian grammarian Pāṇini’s contribution to the syntactic
analysis of the sentence, see, for instance, Kiparsky and Staal 1969.
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set of endings. He is also concerned with the phonetics of Sanskrit, listing the
possible sounds and giving rules for the changes which occur when phonemes
come into contact with another (saṅdhi).
However, Grammarians were not only interested in descriptive and analytic
grammar, but in theorizing about semantics. This is seen in Pāṇini’s com-
mentator, Patañjali, in his Māha-bhāṣya (Great Commentary), a work that is
a commentary on Kātyāyana’s comments on Pāṇini. There were also earlier
theorists such as Vyājyapāyana and Vyāḍi, whose works are not extant.70 Com-
menting on Pāṇini’s rules regarding the appropriateness of particular forms,
Patañjali theorizes about the semantic distinctions at play in these morpholog-
ical rules. For instance, in the Āṣṭādhāyī 3.1.67, Pāṇini says that ‘ya’ should
be used to mark the impersonal passive, as in ‘pacyante odanāḥ’ (“Rice grains
are being cooked”), or personal passive, as in ‘āsyante bhavādbhyam’ (“Sitting
is being done by you two”). Patañjali focuses upon the verb, asking why verbs
can take a dual or a plural number in the impersonal passive, but not the per-
sonal passive, where the verb should be singular. His answer has to do with
the semantics of action, and moves beyond analysis of morphology.71
In addition to Pāṇini and Patañjali, Bhartṛhari is one of the most celebrated
70See Scharf 1996, pp. 124ff. TheMahā-bhāṣya dates to circa 150 BCE. Vyājyapāyana and
Vyāḍi predate Kātyāyana, but it is not clear by how much. As to the dates of Kātyāyana and
Pāṇini, it is unclear how much time elapsed between them. Cardona argues that Pāṇini and
Kātyāyana likely have a gap of two hundred years, as do Kātyāyana and Patañjali, putting
Kātyāyana around the mid-fourth century BC and Pāṇini around the mid-sixth century BC.
Cardona 1976, pp. 267-68.
71See Scharf 1996 for discussion.
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members of the Grammarian school. He lived circa 450–510 CE, and, in ad-
dition to a commentary on the Māha-bhāṣya, he is known for a three-volume
work called the Vākya-padīya, or Work Dealing with Sentences and Words.
This text theorizes about the metaphysics of speech, and the relationship be-
tween sounds and meanings. Bhartṛhari’s most famous contribution to Indian
philosophy may be his ‘sphota’ theory. ‘sphota’ means “burst,” and refers to
the manifestation of meaning in a hearer’s mind after her hearing an utterance.
The basic idea is that sentences are the primary bearers of meaning, and we
understand the objects of language in an immediate, non-sequential “flash” of
insight. This bursting forth of meaning is caused by a sequence of phonemes,
but Bhartṛhari denies that the vehicle of language and its meaning are sep-
arable at a metaphysical level. He argues that while we make distinctions
between morphemes, words, sentences, and so on for practical, theoretical
purposes, such distinctions are ultimately unreal.72
Grammatical theory, although a distinct discipline from aesthetic theory, is
incorporated into the latter in many ways. After all, for Ānandavardhana
and many others, it is the foremost science.73 In fact, Ānanda appeals to
the use of the grammatical term ‘dhvani’ for the reverberation of phonemes
in part of his opening defense of suggestion. While he uses the term in a
semantic sense, he takes the earlier, acoustic sense of the term to be analogous.
72See Chakrabarti 1997a for further discussion.
73The Mīmāṃsā did not share this position, arguing that the study of grammar is not
a true Vedic science or veda-aṅga. There were six Vedic sciences: phonology, the study of
meter, etymology, astrology, and the study of ceremony. Discussion in Scharfe 1977, pp.83ff.
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Further, while Ānanda himself does not directly cite Bhartṛhari—though his
commentator Abhinavagupta does, drawing connections between the “flash of
insight” in sphoṭa and in suggestion—Mukulabhaṭṭa does, commenting on the
Vākyapadīya. He also sees fit to treat Bhartṛhari’s theory of sentence-meaning
alongside the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara views.74
That the study of grammar would be related to the study of meaning comes as
no surprise to contemporary philosophers who are used to a convergence be-
tween linguistics, semantics, and pragmatics. However, prior to Ānandavard-
hana, Sanskrit grammatical investigation served another social role, a norma-
tive one, preserving the purity of the Sanskrit language. Given that the poetry
known as kāvya was pre-eminently (though not exclusively) written in Sanskrit,
knowledge of grammar was essential for poet and poetician alike.75
In the Kāvya-alaṅkāra, the earliest Sanskrit poetic text we have, Bhāmaha
describes how grammatical acuity is essential for refined expressions necessary
74While at some points (such as in his discussion of lexical semantics) he sides with
one against the other, in many instances, he is content to allude to a particular text as
support for his own position, without considering whether there is a further conflict. The
result is that some philosophical questions remain vexingly unanswered. For example, while
the Grammarians and Mīmāṃsā both agreed that the verb is the organizing principle of a
sentence (against the Nyāya, who take a substantive, typically represented by a noun, to play
this role), they disagree in their analysis of verbs. See, for instance, Mazumdar 1977. While
Mukula briefly alludes to this conflict in his discussion of the relationship between sentence–
meaning and non-literal interpretation, he does no more than briefly state the various options
and then put forward his view. Regardless, it is undeniable that the Grammarian tradition,
and the work of Bhartṛhari in particular, inform the philosophical investigation into poetry
and non-literal speech that emerged in the ninth century in Kashmir. More work needs to be
done in illuminating both the textual evidence of this interaction as well as its philosophical
results.
75See discussion in Pollock 2006.
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for poetry.76 Following explicit grammatical rules for Sanskrit was an essential
element of writing proper poetry. The theories of the Grammarians are not
used for literary analysis (and, in fact, Bhāmaha criticizes some of them),
and the emphasis is on rules of syntax and morphology, not theories about
semantics.77 This interest in the Grammarian school for rules of linguistic
purity is characteristic of other literary theorists until Ānandavardhana, who
mentions the Grammarians throughout the Dhvanyāloka, drawing primarily
upon the philosophical/grammatical work of Bhartṛhari.78 He explicitly makes
connections between his theory of dhvani, or suggestion, and the concept of
dhvani original to the grammatical literature—the latter refers to the series of
phonemes which are continuously received by a hearer, like the reverberations
of a bell, and finally integrated into a semantic whole.
What we find in the theories of Ānandavardhana and Mukulabhaṭṭa is a com-
mitment to this organizational principle of the Mīmāṃsā: utterances are uni-
fied by a speaker’s aim, and individual sentences are unified by a speaker’s
aim with the entire discourse. Ānanda implicitly drew upon the idea, cham-
pioned by Bhartṛhari, that we can come to understand certain meanings in a
“flash” of insight, for his development of suggestion. As well, Ānanda thought
that rasa was the best candidate for the overall aim of poetry—and thus the
sacred hermeneutic project of the Mīmāṃsā was brought into a more secular
context, as a way of interpreting the unified aims of creative human speech.
76Bhāmaha 1991.
77Rajendran 2008, p. 497.
78Rajendran 2008, p. 498.
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Mukula distances himself from Bhartṛhari in his analysis of sentence mean-
ing (rejecting the view that our syntactic and semantic divisions are entirely
conventional, and thus unreal), but he does draw upon Grammarian analysis
of lexical semantics. Finally, like the Mīmāṃsā, whose hermeneutic project
is rooted in a desire to ensure that human beings can come to know what is
enjoined by the Vedic texts, Mukula grounds his analysis of poetic utterances
in the larger context of human rationality and epistemology.
1.6 Mukula’s Epistemological Project
The opening sentences of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s The Fundamentals of the Commu-
nicative Function say:
In human contexts, it is true that the things words refer to—things
which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the
cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to
these—are not elevated to usefulness in everyday purposes without
being known with certainty....Therefore, it is only on the basis of
certainty regarding what things words refer to that there is ele-
vation to usefulness in everyday purposes. And certainty requires
meaning being accessible through a connection with words.79
The point is a familiar one in Indian philosophy, made in terms that all philo-
sophical schools could broadly accept. Whether people are attached to the
world (hence the reference to “enjoyment”) or liberated from such attachment
79See appended translation, [1.7].
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(“deliverance”), our discourse about the world cannot become acceptable as
a means of knowledge (“elevated to usefulness in ordinary contexts”) unless
there is epistemic warrant for the cognitions due to language. It is against the
philosophical background sketched above that Mukula’s introduction observes
that the all the various pramāṇa, or knowledge sources, are “enjoy authority
because they result in certainty, being grounded as they are in comprehend-
ing objects of knowledge.”80 It is crucial for everyday knowledge, as well as
the Mīmāṃsā goal of liberation through religious knowledge, that we give an
account of this communicative function.
Mukula shares at least some commitments with the Mīmāṃsā philosophical
school, as we will see in the next several chapters, and his approach to language
converges in places with theirs. However, the Fundamentals of the Commu-
nicative Function was written in response to Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka,
or Light on Suggestion—which is primarily a work of aesthetic theory, not
philosophy of language or epistemology per se. Therefore Mukula also uses
examples from poetic contexts, often the same ones employed by Ānanda. As
I’ve said, his aim is to explain the putative verbal power of dhvani or sugges-
tion, proposed by Ānanda, in terms of lakṣaṇā or indication. Still, Mukula’s
introductory appeal to epistemological aims is more than perfunctory. Even
though poetic speech may be his central concern, Ānanda’s theory of language
has repercussions for more than just the appreciation of art. First, as I have
already mentioned, poetic devices are employed in religious contexts to convey
80See appended translation, [1.7].
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information and give imperatives, and so are important for this reason. Second,
Ānanda thinks that all human communication carries suggested meanings, and
so everyday hearers ought to be able to recover what their interlocutors sug-
gest. Mukula’s competing theory must explain how we have epistemic access
to the content of what Ānanda considers to be suggestion.
Below I sketch the central lines of debate between Ānanda and his predecessors
and Mukula to show the importance of epistemology to their analysis of the
linguistic functions of indication and suggestion.
Ānanda begins his discussion of poetic suggestion with an analogy. Meaning,
he says,
...is praised by sensitive critics as being essential to a poem and
therefore what the soul is to a body already charming by the con-
figuration of graceful and appropriate parts...81
Meaning is of two sorts, he says, the literal and the implied. Literal meaning
has been treated by others, so he does not develop the topic futher (although
he notes that similes fall under the category of “literal”).82 Now, in contrast
to literal and implied meaning,
...the suggested is something different, found in the works of great
poets. It is that which appears as [something] separate from the
81Dhvanyāloka 1.2, Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.
82Dhvanyāloka, §1.3 K. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 77. This introduction is not without
interpretive difficulties as Ānanda later says that it is only dhvani, or suggested meaning,
which is the soul of poetry. Abhinava tries to interpret the passage to avoid this conflict.
See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 75.
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well-known elements [of poetry], just as charm in a woman [is some-
thing that appears different from the well-known individual parts
of her body].83
He continues,
It is that which is well-known to sensitive readers and is separate
from the known, ornamented, elements [of poetry], after they have
been examined...84
For Ānanda, suggested meaning cannot be reduced to any one element of a
poem, such as its meter, a figure of speech, or appropriate word choice. Such
things do make the poem “charming,” of course. However, without suggested
meaning, a collection of words in metered arrangement would not constitute
a poem.85 Ānanda refuses to define what a poem is, but says he will rely on
the work of others in this area.86 Given some intuition about what counts
as a poem, then, we are to understand certain poems as having suggested
meaning—in particular, those poems written by great poets and recognized
by sensitive readers.
Suggestion, whether in poetry or everyday speech, is a “verbal function,” which
Ānanda compares to the operations of denotation and lakṣaṇā. He identifies
two kinds of suggestion: poetic and ordinary. Ordinary suggestion is simply
83Dhvanyāloka, §1.4 K. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.
84Dhvanyāloka, §1.4 A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 79.
85Or, arguably, a poem does not exist without meaning of any sort, per the earlier claim
that meaning simpliciter is the soul of poetry.
86Dhvanyāloka, §1.3 A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 78.
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the generic intention a speaker has to communicate something, and to do so
with a certain aim, like commanding, requesting, stating, and so forth. Poetic
suggestion can be a figure of speech, a particular meaning, or an aesthetic
flavor (rasa as described above). There are aesthetic norms in place which
govern the production of poetic suggestion, since a poem that possesses a
predominance of such suggestion is necessarily beautiful. In contrast, there is
no aesthetic concern for ordinary suggestion.
Ānanda’s case for poetic and ordinary suggestion depends on the claim that
the content of suggested cannot be known through any then-established epis-
temic instrument. For instance, one possibility which he rejects is that hearers
draw an inference from contextual factors, word meanings, speaker intention,
etc. to the suggested meaning. However, such an inference requires us to
know that whenever a particular word or expression appears, there is a corre-
sponding suggested meaning. Ānanda rejects this as untenable, both because
hearers could never come to grasp all such rules, and because he thinks it
doubtful that the relevantly specific rules could exist in the first place. How-
ever, since hearers do come to know suggested meanings—this he takes to be
an indisputable starting point—there must be some epistemic instrument em-
ployed. Through this process he rejects several other explanations, concluding
that philosophers and poetic theorists must posit something new. Among his
arguments, Ānanda argues that lakṣaṇā requires some impossibility with the
literal meaning in the context of utterance, at which point the audience re-
jects the literal meaning in favor of the indicated meaning. Ānanda claims
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that, in contrast to lakṣaṇā, suggestion can function while retaining the literal
meaning, simply by appealing to the author’s intention.87
Mukula responds by expanding the role of lakṣaṇā to include other kinds of
“incompatibilities” than simply sentence-internal ones. He identifies incompat-
ibilities between contextual elements and the sentence as triggers for lakṣaṇā.
As for how hearers understand what is conveyed by indication, Mukula seems
to emphasize presumption, which is something like inference to the best ex-
planation. He identifies a variety of possible relationships between a literal
sentence meaning (or word denotation) and what is indicated, through irony,
metonymy, metaphor, or punning. Thus, while he does not argue that we
can use deductive inference to identify non-literal meaning (and in this way
apparently agrees with Ānanda), he gives justifications that fall broadly into
the category of inference to the best explanation. In this manner, he aims to
leave no explanatory room for suggestion, but to reduce this putative opera-
tion to the operation lakṣaṇā. The epistemic question of how it is that hearers
recognize that speech is non-literal, and recover the content of that speech, is
therefore central for both thinkers.
1.7 Methodology and Précis
In conclusion, I would like to address some methodological questions. This
dissertation is in part a work of history of philosophy, in which my goal is to
87Raja 2000, p. 296.
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understand the views set forward by philosophers separated from me by both
time and culture. This aspect of the project requires close attention to the
original texts and historical context, and is not primarily aimed at relating the
works to a broad, contemporary Anglophone audience. As Richard Hayes has
eloquently put it in the introduction to his study of the Buddhist logician and
epistemologist Diṅnāga,
I would be very surprised if more than a handful of people from this
century would find Diṅnāga’s conclusions completely satisfactory
and his arguments for those conclusions convincing, simply because
he was something of a pioneer, and like all pioneers his tools were
rather crude and unsophisticated compared to those of the later
generations who benefited by inheriting the fruits of the pioneer’s
labours.88
This is the case for Ānandavardhana (and likewise Mukulabhaṭṭa and early
critics) as well. He is responsible for a significant shift in the analysis of liter-
ary works and non-literal speech. While his theory of suggestion is indebted to
the highly sophisticated work of his predecessors in the Mīmāṃsā and Gram-
marian schools, as the first proponent of suggestion, it is up to his successors,
such as his commentator Abhinavagupta and others, to sharpen his insights.
Thus, for the reason that Ānanda and Mukula represent the first generation
taking on the topic of “suggested meaning,” we might expect to find their work
not entirely adequate from a contemporary perspective. Further, that their
88Hayes 1988, p. 3.
50
successors made advances upon their views shows that, relative to the Indian
intellectual tradition itself, their works were viewed as insufficient.
Another reason contemporary philosophers might find the arguments of these
philosophers lacking is the difference in cultural and religious assumptions
between our era and theirs. The importance of Vedic interpretation has al-
ready been emphasized and, while we must be careful not to overstate its role
in Mīmāṃsā philosophy of language, some of their presuppositions are due
to a particular religious standpoint. However, as contemporary philosophers
in the Western tradition, we must not forget how indebted our philosophical
approach is to such figures as Augustine, whose analysis of language is em-
bedded within a theological text, his Confessions. In fact, Augustine and the
Mīmāṃsaka would find points of agreement in their attitudes towards their
respective scriptures, for instance, that they are infallible.89 They would not,
as we will see, be in agreement over other details, and in fact, Kumārila might
find Wittgenstein’s criticism of Augustine’s theory to be quite apt.90 In any
case, the point is that both Western and Indian traditions have presupposi-
tions which, while perhaps jarring from someone unfamiliar with the culture,
inform theorizing in often imperceptible ways. Looking at those theories which
Hayes calls “counterparts” (for instance, the Augustinian and the Mīmāṃsā)
89There are important differences between their concepts of infallibility, however, as Au-
gustine took the Bible to be infallible testimony of a divine speaker. Further, the emphasis
on dharma or righteous action in the Mīmāṃsaka context may be in contrast to the more
fideistic, propositional emphasis in the Christian context.
90See Arnold 2006, p. 445-47, where Dan Arnold argues that, in fact, the Buddhist philoso-
phers Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti were more similar to Augustine in their views about lan-
guage acquisition and what it is to know a language.
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together, with attention to historical context, may give us insight into which
of those presuppositions cause trouble for a view, and why (and how) certain
views must be adjusted.91
However, while this project is primarily historical in orientation—that is, my
starting point is to understand the debate in its original context—my hope is
that it might be useful for contemporary philosophers in the broadly Western
tradition. The usefulness of pointing out similarities between Indian philoso-
phers and Western philosophers lies not in the mere fact of cross-cultural
agreement (although this may be important data in itself), but in clarifying
the arguments on both sides. Thus while the historical aspect to the project
described above can be, to some degree, conceptually separated from rational
reconstruction, ultimately they are part of the same “hermeneutic circle.” The
difference is that I emphasize the initial historical context at one stage, and
the contemporary philosophical context at another, being sure to distinguish
between claims of what Ānanda or Mukula meant in their texts and how the
claims in those texts can be helpfully framed.
Out of this interpretive project, which requires both historical and contem-
porary conceptual tools, it is my hope that we will be in a position to evalu-
ate both Indian and Western philosophy’s claims. Chapter One has situated
Mukulabhaṭṭa and Ānandavardhana historically, arguing hat their analysis
of figurative language is an epistemological project, in contrast to simply a
91Hayes 1988, p. 2.
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work of aesthetic theory, which is where it has been situated previously. In
Chapter Two, I develop this thesis by focusing on the major pramāṇa, or
knowledge-sources in Indian epistemology. Chapter Three focuses on the con-
cept of meaning itself, using contemporary resources to reconstruct the views
of two schools of Indian philosophy on how words combine to constitute mean-
ingful expressions. I argue that their dispute can be understood in terms of
current pragmatic work on the distinction between what is said and what is
meant, and that it displays an interest in what modern contextualists would
call “unarticulated constituents” and pragmatic processes.
With the philosophical background in place, Chapter Four presents Ānan-
davardhana’s argument that an adequate explanation of non-literal meaning
requires us to postulate a semantic capacity known as “suggestion.” In con-
trast to the predominant view, which takes for granted that his position is well-
established, I argue that his arguments are only partially successful. Chapter
Five focuses in detail on one of his central arguments: that the semantic ca-
pacity of suggestion is explanatorily superior to inferential reasoning. I argue
that his version of inferential reasoning cannot do the explanatory work he
wants.
By demonstrating where Ānandavardhana is correct, and where he has made
missteps, I set the stage for Chapter Six, which explores Mukulabhaṭṭa’s re-
sponse. I explore his project in Gricean terms, and show how his conception
of inference to the best explanation, though tacit, forms the backbone for his
proposal. Chapter Seven illustrates the plausibility of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s analy-
53
sis of metonymic non-literal speech, using some formal tools in contemporary
semantics. I conclude in Chapter Eight with some lessons that contemporary
philosophers can draw from this historical dispute, along with areas of future
research in pragmatics. Throughout the dissertation, I will cite my translation




The Problem of Epistemic Access
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I introduce the epistemological problem that Ānandavardhana
and Mukulabhaṭṭa are addressing. Put most broadly, it is, “How do hearers
have knowledge of what is communicated through language?” To fully appre-
ciate the answers that Ānanda and Mukula give, we need to understand the
pramāṇa-theory of classical Indian philosophy and its analysis of testimonial
knowledge and sentence meaning, briefly introduced in the last chapter. The
inadequacy of the pramāṇa of inferential reasoning, or anumāna, is central
to Ānanda’s positive argument for suggestion. In contrast, the structure of
the pramāṇa called “presumption” is central to Mukula’s argument against
suggestion. The goal of this chapter is to argue for the first claim. The next
chapter will take up the second claim. In order to address both of them, we will
take up the relationship between Western categories of inference (deduction,
induction, abduction) and classical Indian categories of inference (anumāna,
arthāpatti). While not strictly equivalent, I argue that anumāna encompasses
both deduction and induction and that arthāpatti is best understood as ab-
ductive inference–or more precisely, inference to the best explanation.
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The chapter has two parts. In the first part, I focus on speech acts and
Mīmāṃsā philosophy. In this section, I introduce the concept of speech acts
in contemporary Western philosophy, as described by J.L. Austin and others.
With John Taber, I argue that the Mīmāṃsā analysis of language has much in
common with this approach to communication. However, I show that there is a
tension in the Mīmāṃsā view between the role of speaker intention and the role
of language itself in conveying meaning. Ānanda’s proposal is, I argue, a way
of addressing this tension by involving both the literal meaning of expressions
(interpreted without reference to speaker intention) and the speaker’s intention
in the communicative act.
In the second section I turn to the concept of pramāṇa, or epistemic instru-
ments, analyzed in the Indian tradition. Indian philosophers appeal to such
instruments to explain how speech acts can result in knowledge. After a survey
of the major pramāṇa, I focus on the three most relevant to the communicative
act: inferential reasoning, testimony, and presumption. After an exploration
of the question of whether testimony is reducible to inferential reasoning, I
give an analysis of presumption on which it is understood as inference to the
best explanation, defending this view against a recent criticism.
2.2 Speech Acts and Mīmāṃsā Philosophy of Language
People use language to serve a variety of aims. We utter sentences to describe
the world, to urge our hearer to act, to prompt our hearer to feel something, to
promise we will do something, to smooth social situations with “small talk,”
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and so on. Successful communication does not solely consist in decoding the
content of a linguistic signal through linguistic rules. Take an ordinary utter-
ance such as:
(1) The speed limit here is seventy.
Suppose that (1) is uttered by a speaker Sally to a hearer Harriet while Harriet
is driving a car at 65 miles per hour. Once Harriet understands the literal
meaning of the sentence—which requires determining what the referent of
indexical “here” is, knowing that “seventy” stands in for “seventy miles per
hour”—she can add the speed limit along this stretch of road to the other
things he knows.
However, perhaps Sally also wants Harriet to perform an action: to drive more
quickly. Nothing in the literal content of (1) represents this desire. But Harriet,
believing that Sally would not have mentioned the speed limit for no reason,
reasons that she wants her to drive (at least) seventy miles per hour. Set
up the context appropriately, and it is also possible that Sally, irritated that
Harriet frequently drives five miles slower than the speed limit, wants Harriet
to feel an emotion: specifically, to feel ashamed for her driving habits. Sally
knows that pointing out the speed limit emphasizes Harriet’s inattentiveness,
but does so in a way in which she herself has not explicitly accused H of being
inattentive. Depending upon how she utters (1) and conventions of intonation
in Sally and Harriet’s shared speech community, Sally may convey frustration.
So not only might Sally want Harriet to feel an emotion, but in uttering the
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sentence, she might also want to express an emotion.
Given different contexts, we can vary what sorts of things Harriet might take
from the utterance. If Harriet is driving 80, the communicative act might be
a warning, with the aim to get her to drive more slowly. If Harriet has just
uttered, “What’s the speed limit?,” the sentence might simply be a factual
reply, with no further aims on the part of Sally than to inform. Or, if Harriet
is driving in a school zone, where she should know the speed limit, perhaps
Sally utters (1) sarcastically, and wants Harriet to take her as communicating
that the speed limit is not seventy.
Since (at least) J.L. Austin, contemporary Western philosophy has recognized
that communication is multi-faceted, not strictly a matter of encoding and
decoding information contained in the semantics of a statement.1 Austin, and
philosophers after him, have variously distinguished the elements of commu-
nicative acts. One distinction is among locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocu-
tionary aspects, corresponding to the several acts a speaker may perform with
a single utterance. Here is one way to schematize the relationship between
these aspects:
Utterance Act: S utters e from L to H in C.
Locutionary Act: S says to H in C that so-and-so.
Illocutionary Act: S does such-and-such in C.
1Austin 1962.
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Perlocutionary Act: S affects H in a certain way.2
Applying this analysis to (1), the Utterance Act is S uttering expression
e (“The speed limit here is seventy”), from language L (English) to H in C
(the context of driving a car at 65 miles per hour). The Locutionary Act
is saying that the speed limit here is seventy. The Illocutionary Act is,
in our first situation, that Sally urges Harriet to drive more quickly in the
context C. Finally, the Perlocutionary Act is that Sally shames Harriet.
We must explain how Harriet is able to recognize not only the content of
the locutionary act (how does she disambiguate “seventy,” fix the context for
“here,” etc.) but how Harriet can recognize that Sally is urging and shaming,
the illocutionary content and perlocutionary effect. Frequently, philosophers
also talk of illocutionary and perlocutionary force, as these aspects of the
speech act have effects in the world.
However, we can immediately see there are problems with the definitions as
offered. Consider the distinction between the definition of Perlocutionary
Act. If the action depends on affecting H in a particular way, does an act
of shaming fail to count as shaming if the hearer is not impacted? Suppose
Harriet recognizes that Sally wants her to feel badly for driving slowly, but
she resists? Or doesn’t recognize that this is the goal of Sally’s utterance? We
might think that including the audience’s response to characterize a speaker’s
action is wrong-headed. Compare the action of offering a gift. That someone
2This analysis is due to Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 3. There are many others, which
differ in some details (for instance Hutchby 2008 and Grice 1975).
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refuses a gift does not mean that the gift-giver has failed to offer. Analogously,
we might think that failure of uptake or the existence of resistance should not
mean that a particular Perlocutionary Act has not been performed. But
then there is no distinction between Perlocutionary Act and Illocutionary
Act.
This first problem has to do with the relationship between speaker and hearer
in a speech act. A second problem targets the speaker’s role. Is it necessary
that it is the speaker who is performing an action with an utterance in a
given context? Compare Sally’s utterance to Harriet with a billboard saying,
“Obey the sign or pay the fine.” We might characterize this expression as
constituting a warning. However, the strict literal meaning of the sentence
is a disjunction—one could choose to obey the sign, pay the fine, or both—
with no explicit urging to prefer one disjunct over the other. Conventional
implicatures could be appealed to in order to make sense of the “or” acting as
an exclusive disjunction. Still, we need to explain the implied warning. And on
speech-act theory, a warning is an Illocutionary Act, performed by a speaker
in a context, and there is, strictly speaking, no speaker here. Perhaps there
is an implied speaker—a police officer or a judge—in which case we need an
account of the relationship between the sentence on the billboard, the unseen
speaker, and the various components of the speech act.
Thus both relationships—speaker/hearer and speaker/speech act—are impor-
tant to clarify to make sense of how non-literal meaning is communicated.
Now, the Mīmāṃsā approach de-emphasizes speaker intention and instead
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emphasizes the way in which words themselves seem to be expressive. An
Ālaṅkāraka such as Ānandavardhana, in contrast emphasizes speaker intention
and the way in which speakers rely upon the literal meanings of expressions
in order to do things with words. Both are concerned with the performative
aspect of language, though, and the relationship between expression meanings
and hearers. In what follows, I show that there is a tension in the making
sense of how the speaker/hearer interrelate. The (Bhāṭṭa) Mīmāṃsā wish to
explain meaning qua Vedic sentences in purely semantic and syntactic terms.
In fact, it is the absence of a speaker which guarantees that the Vedas com-
municate meaningfully and infallibly. However, they also wish for there to be
a continuity between Vedic language and human language, rejecting the Prāb-
hākara distinction between the two. Their analysis, in its reliance on the force
or bhāvanā of speech, seems to require some appeal to a speaker’s intention,
as semantics underdetermines distinctions between forces, in much the same
way as it underdetermines kinds of speech acts.
For the Mīmāṃsā, future-oriented commands, rather than assertion, are the
starting point for thinking about what we do with words.3 For them, the
uniqueness of commands is its ability to give us knowledge of things which are
unexperienced. In contrast to assertion, which they take to be grounded in past
3Appendix 3 contains a discussion of the grammatical distinctions relevant to determin-
ing whether an expression is a command or an assertion, although the distinction is not
purely grammatical. The present tense and indicative mood is a paradigmatic example
of an assertion (”The pot is blue.”) whereas the present tense and imperative mood is a
paradigmatic example of a command (”Paint the pot blue!”). However, one can give com-
mands using the optative mood (”The pot ought to be blue”) or the indicative mood in the
future tense (”The pot will be blue.”)
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perception, commands tell us about the unseen future effects of our actions.
When the Vedas tell people to perform a sacrifice in order to attain heaven
since heaven is unseen by mere mortals, it is language’s status as a pramāṇa
which certifies the (future) results of this command. After all, Kumārila points
out, unless one had confidence that sacrifice were to lead to heaven, there would
be no reason to pursue it (Śloka-vārttika IV.106-108).4 The Mīmāṃsā, in their
analysis of ritual utterances, observe that not only straightforward descriptions
of states of affairs, but other kinds of utterances are part of the Vedas. This is
a recognition of the existence (in different terms) of what Austin would later
call “illocutionary force.”5
John Taber has argued that the Mīmāṃsā defense of the meaningfulness
of Vedic mantras can be usefully understood in terms of speech-act theory.
Mantras are priestly utterances of Vedic verses spoken during rituals. Often
highly figurative, they allude to the simultaneously occuring actions of the
ritual. However, since mantras can seem nonsensical or redundant (the priest
knows how to perform the rite without them), there is a question as to whether
they are a means of knowledge, a pramāṇa. The problem is not just whether
the mantra conveys a meaningful proposition (a question relevant to the figu-
rative mantras) but whether they are useful. Taber points at the analysis of
the mantra, “O agnīdh, bring out the fires!” addressed to a priest who knows
that he is to bring out the fires. In the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra-bhāṣya, Śabara ob-
4On this, see Arnold 2005, p. 65.
5Taber 1989b, p. 150.
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serves that since the priest knows his job, this mantra cannot be a command.6
This is because to be a command, certain conditions must be met, such as
that the person being commanded is not already going to do the action be-
ing commanded. Śabara concludes that these mantras are persuasive in some
sense, rather than commanding. While not directly a pramāṇa, such mantras
support the broader text’s ability to convey knowledge of dharma.
Whether Śabara’s particular explanation is adequate (it is ifficult to see how
a recitation is persuasive), the Mīmāṃsā analyze utterances as acts with ef-
fects and constitutive contextual factors. Like Austin, who identifies the per-
locutionary effects brought about by performing an illocutionary act with a
locutionary act, the Mīmāṃsā talk in terms of what should be brought about,
by what, and how. The answers to these questions tell us about the bhāvanā,
or the “function of words” (śabda-vyāpara, a term that has frequently been
translated as “force.”) Interpreters rely upon force to understand the meaning
of an utterance and it is force which impels them to perform Vedic sacrifices.7
The Mīmāṃsā locate this injunctive force of Vedic commands in the semantics
of the verb, or the bhāvanā described earlier.8 However, this does not explain
how mantras (or other expressions) which lack an optative actually work to
persuade, though Taber points out that, since mantras were to be spoken by
priests, perhaps they can derive illocutionary force from the intentions of the
6Taber 1989b, p. 155.
7See Ollett 2013, p 259-61 for some discussion of the analogies and disanalogies with
Austin.
8Taber 1989b, p. 158.
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speaker.9 (Recall that, lacking a divine or human author, the Veda’s force
cannot be explained by intention.)
For Austin and other speech-act theorists in the Western tradition, the dis-
tinctions among locution, perlocution, and illocution are in the service of un-
derstanding the speech act performed by a speaker. However, the extensive
analysis of Vedic injunctions in Mīmāṃsā philosophy of language is under-
taken with the presupposition that there is no speaker. Thus grammatical
analysis proves central in illuminating how language can have its various ef-
fects. The force of Vedic commands is not dependent upon the intentions of
a speaker. Mukulabhaṭṭa, Ānandavardhana, and other theorists working in
philosophy of language and poetics were, as observed earlier, strongly influ-
enced by Mīmāṃsā interpretive principles. Their focus is primarily human,
not Vedic, utterances, and their concern is how to analyze the speech act of a
person. Still, we will see that in these theorists there is similar attention to sen-
tence structure, word choice, and discourse context, as in Vedic hermeneutics.
They just have an additional feature to incorporate: speaker’s intention.
In fact, we find that there is special focus on speech acts in which speaker’s
attention is in tension with a literal analysis of the sentence.10 I turn now
to the resources within Indian philosophy for understanding what the speaker
9Taber 1989b, p. 158.
10In what follows, I will typically use “speaker” rather than “author,” even though fre-
quently, what is being discussed are written texts. This is in part because the poetic texts
being discussed were intended to be recited, but also because I take it that the analysis was
aiming at both spoken and written language. See Pollock 2006, pp. 75-76 for discussion of
the orality of Sanskrit written court poetry, or kāvya.
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intends.
Given just this single utterance, we can identify several things which a hearer
H might want to retrieve as part of their understanding of an utterance U of
a sentence:
1. The literal meaning of p.
(a) The lexical meanings of the words constituting the sentence.
(b) The meaning of the sentence p, as composed by the words.
2. The speaker’s performative aim in uttering p.
(a) An action S wants H to perform.
(b) An emotion S wants to express.
(c) An emotion S wants H to feel.
(d) A different meaning q that S wants H to understand by p.
In the contemporary Western philosophical tradition beginning with H.P.
Grice, (2d) is called an implicature. Implicatures are distinguished from what
is said, which is the conventional meaning of the sentence, understood lit-
erally, without appeal to contextual elements save for what is necessary to
resolve indexicals, demonstratives, anaphora, and the like. An implicature, in
contrast, is tied to the context of utterance. According to Grice, speakers are
committed to the literal meaning of their sentence, but, “strictly speaking,”
their utterance would not be false if an implicature fails to hold.11 Implica-
11Grice 1989, p. 44.
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tures are indirect ways of conveying meanings, and philosophers distinguish
between varieties of implicatures: conversational or conventional implicatures.
Speaker implicatures are those which attach to a certain conversational con-
text in virtue of the speaker’s intention. For instance, someone who says, “I’m
sick” in response to the question “Are you coming to the movie tonight?” has
implicated that she is not coming to the movie, although she has not said it.
In contrast, conventional implicatures are conveyed regardless of the speaker’s
intention, simply through the choice of words. Candidates for conventional
implicatures include “and” which, strictly speaking, conveys only conjunction,
but implicates temporal order: “I came home and went to sleep.”
2.3 Epistemology and Language
In this section, I outline the epistemological inquiry of Mīmāṃsā philosophers,
in particular the number and nature of the pramāṇa. Indian philosophers call
something that produces a justified, true cognition a pramāṇa, or knowledge-
generator.12 Some common pramāṇa include perception, inferential reasoning,
and verbal testimony. Pramāṇa both generate knowledge-episodes and consti-
12A note on Sanskrit terminology: The object of a pramāṇa is called ‘prameya’ (“the
object known”), though some Buddhist philosophers use the same term, ‘pramāṇa,’ for
the resultant cognition. Thus it is important to be careful about which sense the word is
being used in a given passage. The Sanskrit ‘prāmāṇya’ is an abstract noun derived from
‘pramāṇa,’ and just means “the state of being a pramāṇa” or “what underwrites a pramāṇa.”
Just what it is that makes a pramāṇa authoritative is a philosophical question. Some, like
Matilal and Mohanty, translate ‘prāmāṇya’ as “truth,” while others such as Arnold, render
it as “validity.” I take it that the latter is a better rendering, as what they are after is not
the truth of the proposition in question, but how it is that thinkers can arrive at a true
proposition. We will address this in more detail below.
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tute reasons for accepting such an episode as being knowledge. Within Indian
philosophy, there are two broad questions about knowledge, centered on the
pramāṇa, or sources of knowledge: (1) How many pramāṇa are there? (2)
What is the nature of each pramāṇa?
For a philosophical school to defend its favored set of pramāṇa over the set
of another school, they might argue in two ways. First, they might claim
that a putative knowledge-generator does not generate knowledge; second,
they might claim that a putative knowlede-generator is reducible to another
knowledge-generator. For instance, while inferential reasoning (anumāṇa) is a
nearly universally-accepted pramāṇa, one camp (the Cārvāka) reject it, argu-
ing that whatever it produces, those mental states do not count as knowledge.
Some Buddhists argue that since inferential reasoning relies on a universal rule
(“All x are caused by y, I see an x, therefore there must be a y”) and, as all
objects of perception are unique, no universal rule can be valid. (We will talk
more about the particular kind of inferential reasoning, known as anumāṇa,
the Buddhists are talking about below.) Thus, since successful inferential rea-
soning relies on true generalizations, any possible universal rule will be false,
strictly speaking.13
13Mohanty 1957, p. 228 and Arnold 2006, pp. 22ff. Any time we generalize, on the Bud-
dhist view, we are creating a fiction which, while perhaps useful, is not a true representation
of reality. Note that precisely how to understand Dharmakīrti and Digṅāga, two proponents
of this view, is a live interpretive question. The object of our perception might be infinites-
imal atoms, or medium-sized objects. The general point is similar to Western empirical
foundationalism, which argued that immediate access to something free from concepts (for
instance, sense-data), is what secures knowledge “‘further up the hierarchy.”
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Another candidate for a pramāṇa is awareness of absence (abhāva). When I
gesture to my desk and say, “There is no coffee cup,” I am saying that the desk
has an absence of a coffee cup. That is, I have knowledge of an absence: the
lack of coffee cup. Now, for the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, this knowledge consists in
my coming into contact with a vastu, or a fact: absence.14 However, cognitive
contact with absence is functionally different from the cognitive contact of ex-
isting objects which we call “perception.” What happens is that perception of
a coffee cup does not happen, nor does any other pramāṇa with the coffee cup
as its object!15 Thus, for the Bhāṭṭa, absence-awareness is its own pramāṇa,
defined as the non-occurrence (anutpatti) of the other pramāṇa. In contrast,
whereas the Prābhākara (and most other Indian philosophical schools) reject
it for reductionist motivations, arguing that the knowledge we get from “ab-
sence” is in virtue of some other faculty, such as inferential reasoning (Dhar-
makīrti, the Prābhākara) or perception (the Nyāya school).16 The basic idea,
for those who deny absence, is that when I see a bare patch of ground where I
expected a pot, my perception is simply of the patch of ground. The Buddhist
14In what sense absences are vastu-s is a complex question. The Bhāṭṭa take them to
be real aspects of objects, and important for understanding cause and effect. In his review
article of Birgit Kellner’s translation of a Buddhist text dealing with this question (the
Abhāva-vicāra chapter of Śāntarakṣita’s Tattva-saṅgraha), John Taber summarizes the ways
in which we might characterize absences as objects of knowledge: (1) prior non-being (lack
of curds in milk before curdling), (2) subsequent non-being (lack of milk in curds after
curdling), (3) mutual non-being (lack of a horse in a cow and cow in a horse), (4) absolute
non-being (lack of horns on a hare). Taber 2001, p. 75.
15Kumārila also says that absence-awareness could function from the perception of every-
thing else, which then subsequently leads to the knowledge of what is absent. See Taber
2001, p. 79 for a discussion of how the two definitions work together.
16See Phillips 2012 for a discussion of Naiyāyika epistemology.
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Dharmakīrti argues that my perception of the patch of ground is basically
a non-perception (anupalabdhi) of the pot, which lets me infer that the pot
is non-existent (at least in this particular place). Of course, we must then
address what kind of cognition this inference gives us: on the Buddhist view
mentioned above, it is, strictly speaking, a false generalization.17 In contrast,
the Bhāṭṭa argue that my perception is of the absence of a pot. This is not
necessarily to say that absences are things, simply that my asserting, “There
is no pot on the ground” is asserting a relationship between the lack of a pot
and the ground, and not a disguised claim about the ground only.18
Even given agreement that something is a pramāṇa, philosophical schools dis-
agree on further questions. For instance, even those who accept perception
disagree about how we should characterize its intentional structure. Some
Buddhists argue that whatever it is that grounds our perceptual judgments
must be non-conceptual. In contrast, the realist Nyāya school thinks that
every perceptual episode is qualified by some concept, and that we are never
perceiving a “bare particular” (sva-lakṣaṇa) on its own.19 As well, philosophers
differ about what makes a pramāṇa a source of knowledge. (This feature—
whatever it is—in virtue of which a pramāṇa is knowledge-conducive is called
prāmāṇya.) Does my cognition C1 of a pot, count as knowledge that there is
a pot, require some other verifying cognition C2 (which has C1 as its object)?
17See Taber 2001, p. 82
18For more on abhāva, see Chakrabarti 1997b, Taber 2001, Freschi 2008 and Freschi 2010.
19Note that ‘lakṣaṇa,’ meaning “characteristic,” is not the same as ‘lakṣaṇā,’ meaning
“indication.”
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Or, does C1, my cognition of the pot, have some feature in virtue of which I
can accept it as constituting knowledge? The latter view is that of the Bhāṭṭa
Mīmāṃsā, whereas the first is held by their Buddhist interlocutors, among
others.
The dispute among the various philosophical schools over what counts as a
pramāṇa is a debate about what cognitive processes yield knowledge as well
as, given a putative piece of knowledge, which cognitive processes we can
appeal to as its justification. Call the first question enumerative, and the sec-
ond constitutive. Language is one of many ways that human beings acquire
knowledge, and Indian philosophers study how language functions under the
broader topic of epistemology. The enumerative question, put to language, is
whether it is a pramāṇa. The constitutive question is whether knowledge that
is generated by hearing utterances (or reading sentences) is grounded in per-
ception, inferential reasoning, or an independent pramāṇa of language.20 On
the view that sentences uttered by speakers can lead to knowledge, theories
about meaning are taken as part of the constitutive question of how to char-
acterize the structure of a pramāṇa. The relevant pramāṇa based on language
is testimony (śābda).
The Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā argue that testimony is an independent pramāṇa, dis-
tinct from perception or inferential reasoning. Kumārila, in the Ślokavārttika,
20Indian philosophers understand that, for instance, perception will be implicated in read-
ing or hearing sentences. Their concern is about how to characterize what is necessary and
sufficient for knowledge, and what kind of causal role perception plays in testimony.
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distinguishes between two kinds of testimony: that of the Vedas, which is au-
thorless, and that of ordinary speech, which has an author.21 The Prābhākara
Mīmāṃsā and Buddhists argue that testimony is reducible to the pramāṇa
of inferential reasoning.22 The dispute over testimony’s status as a pramāṇa
turns on its nature: in what way can it be characterized as different from
inferential reasoning? If testimony gives us true cognitions because we infer
that p from the utterance of “p” by a trustworthy speaker, then testimony
can be reduced to inferential reasoning. We will have opportunity to discuss
testimony and inferential reasoning in more detail below.
On the Bhāṭṭa understanding of how pramāṇa generate knowledge, sources
such as perception, testimony, inferential reasoning, and the like are intrinsi-
cally valid, or ‘svataḥ prāmāṇya.’23 This position, found originally in Kumārila
and developed in particular by two later commentators, Uṃveka and Pārthasārathi,
was, and still is, contentious. On one interpretation of the view, my knowl-
edge that there is a pot is intrinsically valid because it is caused by the state
of affairs that there is a pot—the same state of affairs which makes my belief
21In contrast, the theistic Nyāya (for instance Gautama in the Nyāyasūtra 1.1.7) define
testimony as the speech of an authoritative and trustworthy speaker (āpta), and they differ
from the atheistic Mīmāṃsā in attributing a divine author to the Vedas. Importantly,
despite the importance of a trustworthy speaker in their definition of testimony, the Nyāya
do not argue that testimony is ultimately a matter of inference that includes the fact of
trustworthiness. Rather, being an āpta is a causally relevant condition to the generation of
knowledge in the hearer. See Chapter 6 of Phillips 2012 for more detail.
22See Śālikanātha 1934.
23Others, like B.K. Matilal, translate the term as “intrinsically true.” This translation
choice reflects an interpretive choice on which the Bhāṭṭa are offering a causal analysis of
justification. I agree with Arnold 2005 and Taber 1992 that this is an untenable philosophical
account as well as a less charitable reading of Kumārila’s original position.
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true is causally responsible for it. This causal approach, found in Uṃveka,
has been dismissed as a sort of fundamentalism which was designed to safe-
guard the infallibility of the Vedas and, further, as philosophically untenable.
However, Pārthasārathi’s interpretation is that we are prima facie justified
for cognitions which appear to us phenomenologically like bits of knowledge.
It is only if such cognitions are subsequently defeated that we should give
them up. In other words, rather than waiting on verification of apparently
valid cognitions before considering them to be knowledge, we are justified in
taking them as knowledge until they are disqualified.24 It is against this the-
oretical background that the analysis of inferential reasoning, presumption,
and testimony unfolds in the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā. I begin with
testimony.
2.3.1 Testimony
For the Bhāṭṭa, testimony is its own pramāṇa because, when a hearer hears a
sentence, a true cognition results directly from the utterance. The Bhāṭṭa do
not require, in cases where there is a speaker (in contrast to Vedic sentences)
that the speaker be known to be trustworthy by the hearer in order to convey
knowledge. A speaker’s utterance, in order to constitute knowledge, has two
requirements: it must be a unified syntactic entity, or a sentence, and it must
cause a cognition which properly represents the world. While the “transmis-
24See Arnold 2005 and Taber 1992 for more discussion. We might compare this to
Dretske’s claim that having a reason to believe x is A need not require that we also have a
reason to believe x is not B, where B is some incompatible predicate.Dretske 1970
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sion” model of testimony—on which a speaker conveys knowledge in virtue of
her trustworthiness and epistemic standpoint with regard to the proposition
she utters—was defended by other Indian philosophers, the Bhāṭṭa reject it,
in part due to the view that the Vedas are authorless. Note that this is why,
for the Prābhākara, only knowledge through the testimony of Vedic sentences
is its own pramāṇa. They argue that knowledge through human testimony is
reducible to inferential reasoning. Their motivation for this distinction is the
fallibility of humans contrasted with the infallibility of the Vedas. They argue
we must infer that a speaker’s claim “p” is trustworthy from our knowledge
that the speaker herself is a reliable witness. After all, sentences which are
perfectly linguistically adequate, such as “There is a herd of elephants on the
tip of a finger,” do not align with facts. So we need something more than
simply the sentence—in the case of human agents, at least. They also seem
to argue that the conclusion of our inferential reasoning is the content of a
speaker’s intention. In contrast, the Vedas are thought to be infallible and au-
thorless (and thus have nothing like a “speaker’s intention”), so no inference
is necessary.25. For both the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara, the above require-
ments for sentence meaning must be fulfilled in order for knowledge to occur
via human or Vedic sentences.
However, Kumārila is motivated by more than just a defense of the Vedas. He
has concerns similar to those which move contemporary philosophers (such as
25For more on this, see Bhatt 1962, p. 284-85, Jha 1942, p. 139-41, and Śālikanātha 1934,
pp. 25ff.
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Jennifer Lackey) to reject this transmission model. Kumārila’s definition of
testimony emphasizes its intrinsic validity due to the content of the speaker’s
utterance, and its lack of defeaters. He says, “the conception that testimony
produces must be intrinsically valid, if it is the case that there is no percep-
tion of a fault.”26 In other words, the deliverances of testimony are prima
facie justified, unless there is some defeater, or fault. A fault, or ‘doṣa,’ could
be any conflicting cognition attained through one of the other pramāṇa. For
such knowledge to to count as testimonial knowledge, it must not be known
through other means. This excludes cases such as where a speaker utters, “I
have a soprano voice” in a soprano voice.27 In fact, the Bhāṭṭa view of testi-
mony is consistent with what Lackey calls the Statement View of Testimony
(SVT):
SVT. For every speaker, A, and hearer B, B knows (believes with
justification/warrant) that p on the basis of A’s testimony that
p only if (1) A’s statement that p is reliable or otherwise truth-
conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p on the basis of the content
of A’s statement that p, and (3) B has no undefeated defeaters for
believing that p.28
She notes that what counts as “reliability” on the part of a statement can
be cashed out in different ways, leaving open which particular account is cor-
rect. However, the main point is that a speaker’s being sincere or competent
26SV 44.53, ‘...tasmāc chabdena yā matiḥ tasyāḥ svataḥ pramāṇatvaṃ na cet syād doṣa-
darśanam.’ Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 298.
27Lackey 1999, p. 476.
28Lackey 2008, p. 75.
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is not directly at issue. These characteristics are important only insofar as
they impact the speaker’s ability to be a competent testifier, in contrast to
the transmission model of testimony.29 Lackey’s argument against the trans-
mission model of testimony (a model which is shared by the Mīmāṃsā inter-
locutors, the Nyāya), is based on cases where speakers fail to believe that p or
fail to know that p due to a defeater for their belief that p. An example of the
first case would be a creationist teacher instructing her students (accurately)
in evolutionary theory, despite her belief that it is false. An example of the
second case would be of a person in the grips of global skepticism who, when
asked where a cafe is, replies (without disclosing her skepticism).30
In contrast, the Bhāṭṭa argument focuses on cases where there is no speaker,
so there is no agent to believe or know that p. Thus, a more accurate repre-
sentation of their view of testimony would be
SVT*. For every statement s and hearer H, H comes to know that
p on the basis of s only if (1) the statement that p is reliable or
otherwise truth-conducive, (2) B comes to believe that p on the
basis of the content of the statement that p, and (3) B has no
undefeated defeaters for believing that p.
Their view of testimony depends upon the content of the utterance, and not
the epistemic status of the speaker. This leads us to the question of how we can
understand the content of an utterance when the speaker is distant or absent.
29Lackey 2008, p. 74.
30The details of these cases are explored in Lackey 2008.
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In contemporary Western philosophy, this problem usually is described as the
problem of “deferred utterance,” and arises in situations where speakers leave
messages with voicemail, notes, and other means. It is typically framed with
regard to indexicals such as “I,” “here,” and “now”:
(2) I’m not here right now.
Taking the standard Kaplanian line on which indexicals have both character
and content, the sentence (2), when initially uttered at t0 is false. This is
because the content of (2) is determined by evaluating the character of the
indexicals “I,” “here,” and “now” with respect to the context of utterance.
Characters are functions which vary according to contextual input, where these
inputs are parameters called “indices”—such as agent, world, location, and
time. The character maps contexts to content, which is a function from a
possible world to an extension. So when I utter the sentence (2) into my iPhone
to set up my voicemail, the character maps the contextual parameters of agent,
world, location, and time onto the corresponding content: Malcolm, actual
world, my apartment, 2:03 pm on April 5, 2013. The result is a sentence/index
pair whose truth can then be evaluated. For Kaplan, a sentence like (2) will
never come out to be true, because the only indices which he thinks constitute
contexts of utterances are ones where the agent is at the location of the world.
Thus, when my friend calls my phone from the University of Texas and she
hears the sentence (2), it is not a context of utterance, since, after all, I cannot
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make an utterance in a place where I am not.31
The idea that what my friend hears when she listens to my voicemail is some-
thing that is necessarily always false strikes many as incorrect. One of the
responses is that we ought to take into account not just the speaker’s location
and world, but also the hearer’s context. For instance, Andy Egan proposes
that where the speaker’s context results in a gappy proposition, the hearer’s
context comes into play to generate a determinate content. Egan has in mind
especially cases like
(3) Jesus loves you!
on a billboard, where each individual, when reading the billboard, understands
a different singular proposition, with herself as a member.32 This is relevant
to the Mīmāṃsā theory of testimony, in particular Vedic testimony, since
on the Kaplanian account, the speaker’s location turns out to be important
in some cases for determining the content of the utterance. But without a
speaker (such as billboards or the Vedas), there will be cases where we cannot
determine the content, or that the predicted content comes apart from what
seems right. Note that Egan’s suggestion is one that relies on semantics to
determine the proposition expressed, rather than pragmatics. It is not that
by uttering something strictly false the speaker manages to convey something
true by implication.
31Sanderson 1989, p. 509.
32Egan 2009.
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One last observation about the Mīmāṃsā emphasis on sentences over speakers.
Setting aside indexicals, there is a broader problem of determining what the
correct context of interpretation is for sentences like
(4) Close cover before striking (written on the front of a matchbook).33
This imperative sentence is not being uttered by any particular person or to
any particular person. What is the correct context for us to interpret it with?
Stevens argues that this question wrongly presupposes that there is a correct
context of interpretation. He claims that there is no pragmatic imperative force
here, only the grammatical imperative mood, and that the latter is insufficient
for the former.34 For Stevens, it is incorrect to consider (4) a command, as it
lacks pragmatic imperative force.35 However, for the Mīmāṃsā, rather than
admit that there is no imperative force to the commands, they appeal to
bhāvanā, discussed above. Set within the appropriate discourse context, a
sentence like (4) can have illocutionary force, despite a distant speaker (in the
case of the matchbook) or none (in the case of the Veda).
Since it is the statement and its content which are crucial for generating knowl-
edge, the Bhāṭṭa’s analysis of testimony focuses heavily on the necessary condi-
tions for a string of phonemes to count as a syntactic unity within a particular
33Stevens 2009, p. 220.
34Stevens 2009, p. 220.
35This is his solution to the puzzle about voicemail messages: he denies that the utterances
of (2) count as assertions. Instead, while they are cases of uttering a sentence (or the
locutionary act of saying) they are not cases of asserting (the illocutionary act). Stevens
2009, p. 217-220.
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discourse. To count as a statement (in contrast to a phrase or incomplete frag-
ment), there are three requirements, broadly accepted by all schools, though
with some dispute over the details: expectancy (ākāṅkṣā), semantic compat-
ibility (yogyatā), and contiguity (saṃnidhi or āsatti).36 Expectancy, a term
in Sanskrit that literally means “desire,” is the anticipation that one word
requires another to convey meaning. For instance, hearing the word “bring,”
a speaker would expect an object which is to be brought. Whether this expec-
tation is syntactic or psychological is a matter of debate.37
Semantic compatibility (which we will discuss in more detail when we take up
Mukula’s positive proposal) is the requirement that a combination of words be
meaningful. We can illustrate this concept with Chomsky’s famous example
of a syntactically acceptable sentence which is meaningless:
(5) Colorless green ideas sleep furiously.38
This sentence violates the requirement of semantic incompatibility. The vi-
olation of semantic incompatibility is one of the requirements for non-literal
interpretation. The Mīmāṃsā allow metaphorical interpretation only of sen-
tences which violate this principle.
Contiguity is the requirement that the words uttered should be close together.
There are two ways that the necessary condition of contiguity can fail to be
36For a detailed discussion of these elements, see Raja 2000.
37Raja 1990, pp. 157-64.
38From Chomsky 1957.
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fulfilled. First, words which are not uttered close together temporally will not
(ordinarily) constitute a complete sentence. If I utter “bring” on Wednesday,
then two days later utter, “the cow,” this does not constitute a sentence. Sec-
ond, if there is no apprehension of the sentence as connected, contiguity fails.
This condition relates to elliptical sentences. In an utterance such as
(6) the door
Kumārila and the Bhāṭṭa say that a hearer will mentally insert the word
“close,” for example. Otherwise, we will not entertain a proposition. The
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā argue that what is supplied is not a word, but a mean-
ing. They reason that since we know which word to supply based on which
meaning must be supplied, we should just assume we are supplying the mean-
ing. Broadly categorized, the dispute is something like that in contemporary
philosophy over the status of unarticulated constituents. The Bhāṭṭa insist
that grammatical elements are primarily responsible for contributing to the
content of a sentence. While they talk about “words,” we can understand
their claim as akin to philosophers who propose that the deep logical form of
sentences is what drives our “filling in” what is missing. On the other hand,
the Prābhākara are similar to those contextualists who think it unnecessary
that our semantics bear the burden for generating propositions which are ex-
pressed by sentences, at the level of what is said. Hearers can insert, through
pragmatic processes, the appropriate content. We will address this debate in
detail in Chapter Three. For the purposes of understanding testimony, the
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main point is that contiguity is a necessary condition for a sentence to express
structured (propositional) content capable of being known by the hearer. Let
us now turn to the question of whether, and how, testimony and inferential
reasoning are distinct pramāṇā.
2.3.2 Inferential Reason
There are two motivations for resisting the reduction of testimony (śabda) to
inferential reason (anumāna). First is the by-now familiar hermeneutic context
of the Mīmāṃsā. Kumārila argues that if testimony and inferential reason
are the same, then because Vedic testimony would be understood through
inference, it would be faulty. It would be faulty because successful inference
of knowledge via an utterance requires a trustworthy speaker, and the Vedas
are authorless.39 More generally, we can characterize this as the worry that, in
cases where there is sufficient distance between the interpreter and the speaker
of an utterance (either temporal or geographical), the hearer will not be in a
position to evaluate the competence and trustworthiness of the speaker. On the
inferential model of testimony, without such the hearer knowing the speaker’s
epistemic status, she would not be justified in accepting the statement as
true.
A second motivation for distinguishing inferential reason from testimony is the
apparent intrinsic validity of testimony which comes immediately upon enter-
39lakṣaṇena tv abhinnatvaṃ yadi śabda-anumānayoḥ veda-jñāna-apramāṇatvaṃ syād atal
lakṣaṇatvataḥ. Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 213.
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taining a speaker’s utterance.40 Kumārila rejects the idea that, ordinarily, we
must have further verification of the truth of an utterance in order for it to
constitute knowledge. Regardless of whether we’re in a Vedic or human con-
text, we can implicitly trust the deliverance of ordinary sources of knowledge.
Generally speaking, unless there is an apparent contradiction from another
source of knowledge, rational agents are justified in accepting the content of
utterances at face-value as being true. This differentiates testimony from in-
ferential reason in the following way. On the inferential view, a proposition p
that is entertained on the basis of a speaker’s saying that p does not constitute
knowledge unless there is a further step: the apprehension of the speaker as
trustworthy and competent and the apprehension of the condition that when
such speakers utter sentences, those sentences are true. While Kumārila, as
noted above, thinks that all knowledge sources are intrinsically valid, there is
a different structure in inferential reasoning and testimony.
In what follows, I explain Kumārila’s basic view of inferential reasoning (which
is broadly acceptable to most other schools, save the Buddhists), and then
clarify how he sees testimony as distinct. This discussion will focus on the
pervasion relationship (vyāpti) by explaining the natures of the inferential
mark and inferential object (liṅga and liṅgin, respectively), and how they are
related by means of a universal generalization.41
40See above discussion of ‘svataḥ prāmāṇya.’
41While his comment is focused on Nyāya and not Mīmāṃsā, it is important what Stephen
Phillips notes about inferential reason: “We have to keep in mind that Nyāya is focused
not on logic per se, but rather on a psychological process whereby we come to know facts
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The traditional example of inferential reasoning, which I introduced in Chapter
One, is below:
1. Thesis to prove (sādhya): There is fire on the mountain.
2. Reason (hetu): This is because there is smoke on the mountain.
3. Pervasion (vyāpti): Everywhere there is smoke, there is fire, such as the
case of a kitchen.
4. Application of rule (upanayana): This case is like the kitchen.
5. Conclusion (nigamāna): Thefore, there is fire on the mountain.
A crucial aspect of inferential reasoning is the existence of a pervasion rela-
tionship, or vyāpti. This is the relationship between the inferential mark and
the inferred object. An inferential mark, or “prover,” “indicator” is the ob-
served property which indicates the existence of what is being inferred. In the
example above, smoke is the inferential mark (liṅga), and fire is the inferred
object (liṅgin). The inferential mark is described as being “pervaded” by the
inferred object. Smoke is pervaded by fire. The inferred object (fire) is neces-
sary for the inferential mark (smoke). This allows us to infer from smoke that
there is fire. However, fire is not sufficient for smoke. The traditional Indian
counterexample to the sufficiency of pervasion is molten ball of iron which is
fiery but not smokey.
indirectly, by way of a sign, liṅga or hetu, an indication of something currently beyond the
range of the senses, whether at a distance spatially or temporally or of a sort (such as atoms
and God) that by nature cannot be perceived. Phillips 2012, p. 52.
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We must be careful here to distinguish between inferential reasoning and in-
ference. I have been calling this pramāṇa “inferential reasoning” because it
requires an agent with a particular mental state (that of grasping a pervasion
relationship), and because it occurs at a particular time. In contrast, what I
will call “inference” is a formal structure in which the truth of certain propo-
sitions (premises) necessitate the truth of another proposition (conclusion).42
Also, for any given case of inferential reasoning, if it is to be a pramāṇa, the
premises must be true. While counterfactual reasoning from false premises was
certainly a concept familiar to Indian philosophers, the pramāṇa of inferential
reasoning, by definition, deals with true premises.
As well, inferences can be valid regardless of the order in which the premises
appear, and they do not require the existence of a person who entertains them
for this validity. The pramāṇa of inferential reasoning, on the other hand, has
a specific order in which the cognitions are said to occur. First, an agent has
repeated observations of an inferential mark and associated inferential object:
there is smoke in the kitchen, and in the same place there is fire. Then she
comes to recognize that there is a pervasion relationship relating them: every-
where there is smoke, there is fire. At a later point, she observes the inferential
mark: there is smoke on the mountain. Entertaining the fact that the inferen-
tial mark exists in a certain place causes her to remember the universal rule,
from which she concludes that there is fire on the mountain.43
42See, for instance, Harman 1996 and Siderits 2003 for more discussion of this distinction.
43The details of inferential reasoning in the Indian tradition are a subject of significant
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While the Indian tradition has a certain way of representing this process (as
above), it is possible to represent the inference itself in any order and maintain
its validity. We could reverse (1) and (2) below and the syllogism would still
be valid.44
1. There is smoke on the mountain.
2. If there is smoke in a locus, there is fire in that locus.
3. Conclusion: There is fire on the mountain.
Quite a lot has been written on the pervasion relation, or vyāpti, by both
philosophers in the Indian tradition and contemporary philosophers reflecting
on these texts. Indian philosophers argued over just what kinds of relation-
ships constitute pervasion, and whether there is, to all of them, some underly-
ing commonality. This particular problem need not concern us directly, but it
dispute. For instance, see Matilal 1998, Mohanty 1957, Siderits 2003, and Taber 2004, to
name just a few contemporary discussions of the topic.
44J.N. Mohanty makes sense of this by appealing to the distinction (found in some Indian
philosophers) between “inference-for-oneself” and “inference-for-another.” The first is “a
causally necessitated sequence of inner episodes” which does not have logical necessity, only
a causal sequence. Mohanty 1957, p. 118. But inference-for-another is sentential and in
this structure, there is a kind of logical necessity. Mohanty 1957, p. 119. Inference-for-
another is characterized as sequential cognitive moves, which the speaker prompts in her
hearer. He also observes that Indian philosophers are not concerned with abstract entities
like propositions. Therefore, the logical necessity that holds between propositions may not
be the same as the necessity which holds between “structures of the cognitive episodes which
the component sentences express” Mohanty 1957, p. 119.
However, it is not clear if Kumārila distinguishes between these two forms of inference.
He does say that if someone has gotten knowledge from inferential reasoning, in order to
prove that her knowledge is valid, she should first put down the inferential object: ‘tas-
māt vyāpyatva-rūpeṇa vācyo hetutva-sammataḥ,’ Jha 1983, 272. See Bhatt 1962, 255–56
for a discussion of this question. He points out that on the Mīmāṃsā view, knowledge
by someone’s statements is verbal testimony, not inferential reasoning, even if someone is
communicating what she has learned from inferential reasoning herself.
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is worth observing that although the smoke–fire relationship is one of causa-
tion, this is not the only pervasion relationship accepted. Kumārila gives the
example of inferring from x being a cow that x is a horned animal.45 How-
ever, being a horned animal does not cause something to be a cow. Rather,
the relationship between the inferential object and inferential mark between,
respectively, a universal and a characteristic of a particular object in which
that universal inheres.
Finally, an important aspect of inferential reasoning is that it moves from a
universal rule (the pervasion relationship) to a particular claim. The thesis
to be proved (sādhya) is a particular observational claim (viśeṣa) whereas the
pervasion relationship (vyāpti) is a general law-like claim (sāmānya).46 We
can formalize the pervasion relationship as
8(x)[S(x)!F(x)]
(For all places x which are occupied by smoke, that place x is also
occupied by fire)
This universal pervasion rule is at the heart of inferential reasoning. The
observation of a particular instance of smoke on a mountain, S(m),allows us,
by universal instantiation, to conclude there is fire on the mountain, F(m).
Kumārila argues that these universal rules are known by observation.47 For
45See [p. 183]jha1983.
46viśeṣe hi sādhye āmanya-hetutā. Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 256
47There are two categories for Kumārila, either particular observations (viśeṣata-udṛṣṭa)
or general observations (sāmānyata-udṛṣṭa). For a discussion of different Mīmāṃsā views,
see Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 258ff.
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Kumārila, these observations are due directly to the pramāṇa of perception,
not, as Western philosophers might surmise, inductive generalization. This is
because he argues it it is possible to perceive general class properties as they
inhere in objects (for instance, a fire has the property of fireyness).
In order for testimony to be reducible to inference, two requirements need
to be met: there must be an inferential mark and an object of inference and
there must be a pervasion relationship between these two, where the pervasion
relationship must be a universal rule which allows a particular conclusion to
be drawn. The inferentialist about testimony claims that we come to know
the inferential object (meaning) by the presence of an inferential mark (words)
through the pervasion relationship between words and their meanings. How-
ever, Kumārila objects first, that neither words nor sentences can be suitable
inferential marks and second, that there is no pervasion relationship between
expressions and expression meanings. We will find this argument echoed by
Ānandavardhana in the Dhvanyāloka, though marshaled in support of the lin-
guistic capacity of suggestion.
Kumārila says that words are not inferential marks because the denotation of
a word is a general class, while inferential mark must be a particular qualified
object. For example, the inferential mark in the case of fire and smoke is smoke
qualified by a particular place. But the denotation of “smoke” is “smokiness”
(or whatever the general class property is that all smokes possess). Without
some kind of qualification which links the inferential mark to its object, like the
mountain which is the locus of both smoke and fire, no inference can be made.
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Immediately, one might object that the object of a sentence is a qualified
thing—a proposition. Kumārila takes up this possibility in the section on
sentences. He says,
Sentence meaning is understood as influenced by the meaning of
the words. The words do not communicate the sentence meaning
separate from their own meanings, like in the case of smoke and
fire.48
In other words, since the sentence-meaning is composed of word-meanings, it
would be a mistake to say that the word-meanings are the basis for inferring
the sentence-meaning. Metaphorically, perhaps, it would be like saying that
one infers a building’s existence from observing the presence of a collection
of blocks in a building shape. Kumārila wants to say that this is not infer-
ence.
Second, Kumārila argues that the relationship between a sentence and its
meaning cannot be one of pervasion. One problem is that the pervasion re-
lationship is ascertained by perception, and since there is an infinite number
of constructable sentences in a given language, there is no way to know the
pervasion between every sentence and its meaning. He argues that this would
require infinite knowledge, of all sentences and their meanings.49 Further, the
pervasion relationship is one of necessity: only if fire is necessary for smoke
can we reason “Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.” However, we cannot
48‘pada-arthair anurakto ’sau vākya-arthaḥ sampratīyate, na ātmanā gamayanty-enaṃ
vinā dhūmo ’gnimattvavat..’ Bhaṭṭa 1978a, p. 642.
49Bhatt 1962, 284 and Jha 1983, p. 530.
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reason “Wherever there is the word ‘cow,’ there is the meaning cowhood” in
the same way, since it is possible to entertain the requisite concept without
the word prompting it.50
Finally, Kumārila argues that any knowledge we have of the pervasion relation-
ship between, say, “cow” and its the meaning cowhood, must come through
someone uttering the word and our grasping its referent. Put another way,
the pervasion relationship which is supposed be the inferential “trigger” by
which we come to know the meaning of “cow” relies on knowing the meaning
of “cow” in the first place. He concludes that we must assume the capacity of
verbal testimony in order to make sense of inference.
2.3.3 Presumption
The last pramāṇa I will discuss is presumption, which is crucial to understand-
ing Mukula’s account of indication and how hearers have access to non-literal
meaning in general. I argue that presumption (as understood by the Mīmāṃsā)
has a structure analogous to what Western philosophers call inference to the
best explanation. First, I survey several examples of presumption in the orig-
inal Sanskrit literature. I then reconstruct these to make the structure of
the reasoning apparent. Finally, I discuss a particular form of presumption
which relies upon testimonial knowledge, and which will be crucial to Mukula’s
discussion of non-literal speech.
50SV 44:85–86. See Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 303 and Jha 1983, p. 219.
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In the Indian tradition, presumption, or arthāpatti, was accepted as an in-
dependent pramāṇa only by the Mīmāṃsā and the Advaita Vedānta.51 The
other schools of thought either reduced presumption to inferential reasoning
or denied that it held the status of a knowledge source.52 The Bhāṭṭa and
the Prābhākara schools within Mīmāṃsā differed over their analysis of pre-
sumption, although they both accepted it as a pramāṇa. While (as for many
Mīmāṃsā concepts) the earliest reference is in Śabara, it is Kumārila who is
responsible for developing the concept more thoroughly. In the Śloka-vārttika,
Kumārila defines presumption as
When an object is known through the six pramāṇa, which otherwise
could not be,
Another, unexperienced object is imagined—this is presumption
exemplified.53
Presumption is, like inferential reasoning, something that rational agents do,
although from what rational people do we can abstract away certain formal
conditions for knowledge. Psychologically speaking, however, what an agent
requires before she is in a position to gain knowledge by presumption, is an
episode of knowledge generated by a pramāṇa. This can be any pramāṇa,
51Among the nāstika or “unorthodox” schools, the Jaina also accepted arthāpatti.
52For an overview in English of how each school understood presumption, see Simha
1991, the only book-length treatment of arthāpatti to date. I have benefited tremendously
in conversation with Nirmalya Guha, whose unpublished thesis is also on arthāpatti.
53pramāṇa-ṣaṭka-vijñāto yatra artho na anyathā bhavet, adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayed anyam sa-
arthāpattir udāhṛatā, Bhaṭṭa 1978b, 320. Thanks to Elisa Freschi for her comments on this
translation at the Indian Philosophy Blog. While I translate ‘na anyathā bhavet’ as “which
otherwise could not be,” there is controversy over how to understand the ‘anyathā bhavet.’
For instance, the Prābhākara argue that it should be taken as referring to inexplicability.
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including presumption itself. Kumarila gives examples of presumptive knowl-
edge based upon each of the knowledge sources:
1. Perception: from the perception of fire burning, we can presume that
fire has a power, that of burning.
2. Inference: from inferring that it is the same sun which appears in dif-
ferent places in the sky, we can presume that the sun has the power of
mobility.
3. Analogy: from the fact that it is possible to understand that a cow is
similar to a gavaya (a kind of buffalo), we presume that the cow has a
capacity which triggers analogical understanding.54
4. Presumption: from the presumption that words have an expressive power,
we can presume that words are eternal.
5. Absence: from the absence of Caitra, whom we expect to see in his home,
we can presume that he is alive and outside.
6. Testimony: from the statement, “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the
54Analogical understanding is the pramāṇa which is responsible for our learning new
words. In this example, a forester is asked by townspeople what ‘gavaya’ means. He replies
that a gavaya (a kind of buffalo) is like a cow. Armed with this comparison, on encountering
a gavaya for the first time, the townspeople (who were already familiar with cows) see
the gavaya and truly understand what the word ‘gavaya’ means. What is understod—
discussed later in the chapter on analogy—is the gavaya-as-qualified-by-similarity. Analogy
is taken to be its own pramāṇa since although the similarity between cow and gavaya is
known by sense–perception and the cow is known through memory (not a pramāṇa for any
Indian philosophers), what is left over (gavaya-as-qualified-by-similarity) must be known by
analogy. In a similar way, later, on returning to the cow, what is understood is the cow’s
similarity to the gavaya. The presumption seems to be that the cow itself has some power
or capacity that is responsible for this new understanding.
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day,” we can presume the statement, “he eats at night.”
We can make a few observations about this list. First, in each, while it is
clear which is the object “ascertained by means of...the six pramāṇa,” it is
less apparent how presumption is required, on pain of things being impos-
sible to exist otherwise (‘na anyathā bhavet’).So what is at issue in each of
these cases? Kumārila does not expand on all of them in detail (though he
does for 4 through 6), but we can surmise that there is background piece of
knowledge which is apparently inconsistent with new knowledge. This is made
explicit in the view, though slightly different, of the philosopher Prābhākara
Śālikanātha, in which he points out that the incompatibility is between some-
thing just observed, and another thing already known.55 (We’ll look at his
account of presumption below.) The conflict is between a piece of knowledge
just attained through a pramāṇa and a piece of knowledge one already has in
one’s background beliefs.
A second observation we can make about this list of cases is that most of
them are explanatory. Cases 1 through 4 are what we would today consider
scientific or natural hypotheses, presuming powers or regularities belonging
to phenomena now studied by fields such as chemistry, astronomy, cognitive
psychology, and linguistics. Cases 5 and 6 are more ordinary explanations:
the former is an explanation as to why Caitra is surprisingly absent, and the




The category in contemporary philosophy closest to presumption is inference
to the best explanation (IBE),often also called “abduction.”56 Abductive in-
ference is described as “reasoning that no other explanation which accounts
for all the facts is plausible enough or simple enough to be accepted.”57 Typ-
ically, what is emphasized is that what is abductively inferred needs to play
an explanatory role. We must then given an account of what constitutes an
explanation and what determines the best explanation of a set of facts.
Kumārila and those who also accept arthāpatti in the Indian tradition couple
explanation with removal of apparent inconsistency or “inexplicability other-
wise.”58 As noted earlier, the apparent inconsistency is between a fact and
background knowledge, which is going to be agent- or context-relative (in pre-
sumption, we are not working with the set of all truths and drawing inferences,
but with the set of what is known to a rational agent).59 The example of Case
5, where a presumption is made from an earlier presumption highlights the
fact that once a presumption has been made, that piece of knowledge is now
part of the background, and it may “trigger” a new presumption.60 To sum
up, for an agent to make a presumption, she (1) must acquire a piece of knowl-
56I will distinguish between IBE and abduction in what follows.
57Harman 1996, p. 89.
58The Sanskrit is ‘anyathā anupapatti.’
59This aligns with work in contemporary philosophy. It is implicit in Pierce’s idea of
a “surprising fact,” and has been made more explicit by others such as Josephson and
Josephson 2003.
60Compare Mackonis 2013, 978.
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edge through a pramāṇa, and (2) must consider that piece of knowledge to be
apparently inconsistent with her background knowledge.
Before moving on to discuss some of these cases in detail, let us first examine
the Prābhākara analysis of presumption, since they have a different formula-
tion of (2). Śālikanātha Miśra was an important proponent of the Prābhākara
Mīmāṃsā system. His dates are not well-established, perhaps around 700 CE.
We only have a few extant Prābhākara texts, and three of those are written
by Śālikanātha (the Ṛjuvimalā, Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, and Bhāṣyadīpa). In his
Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, he gives an overview of the major views of the Prābhākara,
on the topics of Vedic injunctions, sentence meaning and communication, per-
ceptual error, the existence of universals, and the various pramāṇa. In his
analysis of presumption, Śālikanātha identifies the presumptive trigger as the
removal of doubt, not just apparent incompatibility. He says that in presump-
tion, an agent acquires a piece of knowledge and this throws something into
doubt which was earlier taken to be knowledge. To illustrate this, he uses the
example of Caitra’s absence at home.61
The example of Caitra’s absence is one of the most common, and contentious,
examples of presumption in Indian philosophy. This is a typical example taken
to be reducible to inferential reasoning. The case is described as follows: I go
to see Caitra at his home, with the expectation that he will be there, since
61As a Prābhākara, he does not accept that perception of absences constitute a pramāṇa,
so he must explain this instance of knowledge through another means, in this case, inferential
reasoning.
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it is part of my background knowledge that he is alive. Finding him absent,
I presume that Caitra is alive and present somewhere other than his house.
On Kumārila’s analysis, this presumption removes the apparent inconsistency
between Caitra’s not being at home and Caitra’s being alive. For Śālikanātha,
presumption removes the doubt that I now have that Caitra is alive, since he
is not where I expect him to be.
On Kumārila’s analysis, we reason presumptively as follows:
1. Caitra’s house is absent of Caitra.
2. Caitra is alive.
3. (1) and (2) appear inconsistent because we expect Caitra at home.
4. Caitra is alive and outside the house.
I put (1) as I do to highlight the fact that Kumārila understands this piece of
knowledge to originate from the pramāṇa of absence. We perceive that Caitra
is absent from the house. However, this isn’t necessary for the case, since we
could also infer that he is absent given our perception of an empty house and
knowledge that Caitra is alive. In any case, the apparent inconsistency between
(1) and (2) is that someone not being found at their house is common to dead
people (since when you are dead, your body is put elsewhere). Kumārila argues
that it is only because we also know that Caitra is alive that this, in conjunction
with (1) can lead us to presume he is alive and elsewhere. This is because (1) on
its own is compatible with Caitra’s being dead, and Caitra’s being alive (2) is
compatible with his being in the house. Put together, however, these two facts
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lead us to the presumption that Caitra is alive and outside the house.
On Śālikanātha’s analysis, we reason in this way:
1. Caitra’s house is absent of Caitra.
2. Caitra is alive.
3. (1) causes (2) to be doubtful.
4. Caitra is alive and outside the house.
While the premises are the same, the presumptive trigger is not an apparent
incompatibility between (1) and (2), but the doubt that (2) is true, given the
new piece of knowledge (1). Kumārila explicitly rejects this account, since it is
only (1) and (2) together which form the basis for presuming (3), and if there
is doubt about (2), he thinks we cannot presume (3).
I believe a hidden assumption in the analysis of presumption is that accept-
ing that Caitra is alive is true is a better explanation than updating to the
belief that Caitra is not alive. Compare Pierce’s famous definition of abduc-
tion:
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.62
Something like this is how presumption is represented: the surprising fact that
Caitra is not home is observed, but if Caitra were alive and not at home, this
62Peirce 1934, p. 189.
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would be normal. Thus we presume that it is true that Caitra is alive and not
at home. The fact that Caitra is not at home is surprising given the agent’s
belief that he is at home and alive. However, to separate the knowledge-
generating presumption from simply guessing, we need to insert a constraint,
like Mackonis does, who distinguishes between abduction as defined by Pierce
and inference to the best explanation (IBE):
The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course,
No available competing hypothesis can explain C as well as A does.
Hence, A is true.63
Of course, now we must identify why it is that presuming Caitra is alive
and well outside explains his absence in the house better than presuming, for
instance, that he has died and his body been moved somewhere, that he has
temporarily vanished into a parallel quantum universe, that he has become
invisible, that he is a time-traveler, that he is hiding in a box in his home, and
so on. This may involve such things as the costliness of updating background
beliefs already accepted as true, information we have about Caitra’s well-being,
the time since we’ve last seen him, and so on.
It is worth noting that the interpretation I have given of presumption is not
shared by everyone, although it is common.64 Within a larger analysis of
63Mackonis 2013, p. 977
64See, for example, Shida 2011 who analyzes Udayana’s Naiyāyika version of arthāpatti
in order to compare it to Charles Pierce’s abduction. Mark Siderits mentions same com-
parison off-handedly in a review of Chakrabarthi Ram-Prasad’s Indian Philosophy and the
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Indian epistemology in general, they argue that presumption (which they call
“postulation”) differs from IBE. In what follows, I briefly lay out a response to
their view, a reply which will form a concluding summation of what I’ve argued
above. Kasturirangan et al claim that IBE and presumption are different for
the following reasons:
1. The question of “inconsistency otherwise” or “inexplicability otherwise”
does not arise in cases of IBE.
2. IBE is a “full-fledged inference in the sense of anumāna” in that it de-
pends on inductive reasoning and observation, whereas presumption re-
quires only “inexplicability otherwise,” and does not depend on observa-
tion.
3. Presumption (whether correct or not) has a phenomenology that leaves
the reasoner with the feeling she cannot know anything more, but this
“procedural closure” is lacking in IBE, as there is the feeling that it could
be invalidated by future empirical data.
4. Presumption is non-defeasible on the basis of perceptual inputs.65
Their first claim, that IBE lacks the feature of “inexplicability otherwise”
which is so central to presumption, seems dependent upon the single example
they use for IBE. As a definition of IBE, they give
Consequences of Knowledge as if the equivalence between abduction and arthāpatti was ob-
vious and non-controversial (Siderits 2009). The most notable criticism of the claim that
presumption is, or resembles, IBE, comes from Rajesh Kasturirangan, Nirmalya Guha, and
(ironically enough) Chakrabarthi Ram-Prasad himself.Kasturirangan et al. 2010.
65Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223-24
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If E is an inference to the best explanation of a set of events O
according to a theory T, then (1) O must be a consequence of E
according to T, and (2) T and E must be consistent.
As their paradigmatic case, they give a situation where we are drawing red
balls from an urn:
1. All balls in this urn are red.
2. All balls in this particular random sample are red.
3. Therefore, all balls in this particular random sample are taken from this
urn.66
They then claim that the pervasion relationship central to Indian inferential
reasoning (which we discussed earlier) is present in this case. It is:
Any case of “having only red balls both in a random sample and in
a particular population” is a case of “drawing the random sample
from the particular population.”
That there is a pervasion relationship makes abduction different from arthā-
patti, they argue. Further, they note the pervasion relationship which arthā-
patti lacks has an observational basis.
I grant that, if this case is paradigmatic IBE, it would be strange to charac-
terize presumption as IBE. The problem is that how to characterize abduction
and inference to the best explanation is far from settled. Kasturirangan et
al rely on Lipton’s view, which is only one of many attempts to formalize
66Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.
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IBE, and who observes himself that IBE is “more a slogan than an articulated
philosophical theory.”67 Further, as I alluded to above, there are those like
Mackonis who argue that abduction is not the same as IBE. The difference
is essentially that abduction is a first step, a procedure that gives us a set of
possible explanations, and IBE is a process which narrows to what ought to
be (though is not guaranteed to be) the correct one. Given this distinction
between abduction and IBE, my claim in this chapter is a broad one: presump-
tion is a form of inference to the best explanation, although it may turn out to
be non-identical to some varieties of IBE if IBE is not a unitary concept. Sec-
ond, as I noted above, many philosophers distinguish between abduction and
IBE and do so in a way that supports my thesis. What characterizes IBE in
contrast to abduction is the requirement (see above) which states that no other
explanation is sufficient to explain what has just been observed. This claim, I
argue, just is what Indian philosophers mean when they use the Sanskrit term
“anyathā anupapatti” or “inexplicability otherwise.”68
Three examples from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy support my
contention that the kind of cases typically subsumed under IBE are analogous
to those described in the Indian literature under the concept of presump-
tion:
You happen to know that Tim and Harriet have recently had a
terrible row that ended their friendship. Now someone tells you
67Lipton 2004, p. 2.
68
100
that she just saw Tim and Harriet jogging together. The best
explanation for this that you can think of is that they made up.
You conclude that they are friends again.
One morning you enter the kitchen to find a plate and cup on the
table, with breadcrumbs and a pat of butter on it, and surrounded
by a jar of jam, a pack of sugar, and an empty carton of milk. You
conclude that one of your house-mates got up at night to make
him- or herself a midnight snack and was too tired to clear the
table. This, you think, best explains the scene you are facing. To
be sure, it might be that someone burgled the house and took the
time to have a bite while on the job, or a house-mate might have
arranged the things on the table without having a midnight snack
but just to make you believe that someone had a midnight snack.
But these hypotheses strike you as providing much more contrived
explanations of the data than the one you infer to.
Walking along the beach, you see what looks like a picture of Win-
ston Churchill in the sand. It could be that, as in the opening pages
of Hilary Putnam’s (1981), what you see is actually the trace of an
ant crawling on the beach. The much simpler, and therefore (you
think) much better, explanation is that someone intentionally drew
a picture of Churchill in the sand. That, in any case, is what you
come away believing.69
In all of these cases, a new piece of knowledge triggers formulation of an
explanatory hypothesis. While it is implicit in these cases, rather than explicit,
69Douven 2011
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this new piece of knowledge is in some way surprising against one or more
pieces of background knowledge. Otherwise, there would be no need for a
hypothesis, as you could simply accept the knowledge into your existing set of
beliefs.
The other three points which Kasturirangan et al make have to do with the
role of empirical evidence in presumption. Let’s take claim (4) first. On their
analysis, presumption is not defeasible since the conclusion of presumptive
reasoning follows necessarily from known concepts that the reasoner already
has. This is what they call “cognitive mapping.” In the case of Caitra, they
argue that “the concept of not-at-home is ‘cognitively mapped’ onto the con-
cept of being-somewhere-else.”70 Thus (2) observation is not required, only
accessing concepts, (3) nothing more can be learned once the mapping is com-
plete, and (4) further perceptual information could not impact the cognitive
mapping.
However, in the cases above as well as the cases in the Indian literature, ob-
servation is important. First, in many cases observation is the way in which
the new piece of information is acquired. This is explicit in Kumārila’s SV, as
well as other texts, which identifies the various pramāṇa which precede pre-
sumption. However, while Kasturirangan et al would accept this, what they
would reject is the claim that further observation could impact the presump-
tive conclusion. The problem is that this assumes that the set of background
70Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.
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beliefs an agent has is rich enough to have accounted for all possible other
conclusions.
In the case of the absent Caitra, this is more or less plausible. It seems
unlikely that another observation would lead us to the conclusion that Caitra
is, in fact, in the house, as we have seen that he is not there and we know
he is alive. Given our background knowledge about this world–people don’t
just disappear, etc.–the conclusion seems firm. However, it is not immune
to further evidence. Let’s assume this is a modern case. Now, consider the
possibility that, having concluded Caitra is not in the house, I then notice that
the window through which I am looking has a very thick frame. It turns out
that I am looking through a series of lenses which form a “cloaking device.”71
This casts my previous conclusion into doubt, since it is consistent with this
new piece of evidence that Caitra is inside the house.
As for claim (3), while the phenomenological “procedural closure” would ordi-
narily be present, I argue such a feeling could also be present in the three cases
given above. Normally, my conclusion that someone drew Winston Church-
hill in the sand is not experienced with the sense that further information
would invalidate it. At least, I don’t think such a sense would be present
unless someone were to challenge my reasoning, in which case I might be open
to other explanations. But this seems to be so with presumption as well–as
71The device is intended to be similar to the one recently designed by Rochester University,




in the case of Caitra and the cloaking device. Whether or not such a phe-
nomenology is present or absent in presumption (or IBE) also seems to be
highly agent-relative. Consider the phenomenology of a geologist and an ordi-
nary person when finding that there are perfectly spherical objects on Mars.
A geologist familiar with the process of concretion would likely conclude that
natural processes acting on Martian sediment was responsible. She would, I
suspect, have a sense of “procedural closure” given her extensive background
knowledge. In contrast, an ordinary person might conclude that intelligent
beings are responsible, and that this is evidence for life on Mars. She may or
may not have a sense of procedural closure about this. And, returning to claim
(4), such a sense of procedural closure is irrelevant to whether the conclusion
is a good one, and whether further empirical evidence can impact it.
Finally, Kasturirangan et al argue that IBE has a pervasion relationship or
vyāpti, which they provide for the case of the red balls, whereas presump-
tion does not. For this reason, they claim that IBE is inferential reasoning
(anumāna) but presumption is not. At this point, it’s important to note that
they are taking sides in a historical debate about presumption. The Nyāya or
“Logic” school of Indian philosophy would differ on this point, claiming that
presumption is reducible to a kind of inferential reasoning known as negative-
only concomitance.72 On the assumption that the Mīmāṃsā have the correct
72This kind of inference relies on reasoning of the form: “whatever is not X is not Y.” So,
to take a famous example, we reason from “whatever is not omnipotent is not the creator”
to “God is omnipotent because God is the creator.” We cannot observe God and so cannot
reason positively from God’s omnipresence being co-located with his being the creator.
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view against the Nyāya, it is because presumption lacks a pervasion. In con-
trast, Kasturirangan give the pervasion statement above (which I reproduce
below):
Any case of “having only red balls both in a random sample and in
a particular population” is a case of “drawing the random sample
from the particular population.”
Such a pervasion is based on the presence of a positive example (sahacāra-
darśana and lack of a negative example (vyabhicāra-adarśana). In the red ball
case, there is the observation that all balls taken from the urn are red and no
balls taken from the urn are non-red. However, they go on to note that it is
possible that, “unknown to us, there are two urns each of which has a billion
red balls, and we are aware of the first one only while the random sample is
actually drawn from the second urn.”73 This caveat is intended to show that
the red ball case does not involve “inconsistency otherwise” (by which they
mean, and subsequently say, “inexplicability,” or ‘anyathā anupapatti’). Why?
Because, they argue,
But we cannot say that: A case of ‘having only red balls both in
a random sample and in a particular population’ must be a case
of ‘drawing the random sample from the particular population,’
otherwise it is inexplicable.
Since we could be in a position with the hidden urn, unbeknownst to us, the
case is not otherwise inexplicable. There is another explanation. But this
73Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.
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cuts against their example as well. We could be a situation, where Caitra is
absent, where there is a hidden cloaking device, or Caitra has an identical twin
brother, or Caitra has the power of invisibility, or we are hallucinating, etc.
The possibilities range from the ordinary to the unlikely, but this does not
mean there are no other possibilities.
The reason that Kasturirangan et al think that there is a necessity to presump-
tion is that they characterize it as: “A case of not-being-here-while-existing
must be a case of being-somewhere-else; otherwise it is inexplicable.”74 Sim-
ilarly, in the case of Caitra’s absence from the house, we move from Caitra-
is-not-here to Caitra-is-somewhere-else. They deny that these relations are
analytic, since they say that the meaning of “Caitra is somewhere else” is not
part of the meaning of “Caitra is not at home.”75 Instead, the relationship is
the one of “cognitive mapping” between not-at-home and being-somewhere-
else.
However, as they describe presumption, it is difficult to see the explanatory
quality to the explanans, “a case of being-somewhere else” for the explanandum
“not-being-here-while-existing.” Let’s represent the explanans, “a case of being
somewhere else” with :H, for “not here.” The explanandum is then :H and E.
I would not say that :H is an explanation for the compound statement : and
E. I think a better representation of the presumptive schema is below,
74Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223.
75Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 223. Perhaps they mean to characterize the move as being
from Caitra-is-not-at-home to Caitra-is-somewhere-else, but this is not how it is written in
the text, which makes the response to their interlocutor difficult to understand.
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Caitra is known to be alive.
The surprising fact, Caitra is not home, is observed;
But if Caitra is alive and outside were true, Caitra is not home
would be a matter of course,
No available competing hypothesis can explain Caitra is not home
as well as Caitra is alive and outside does.
Hence, Caitra is alive and outside is true.
Now, the third claim, about competing hypotheses is not made explicit in
the Indian discussion of presumption, though something like it is discussed
in Mukula’s text, as we will see. Caitra’s being alive is important, since the
fact that he is not at home might cause us to doubt our earlier knowledge
that he is alive, and suppose that he is dead, and his body has been taken
somewhere. This constitutes a competing hypothesis, but we take it to be
less plausible than the alternative, that Caitra is still alive and is outside of
the house. Rather than take the surprising fact as reason to reject our earlier
belief (Caitra’s being alive), we reason that he is gone on an errand (and not
invisible, behind a cloaking device etc).
I think Kasturirangan et al, in their analysis of presumption, assume that
agents presumptive capacities are too tightly connected to the world as it is.
They come close to postulating an omniscient reasoner, saying that “a world
where beings can vanish for a while and emerge back from the ether is not a
world where [presumption] of the form, ‘X that exists and is not here must be
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somewhere else’ will work.”76. The reason is, they say, that human epistemic
systems would have different phenomenological structures. However, there
is not guarantee that our phenomenological structures map onto the way the
world is–take, for instance, inverted goggles, which flip the wearer’s perception
upside down. Eventually, persons wearing such goggles adjust, but not because
the world itself becomes inverted.77
A similar, though not identical, worry is that if Kasturirangan et al are right,
and presumption is simply the exploitation of an automatic mapping process,
it is difficult to see where to fit the phenomenology of the initial doubt or ap-
parent conflict with our background knowledge. As Mackonis points out, om-
niscient creatures would not experience an abductive trigger, as they wouldn’t
have any reason to ask for an explanation.Mackonis 2013, pp. 977-78 And yet,
on the cognitive-mapping model of presumption, the background knowledge
already has the explanation at the ready–so why would there be a feeling of
“inexplicability in explaining it any other way”? Why would our agent be
tempted to explain it in another way? The answer is that she wouldn’t. She
might be worried that her initial belief–for instance, that Caitra is alive–is
false. But this is not the phenomenological aspect emphasized by Kasturiran-
gan et al.
In conclusion, presumption or arthāpatti is equivalent to inference to the best
explanation. The Mīmāṃsā view is that presumption is a pramāṇa, that is,
76Kasturirangan et al. 2010, pp. 224.
77I owe this example and point to conversation with Josh Dever.
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that it is a means of knowledge. This does not require that every apparent
case of presumption invariably results in true beliefs or that its deliverances
cannot be overturned by later evidence. Such a claim is far too strong, and
inconsistent with the way the Mīmāṃsā understand the other pramāṇa, which
are sources of knowledge if undefeated. Instead, there are false-but-apparent
cases of presumption, perception, and so on—these are pramāṇa-ābhāsa, which
turn out to be faulty. When the explanation turns out not to be the best, we
no longer have knowledge, and indeed, never really did.
2.4 Conclusion
The Mīmāṃsā view language as an epistemic instrument, a means by which we
can acquire knowledge that is a basis for our actions. This knowledge comes
from the pramāṇa of testimony, which derives its validity not from facts about
a speaker’s authority, but in a prima facie manner similar to perception and
inference. Testimony “grips” us until we encounter defeaters. The Mīmāṃsā
were also sensitive to the fact that language is not merely, or even primar-
ily, used for asserting propositions. In ways that resonate with contemporary
speech-act theory, they were concerned with the “force” of statements. Again,
such force was not inherently parasitic on a speaker’s intention, but could
be cashed out in terms of grammatical structure. However, there are out-
standing questions of how non-literal interpretations can be retrieved. When
semantic compatibility fails, how does a hearer know what is meant? While
the Mīmāṃsā argue that testimony is not reducible to inferential reasoning or
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other pramāṇa, this does not entail that inferential reasoning (or presumption)
is not involved. After all, perception and memory are necessary for inferential




Knowing What is Meant
3.1 Introduction
We are now in a position to evaluate some of the answers given by Indian
philosophers to the question introduced in the last chapter. How do hear-
ers understand what is communicated, and thereby come to have testimonial
knowledge? In this chapter I will examine two Mīmāṃsā accounts which are
frequently taken to be, if not contradictory, at least in tension. These are the
accounts given by the Bhāṭṭa and the Prābhākara schools, two accounts which
Mukulabhaṭṭa claims to have reconciled in his Fundamentals of the Commu-
nicative Function. These accounts, in particular the Bhāṭṭa account of lexical
semantics, are part of the background against which Ānandavardhana pro-
poses his theory of suggestion. I argue that the dispute between the Bhāṭṭa
and Prābhākara, while similar in some ways to contemporary debate over con-
textualism, cuts across distinctions important to Western philosophers, such
as the distinction between mandatory and optional processes. Ānanda’s objec-
tions to the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara are the subject of the end of the chapter.
Specifically, he thinks that neither group can explain how hearers come to un-
derstand additional meanings which are intended in addition to (rather than
instead of) the literal sentence meaning. Foremost among these meanings is
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the suggested meaning known as rasa, which I clarify is propositional in nature
in contrast to how it is conceived of in later Indian philosophers. I also intro-
duce some epistemological concerns about how hearers can come to understand
rasa, although these will be developed more thoroughly in later chapters, as
they are the target of Mukulabhaṭṭa’s reply to Ānanda.
3.2 The Bhāṭṭa Theory: Words as Sentential Building
Blocks
3.2.1 The Organizing Principle of Bhāvanā
To understand the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentences, metaphors will be helpful—
for instance, that words are building blocks. In this metaphor, the building
blocks are used to to construct a structure which is a unified speech act. This
could be a text such as the Vedic texts, understood as a “great sentence”
whose aim is to communicate dharma or human duties. Everything from
phonemes to words to sentences to larger discourse units are taken as fitting
together with an eye towards the purpose of the speech act.1 In this sense,
their analysis of meaning is “bottom-up.” That is, since language functions by
assembling words together in a potentially infinite number of ways, the Bhāṭṭa
emphasize the principle of compositionality. Further, as we have seen earlier in
the discussion of “linguistic force” (bhāvanā), they emphasize the constitutent
parts of words as well.2 For instance, in the sentence








‘The heaven-desirer ought to sacrifice.’
since the Sanskrit verb is recognized as having in the optative mood by the
ending ‘-eta’, we know that the force of this sentence is a directive.3
However, this bottom-up principle is coupled with a top-down principle, in
which the “assembly” of constituent parts into meaningful units is guided by
the presumption that there is a purpose (prayojana) for the communicative
speech act. This purpose may be, as is frequently the case in the Veda, to
urge someone to act. Or it may be to describe a state of affairs, to express an
emotion, and so on. Whatever the case, the purpose of the speech act governs
the interpretation of the constituent parts.
An extended example will clarify how these two principles, compositionality





‘You should bring a/the cow.’4
3There is not always a distinction between the optative and imperative in Sanskrit, and
the optative can be used as a “soft imperative”; see Whitney 2005, p. 215 for discussion.
What I have translated as “heaven-desirer” is a bahuvṛīhi or possessive compound made
up of the word ‘svarga’ (heaven) and ‘kāmaḥ’ (desire), where phonological processes called
‘saṃdhi’ change the ‘aḥ’ ending to an ‘o.’ As a bahuvṛīhi compound, the expression ‘svarga-
kāmaḥ’ is taken adjectivally, despite its component parts being nouns. Thus, instead of
“desire for heaven” it is “one who desires heaven.” See Whitney 2005, pp. 480–85.
4At this point, we do not have enough contextual information to know whether there is
a particular single cow which should be brought, or whether anything, so long as it is a cow,
is suitable. Sanskrit lacks definite articles.
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The Mīmāṃsā (both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara) take the verb as the starting
point for their analysis. The force (bhāvanā) of the verb is understood as
having two parts: a linguistic force (śābdī-bhāvanā) and an objective force
(ārthī-bhāvanā).5 The first refers to the force that is applied to the hearer,
and is close to what speech-act theorists refer to as “illocutionary force.”6
The objective force is targeted at the results of the utterance in the world,
in contrast to the mental states of the speaker.7 We will have more to say
about both of these below. Each kind of force has three aspects, which were
introduced in Chapter 1:
• Aim. What is being produced?
• Instrument. By what means is it being produced?
• Procedure. How is it being produced?
These questions are heuristic tools for interpretation insofar as they help us get
at what contemporary theorists might call the “deep structure” of a sentence.
5In what follows, I am simplifying an analysis which is contested among the Mīmāṃsā
themselves, both between the two traditionally opposing camps of Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara
and within them. See Chapter Two of Freschi 2012 for a discussion of the debate which is
summarized in the Tantra-rahasya and Śāstra-prameya-pariccheda of Mīmāṃsaka Rāmānu-
jācārya, which Freschi’s work translates. A recent overview is found in Ollett 2013. For intro-
ductory Sanskrit texts, either the Mīmāṃsa Nyāya Prakāṣa by Āpadeva or the Arthasaṃ-
graha by Laugakṣibhāskara are useful primers, intended as introductions to the Bhāṭṭa
hermeneutic system. See Edgerton 2012 and Gajendragadkar and Karmarkar 2007. I am
grateful to Donald Davis for his willingness to read earlier versions of this chapter and
provide feedback on my discussion of Mīmāṃsā topics.
6But again, note that in the Vedic context there is no speaker whose intention grounds
such a force. The words themselves are responsible.
7Note that “objective” here is not in the sense of a contrast to “subjective,” but translates
the abstract noun ārthī, that which relates to an object or purpose. In other words, objective
force is a force which has an object or aim.
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The term “deep structure” has been variously within the literature in contem-
porary generative syntax and semantics. As Kiparsky and Staal note in their
paper situating Pāṇini’s grammar in relation to contemporary thought, for
Chomsky, both so-called “deep” and “surface” structures share formal proper-
ties, where deep structures (such as Sentence, Noun Phrase, etc.) are a subset
of surface structures.8 However, Pāṇini and many grammarians after him,
distinguish between the deep and surface structures, keeping them apart. For
them, the deep structures mediate between semantic representations and sur-
face structure. These deep structures are built up through relations between,
for instance, actors and the objects acted upon.9 The actor may or may not be
the grammatical subject of the sentence (for instance, in a passive construc-
tion, it would not be). They are thus not identical to syntactical structure.
Nor are they the same as semantic representations. Pāṇini’s grammar, the
Aṣṭhādhyāyī, maps out relations between deep structure, syntactic form, and
semantic content, and is frequently appealed to by Indian philosophers in their
analysis of sentences, the Mīmāṃsā being no exception. A contrasting pair
of sentences will help with this conception before moving on to the Mīmāṃsā
context in particular.
8Kiparsky and Staal 1969, p. 106. Their argument is that Pāṇini’s grammar operates
a conceptual space unoccupied in contemporary generative grammars, although it shares
many affinities with them.
9The word for “deep structure,” ‘kāraka’, literally means “doer of an action,” and Ab-
hyankar suggests it is extended to mean “the capacity in which a thing becomes instrumental
in bringing about an action” and that this capacity “is looked upon as the sense of the case-
affixes which express it.” Abhyankar 1961, p. 110-11.
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(3) He plays dice.
(4) He plays with dice.10
The deep structures posited by Pāṇini and others are used to connect semantic
representations to syntactic ones (and finally to phonological ones, but that
level does not concern us here). The tree below, from left to right, represents
the relationship between semantic representation to deep structure to syntax
for sentences (3) and (4).




The “Acted Upon” relationship (See Figure (3.1)), which is the same in both
sentences, is represented in (3) by the accusative case, which is frequently
how the deep structure of being an object is represented.11 In (4), the seman-
tic relationship is represented by the instrumental case, frequently how the
deep structure of being an instrument is represented. Thus the same semantic
relationship can be represented with two different deep structures (and syn-
tactic structures). However, one should not confuse case endings with deep
structure—that is, being marked as an nominative is not a guarantee that a
10Kiparsky and Staal 1969, pp. 85-86.
11Kiparsky and Staal call the semantic relationship “Instrument” but I think it is not
quite clear that this is a relationship of instrumentality. As well, I want to make clear the
distinction between the three levels.
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sentence constituent is expressing the deep structure of being an actor. Take,
for instance, the passive construction
(5) kumbaḥ kriyate
potMasc:Nom:S: is madePres:Pass:3s
‘The pot is made.’
In this sentence, while “the pot” is declined as a nominative, its referent is not
the actor but is the object of the action.12
Let us now return to how the tripartite nature of the linguistic and objective
forces is used for sentence interpretation. The analysis begins with taking
the verb as consisting of two parts: a verb root (dhātu) and a conjugational
ending (pratyaya). The conjugational ending is then further analyzed into (1)
“verbality,” or whatever it is that conveys the sense of action (in contrast to
nouns and substantives), (2) a mood marker, (3) the verb’s number, tense,
and person. The tree below illustrates this analysis. Note that it is not purely
a syntactic analysis, as will be made clearer in discussion of the objective
and linguistic force. (Boxes indicate that a fuller diagram for a node will be
presented later.)
The three parts of the two forces (linguistic and object) have “expectation”
(ākāṅkṣā), introduced in the last chapter, which force the interpreter to look
for an answer in the form of a complement somewhere within the sentence or
12See Kiparsky and Staal 1969, p. 86 for a discussion of how Pāṇinian rules allow for
these variations. This general picture of thematic relations is one familiar to contemporary
linguists. See, for instance, Jackendoff 1976, for early work.
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surrounding discourse units.13 Both of the forces are taken to cause something
to come into existence. The linguistic force acts upon the hearer. In other
words, one aspect of words having “force” is the creation of an action on the
part of the hearer (even if the action is understood as a mental event).
13There is a dispute over what this “expectation” is, similar to the debate over unartic-
ulated constituents in contemporary philosophy of language. Given a word like “bring,” is
there an argument required for all of the following: object, instrument, time, place, color,
shape, size, etc.? If so, then a sentence like “Bring the cow” is incomplete. This incomplete-
ness could be due to a syntactic failure, or the hearer’s psychological expectation that more
information be given. For contemporary discussion of this problem, see for example Perry
1998 and Recanati 2002.
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In Figure 3.2.1 (on page 117), the arrow between the linguistic force and
the objective force represents the relationship between the question “What is
being produced?” and its answer, “A desire for the object force.” In other
words, the force of the words in an imperative has as its aim the impelling of a
person to act. This is the aim of the linguistic force (sādhya), shown in Figure
3.2.1 above. To the question, “By what means is desire being produced?”
the answer is: through the hearer’s knowledge of the mood of the verb. In
this instance, since the mood is optative, the hearer knows that whatever
action is to be produced, she is being commanded or impelled. Finally, to
the question, “How is the desire being produced?” the Mīmāṃsā respond:
through the linguistic force, or the mood. In other words, there is something
about hearing a command and recognizing that it is a command which impels
a hearer to act. Further, frequently other exhortative sentences (arthavāda in
the Veda) act as encouragement to the hearer. For instance, if one urges “Go
out with us tonight!,” other sentences, like “We’ll have fun!,” “You don’t need
to do your work!” and so on may inculcate a desire to go out.14
Given that the aim of the linguistic force is to bring into existence a desire for
whatever thing the objective force aims to bring into existence, then we must
analyze the objective force. (See Figure 3.2.1 on page 121.) Again, we pose
the same three questions to determine the three aspects. At this point, the
14See, for instance, the Artha-saṁgrahaḥ of Laugākṣibhāskara: ‘iti-karttavyatā-
ākāṅkṣāyām arthavād jñāpya-prāśastyam iti-karttavyatātvena anveti.’ English translation
(mine): “With regard to the expectation of what should be done, the praise that is learned
from exhortations has a logical connection with what should be done.” Gajendragadkar and
Karmarkar 2007, p. 6.
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verbal root becomes relevant. Up to this point, only the mood and fact that
the verb conveys action in general are taken into account. All that has been
relevant is that an action is being commanded, not what the action is.
Now we ask, “What is being produced?” The Mīmāṃsā answers: a cow is
produced, by being brought. In other words, the goal of the command is for
there to be a cow, through some means. To answer “By what means is it
being produced?” the Mīmāṃsā transform the verb root into a instrumental:
“by bringing.” Third, in answer to the procedural question, “How is it being
produced?,” this particular short sentence does not tell us anything. The cow
is to be produced by bringing, but on whether it is brought by leading it with a
rope, prodding it with a stick, or so on, this sentence is silent. In fuller context,
a more precise answer might be given through the surrounding sentences in the
discourse. Without answering the procedural question, the Bhāṭṭa argue that
we are unable to bring the result about, since we don’t know how to engage
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in the action.










3.2.2 Assembling Lexical Meanings
Finally, let’s look at the lexical meaning of “cow.”15 We have focused on the
analysis of verbs as being composed of a verb root plus “verbality” plus a
conjugational case ending (containing mood, tense, number, and person). The
verb’s mood impels the hearer to bring something, and we have said that
this object is communicated by cow in the diagram above. But we have not
identified what cow refers to. Is it a single particular cow (Bessie) or any x
15An objection might be raised at this point, that nouns and other parts of speech also have
the kind of property the Mīmāṃsā describe by the term ‘bhāvanā.’ In fact, this objection is
raised by an interlocutor in the section of the TV focused on force (Jha 1924, pp. 495-96. In
reply, Kumārila first observes that nouns function differently than verbs, in that when we
hear a word like “cow,” we immediately have cognition of their denotation. In this way, the
object of nouns are already accomplished, or complete. Verbs, however, especially their root,
Kumārila argues denote something which is to be accomplished. They represent an activity,
and because of this, they require an instrument. This discussion echoes contemporary
discussion of argument structure, which is not restricted to verbs. See Comrie 1993 for an
introduction to the topic.
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such that x is a cow?
According to the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, the lexical entry for “cow” is something like
cowhood, since nouns refer to universals or class properties. Now, however,
we have a problem, which is that the objective force of the sentence seems to
require that someone bring cowhood. This is untenable, since whatever class
property all cows have in common, it is infeasible for a human being to produce
it in response to a command.16 Further, unless “cow” can be qualified by the
verb “you should bring,” we have a fault which the Mīmāṃsā call “sentence-
splitting” (vākya-bheda). By definition, a sentence is a syntactically unified
utterance, and if “cow” cannot be the object of “you should bring,” then what
we have is not a sentence, but something close to, in English:
(6) Furiously sleep green ideas colorless.
This example, due to Chomsky, illustrates syntactic deviance (which in En-
glish is frequently a matter of word order, in contrast to Sanskrit, which has
more flexible word order due to its being a case declined language). The
Mīmāṃsā appeal to lakṣaṇā to explain how the sentence (2) “gam ānaya” is
not syntactically deviant. Lakṣaṇā, which was briefly introduced to in Chap-
16We might wonder, why don’t the Mīmāṃsā simply assume that the customary reference
of nouns is an individual? The reason is their emphasis is upon how language must be a
means of knowledge: “If again, a word were to denote that individual alone to which it has
been actually applied in usage, then the word “cow” could not be used in reference to the
new-born calf.” From Śabara’s Bhāṣya, translated and cited in Jha 1942, pp. 115. In other
words, if “cow” refers to a specific cow Bessie, then we have no way to use it for another
cow, Daisy. “Cow” must refer to something which all cows have, in order for us to use it for
different cows and be understood.
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ter 1, is often translated as “indication” or “secondary meaning.” Lakṣaṇā is
a concept crucial to the debate over suggestion and poetic meaning, but it is
not limited in its relevance to metaphor and aesthetic speech acts.
Briefly, the solution to the problem with (2) is to posit a metonymical shift
from a universal to a particular.17 Lakṣaṇā is the power (śakti), activity, or
function (vyāpara), by which this shift occurs. From one standpoint, this is a
function of words (śabda-vyāpara) and so can be represented formally without
requiring conscious inferential activity on the part of the hearer. However, the
classical Indian philosophical tradition, as we have seen, is very interested in
the psychological reality of language processing. From this perspective, the
authors frequently talk as if hearers themselves first understand the referent
of “cow” as cowhood and then, finding their understanding of the sentence
blocked, settle upon an interpretation of “cow” as a particular cow.
This shift is understood by indication, introduced in the last chapter. This
is because there is an apparent conflict between literal word-denotation of
“cow” (cowhood) and the command to bring something. To avoid sentence-
splitting, hearers must understand what is meant by “cow” to be a particular
cow. We will see later how Mukula draws on this very example and develops
it in his defense of the adequacy of lakṣaṇā for a wide array of linguistic
phenomenon. For now, the general point is that for the Bhāṭṭa indication is
17Note that this is not a metaphorical shift, contra Siderits 1991, because the relationship
between a universal and a particular is part–whole, and not similarity in characteristics. The
universal cowhide does not have a dewlap, horns, etc. or properties which are metaphori-
cally similar to the dewlap, horns, etc. of a particular cow.
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necessary for speakers to understand what is meant even in putatively “literal”
sentences like (7) above.
3.3 The Prābhākara Theory: Words as Arrows Flying
to their Mark
If the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentence meaning is that words are building blocks
to construct sentences, the Prābhākara understand words as arrows on their
way to a target.18 The target, a particular sentence meaning, delimits how
far the word ranges, and so in this metaphor word meanings are not cognized
by hearers as the same in every context, but as different, qualified by their
relationship to the sentence in which they are found. We find the Prābhākara
view articulatd by Śālikanātha Miśra in his Prakaraṇa-pañcikā, or Elaborative
Exposition (henceforth PP).19 In what follows, I begin with the Prābhākara
rebuttal to the Bhāṭṭa view and then give the general contours of their pos-
itive account. Along the way, I argue that the position of contextualism in
contemporary philosophy of language can be a useful way to understand the
18This analogy is due to the Kaumudī, and is mentioned by Abhinavagupta in his commen-
tary on the Dhvanyāloka: ‘yo ‘py anvita-abhidhāna-vādi yat-paraḥ śabdaḥ sa śabda-artha iti
hṛdaye gṛhītvā śaravad abhidhā-vyāpāram eva dīrgha-dīrgham icchati.’ Ingalls’ translation:
“Now the school of anvitābhidhāna holds dearly to the doctrine that ‘the word’s meaning
is that to which the word [finally] leads,’ and would have it that the denotative operation
continues longer and longer, like the course of an arrow.” Amaladass 1984.
19For Sanskrit text and English commentary, see Śālikanātha 1934. For a lengthier analy-
sis of the text, see Sarma 1990. As Sarma notes (p.5), Śālikanatha’s work was cited by later
thinkers such as Bhavanāthamiśra, Bhoja, Rāmānuja, Udayana, Vācaspati, and others, as
an authoritative source of Prābhākara views. While Śālikanātha, being approximately the
10th century CE, post-dates Mukulabhaṭṭa, the Prābhākara views in the PP were being
discussed in his day, as shown by their being quoted as the opponent, or pūrva-pakṣin, in
earlier texts (such as the Bhāvanā-viveka of Maṇḍanamiśra).
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central insights of the Prābhākara.20
The Prābhākara, as discussed above, see a distinction between the way Vedic
texts and human language convey meaning. For them, only the former is
obtained via the pramāṇa of testimony. Human utterances are understood
through an inference to speaker intentions, relying on semantic content as
“inferential marks.” That said, both the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa are writing
in a polemical context against nominalist Buddhists, who view language much
more skeptically, arguing that it does not make contact with reality in the way
that humans ordinarily think it does.21 So the Prābhākara are concerned to
show that in both the Vedic and the human contexts, we can come to know
the world through speech.22 They have two central objections to the Bhāṭṭa
analysis, one to do with how we learn language, and the other with how we
20For some earlier work on this topic, especially its relationship to contemporary Western
philosophy, see Siderits 1991 and the reply and positive proposal in Taber 1989a, as well as
Prasad 1994. Siderits’ book focuses upon lessons Western philosophers can draw from the
Bhāṭṭa–Prābhākara dispute that are relevant to the sense–reference distinction, in particular
that the Prābhākara have an account which is superior to the Bhāṭṭa in accounting for such
a distinction. Taber argues that, in fact, both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara can be read claiming
that words have both a sense and a reference. Further, Taber (I think successfully) argues
that the real importance of the Prābhākara view is that they recognize the mutability of
word-meanings from context to context. Taber concludes his analysis by saying that, on
the Prābhākara view, “The referent of a word, thus, changes somewhat from sentence to
sentence. That is to say, it is not even the same type of thing in every case. And I believe
that is a slightly different understanding of reference than is found in modern Western
philosophy of language” (p. 423). I will argue in Chapter Seven that, in fact, the concerns
of the Mīmāṃsā are accounted for in contemporary theories of type-shifting, a theory not
countenanced by Taber.
21See, for instance, Taber 2002, p. 163ff for a short discussion of the dialectic, as well as
Siderits 1991.
22The Sanskrit term I’m glossing as “human contexts” is ‘laukika’, which strictly speaking
means ordinary or worldly.
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understand a particular utterance meaning.
3.3.1 Learning Meaning through Action
The Prābhākra object first that if the Bhāṭṭa are correct, we would have no
explanation for how we come to master the relationship between a word and
its referent. As children, we learn language by watching other people use
words associated with actions. The Mīmāṃsā take injunctions as the basis for
language-learning. So, for instance, a child learns words from hearing
(7) Bring me a cow.
and seeing someone bring a cow. In another situation, she hears
(8) Bring me a goat.
and watches someone retrieve a goat. By observing the correlation between
sentences uttered and the subsequent (correct) actions performed, children
learn how words function in sentences. Now, both the Prābhākara and Bhāṭṭa
agree that it is this process that grounds acquisition of language skills. Where
they disagree is on the implication for a philosophical theory of meaning. From
this process the Prābhākara conclude that words alone cannot cause the sort
of cognitive act we consider “meaning,” but that they do so only in sentence
context.23 If the Bhāṭṭa were correct and words, on their own, could convey
meaning, there would be no need for this sort of language-learning process.
23Jha 1942, p. 136-137.
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We could use “cow” on its own, outside of any context, in order to convey its
meaning. However, the Prābhākara argue that this is not how language works,
and that this is evident from observing children learning word-meanings.
In response, the Bhāṭṭa argue that we recognize the different uses of “cow”
only because the word has some stable, core meaning in each of the various
contexts of learning. Otherwise, I would have to learn that “cow” means
something different for each of the following sentences:
(9) Go milk a cow.
(10) A cow is a four-legged animal.
(11) Don’t have a cow, man.
Given that there are a vast number of possible contexts and sentences in which
one could use “cow,” if what’s required to know the meaning of “cow” is to
know its meaning in each particular case, the Bhāṭṭa complain that language-
learning would never get off the ground.
In contrast, the Prābhākara argue that what is meant by “cow” in (9) is the
class-property of cowhood which inheres in some (though not any particular)
single cow, in (10) is meant all those things which have the class property of
cowhood, and in (11) is meant (perhaps) an emotional state which is metaphor-
ically similar to that which occurs when birthing a cow. The class property of
cowhood is never understood on its own, but always as qualified.
How should we assess the dialectic here? First, an observation: it is un-
clear what we ought to conclude about our theory of meaning from observing
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language-learning. Take, for instance, the case of proper names. We cannot
settle the dispute over whether the meaning of a proper name like “Deva-
datta” is a definite description (“the fat man who eats at night”) or its refer-
ent (Devadatta) by appealing to the way in which we come to know how to
use “Devadatta.” After all, there are many ways that I could come to learn
how to use “Devadatta” successfully. What we’re interested is knowing in
what such success consists, if that success involves coming to know a meaning.
This is a further theoretical question.24 To illuminate the way in which the
Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara dispute is similar to one in contemporary philosophy
language, I now turn to the work of François Recanati, who is a proponent of
contextualism.
3.3.2 Contextualism and “What is Said”
There are many varieties of contextualism.25 In general, contextualists claim
that what is said by a speaker with a sentence in a context is determined by
contextual processes.26 These processes include, but are not limited to, the as-
24In Indian philosophy, the meaning of a name was often understood just to be its referent,
broadly along the lines of Millianism in contemporary Western philosophy. However, this
was not the only position (some philosophers were more akin to descriptivists). Further,
even the direct–reference position was made more nuanced in order to address problems
similar to the classic Frege puzzle of co-referring terms. See Chapter 8, “Pāribhāṣiki: The
Meaning of Names” in Ganeri 2006 for an introductory overview in comparison with Western
thought.
25For instance, the relevance theoretical approach could be characterized as “contextual-
ist,” although relevance theorists do not draw distinctions between sub-sentential processes
in the same way as Recanati. See Chapter 3 in Recanati 2004 for a discussion of the differ-
ences been Recanati and Robyn Carston, Dan Sperber, and Deirdre Wilson.
26I use what is said in a technical sense, hence my use of italics.
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signment of values to indexicals and other semantically mandatory processes.
Contextualists argue that contextual processes which are unnecessary for gen-
erating a complete proposition—processes that are frequently characterized as
“pragmatic” and “optional,”—do in fact inform what is said. The concept of
what is said can be initially grasped by reflecting on the intuitive distinction
between what one is and is not committed to by uttering a sentence.
To motivate his version of contextualism, Recanati gives the example of
(12) I am French.27
Recanati claims that if he utters this in response to the question, “Can you
cook?” he is only committed to the claim that he is French. As we saw in
the last chapter, where to draw the line between what is said and what is
implicated is a crucial question. In this example, Recanati argues that he,
the speaker, has conversationally implicated that he can cook, trading on the
stereotype of the French as good cooks. While the sentence is used as an
answer (in the affirmative), he has not said “Yes, I can cook” in this technical
sense of said. Another way to distinguish between what is said and other
aspects of an utterance is by asking what the truth conditions are for (12). In
the mouth of Recanati, this sentence expresses a true proposition if and only
if Recanati is French. Thus, what is said is more robust than what a sentence-
type means, since the sentence-type makes no reference to Recanati (“I” picks
out whoever utters the sentence). His hearers understand his implicature via
27Recanati 2004, p. 5.
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inferential reasoning—in a broad sense, not necessarily in the stricter sense
Indian philosophers have of the term as a pramāṇa. However, this implicature
is defeasible, as he could continue to add, “And, sadly, despite this, I cannot
cook,” canceling the implicature.
Recanati contrasts his variety of contextualism with what he calls “Minimal-
ism.” He characterizes Minimalists as holding the view that only those contex-
tual processes necessary for a sentence-type to express a meaning are involved
in what is said.28 The process of assigning semantic values to the compo-
nents of a sentence is called “saturation.” For instance, sentences containing
indexicals require assignments, but once the mandatory saturation process is
complete–or once a proposition, no matter how general, is available—the re-
sulting proposition is what is said by the sentence, on the Minimalist account.
While Recanati and the Minimalist might agree, in the context above, on what
is said by a speaker in uttering (12), they disagree in the case of sentences
like
(13) I’ve had breakfast.29
Minimalists claim that (13) expresses the proposition that the speaker has had
breakfast at a time before the time of its utterance. However, when used in
response to the question “Do you want something to eat?,” the speaker uses
it to convey that she isn’t hungry because she’s had breakfast recently. The
28He characterizes Kent Bach, Herman Cappelen, Ernie Lepore, as belonging to this camp.
29Recanati 2004, p. 7-8.
130
truth conditions of what is said, on the Minimalist account ,are satisfied if
the speaker has eaten breakfast once, twenty years ago. All that is said is
that the speaker has had breakfast, once, prior to the time of the utterance.
Further, there is nothing mandatory in the sentence structure that requires
sharpening the temporal space within which the breakfast-eating occurs. This
is unlike the case of indexicals, which require a semantic value, for instance,
corresponding to the speaker. Minimalists conclude that (13) is like (12), in
that optional contextual processes are what get us to the further proposition
that the speaker has had breakfast recently. This is a matter of implicature
(whether generalized or particularized).30
The Minimalist picture is similar to the Bhāṭṭa account, in that a sentence
such as (2) ‘gam ānaya’ (“Bring a cow”) has as its content, prior to lakṣaṇā,
a proposition involving cowhood.31 Like the Minimalists, there is a gap
between the intuitive satisfiability conditions of the sentence before lakṣaṇā
and after lakṣaṇā.32 Strictly speaking, the command is satisfied if someone
brings the universal class property of cowhood. However, the Bhāṭṭa re-
quire that the sentence communicate something actionable, and as we’ve seen,
understood in this way, the request is nonsensical.33 Thus the hearer relies
30See Recanati 2004, p. 12.
31Arguably, before lakṣaṇā, there is no proposition at all, but something more like a
propositional radical, since we do not yet have a structured thought. In either case, the
Bhāṭṭa are committed to words having successfully prompted us to have a mental cognition
of things like cowhood, and in this lies the denotative capacity of words.
32The paradigmatic cases of the Mīmāṃsā are commands, and so we cannot talk in terms
of truth conditions.
33Or the command has underdetermined satisfiability conditions. There are a variety
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on something like inference to the best explanation (arthāpatti, as described
earlier) to recover the more appropriate content of the command: bring a
particular/individual cow. In one sense, this process is not required by the
syntactical structure of the sentence. Words, in the metaphorical image used
by Indian philosophers, expend their “power” once they have communicated
their referent, a universal. While lakṣaṇā is essentially required for any utter-
ance of a string of words to be a coherent sentence, lakṣaṇā is grounded in the
hearer’s sense that something is amiss.
Recanati’s response to the Minimalists and the Prābhākara response to the
Bhāṭṭa are strikingly analogous. They both emphasize what is consciously
available to the hearer. Take Recanati on the sentence
(14) John has three children.
Suppose for example that I am asked how many children John has
and that I reply by uttering [“John has three children”]. Clearly,
in this context, I mean that John has (exactly) three children—
no more and no less. This is standardly accounted for by saying
that the proposition literally expressed, to the effect that John has
at least three children, combines with the ‘implicature’ that John
has no more than three children...as a result of this combination,
what is globally communicated—and what I actually mean—is the
proposition that John has exactly three children. Now this is the
of ways in which we could satisfy the command to bring cowhood, depending on one’s
metaphysics. One could bring a cow-shaped-thing (on the view that the class property is a
shape, or ākṛti), a dead cow, a group of cows, etc.
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only proposition that I am conscious of expressing by my utter-
ance...34
Recanati goes on to criticize the Minimalist willingness to accept what is said
as being frequently unavailable to consciousness. Why, he asks, would we in
some cases, as in (12), be able to distinguish between what is said and what
is implicated, and in others, like (13), conflate the two? His solution, what he
calls his Availability Principle is to claim that what is said is consciously
available to hearers and speakers, and that this conscious availability is a
mark of meaning.35 The illustrations of language-learning invoked earlier by
the Prābhākara are better understood as eliciting an intuition along the lines
of Recanati’s Availability Principle.
Śālikanātha says,
Wise people recognize that the meaning of a sentence is just word
meanings, which are a mutually interconnected sequence that has
been obtained (by those words), related as subsidiary (words) to
primary (sentence)...
...As to how the primary (sentence) meaning is something which
can be conveyed as a particular qualified meaning, (we say) it is in
fact the communication of the subsidiary meaning, since they have
34Recanati 2004, p. 11, italics original.
35Specifically, conscious availability is a mark of non-natural meaning, a concept due
to Grice. Non-natural meaning is a broader class than linguistic meaning, as it can be
communicated through gestures, pictures, and so on. Non-natural meaning is contrasted
with natural meaning. For instance, spots on a patient “means” measles in a natural sense.
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as their aim (tātparya) just this very thing. The sentence meaning
is the object of knowledge (prameya).36
In this passage, Śālikanātha describes the relationship between word-meaning
and sentence-meaning as between a subsidiary and a primary. What is known
to us, or, in Recanati’s terminology, what is consciously available, is the sen-
tence meaning. Word-meanings are instrumental, insofar as they relate to one
another (in what we might characterize as subconscious processes). They are
not the object of our knowledge (prameya). What the example of language-
learning points out, then, is that what is available to us for acquiring compe-
tence in a language is not, as the Bhāṭṭa might suggest, that “cow” always
picks out cowhood. Rather, “cow” is used in a number of ways, and in order
for us to act upon a speaker’s utterance, we have to know what it means in
that particular context. Further, this is what the speaker wants us to recog-
nize, and this is the purpose of words (their tātparya). The goal of words is
to be qualified by other words to the point where we have a complete sen-
tence that is actionable. For the Prābhākara, on the Bhāṭṭa view, we are left
with (at best) a minimal proposition and (at worst) a string of disconnected
words.
Take the earlier example of (2) “Bring the cow.” For the Bhāṭṭa, in the terms
of the diagram above, before lakṣaṇā operates, what is said is what is denoted
36Translation mine, text found in Śālikanātha 1934, p 352. pradhāna-guṇa-bhāvena
labdha-anyonya-samanvayān, pada-arthān eva vākya-arthān saṅgirante vipaścitaḥ...yad-dhi
pradhāna-bhūtaṃ tad eva katham nāma viśiṣṭaṃ pratīyatām ity evam arthaṃ guṇānāṃ
pratipādanam, tena tatra eva tātparyam. tad eva prameyam.
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by the words: cowhood, is–to–be–brought. But what is communicated is
understood through an interpreter relying upon arthāpatti, through the force
of lakṣaṇā, described above. Thus what is communicated is “Bring a cow.”
For the Prābhākara, the capacity of words is to designate in relation to other
words, and so what is said is simply, “Bring a cow.” The word “cow,” through
the fact of its being related to the Sanskrit imperative, comes to mean a
particular cow without lakṣaṇā.
3.4 Contemporary and Indian Theories of Sentence Mean-
ing
Despite the broad similarities I’ve sketched between the contemporary ap-
proaches and the positions advocated by the two Mīmāṃsā camps, there are
some important distinctions. On the Minimimalist/Bhāṭṭa side, these are
the differences between optional processes and lakṣaṇā. On the Contextu-
alist/Prābhākara side, the distinctions are between primary and secondary
pragmatic processes and word-meaning in relation.
First, it is worth noting that the Mīmāṃsā did have a concept somewhat
equivalent to saturation in the case of indexicals. Śabara observes in two
places that pronouns (sarva-nāma) refer to objects previously mentioned in
the discourse.37 What pronouns express is the meaning of the prior (pūrva-
ukta) word. So, while the Bhāṭṭa may not be conceiving language in terms
of free or bound variables and the like, they do distinguish between what
37Devasthali 1997, p. 93.
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is the innate capacity of a word (śakti) and what is due to lakṣaṇā, which
picks up where the word’s capacity ends. I suggest that by “capacity of a
word,” they are intending something like what contemporary philosophers call
“mandatory” processes.
What makes the Bhāṭṭa view less easily categorized is the question of whether
lakṣaṇā is truly optional or not. In one sense it is. Throughout the Bhāṭṭa
exposition of hermeneutic principles, in example sentences, the aim is to con-
strue a sentence meaning without resorting to lakṣaṇā. Reliance upon lakṣaṇā
is, in a sense, a last resort, useful when there is a problem in construing the
sentence as a single, syntactically unified thing which makes sense. We can un-
derstand plenty of sentences without it, and these sentences are ones that have
truth-conditions (or satisfiability conditions) and cause us to have knowledge.
Thus we do not need lakṣaṇā, and it is optional.
There is a tension in the Bhāṭṭa account, however, and that is due to the fact
that nouns will denote universals, as we have seen above. Thus while lakṣaṇā
is described as optional, a last resort, and an interpretive process aiming to
remove apparent inconsistency, in reality, it is resorted to frequently to yield
something truth-evaluable. The Bhāṭṭa often speak as if this is a conscious
process, where cognition of something truth-evaluable is blocked (bādha), and
then the interpreter must use arthāpatti to discern what the right reading
should be. This is an implausible account of our language-processing, how-
ever. We frequently are not aware of any initial interpretation, even in highly
metaphorical cases, let alone cases of metonymy. Whether we characterize
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them as “inferential” (in the Indian sense of anumāṇa) or not, our linguistic
processes function rapidly and without conscious awareness of them. In any
case, this is a point we will return to below in Ānandavardhana’s criticism,
and again as Mukulabhaṭṭa attempts to salvage the view.
I conclude this discussion by addressing some remaining questions about the
Prābhākara proposal. On their analysis, words designate their meanings only
in combination with other words, and they do this to the fullest extent pos-
sible. Should this be understood as a semantic or a pragmatic process? If
by “semantic process” we mean, with Recanati, a mandatory process which
relies upon contextual values to fill empty “slots” or variables, then the an-
swer is, yes, sometimes. Anaphoric pronouns, as we saw above, were observed
by the Mīmāṃsā, and must be assigned values for there to be a sentence, or
vākya.
The real difficulty is getting clear on the Prābhākara conception of words
acquiring their meaning in context. One reason to describe the process as
mandatory is because they describe it as being part of the designative capacity
of words. For instance, Siderits interprets the Prābhākara as holding the view
that all words are “semantically incomplete” and in this way, what the word
“cow” means is: “cowR(x)” where the x is some entity or relational complex
and “R” represents some relationship.38 Understood in this way, they would
38Siderits 1991, p. 48. Importantly, the Prābhākara would argue that we do not compre-
hend this incomplete semantic contribution of a word but only understand it as related to
other aspects of the sentence.
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not draw a distinction between so-called “optional” and “mandatory” processes
(such as free enrichment and saturation, respectively). Since the designative
capacity of words just is to convey an appropriately context-specific meaning,
the entire process is “mandatory.”
However, as Taber points out, and as is clear in Śālikanātha’s presentation,
the Prābhākara do admit that there is some “core” or “own-meaning” that is
invariant across contexts, and which hearers are reminded of when they hear
a sentence.39 Śālikanātha describes the process of comprehension as requiring
the interpreter’s having a memory of what objects the words typically are
paired with, though he rejects this memory as constituting the “meaning”
of words.40 This suggests some distinction between the capacity of words to
remind us of objects and their designative capacity.
Ultimately, whether the Prābhākara’s analysis is to be construed as consisting
(in contemporary terms) of mandatory or optional processes may be unan-
swerable, given that these distinctions are not the relevant ones for for the
Mīmāṃsā conceptual space. It does seem, at least, that the Prābhākara would
admit that there is a distinction between how words “remind” us of their ob-
jects and how they convey their related meanings, and this could be taken as
admitting of a distinction between different kinds of processes. However, what
we can conclude is that the Prābhākara reject the role of lakṣaṇā in consti-
tuting what is said, whereas the Bhāṭṭa accept lakṣaṇā as, if not necessary by
39See footnote 20 on Taber 1989a, p.429. Also, Śālikanātha 1934, p.380-81.
40Śālikanātha 1934, pp. 381-82.
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definition, at least required in practice. I now to turn to Ānandavardhana’s
reason for rejecting both of these views as insufficient accounts of what is
communicated by language.
3.5 Emotions and Implicatures in Ānandavardhana
As I have said, one of the reasons that Ānandavardhana proposes a new lin-
guistic function is that he believes the richness of speaker intentions has been
overlooked by the Indian tradition. When a speaker utters a sentence or writes
a poem (the latter is certainly Ānanda’s primary focus), she has chosen par-
ticular words based upon her intention. For example, there seems to be some
subtle difference between:
(15) John invited Mary to the ball.
(16) Mary was invited to the ball by John.
One explanation is that the active voice connotes the subject’s sense of re-
sponsibility and agency, whereas the passive voice avoids culpability and de-
emphasizes the subject’s role. However, there is also a difference in topic
between the two sentences, a difference which is sometimes reflected in their
prosodic profile (the intonation and stress speakers put into words)–when we’re
talking about sentences uttered rather than written.41 As we saw earlier, in
terms of the underlying kāraka or what Kiparsky calls “deep structure,” the
41I owe this point and example to Hans Kamp.
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passive and active constructions represent the same qualified relationship. The
truth conditions of the two sentences are identical. However, Ānanda is con-
cerned with more than just this aspect of utterances. He thinks that, par-
ticularly in the provenance of poetry, philosophers have overlooked the ways
speakers convey additional meanings such as (1) figures of speech, (2) implied
statements or facts, and (3) rasa, or aesthetic quality. He argues that nei-
ther the Prābhākara nor the Bhāṭṭa can account for what is communicated,
if what is communicated includes these three phenomena. In his analysis of
these phenomena, Ānanda’s concern turns out to be with what are widely
known as “implicatures” in the Western tradition. Some of these phenomena,
such as rasa, will turn out to fall beyond the boundaries of what contemporary
philosophers take as implicatures, however.
3.5.1 Implied figures of speech and other meanings
The problem of retrieving implicatures is especially vexing against the models
of sentence understanding described above. As we saw in the example of (2)
above, the Bhāṭṭa appeal to lakṣaṇā to allow the word “cow” to be qualified by
“you should bring.” This is because words must have semantic “fit” (yogyatā).
When this is lacking, then we resort to lakṣaṇā. This occurs, for instance, in




‘The student is fire.’42
is taken metaphorically by lakṣaṇā.
However, this Bhāṭṭa analysis fails to account for what is communicated in all
cases of figurative speech. Since Ānanda is working with poetic utterances,
let’s take Billy Joel’s song lyrics as an example:
(18) We didn’t start the fire.
In contrast with (17) “The student is fire,” where there is a violation of seman-
tic fit, this sentence is grammatically and semantically acceptable. There is a
literal interpretation available to us: Billy Joel didn’t start a particular (lit-
eral) conflagration. However, when Billy Joel says “We didn’t start the fire”
in the 1989 hit of the same name, he is not speaking literally. Instead, he is
referring to a metaphorical conflagration characterized by lyrics such as
Harry Truman, Doris Day, Red China, Johnnie Ray,
South Pacific, Walter Winchell, Joe DiMaggio,
Joe McCarthy, Richard Nixon, Studebaker, television
North Korea, South Korea, Marilyn Monroe,
Rosenbergs, H-bomb, Sugar Ray, Panmunjom
Brando, “The King and I” and “The Catcher in the Rye”
On the Bhāṭṭa analysis of sentence meaning, a hearer would be guided in her
interpretation by the verb “start.” As with the case of cow, a particular fire,
42Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 440.
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rather than the universal class of fires, is best understood as the object of the
action.43 However, in his treatment of non-literal meaning, Kumārila does not
take up metaphors where an acceptable literal meaning is available. Instead,
he accounts for metaphors such as (17). Regarding this sentence, he argues in
the Tantravārttika,
...we are not cognisant of any sort of invariable concomitance of
the student with the fire (italics original); what we are cognisant of
in this sentence is that, (1) the word ‘fire’ denotes the class ‘fire’;
(2) this class indicates the qualities of fire, such as the peculiar
colour, brightness, etc.; and (3) the presence of these qualities in
the student gives rise, through similarity, to the idea of his being
fire itself.44
However, in the case of (18) there is no explicit, attempt at identification of
the sort ‘A is B’ that causes an apparent failure of semantic fit, which is how
Kumārila explains non-literal interpretation in the following sections of the
Tantravārtika.45
The Prābhākara account, in contrast, would be that “fire” simply extends
its meaning to fit into what is most appropriate for the context. Their view
might be able to account for cases like (18) as well as (17), but it is less suited
43This is especially likely to be true given the use of the definite article in English, although
definite descriptions can be understood generically. As noted earlier, Sanskrit does not use
definite articles but philosophers and grammarians did distinguish between generic and
particular as well as between specific and non-specific readings of nouns.
44Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 440.
45See Adihkaraṇa 12, Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 441ff.
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for situations where there is a tension between the literal sentence meaning
and the meaning the speaker wants to convey with it. For example, in the
metaphor above, there is some residual impact that the literal meaning of
“fire” has on the interpreter. Metaphorical use of words strikes us, often, as
different from simply exaggerated use.46
For instance, Ānanda discusses a case where the literal meaning is a prohi-
bition, but there is another meaning the speaker wishes to convey (which he
argues is gotten through suggestion) that is an invitation. The example he
uses is
(19) Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:
Look, traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see
You must not fall into my bed.47
Here there is no problem with semantic fit. The utterance is acceptable and
has an easily understood literal meaning: “You must not fall into my bed.”
But Ānanda argues that the speaker (a woman whose husband is away is
inviting the traveler) is using a prohibition to disguise an invitation to adultery.
Ānanda’s commentor, Abhinavagupta, points to word choice such as ‘rātry-
andha’, as an explanation for how we can know this is the case. This compound
46There is the question of what to do with conventionalized expressions like “on fire,”
where this tension is not felt, in ordinary contexts, at least.
47Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 98. In what follows, I treat the poem as an actual utterance
from a woman to avoid having to analyze the intention of the poet in addition to the
intention of the (fictional) speaker.
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word means “blind at night,” and Abhinava takes it as hinting at the traveler
being out of his senses with desire.48 A Gricean explanation might point to the
unnecessary prolixity of the woman as failure of the Maxim of Quantity, “Do
not make your contribution more informative than is required.” This would
prompt the hearer to reason (through some manner which we have not yet
specified) to conclude she has a purpose in being this informative–otherwise,
why the need to emphasize not falling into her bed?
The other kind of additional meaning that Ānanda is interested in explaining,
is discourse-level figures of speech. Take, for example,
(20) The reddening moon has so seized the face of night
With her trembling stars,
That all her cloak of darkness in the east
falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.49
In this case, while lakṣaṇā could explain the lack of apparent semantic fit
between “moon” and “seized” and the night’s having a face, being confused,
having a cloak, and so on, there are multiple levels of figurative language be-
ing employed. There is the sentence-level personification of the moon and the
night, which hearers might grasp through the Bhāṭṭa’s method of indication,
or the Prābhākara’s contextualism. In addition, the stanza describes a moon-
rise through picturesque and indirect language. Finally, the personification of
48Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 99.
49Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137.
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the moon and the evening correspond to the movements of male and female
lovers. This interpretation is available in part by double-meanings to words
such as “reddening,” which in Sanskrit can mean either love or red, and “stars,”
which can also mean “pupil.” The grammatical genders of the moon and night
(masculine and feminine, respectively) also support this interpretation.50
While these kinds of interpretive layers are common in poetry, they are also
present in ordinary speech. Speakers frequently make use of irony, implicit
analogies and imagery, indirect invitations, and so forth, in ways that their
hearers do come to understand. Ānanda’s claim is that existing explanations,
which would rely upon some combination of inferential reasoning, arthāpatti,
and testimony (understood as word-denotation and lakṣaṇā) are insufficient.
The Bhāṭṭa cannot account for cases where a literal interpretation is available
and yet a different meaning is communicated as well. The Prābhākara cannot
account for cases where there is an interpretation relying on two simultaneously
available readings. Yet, Ānanda argues, both situations are common to how
speakers communicate. Therefore, he concludes, something is missing from
both analyses, which he claims is the suggestive capacity of expressions. His
positive proposal is the subject of the next chapter. Before turning to this, I
briefly take up the topic of emotional content in communication.
50As Ingalls notes, it is possible to read the entire stanza with a different meaning: “The
lover, with aroused passion, kisses the face of his beloved, whose eyes tremble, so that she
drops her robe entirely before him without noticing what she has done in her confusion.”
However, the usual interpretation is that these two versions are separate and the one suggests
the other. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 138.
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3.5.2 The Metaphysics and Epistemology of Rasa
The above examples of (11) and (20) are notable because they convey emo-
tional content or prompt emotional responses. As mentioned earlier, Ānanda
argues that rasa, or an aesthetic experience which is grounded in emotion, is
the proper aim of all poetry, and that this is what suggestion conveys. Recall
that in the Indian tradition, there are eight kinds of rasa: the erotic, comic,
pathetic, furious, heroic, terrible, repugnant, and wonderful (with a ninth, the
peaceful, added later, along with others). The sentences of (20) above are
characterized as suggesting the erotic rasa. We might put it this way: What
good is a poem if it doesn’t move us? After all, if someone reads (20) and
comes away impressed by the wordplay, but without an experience of rasa,
they have misunderstood the passage.51 However, it is only with Abhinav-
agupta, Ānanda’s commentator, that rasa comes to be a response on the part
of the reader. For Ānanda, rasa is linguistic, as he emphasizes in arguing
that suggestion is a linguistic vyāpara, or function, as Sheldon Pollock has
shown.52
The fact that Ānanda does characterize rasa as meaning, rather than a reader’s
emotional response, understanding it alongside of the other, ordinary linguis-
tic functions, raises two questions. First, what is the metaphysical status of
51Alternately, we could say that the poet has done her job poorly. Ānanda focuses on
this possibility in several sections of the Dhvanyāloka in which he prescribes ways that poets
ought to write in order to convey rasa. However, if a poet has written well, then the fault
lies at the feet of the interpreter. This view strongly emphasizes that there is a normative
dimension to even poetic interpretation.
52Pollock 2012.
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rasa? That is, should we understand it to be propositional in nature? Sec-
ond, what is the epistemology of rasa? That is, how do hearers understand
rasa? Whether or not Ānanda himself emphasized these two questions, they
arise from the subject–matter itself. Thus while Pollock may be right to say
that Ānanda himself “shows no interest whatever in rasa as an epistemolog-
ical problem let alone in the subjective experience of rasa,” since it is “the
viewer/reader who is always the one making the judgments about the suc-
cessful or unsuccessful manifestation of rasa,” we his readers can (and indeed,
ought to) address the problem.53 And, in fact, the Sanskrit literary tradition,
in reading Ānanda’s Dhvanyāloka, did take up the metaphysical and episte-
mological problems, viewing them as intimately connected. Further, since
Ānanda himself considered the status of suggestion alongside other pramāna
such as inferential reasoning, I think it is fair to say he did have some interest
in rasa as an epistemological problem, even if it was up to later generations
to spell out these issues more explicitly.
One criticism of Ānandavardhana’s theory is put forward by Dhanañjaya in his
Daśarūpika and exposited by Dhanika in his Avaloka, around 975 CE. Again,
Pollock:
...what Dhanika’s comment suggests is that any given theoretical
position on the location (or, generally, ontology) of rasa—whether
it exists in the text or in the receiver—was intimately connected
with a particular modality of its cognitive genesis (or, generally,
53Pollock 2012, p. 235.
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epistemology)...54
In other words, we can draw conclusions about what epistemic process allows
us to cognize an object in virtue of its ontological status. With regard to rasa,
what Dhanañjaya argued was that it could be reproduced but not manifested
(meaning “illuminated” or “made visible”). Manifestation is defined through
example: a pot is made manifest by light after it has been created by clay.
Crucially, the pot cannot be created by the clay as well as light, and certainly
not simultaneously. Suppose we start with the assumption that rasa is a fea-
ture of a character in a poem or play. If this is so, then it must be created in
the character by certain narrative events which are responsible for the char-
acter’s having a particular emotional response. By definition, the same causal
process (narrative events) cannot give rise to the manifestation of rasa. So it
is by the textual features (figures of speech, phonemes, etc.) of the poem that
rasa is made visible or apparent—in the character, on the analysis.
But Dhanañjaya notes that the character is not alive, and so cannot experience
rasa. Further, he observes that poetry’s goal should be understood as aimed
at its readers, not at its characters. Finally, unless we attribute rasa to the
reader, we cannot make sense out of the responses readers do have to poetry.
After all, when reading love poetry, we are not embarrassed at overhearing
intimate conversation between lovers, nor jealous, and so on. So we ought to
conclude that rasa is found in the reader, and not the character. Given this, we
54Pollock 2012, p. 237.
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must then reconsider the epistemic process which leads us to it. In the Indian
aesthetic tradition, then, consideration of rasa becomes a question of mental
processes (citta-vṛtti), not linguistic ones (śabda-vṛtti). The process proposed
by Dhanañjaya is reproduction (bhāvakatva), a way to apprehend aesthetic
objects—which are distinguished from linguistic objects insofar as the former
are psychological and the latter, qua referents, are part of the extra-mental
world.55
While the debate over rasa’s ontology is fascinating and complex, for our pur-
poses, we are concerned with how it helps us understand Ānanda’s original
position. What we can conclude is that (1) Ānanda was understood to be
arguing for a character/text–centered metaphysics of rasa, and (2) the epis-
temic and metaphysical questions were viewed as mutually related. We will
see that (2) is evident in Ānanda’s own analysis as we take up his discussion
of inferential reasoning and rasa in the next chapter.
If rasa is a variety of meaning just like primary meaning and lakṣaṇā, then
how should we characterize its form in the example given earlier, of the erotic
rasa?
(20) The reddening moon has so seized the face of night
With her trembling stars,
That all her cloak of darkness in the east
55Pollock 2012, p. 236-37.
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falls thus unnoticed by her in confusion.56
Perhaps its suggested meaning is just:
(21) That poem has the character of erotic rasa.
However, as we will see more clearly in the next chapter, Ānanda talks about
rasa-dhvani as belonging not only to a poem, but to individual words, figures
of speech, and even phonemes. These various levels work together in order to
form a unified rasa. So the suggested meaning might need to include all of
these elements.
We will also see that Ānanda distinguishes between what is suggested and
what is expressed by the sentence-meaning (both directly and indirectly). On
his view, suggested meaning, whether rasa or its other varieties, is, while part
of what is communicated, but not what is expressed. As part of the content of
the communicative act, rasa, like implicatures or perlocutionary aims, can be
understood or missed by the hearer. Ānanda does not dwell on this problem
too much, however, since his focus is on the text. In later thinkers, such as
Abhinavagupta, something called “apparent” or “specious rasa” (rasa-abhāsa’)
turns up as a defect in the reader’s experience. This is because of the new
emphasis on the reader’s reception of rasa, something that is not developed in
Ānanda, though he does describe the normatively best reader, the sahṛdaya,
or “sensitive critic.”57
56Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137.
57The term ‘rasa-abhāsa’ predates Abhinavagupta, and is found in Ānanda as well as
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It is against the background of the competing sentence-meaning theories above
that Ānanda proposes the existence of suggested meaning, especially rasa-
dhvani. He accepts the Mīmāṃsā principle that sentence-meaning must be
unitary, although he does not take a stand on the debate between the Bhāṭṭa
and Prābhākara (except to say they have both missed the centrality of sug-
gestion.) In a way, suggestion becomes the bhāvanā, or the organizing “force”
of a sentence—except that it is not a force centered on the reader, as we have
explained above. However, if suggested meaning is to be analyzed as a ca-
pacity of language alongside of word- and sentence-meanings, Ānanda must
situate it in relationship to syntax and semantics, as well as the pramāṇa-s
(is suggested meaning known through testimony or or something else)? This
project—situating suggested meaning conceptually—is the topic of the next
chapter, which allows us to begin evaluating Ānanda’s epistemological claims
in earnest.
earlier Ālaṅkārikas. However, there it seems to be a certain kind of figure, something like
“inappropriate rasa” which is found in narratives that violate propriety. From Abhinav-
agupta on, the sense is of a reader’s response to poetry being inauthentic because of being
grounded in improper textual matter. This, as Pollock argues, is a stronger sense, as it
means to exclude rasa-abhāsa from poetry rather than simply categorize it.Pollock 2001.
151
Chapter 4
On Knowing the Non-Literal
4.1 Ānanda’s Theory of Suggestion: Motivations and
Overview
Ānandavardhana’s Dhvanyāloka argues that the Sanskrit intellectual tradition
up to his time had put forward impoverished theories of language. In particu-
lar, Ānanda claims that they overlooked the communicative function he calls
‘dhvani’ (suggestion). The word ‘dhvani’ can be used for (1) the suggested
content of an utterance or (2) the capacity of an expression to convey such
content.1 In what follows, I will use ‘dhvani’ for the latter, and “suggested
meaning” for the former. There is a third conceptual distinction that is im-
portant to make. While Ānanda speaks in terms of hearers understanding
what is suggested simply by being receptive to the capacity of dhvani, we can
distinguish between the process of interpretation and the semantic properties
of expressions. What I wish to consider is the epistemological question of how
what Ānanda calls “sensitive hearers” (sahṛdaya) can have access to (1) by
1In actuality, there are other ways the word can be used: Abhinavagupta, in his com-
mentary on the text, the Locana, gives five possible senses of the term: (1) a word that is the
basis for a suggested content, (2) the meaning that is the basis for a suggested content, (3) a
function or process (vyāpāraḥ) that produces a suggested content, (4) the suggested content,
(5) the discourse unit that includes (1)-(4). Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 47-48, 131-132.
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means of (2).
While my ultimate aim is to show that Mukulabhaṭṭa’s rejoinder to Ānanda is
largely successful, I think that Ānanda’s observations about suggested content
have merit in pushing Indian philosophers to think more carefully about lan-
guage’s capacity. In what follows, I lay out these observations by discussing
the varieties of suggested content that Ānanda’s analysis is concerned with.
He draws a number of subtle distinctions, many of which cross-cut one an-
other, forming a complex picture of the results of our expressive capacities as
language users. Ānanda must then explain what it is that hearers are sensitive
to when they are receptive to dhvani–the expressive capacity that conveys such
a wide variety of things: figures of speech, aesthetic moods, narrative facts,
etc.
According to Ānanda, the reason that dhvani should be accepted as a unique
communicative function, alongside denotation and indication (lakṣaṇā) is that
dhvani cannot be subsumed under either of these functions. In addition to
being distinct from denotation and indication, he argues that dhvani is also
distinct from convention, which I introduce and address in this chapter. De-
notation and indication are, as shown in previous chapters, linguistic capac-
ities. Convention, in contrast, is, roughly, agreement among language-users.
n the Dhvanyāloka, each of these three candidates—denotation, indication,
and convention—is raised as a possible explanation for the effects Ānanda has
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identified.2 I demonstrate that his arguments fail, although he has pointed
to some important difficulties for our account of understanding, in particu-
lar the vexed distinction between knowledge of the world and knowledge of
language.
4.2 What is Suggested Meaning?
Ānanda divides the content of what is suggested into implied meanings, im-
plied figures, and aesthetic moods (rasa). However, Ānanda also distinguishes
among varieties of suggested meaning according to other criteria such as the
speaker’s intention, how rapidly the hearer recovers the suggested content, and
whether expressions or phonemes are the basis for what is suggested.
Below, I give, and briefly gloss, examples of the distinctions Ānanda is mak-
ing. These distinctions are important because he claims that it is through
suggestion, and not another language function, that hearers come to under-
stand suggested meaning. As I develop the distinctions between varieties of
suggested meaning, I represent their relationship through a branching tree
structure. This is to help the reader visualize the relationships. However, the
tree should not be taken as a complete representation of the varieties of sug-
gestion. While one can, as does Ānanda’s commentator Abhinavagupta, count
the terminal nodes of a branching structure and present a definitive number
of varieties (he says there are thirty-five), Ānanda himself says there are an
2A fourth, inferential reasoning, is the subject of the next chapter, as it merits a lengthier
treatment.
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endless number of combinations if we take into account all of the facts involved
in creating suggested meaning. Whether this should be taken literally or as
a rhetorical flourish, the point is that Ānanda does not view his analysis as a
complete taxonomy of suggested meaning.
4.2.1 Speaker’s Aim with Regard to Literal Meaning
Ānanda subdivides dhvani in two ways based on two kinds of intentions a
speaker has with regard to the expression she utters. This is consistent with his
view that underlying all cases of suggestion there is a purpose (prayojana) the
speaker has in choosing a particular expression.3 In particular, these intentions
are defined in terms of the speaker’s attitude towards the literal meaning of an
expression. First, a speaker may intend to convey the literal meaning plus some
suggested meaning.4 I will call this Intended Literal Suggestion. Second,
she may not intend to convey the literal meaning, but only have an intention
to convey a suggested meaning.5 The negation in the second variety takes wide
scope. That is, the speaker does not have any intention to convey the literal
meaning, but this does not mean she is expressly blocking, or trying to not
convey the literal meaning. Let’s call this Unintended Literal Suggestion.
This category subdivides further into cases where the literal meaning is “set
aside” (‘atyanta-tiras-kṛta) and cases where the literal meaning is “shifted”
3This excludes purely conventional, or “frozen” figures, where the suggested meaning is
conveyed regardless of the speaker’s aims.
4The Sanskrit for this category is vivakṣita, or “what is desired to be said.”
5The Sanskrit term for this category is avivakṣita, or “what is not desired to be said.”
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(‘artha-antara-saṃkramita’). I will call these Literal Set–Aside Suggestion
and Literal Shifted Suggestion. Below, I illustrate these divisions in turn
along with verses from Ānanda. The diagram below illustrates how these
distinctions are related:





As an example of Intended Literal Suggestion, Ānanda cites verses by the
Buddhist philosopher Dharmakīrti:
(1) On what mountain peak, for how long,
and what were they called—the meditative practices he performed?
Young lady, I mean this little parrot’s,
that he bites into a bimba-fruit as red as your lip?
śikhariṇi kva nu nāma kiyac-ciraṃ
kim abhidhānam asāv akarot tapaḥ
taruṇi yena tava adhara-pāṭalaṃ
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daśati bimba-phalaṃ śuka-śāvakaḥ6
Ānanda observes that the poet aims for both a literal reading of his text and
for a grasping of something suggested. Even without the cultural background
original to Dharmakīrti’s time, a reader can recognize that the sentences are
literally intelligible. To understand what is suggested, let’s look at these two
verses in more detail.
The verses are from a love poem, and the poet’s voice is that of a (male)
lover speaking to his (female) beloved. It is implied that he is watching a
young parrot (śuka-śāvakaḥ) bite into a reddish bimba-fruit. Alluding to a
common belief that one’s asceticism in a previous life is rewarded with sensual
pleasures in later lives, the poet asks what kinds of meritorious meditation
and penitential observances (tapaḥ) the parrot could have done to earn the
reward of a succulent fruit. He compares the redness of the bimba-fruit to
the redness of his beloved’s lips, noting that they are the same reddish hue
(adhara-pāṭalaṃ).
The scene I’ve just described can be understood with the literal meaning of
the verses (plus some relevant world knowledge). So far, there is no need for
dhvani, or even lakṣaṇā, the indicative function which underwrites metonymy
and metaphor. Even the comparison of the bimba-fruit to the beloved’s lips
is within the range of ordinary, literal communication. Howevever, the poet
6Translation mine. Where the translator is not noted, I use Ingalls’ 1990 translation of
the Dhvanyāloka.
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asks about the parrot nibbling on a fruit not merely to speculate about past
lives and religious merit. Implicit in the verses is his own desire for his lover’s
lips. McCrea says that the comparison with the parrot’s many years of re-
ligious effort for a mere fruit is meant to evoke the high privilege of kissing
the beloved’s lips.7 Whatever the particular suggested meaning is, it is not
possible without the literal meaning being in place.8 Thus these verses are an
illustration of Intended Literal Suggestion.
This phenomenon is similar to what Ted Cohen calls “twice true” metaphors.
He cites utterances like
(2) Jesus was a carpenter.
(3) Mondrian’s Composition in a Square is flat.
as counterexamples to the common claim that metaphors require literal fal-
sity.9 Example (2), uttered about Jesus of Nazareth, is true in a straightfor-
wardly historical sense.10 However, in a religious context, the utterance could
be used to talk about Jesus’ work in putting people spiritually “back together.”
Likewise, (3) is true in the sense that Mondrian’s painting is a flat surface.
However, it could be uttered to point out that the work of art is lacking in artis-
tic qualities that would give it, metaphorically speaking, a “third dimension.”
Remarking on this phenomenon of twice-trueness, Elizabeth Camp theorizes
7McCrea 2008, p. 380.
8Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 173-74..
9Cohen 1976, p. 752.
10Assuming the veracity of the New Testament accounts, that is.
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that metaphors like these are importantly similar to “literary metaphors” such
as
(4) Juliet is the sun.
(5) The hourglass whispers to the lion’s paw.
All four of these examples, according to Camp “’involve an intuitively felt gap
between literal and intended meaning, where the first provides the perspec-
tive for constructing the second.”11 She has a particular analysis of what a
“perspective” is, the details of which need not concern us here.12 The reason
for highlighting Camp’s analysis of metaphors is that her approach is anal-
ogous to Ānandavardhana’s, but with at least one important difference: she
connects two concepts that Ānanda keeps distinct. As we will see below, the
“intuitively felt gap” that Camp describes is captured in Ānanda’s category
of suggestion that “reverberates.” However, for Ānanda, this felt gap need not
always accompany metaphor. For Camp, it is this tension between what a
speaker says and what she means that makes metaphor different from exag-
geration and other kinds of talk.13 For Ānanda, this tension is one of many
11Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 14.
12Camp 2003. The general idea is that a perspective is a non-propositional frame from
which hearers come to recover propositional content relevant to the metaphor.
13Camp says, “Metaphors are importantly discontinuous from utterances in which the
speaker means what she says, insofar as they rely on a felt gap between what is intuitively
said and what is meant, and insofar as they retain a kind of deniability about the specific
content of the speaker’s assertoric commitment that is unavailable for literal, direct, and
explicit speech.” Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 17. The element of deniability does not play a
prominent role in Ānanda’s account, as far as I can see.
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features involved in suggestion, but it does not play the central role that it
does for Camp.
Let’s return to Ānanda’s taxonomy of suggestion and take up the category of
Unintended Literal Suggestion. As noted above, this category sub-divides
into Literal Set–Aside Suggestion and Literal Shifted Suggestion. In
both of these categories, the speaker does not aim to communicate the literal
meaning of her utterance. However, the categories reflect different relation-
ships between the literal meaning and what is suggested.
As an example of the first case, Literal Set–Aside Suggestion, Ānanda
cites the Rāmāyaṇa:
(6) The sun has stolen our affection for the moon,
whose circle now is dull with frost






The expression that Ānanda says is a case of Literal Set–Aside Suggestion
is the compound ‘niḥśvāsa-andha,’ “blinded by sighs.” The term ‘andha’ means
14The verses are from the Rāmāyaṇa 3.15.13. The Rāmāyaṇa, by the poet Valmīki, is
taken as the beginning of the kāvya tradition in Sanskrit poetry.
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blind, but is not literally true of a mirror (‘adarśa’), which is an insentient piece
of glass without any eyes. Thus the literal meaning is displaced, set aside,
rejected, in favor of a suggested meaning, which is that the mirror is obscured
or fogged up by the drops of condensation coming from a breath. By itself,
however, this metaphorical meaning, is not the full extent of dhvani. What is
suggested in these verses are a special kind of beauty, which is the reason that
the poet chooses these particular words, rather than stating directly that the
moon is like an obscured mirror.15
As another example of Literal Set–Aside Suggestion, Ānanda gives
(7) These seven are the kindling sticks of royalty.16
Here, the word “kindling sticks” literally refers to the sticks at the bottom of
a sacrificial fire discussed in the Vedas. It is understood as a metaphor for a
king’s characteristics which make him successful.17 The fuller context, cited
in Abhinavagupta’s Locana makes clearer what the “seven” are:
Firmness, forbearance, self-control,
purity, pity, kindliness of speech,
and constant faithfulness to friends:
these are the seven kindling sticks of royalty.18
15As McCrea notes, the principle that indirect expression is aesthetically preferable to
direct expression is a presupposition of the Sanskrit poetic tradition that is nowhere argued
for. McCrea 2008, p. 195.
16Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 173.
17Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 371-72.
18Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 372.
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To illustrate the second major subdivision, Literal Shifted Suggestion,
Ānanda cites an anonymous poem which Mukulabhaṭṭa also cites, later, in
his arguments against dhvani:
(8) White cranes are moving, the cloud is stretched,
Smeared with radiantly dark color
Winds sprinkle water.
The friends of the clouds joyfully make melodious cries.
Let it be. The vessel of my heart is hard. I am Rāma. I
bear it all.
But Vaidehī, how will she live? Oh, alas, queen, be resolute!
snigdha-śyāmala-kānti-lipta-viyato vellad-balākā ghanā
vātāḥ sīkriṇaḥ payod-suhṛdāmāna-ānanda-kekāḥ kalāḥ
kāmam santu dṛḍaṃ kaṭora-hṛdayo rāmo ’smi sarvaṃ sahe
vaidehī tu bhaviṣyati ha hā hā devi dhīrā bhave ’ti
4.2.2 Interpreter’s Phenomenology
While the previous three categories are distinguished by the speaker’s aims, the
next two categories are distinguished by the hearer’s experience. Ānanda says
that when hearers come to understand the suggested meaning of a poem, they
can do so instantaneously, or after a “reverberation”—some experienced tem-
poral gap between recovering the literal meaning and recovering the suggested
meaning.19 Call these subdivisions Reverberation and No Reverberation.
19Ānandavardhana’s use of “reverberation” is a play on the sense of “poetic suggestion”
(‘dhvani’) which refers to sound.
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This subdivides the earlier variety of suggested meaning, where the literal
meaning is unintended, as shown in the diagram below.
Figure 4.2: Second Major Division of Suggestion
Literal Meaning Intended
No ReverberationReverbration
The suggested content characterized byReverbertation is, as I’ve noted, sim-
ilar to what contemporary philosophers talk about in terms of the metaphorical
“felt gap” between literal and metaphorical meanings in particular. However,
it also includes the idea of a temporal gap between understanding the literal
and suggested meaning. The phenomenological observation can, and should,
be distinguished from a claim about content recovery. For instance, Eliza-
beth Camp claims, “even though we do usually process metaphors more or
less automatically, they still depend on a felt gap between what the speaker
says and what she means.”20 It is possible to hold that we recover (what
Ānanda calls) suggested meaning relatively quickly, but that there is still a
felt tension between the literal and figurative. Ānanda does not appeal to
the phenomenology of suggested meanings as evidence that they are recovered
in a certain way, though such a move was certainly available to him (Indian
philosophers discussed the phenomenology of inference and other pramāṇa at
20Camp and Reimer 2008, p. 4.
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length). While I do not want to argue from silence, I think it is noteworthy
that he does not make this move and I take it that Ānanda’s overall case
for suggestion should not be taken to depend upon these phenomenological
observations.
An example of Reverberation is a verse from the Harṣa-carita (The Life of
Harṣa). The verse can be read in two ways, as shown in the table below.
Table 4.1: Example of Reverberation










You are now the only
thing left to support
the earth
You are now the
world-serpent Śeṣa for
the support of the
earth
This double-meaning is known as śleṣa, a word which means “connection” or
“combination,” but is typically translated into English as “pun.” The San-
skrit use of double-meaning, however, is highly complex and not necessarily
used for humorous effect, as puns typically are in English.21 This particular
śleṣa has two words used in a dual manner. The Sanskrit ‘mahā-pralaye’ liter-
ally means “in the great destruction” and could refer to any large destructive
21Perhaps the most well-known instance of śleṣa occurs in Śrīharṣa’s Naiṣadha-carita, or
Life of Naiṣadha, a twelfth-century retelling of the story of Nala, found in the Mahābhārata.
In this poem, the goddess Sarasvatī (the goddess of poetry and language) speaks using
a śleṣa which can be understood in five different ways, in a speech which simultaneously
describes the protagonist Nala and four of his rivals. See Bronner 2010, pp. 82ff.
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event. However, in the Viṣṇu Purāṇa and other religious texts it refers to a
particular destruction—the one which comes at the end of a cosmic cycle and
dissolves all of reality in order for it to be created anew (and then destroyed
in another mahā-pralaya). The other word used for double-effect here is ‘śeṣa’
(“remainder,” or “only thing left”), meant as the name of a thousand-headed
serpent that is described as supporting all of the cosmos.
Ānanda categorizes this case of śleṣa as Reverberation, as both meanings
do not occur to the reader simultaneously. Further he describes this as a case
where the sentence (rather than individual words) suggests a second meaning,
which comes like a “reverberation” or some time after the first.22 This supports
the idea that Reverberation is about processing time, rather than (or in
addition to) a felt tension. Elsewhere, Ānanda points out that for many kinds
of suggestion, hearers do not have a “reverberation” or awareness of a gap
between the literal meaning and what is suggested.23 This is because the
temporal interval is very short. Ānanda’s commentator, Abhinavagupta gives
22There are many philosophical questions about śleṣa in Sanskrit poetics and Ānanda
touches upon a few here. First, there is the question of whether a compound expression
such as ‘mahā-pralaya’ has two meanings (polysemy) or whether there are two expressions
which have the same sound (homonymy). Ānanda distinguishes between suggestion based
on meaning and sound, and depending upon how we understand śleṣa, as polysemy or
homonomy, it would be categorized differently. As well, in the Sanskrit tradition, the two
meanings found in śleṣa have some relationship between one another. Thus, King Harṣa,
the subject of the verses above, is being compared to the world-serpent Śeṣa, in which
case a third meaning is suggested, a simile. For further discussion of Ānanda’s analysis of
śleṣa, see McCrea 2008, p. 141-147 and Bronner 2010, p. 195ff. Bronner makes the case
that Ānandavardhana’s divisions of dhvani are parallel to the divisions of śleṣa presented
in earlier thinkers such as Rudraṭa and Udbhaṭa, belying his claim that he is presenting a
novel set of categories (pp. 211-212).
23Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 540.
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an analogy to explain cases where there is no such reverberation. He says
that when someone has taken to heart the universal concomitance between
smoke and fire, she will be able to reason inferentially to the existence of fire
simply on the perceptual basis of smoke. There need not be any awareness of
inferential processes on the part of the thinker.24
In some ways, Ānanda’s phenomenological observations about how the varying
speeds with which hearers and poetic interpreters come to understand what he
calls “suggestion” fit with contemporary observations about metaphorical pro-
cessing. For example, Gentner and Bowdle gave participants in an experiment
two sentences with roughly the same meaning but different metaphors:
(9) Was Anna still boiling mad when you saw her? No, she was doing a
slow simmer.
(10) Was Anna still a raging beast when you saw her? No, she was doing a
slow simmer.
In their experiment, sentence (10) was processed more slowly than (9), and
Gentner and Bowdle hypothesize it is because there is a consistent discourse-
level metaphor in the first, but the second includes two distinct metaphors
which require new “conceptual mappings.”25 Ānanda does not give an ex-
planation in terms of conceptual mappings, but simply says that some cases
24As with many other comments made by Abhinavagupta, it is unclear whether Ānanda
himself would agree with the extrapolation. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 546.
25Gentner and Bowdle 2001, p. 212-16.
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of suggestion are immediately cognized while others “reverberate.” However,
he does argue that in cases where the difference between the literal sentence
meaning and the suggested meaning is great, there is an obvious temporal
sequence.
4.2.3 The Basis for What is Suggested
Ānanda makes yet another distinction relevant to the varieties of suggested
content. This, however, is a distinction between the various bases for what is
suggested. Suggested meaning can be grounded in expressions or in phonemes.
For instance, the meaning of a poem may suggest an aesthetic mood, such as
the heroic, the erotic, the peaceful. We saw this above in (1), where the poet’s
description of the parrot’s past life suggested the lover’s desire for his beloved.
The sounds of the poem may also suggest an aesthetic mood, through particu-
lar combinations of phonemes (varṇa). As an example of suggestive phonemes,
Ānanda cites the palatal fricative ś, retroflex fricative ṣ, and retroflex aspirated
ḍh, which are all suggestive of the rasa of cruelty.26 He gives these examples
as part of a response to the objection that “phonemes are meaningless and
therefore cannot suggest anything.”27
26The palatal fricative ś is pronounced with the tip of the tongue against towards the front
of the roof of the mouth, like “shove” or “sugar.” The retroflex fricative ṣ is pronounced
with the tongue further back, and isn’t easily distinguished from ś by English-speakers. The
middle and retroflex aspirated ḍh is similar to the pronunciation of a “d” in English, except
that the tongue is not pressed against the front of the palate, but the middle and there is a
simultaneous aspiration of a breath of air.
27Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 390. Sanskrit: ‘varṇānām anarthakatvād dyotakatvam
asambhavīty āśaṅkyedam,’ in Ānandavardhana 1990b, p. 114. While Ānanda conceptually
distinguishes between expression meaning suggestion and phonemic suggestion, he notes
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As far as expressions are concerned, Ānanda observes that what is suggested
can be based on a single word or a sentence. Further, the literal meaning
or the indicated meaning may serve as the basis. The examples we have
already discussed can serve as illustrations for these differences. In the case
of double-meaning (śleṣa), (4.1), it is the individual words which are the basis
for suggestion, as they carry the punning meanings. In the case of (1), it is
the sentences which are the basis for suggestion, as they are the source of the
hearer’s cognition of states of affairs (like the parrot eating a pink cherry)
which suggest other states of affairs (the lover desiring his beloved’s lips).
Thus, we have the distinctions below:28
Figure 4.3: Third Major Division of Suggestion
Basis for What is Suggested
PhonemesExpression Meaning
LakṣaṇāDenotation
that poetry usually incorporates both.
28For the sake of space, I omitted the bifurcation between words and sentences which
would fall under expression meaning, each of which would be subdivided into denotation
and lakṣaṇā.
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4.2.4 What is Suggested
Finally, Ānanda distinguishes among the kinds of things which are suggested,
or suggested meanings. We have already touched upon the three major cat-
egories of suggested meaning: states of affairs/facts, figures of speech, and
aesthetic moods. In addition to these categories, Ānanda distinguishes be-
tween ways in which what is suggested can be possible, and whether what is
suggested is due to the author of a poem or the words of a character within
the poem. Below, I take up all these categories in turn.
Figure 4.4: Fourth Major Division of Suggestion
What is Suggested
RasaFigure of SpeechFact
Ānanda uses the word ‘vastu,’ “thing” or “fact,” for a wide range of phenom-
ena. He distinguishes this variety of suggestion, which I’ll call Suggested
Fact, from two others: Suggested Figure and Suggested Mood. Sug-
gested Fact occurs where, for example, the literal meaning of a sentence is a
prohibition, and there is an implied invitation, as in:
(11) Mother-in-law sleeps here, I there:
Look, traveler, while it is light.
For at night when you cannot see
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You must not fall into my bed.29
Here, what is suggested by the (female) speaker is an invitation to the (male)
traveler to fall into her bed when it is dark. This is the reason she points out
the location of her bed, which would otherwise be unnecessary. This kind of
suggested content may sound analogous to Gricean conversational implicature.
We might think that the speaker’s unnecessary prolixity violates the Maxim
of Quantity, being more informative than is necessary for conversational pur-
poses. However, a problem that plagues Gricean accounts of implicatures is
lack of precise guidelines to know when maxims have been violated. After
all, if the stakes are high—and accidentally falling into the wrong bed might
constitute high social stakes—reiterating just where things are in a dark room
might be appropriate.
Another instance of a Suggested Fact is not from an implicature related to
a direct assertion, but an implicature arising out of an overheard conversa-
tion. Ānanda remarks that this shows the suggested meaning can be aimed at
someone different than the person that the literal meaning is directed to:
(12) Who wouldn’t be angry to see
his dear wife with her lower lip bitten?
You scorned my warning to smell the bee-holding lotus.
Now you must suffer.30
29Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 98.
30Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 103.
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Here, the verses are being uttered by a woman’s (female) friend; let’s call
her “A.” A knows that her married friend, B, has been having an affair and
has some telling marks. B’s husband, C, is nearby and A, pretending not
to know he is within earshot, speaks these lines for his benefit, in order to
suggest her friend’s innocence. Ānanda does not comment on this verse, but
Abhinavagupta’s Locana notes that what is suggested is that the woman, B,
is innocent of adultery.
This case is interesting from the perspective of speech-act theory since it is
difficult to categorize. First of all, A’s utterance would, ordinarily, be catego-
rized as a question and a pair of assertions. However, the question is clearly
rhetorical–a pretense of a question, not one genuinely asking for a response.
Its form conventionally implicates that everyone would be angry to see what
is described. And the assertions are also not made with sincerity, since both
A and B know they are speaking for the sake of a third–party, who mistak-
enly thinks they are genuinely asserting. We might say, then, that A is lying.
However, speech-act theory runs into a difficulty at this point:
If a speaker produces an utterance which is a lie, it is necessary
for the success of that lie that the illocutionary act of assertion be
successful. But if the perlocutionary act of lying is successful, then
the illocutionary act of assertion is not successful.31
In other words, to have the effect of lying (the perlocutionary act), one has
to be taken seriously despite being insincere. Further, by the liar being taken
31Reboul 1994, p. 297.
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seriously, and having her interlocutor think she is genuine, the act of assertion
is thereby successful. And yet, by lying and failing to be sincere, there is, in
truth, no act of assertion. We seem to face a paradox.
An additional complication arises in that while the two assertions may be false,
the force of the deception arises from their respective implicatures. There is
significant debate about how to define “lying,” especially in relationship to
other categories such as “deception,” but for the purposes of this example, let’s
stipulate that a lie is when a speaker asserts p and simultaneously believes
not-p.32 Now, while it is false that B scorned A’s warning, the deception
occurs because there is a further implication: visible marks are not due to
another person. Thus we might say that A lied through implicature, since she
implicated q by asserting p and simultaneously believed not-q.33
Finally, the suggested content’s character relationship to Gricean implicature
is complicated. For Grice, recovery of conversational implicature from an
utterance occurs from the hearer recognizing the speaker’s intention to com-
municate the implicature using the utterance. Here, if the husband were to
recognize such an intention, the purpose of the conversation would be foiled,
since she is speaking as if he is not nearby. However, if we step out of the
fictional world, what is suggested to the reader by the poet could be character-
32Here I follow Meibauer 2005.
33She lied doubly, since she also believed not-p, but it is certainly possible to mislead
through a true assertion. Meibauer gives the example of a child who truthfully replies “ I
didn’t kick the ball into the window” when her father asks, “Did you kick the ball into the
window?” but the statement is true because she threw it.
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ized as an implicature. Suggested Facts, then, can include what we might
call “conversational implicatures” but we needn’t restrict to them to this de-
scription. Nothing in the illustrations given as paradigms precludes us from
including conventional implicatures as Suggested Facts. After all, Ānanda
is careful to qualify his discussion, noting that the few examples he has given
only give a sense of what this kind of suggested content is.34
Turning to Suggested Figures, one example is:
(13) The fragrant moth prepares,
but gives not yet for his use against young maids,
the arrows, pointed with mango bud
and feathered with new leaves, to the god of love.
In these verses, a moth is described as preparing arrows (whose tips are mango
buds and whose feathers are leaves) for the god of love to use against young
women, like Cupid in Roman mythology. As moths are not human beings,
they cannot, in reality, make arrows. However, they are described as doing
so, and the result is that there is a figure of speech known as “imaginative
expression.” The term for this is ‘prauḍhokti,’ a word which does not literally
mean imaginative expression but something like bold, elevated, or impres-
sive speech. This kind of figure is contrasted with the Inherently Possible
(‘svataḥ sambhavin’). While (13) is an Imaginative Expression because it
is an anthropomorphizing of a moth, which, in our experience, is incapable of
34Ānandavardhana 1990a, p.105.
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making arrows, the verses below are Inherently Possible since they describe
a scene which actually could occur:
(14) The hunter’s wife strolls proudly
with a peacock feather behind her ear.
She strolls amid fellow wives
who are decked with pearls.35
The Imaginative Expression can be of two sorts. First, there are expressions
which are due to the poet, as in (13). Second, there are those which are put
in the mouths, so to speak, of characters in the poem, and are not the voice
of the poet. We have seen a case of this in (1), earlier. Ānanda spends
little time discussing how we can distinguish between what is Imaginative
Expression and Inherently Possible. While Ingalls, in a footnote, defines
the first as “arising from the poet’s imagination rather than from the data
directly presented by the everyday world,” this is not quite right. After all,
the poet may have imagined the hunter’s wife and never directly observed a
situation as described. Further, even if the poet has never directly observed a
moth nocking a mango-bud arrow to a bow, he has directly observed moths,
young maids, arrows, mango buds, etc. Out of these data, he has constructed
35From a Prakrit collection of love poetry, the Sattasaī. The character of the hunter
appears often in Prakrit poetry and as a stock character, he is used to illustrate how his
work is in conflict with his marriage. About these verses, ... says, “The peacock feathers
worn by his young wife are a token of his love, but the pearls worn by his less–favored wives
are a reminder that he once had the strength to kill elephants (whose foreheads are thought
to secrete pearls).” Khoroche and Tieken 2009, p. 162.
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the imagery in the poem.
One way to think about the distinction here is in terms of possible worlds and
counterfactuals. We could say that while the situation in (14) is one that may
not have occurred in the actual world, thus making it fictional, it is one that
could have occurred in the actual world. In contrast, (13) is one that could
not have occurred in the actual world. This leads us to the question, however,
of what sense of possibility we are after. Is the difference between (14) and
(13) one of logical possibility, conceptual possibility, physical possibility, or
metaphysical possibility? Ānanda’s definition of Inherently Possible is “The
‘inherently possible’ is that situation being considered as suitable (aucityena)
to the external world, and the situation’s substantial appearance is not merely
through the whims of speech.”36 There is some way in which the Inherently
Possible is appropriate or suitable (acuity) to the actual world, in a way
that the Imaginative Expression is not, and this suitability is something
that withstands some reflection. The question of the relationship between
fact and fiction in Sanskrit literature is a difficult one, and one which merits
further investigation. A summary of the modal status of the suggested figures
is below.
While Sanskrit thinkers distinguished between fact and fiction, genres of his-
tory (ākhyāyikā) and others, Sheldon Pollock notes that facts were “mal-
36svataḥ sambhavī ya aucityena bahir api sambhāvyamāna-sad-bhāvo na kevalaṃ bhaṇiti
vaśena eva abhiniṣpanna-śarīraḥ.
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Figure 4.5: Fifth Major Division of Suggestion




leable.”37 The way in which matters of fact were treated was guided by poetic
aims and a sense of propriety (‘aucitya’) to cultural and ethical norms. Fur-
ther, for Ānandavardhana and the dhvani theorists after him, rasa was an
important guide for how fact and fiction were treated. He argues that the
poet’s responsibility is not to set out a “chronicle of events” but to identify
patterns in stories that are consistent with the aims of rasa, and include these.
The poet should excise anything which will not lead to rasa.38
This kind of suggested content, rasa, is the centerpiece of Ānanda’s theory.
Rasa, what I have called Suggested Mood is more than “mood” in the
sense of an emotion. It is a heightened form of an emotion. As noted in
Chapter One, the idea of rasa originates from the dramaturgical tradition,
but Ānanda identifies as an organizing principle for poetry in general. The
goal of a poet is to write a poem which will manifest rasa, and all other varieties
37Pollock 2003, p. 58.
38Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 435-36.
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of suggestion ought to support this aim. Ānanda characterized rasa in terms
similar to thinkers that preceded him–it was Abhinavagupta who took rasa
to be something beyond ordinary human perception, as discussed in the last
chapter.
In terms of the distinctions we’ve laid out so far, rasa in the sense of a Sug-
gested Mood is a content which the hearer understands through dhvani.
Many of the examples we’ve looked at earlier can also be examples of sug-
gested rasa–for instance, excellent love poetry gives rise to the aesthetic mood
of the erotic (śṛṅgāra). Multiple kinds of suggestion can be present in the
same verse, but Ānanda says that the best poetry aims at a predominance of
rasa or suggestion. In this way the distinctions above are not part of an ex-
haustive, determinate model–which is why I have not tried to represent them
all in a single diagram. The aim is for these varieties of suggestion to work
together in order to generate rasa. This requires skill on the part of the poet,
both in terms of language–what sounds, words, and meanings are appropriate
together?–and in terms of world knowledge–what fictions are appropriate to
cultivate the right emotions?
In summary, we can ask five questions about suggestion, according to Ānanda’s
analysis. (These questions correspond to the figures above.)
1. What is the speaker’s intention concerning the literal meaning and the
suggested meaning?
2. Does the hearer experience a delay between understanding the literal
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meaning and the suggested meaning?
3. What is the basis of the suggested meaning: expression meanings or
phonemes?
4. What is the object of suggestion, a fact, figure, or rasa?
5. What is the modal status of the object of suggestion, possible or imagi-
native?
There are other, finer distinctions which Ānanda makes in his analysis of the
varieties of suggestion which would unnecessarily complicate the picture for our
purpose, which is simply to get a sense of his project. Whether he is correct
that the varieties are infinite, as he understands suggestion its varieties are
numerous.
After enumerating the varieties of suggestion, Ānanda argues that it is not
possible for a reader or hearer to understand them in the same way as she
might other kinds of meaning. We now turn to the epistemological aspect of his
project. In the rest of the chapter, I focus on Ānanda’s claim that suggestion
is distinct from the linguistic capacities and epistemic instruments accepted
by thinkers in his day. He raises four possible candidates which could give
rise to suggested meaning: denotation, indication, convention, and inferential
reasoning. In what follows, I take up his arguments in turn, demonstrating that
they do not completely succeed, although they highlight some inadequacies in
the approaches to language of his day. The fourth candidate, anumāna, or
inferential reasoning, will be treated in the next chapter, due to the argument’s
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importance and complexity.
4.3 Suggestion is Not Like Lexical Meaning
Ānanda contrasts the function of suggestion with the function of denotation.
As for the latter, he says the relationship between the composition of words in
a sentence and its denoted meaning is a “natural relation.” The sense in which
the word–referent relation is “natural” is that it is fixed (niyata). A word’s
denotation is that meaning which is cognized in every single instance the word
is employed. Suggestion, in contrast to denotation, is an “artificial relation,”
since it is a meaning that is “not denoted by its natural word,” and the rela-
tionship between suggested meaning and a suggestive word is not one to one.39
(Of course, as we have seen above, sentences as well as words are suggestive,
so by “denotation” is meant the literal meaning of any expression.)
One might instead argue that the Prābhākara analysis, which is a decidedly
contextualist account of word-meaning, is a better candidate than Ānanda’s.
On this view, what hearers come to understand is the most appropriate (how-
ever we precisify “appropriate”) word meaning given the context of utterance.
Thus, whatever the conventional or literal meaning of a word might be, hearers
do not come to understand that, but they understand the so-called “suggested”
meaning. However, Ānanda has observed that there are cases where hearers
grasp two meanings (and are meant to), such as in (4.1), where ‘śeṣa’ means
39Dhvanyāloka, §3.33o A. Ānandavardhana 1990a, 588.
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“what is left” as well as the proper name of a serpent. On the Prābhākara
account, the word-function will give as its output the most contextually appro-
priate meaning for the words. The problem is that there are two appropriate
meanings here, depending upon which context we focus on.40
One response open to the Prābhākara is to say that there are two instances
of the word-function operating here. After all, Ānanda has said that this kind
of suggestion has a felt interval between the first and second meanings. We
can surmise that what happens is simply that there are two interpretive acts
occurring, and the reader recovers different meanings, but through the same
process in both instances. The outcome is different because the context is
different in each case. Ānanda’s case is therefore strongest for examples such
as (11), where the woman surreptitiously invites a traveler into her bed. Here,
unlike (4.1), there are no individual words which can be taken as conveying
the disguised invitation. Instead, there is something about the utterance as a
whole which prompts the reader to understand that the warning is actually an
invitation. Since the basis for what is suggested is not a word, but a sentence
(or, more strictly, an utterance), the Prābhākara account fails for these kinds
of suggested content. Thus Ānanda’s argument that at least some cases of
suggested content cannot be recovered like lexical meanings succeeds.
40A further complication is that śleṣa, the term for this kind of double-meaning, usually
also results in a third meaning, an analogy or metaphor that unites the two (or more)
distinct punning interpretations.
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4.4 Suggestion is Not Like Lakṣaṇā
However, it is unlikely that we would want to attribute our understanding of
the phenomena above to understanding word-meanings. A likelier candidate
is lakṣaṇā, or indication. Indication is where there is a failure of semantic
fit—or some other failure, as we shall see later—among the words composing
a sentence, and so a speaker must be understood to be saying something else.
Ānanda gives the example, referenced earlier:
(15) “The village is on the Ganges.”
In Sanskrit, the word for “Ganges” is in the locative case which (read strictly
literally) means that the village is resting upon the surface of the river. This
example is found in several places in Ānanda and is a traditional example of
indication for Indian philosophers.41
In this sentence, “Ganges” is understood by Ānanda to change its meaning to
“the bank of the Ganges” by metonymical association. As briefly mentioned in
Chapter 3, because the literal referent of words is understood to be a universal
by the Mīmāṃsaka, there must typically be a metonymic shift in order for
sentence constituents to refer to particulars which can then be brought into
relationship with the action word in the sentence (often but not always a
verb).42 He says this shift occurs by indication operating on the literal referents
41Ānandavardhana 1990a, 555, 562-563, 569..
42See Scharf 1996, for instance, for discussion. Note that the “sentence operation” or
“tātparya” is sometimes counted as a distinct verbal operation, along with denotation and
indication. However, frequently, early Indian philosophers focus upon the referents of words
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of the words in the sentence. Ānanda claims that the literal meaning of the
sentence is replaced by “the bank of the Ganges,” which is distinct from the
meaning of “Ganges” (as a river is not the same thing as its bank). The
suggested meaning of (15) is the coolness and purity of the village, a suggestion
which does not replace the literal meaning of the sentence, nor contradict it.
Thus, for Ānanda, the multiple meanings of (15) could be glossed as:
Denotation: The village is on the current of the Ganges river.
Indication: The village is on the bank of the Ganges river.
Suggestion: The village which is on the bank of the Ganges river is cool and
pure.
Relying on the denoted meanings, a hearer can recover what is indicated. On
Ānanda’s view, the suggested meaning is a further step beyond this indicated
meaning, but is not understood through what is indicated. Instead, it is
through the denotation of “Ganges,” since it is the river, and not the bank,
which is associated with purity and coolness.43 The crucial aspect of Ānanda’s
argument is that while lakṣaṇā requires a failure of semantic fit, suggestion
does not. A hearer’s understanding of “on the Ganges” as meaning “on the
bank of the Ganges” is necessary in order for the sentence not to cause a
at the expense of the meaning of sentences (using “artha” as a term for both referent and
meaning). Mīmāṃsā scholars were known for their analysis of sentence meaning, but for
them indication and the so-called sentence operation are the same. Ānanda spends little
time discussing tātparya, though his later commentator, Abhinavagupta, discusses it more
as later theorists develop the topic further. See McCrea 2008 on tātparya and Ānanda.
43We will see later how Mukulabhaṭṭa explains this same example in terms of lakṣaṇā, or
indication in a way that tries to account for this fact.
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cognition of a village as floating upon the Ganges. In contrast, the suggested
sense does not rectify any apparent semantic incompatibility in the literal
meaning of the sentence.
This point is especially pertinent for cases of suggestion where the literal mean-
ing is said to be intended, as in (11) above. There is nothing semantically unfit
about the verses where the speaker warns the traveler as to the location of her
bed. There is thus no justification for lakṣaṇā, taken as recovery through pre-
sumption of another meaning that resolves an incompatibility. Yet, Ānanda
says, hearers know that the speaker is actually inviting the traveler, and not
warning him. Further, the aesthetic nature is due to its being disguised. The
effect of the warning being implied is that the hearers recognize the illicit
eroticism of the encounter. A flat-out invitation would not have this effect, or
this suggestion.
If lakṣaṇā requires a sentence-internal incompatibility, then Ānanda’s argu-
ment that cases like (11) cannot be cognized by lakṣaṇā clearly succeeds. How-
ever, if lakṣaṇā requires only incompatibility in general, then we can preserve
it as a means of resolving incompatibilities, perhaps those between sentence
meanings and other contextual elements. This is what Mukulabhaṭṭa argues,
and in Chapters Six and Seven I take up his solution in more detail.
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4.5 Suggestion is Not Like Convention
So far, the claim is that we do not understand suggested meaning by either de-
notation or indication–the two linguistic capacities accepted by Indian philoso-
phers. However, Ānanda has stated that dhvani is linguistic in nature. In what
way, then, can hearers rely on linguistic capacities to recover what is suggested,
if not through these? The answer for Ānanda involves being a ‘sahṛdaya,’ or
sensitive listener. A sensitive listener knows the aim of poetry is to gener-
ate a particular “taste” or “flavor” (rasa) through suggestion.44 There is an
element of circularity to this concept: if someone understands the suggested
meaning, they count as a “sensitive listener” and if sensitive listeners enjoy a
set of verses, the verses count as “poetry.” However, there is also, as we’ve
observed before, a strong undercurrent of normativity to Sanskrit poetry and
its appreciation. Not just anyone is a sensitive listener, and not just any poem
counts as good.
What Ānanda is gesturing at through this concept is that, in contrast to
knowledge of the denotations of words or the patterns leading to indication,
knowledge of poetry involves skill. This skill is linguistic, since sensitive lis-
teners are attuned to verbal phenomena. However, it is not a skill which can
be reduced to a set of algorithms. There is no way to entirely formalize the
rules for appreciation of art. If this is what he is getting at, we’re still left with
a problem. After all, sensitive listeners are described as having knowledge of
44Dhvanyāloka 1.1, in Ānandavardhana 1990a, 48.
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poetry. They are not simply generating interpretations, any one of which will
do as appropriate. So what is it that sensitive listeners have knowledge of,
when they understand what is suggested by poetry?45
Ānanda gives two possible definitions of a sensitive listener in virtue of possible
objects of their knowledge:
Definition 1 Is one whose knowledge46 is of an object that is poetic conven-
tion (samaya) regardless of rasa, bhāva and the like?47
Definition 2 Or is one whose skillful knowledge48 is of the nature of poetry
the measure of which is rasa, bhāva and the like?49
Ānanda argues that if we accept Definition 1, since conventions are arbitrary,
the beauty of certain words would be relative to a community of readers:
On the first view, it would be impossible for there to be a constraint
on particular words having beauty as such qualities of beauty are
established by sensitive readers. Moreover, this impossibility is due
to the possibility of establishing another, different convention.
45Later thinkers in the poetic tradition will take up the problem of rasa-abhāsa, or “ap-
parent rasa” in an attempt to further fill out the conceptual space of knowing rasa. This
idea becomes especially important as rasa comes to be something felt or experienced by the
reader. Some experiences are genuine and some are not, and thinkers will distinguishing be-
tween these experiences in light of such things as their causal origin (excellent and mediocre
poetry).
46“Knowledge” = ‘abhijñā,’ or recollection, memory, recognition.
47The term ‘samaya,’ or “convention,” refers to a mutual agreement or an established
custom.
48“Skillful” = ‘naipuñya,’ “knowledge” = ‘parijñā,’ or understanding, recognition.
49Translation mine, Dhvanyāloka, 3.16. Full context is appended to this chapter.
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The term I translate as “convention” is ‘samaya,’ which is used for agree-
ment among people in an ordinary context, and often prefaced with ‘kavī ’
to mean “poetic convention.” One element of poetic convention is the use of
certain imagery—the adulterous woman, liaisons on riverbanks, lotuses, pea-
cock feathers, and etc.—to suggest meaning. These images are embedded in
a broader social context, which fixes their significance for the reader, who is
assumed to be familiar with them. However, what Ānanda seems to argue is
that insofar as these images (and, more broadly, the poetry which employs
them) are based on agreement about social practices and their attendant val-
ues, poetic conventions are able to be undermined. For instance in the case of
(15) “The village is on the Ganges,” The use of the term “Ganges” might not
suggest purity and coolness for every community, since it would be possible to
set up a different convention where the Ganges is associated with these quali-
ties. The problem for him is not that there actually are multiple conventions
in existence, but simply the possibility of a different convention.
Another feature that could be meant by “convention,” is that of poetic style
or riti. Theorists before Ānanda, such as Daṇḍin and Vāmana, emphasized
regional distinctions (the Vaidarbhī, Gauḍī, and Pāñcālī) in their analysis
of poetry. An example of a quality found in one style and not in another
is the presence of lengthy compounds. This was a quality of Gauḍī poetry
in particular, and it is a quality that Ānanda discusses in the Dhvanyāloka.
The discussion, which takes up several possible relationships between quali-
ties, style, and rasa, occurs in 3.6. The conclusion of this section (which is
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quite detailed in its consideration of earlier views) is that styles and qualities
have a subordinate relationship to rasa. Simply put, a poet selects particular
compounds for the goal of generating rasa. Regional conventions are not the
proper final analysis for thinking about poetry. In fact, these conventions are
misleading since they distract us from the true purpose of poetry.
While Ānanda is clear that convention—imagery and style—is insufficient as
the basis for a sensitive listener’s knowledge of suggested meaning, it is unclear
why the existence of a convention would threaten our apprehension of beauty
in poetry. The problem is that Ānanda seems to understand convention as
being deeply arbitrary in a worrisome way. In what follows, I briefly employ
David Lewis’ analysis of convention as a starting point for thinking through
Ānanda’s rejected Definition 1.
Lewis thinks about convention in terms of solving coordination problems. We
want to travel on escalators quickly and efficiently. Thus we converge on (in
some cities, at least) the solution that people who stand will stay to the right
while those who prefer to treat escalators as stairs will walk to the left. This
solution allows for everyone to travel in their preferred manner and, once the
convention is established, its existence becomes a self-perpetuating reason to
follow it. In New York City, the existence of this convention is a good reason
for me not to stand with my luggage on the left side of an escalator in the
subway at rush hour.
Lewis characterizes conventions this way:
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A regularity R in the behavior of members of a population P when
they are agents in a recurrent situation S is a convention if and
only if it is true that, and it is common knowledge in P that, in
any instance of S among members of P,
1. everyone conforms to R;
2. everyone expects everyone else to conform to R;
3. everyone has approximately the same preferences regarding
all possible combinations of actions;
4. everyone prefers that everyone conform to R, on condition
that at least all but one conform to R;
5. everyone would prefer that everyone conform to R￿, on con-
dition that at least all but one conform to R￿,
where R0 is some possible regularity in the behavior of members of
P in S, such that no one in any instance of S among members of P
could conform both to R0 and to R.50
Poetic convention among the various regional groups would then describe the
preferences for conforming to general stylistic approaches. On Lewis’ under-
standing, there must be an R￿, or an alternative convention, available which is
incompatible with R. Put into linguistic contexts, not only actions, but beliefs
are the target of conventional regularities. For assertoric speech acts, then,
conventions guide what it is that we come to believe as a result of certain ex-
pressions. We converge on a languagethat pairs propositions with sentences.
50Lewis 1969, p. 76.
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But Ānanda is not just describing converging on believed propositions or ac-
tions. He takes it as given that a sensitive listener understanding good poetry
recognizes an aesthetic fact about the world in addition to understanding the
denoted and indicated meanings of poetry. And aesthetic properties, he thinks,
are simply not the kind of thing that can be relative to a community. He might
agree with Immanuel Kant who says, centuries later, “But if (someone) pro-
claims something to be beautiful, then he requires the same liking from others;
he then judges not just for himself but for everyone, and speaks of beauty as if
it were a property of things.”51 Ānanda is not just speaking of beauty “as if”
it were property of things, but he thinks that it is a property of things.
Suppose a group of poets in population P agreed that a set of words are beau-
tiful and proceeded to make poetry using them. They all conform to this R,
all expect each other to conform to it, etc. Ānanda’s claim (echoed by Abhi-
navagupta) is that this makes the idea of a criterion for beauty empty. Abhi-
navagupta complains that it makes the criterion dependent on “unregulated
individual whim.”52 This is to oversimplify how it might be that suggested
meaning is conventional, in particular, to conflate conventionality with capri-
ciousness. Ānanda’s argument against convention relies on a counterfactual:
if suggested meaning were conventional, then we could choose a different set
of words to have a specific poetic effect, simply on the basis of agreement. We
cannot simply choose a different set of words to have a specific poetic effect,
51Kant 1987, p.47.
52Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 475.
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and therefore suggested meaning is not conventional. But in the Lewisian sense
of convention, the regularities are not random, though they may be arbitrary
in the strict sense of the word.
Agreement among language-users sets the stage for continued use of the same
words in the future. While there is some choice in convention, it is not at
the level of the individual–conventions emerge at the societal level, and one’s
“opting out” of a convention does not make it not a convention. Were I to
consistently stand to the left on an escalator, that does not establish a new
convention–it only makes me get in the way of my fellow travelers. Further,
not everyone recognizes conventions as being conventions. This does not undo
their status as such, although the degree to which such exceptions can exist is
an open question.53
Ānanda is pointing to a difficult problem here: how do we distinguish between
aesthetic qualities of words and aesthetic qualities of the world that the words
represent? Suppose a modern United States citizen, hearing “The village is
on the Ganges,” visualizes throngs of people bathing in a muddy river in the
heat of the day. She believes that the expression suggests dirtiness and heat.
Is this a matter of her not knowing what “Ganges” means, or not knowing
that the Ganges river has the properties of purity and coolness? Ānanda in
53Lewis talks about “children” and the “feeble-minded” as being exceptions, but surely
there are plenty of conventions that many people, perhaps even the majority, take as being
natural when they are not. I think of conventions regarding gender in particular–what
certain persons ought to wear or how they ought to act may be demonstrably conventional
since history bears out the existence of incompatible alternatives, even if people are unaware
of this fact.
190
Definition 2, accounts for the (mis)understanding by saying that the US citizen
lacks knowledge of aesthetic properties. But he goes on to says that sensitive
listeners are aware that certain words have a property, whatever it may be,
which transmits rasa, or taste. He also says that it is having knowledge of rasa
itself, or the aesthetic moods at which poetry aims, that determines whether
someone is a sensitive listener. Thus, he argues against conventionality and
for something like aesthetic perceptibility. Or, perhaps she does not know that
“Ganges” has the power to suggest an aesthetic mood (possibly the mood of
“peacefulness”).
I take it, then, that Ānanda’s argument against convention is not very success-
ful. (Even if Ānanda is correct about convention, Jeffrey Masson notes another
problem for Definition 2, which is that nothing he says demonstrates that rasa
is the feature to which sensitive listeners are attuned. One must already ac-
cept his theory in order for Definition 2 to be accepted.)54 There is another
problem in the argument that is more fundamental to Ānanda’s theory. Even
if he could show that linguistic conventions are in some way constrained by
facts about aesthetic properties, once he admits that the sensitive listener’s
knowledge of suggestion is a knowledge of rasa, he has opened the possibility
of using inferential reasoning to recover it. This is because knowledge of rasa is
not precisely the same thing as the knowledge of suggested meaning, although
the two are related.
54Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 474, fn. 4.
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Consider an utterance intended to suggest the rasa of the erotic:
(16) Pārvatī counted the petals of the lotus in her hand.55
Ānanda claims that a sensitive critic hears this and directly comes to know
the literal meaning of this sentence. She knows that in a poetic context, the
point of any sentence is to contribute to an aesthetic mood. The suggested
meaning is related to the particular context—just any mention of lotus petals
will not guarantee the erotic rasa. So could a sensitive critic get the suggested
meaning? Ānanda maintains she could understand it in a “flash of insight”
(pratibhā) through the distinct process of dhvani which he believes he has es-
tablished. However, we might think that dhvani is sophisticated inferential
reasoning that involves the specialized knowledge of the sensitive listener. Af-
ter all, Ānanda denies that suggested meanings are ineffable, and throughout
the text he explains what these meanings are in detail. Through rapid inferen-
tial reasoning, one might understand quickly what is meant. As we saw earlier,
we are frequently unaware that we are reasoning from the perception of smoke
to the existence of fire. Perhaps this is what dhvani is–a rapid inferential
process that only the highly skilled are capable of making.
Nothing in what Ānanda has said about denotation, indication, or convention
has excluded this possibility, and since anumāṇa or inferential reasoning, was
a prominent and widely accepted epistemic instrument, he needs to directly
55Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 562 and Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 311-312.
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The Irreducibility of Suggestion
5.1 Introduction
Ānandavardhana argues inDhvanyāloka 3.33 that suggestion cannot be equated
to anumāna, or inferential reasoning. Below I examine his argument and show
that he is largely successful. However, given that there are some readily avail-
able emendations to the inferentialist’s position that would rescue his oppo-
nent, I reconstruct the debate in a way slightly different than is presented in his
text while preserving the basic insights of each position. This requires draw-
ing a distinction between concepts which are brought together in the Indian
model of anumāna. While Ānanda is successful against both reconstructions
of the inferentialist argument, his analysis of anumāna’s failure points us to
another pramāṇa, presumptive inference. This will put us in the position to
appreciate Mukulabhaṭṭa’s views in the next chapter, which centers on pre-
sumptive inference, or arthāpatti, which I argued earlier is inference to the best
explanation.
In what follows, I first introduce the inferentialist’s position as presented by
Ānanda, clarifying in what sense the interlocutor is claiming that sugges-
tion can be known through the pramāṇa of anumāna. I then briefly present
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Ānanda’s response, which is that unlike what is known through anumāna, in-
terpreters disagree over the identification of suggested contents. In the second
part of the chapter, I consider a possible response on the part of the inferen-
tialist: that there would be no disagreement over suggested content once the
correct pervasion relationship is identified. This response is strengthened by
the fact that it can take on board the existence of skillful interpreters (the
sahṛdaya) that Ānanda emphasizes. Finally, on behalf of Ānanda, I develop
a rebuttal in the spirit of the Dhvanyāloka. This rebuttal to the inferentialist
is two-pronged, arguing that not only can interpreters not employ anumāna
qua epistemic tool but they cannot appeal to anumāna qua justificatory ar-
gument, either. This response to the interlocutor emphasizes the defeasible
nature of suggestion and its non-necessary relation to the expressions employed
by speakers. Both of these features must be accounted for in a successful ac-
count of suggestion. In the next chapter I will show that Mukulabhaṭṭa’s view
can accommodate them.
In DV 3.33, Ānanda introduces the dispute between himself and the inferen-
tialist as follows. He says that suggested meaning is an accidental attachment
to words (‘aupādhika’), conditioned by context.1 In other words, an expres-
sion alone is insufficient for generating a particular suggested content, but it
requires additional factors, called ‘upādhi.’2 In this way, suggestion is differ-
1I have appended this section to the end of the chapter for reference.
2The term ‘aupādhika’ is a derivative created by strengthening the initial ‘u’ in ‘upādhi’
to ‘au’ and the ending ’-ka,’ resulting in a word which means “related to additional factors
(upādhi).”
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ent from denotation, where an expression’s use in a language L is sufficient
for its meaning to be understood by an ordinary speaker of that language.
Ānanda goes on to add that his proposal of suggested content is theoretically
neutral, and can be accepted by any of the contemporary theories of linguistic
communication. Further, while philosophers can argue over semantic theo-
ries, he says they cannot disagree that there is the phenomenon he is calling
“suggestion.”
It is at this point that anumāna becomes relevant. Ānanda inserts the voice
of an interlocutor, who says that in fact, suggestion is open to derision by
philosophers. The reason is because what Ānanda calls “suggestion” is merely
anumāna. Why is this a reason for philosophers to deride his suggestion? Well,
Ānanda has already said that poetic suggestion is something which a speaker
intends to communicate. On a widely accepted view of natural language,
we use anumāna to determine what a speaker intends. Thus, his opponent
concludes, the linguistic capacity of suggestion is nothing more than anumāna
and Ānanda is not proposing any new phenomenon. He is simply pointing
out the obvious and giving it another name. Here is how Ānanda presents the
inferentialist:
The fact that words have the capacity to suggest something means
that words have the capacity to cause understanding, and having
the capacity to cause understanding is being an inferential mark;
therefore, understanding what is suggested is simply understanding
the object of the inferential mark. And the relationship between
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a suggestive expression and its object is simply the relationship
between the inferential mark and the thing to be inferred, and not
anything else. And therefore, necessarily, this inferential relation-
ship surely should be recognized by you, since you have just now
claimed that suggestiveness is recognized by the speaker’s inten-
tion and that the nature of speaker’s intention is something which
is to be inferred.3
The interlocutor argues that suggestion relies upon a claim of identity between
something having the capacity to cause understanding and something being
an inferential mark. Recall that an inferential mark, in the Indian conception
of anumāna, is some characteristic or property H whose existence is invariably
connected with another characteristic or property S, where S is the thing we
are trying to establish through anumāna.4 The inferential mark is given to us
through another means of knowledge such as perception. One paradigmatic
inferential mark is smoke, whose visible presence (under the correct perceptual
conditions) in a certain place guarantees the existence of fire in that same
place. Thus, the interlocutor claims that words function for speaker’s intention
like smoke does for fire: given (the right kind of) words, we can identify the
corresponding speaker’s intention.
Ānanda responds first by saying that even were the opponent correct, this
would not harm his broader claim that suggestion is a distinct function of
3The word for “capacity to cause understanding” is ‘gamaka,’ which is the term frequently
used for a reason, or hetu.
4Recall the traditional choice of H and S represent the hetu and sādhya, Sanskrit terms
for inferential mark and probandum respectively.
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language, different from denotation and indication. On the view that neither
denotation nor indication are equivalent to anumāna, the claim that suggestion
is equal to anumāna does not touch Ānanda’s claim of distinctness. Further,
the interlocutor accepts that suggestion requires words, and so Ānanda is safe
in characterizing suggestion as “verbal.” He goes on to argue that, in fact, the
relationship between words and their suggested content cannot be equated with
the relationship between an inferential mark and an object of anumāna.
The first stage in Ānanda’s defense against his opponent is to present his
analysis of the content of a communicative act. He distinguishes between
two aspects of linguistic communication: what can be understood through
anumāna (anumeya) and what can be conveyed (pratipādya). From the ob-
servation that a speaker has uttered words in a particular language, there are
two things we can conclude: a speaker desires to perform a speech act and a
speaker desires to perform a speech act with certain sounds.5 Crucially, for
Ānanda, we cannot understand the content of the speech act (what is said,
what is requested, etc.) through anumāna. See Figure 5.1.
Ānanda says that the content ascertained through anumāna is also “suggested”
(vyaṅjya), but this is not the same kind of suggestion as accompanies poetry. I
have called the first “ordinary suggestion” to distinguish it from the intentional
sort, which I call “poetic suggestion.”6 According to Ānanda, poetic sugges-
tion is something which the speaker wants to communicate, whereas ordinary
5In what follows, I use “intention” and “desire” interchangeably.
6See earlier discussion in 1.3.
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suggestion includes such things as the fact that someone is an English speaker.
This would be known on the basis of an utterance just by virtue of its being in
English, through anumāna. Likewise, ordinary suggestion includes that I am
trying to say something (rather than humming or making random noises), and
that I am trying to say something with those sounds (rather than humming
while I communicate with hand gestures). Thus, suggestion is not only found
in poetic contexts, but in every instance of communication. However, this kind
of suggestion does not include the content of the speaker’s intention.
What Ānanda calls “ordinary suggestion” would probably be characterized as
entailment by contemporary philosophers. Take an example due to Searle, the
utterance of
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(1) Kennst du das Land...7
From the fact that (1) is an utterance in the German language, a hearer can
infer that the speaker of (1) is German, or that she speaks German. Ordinarily,
neither of these propositions are what is intended by the speaker who uses (1).
For this reason, contemporary philosophers frequently do not characterize such
entailments as “meaning,” on the principle that meanings must be effects which
a speaker intends to produce in a hearer “by means of [the hearer’s] recognition
of [the speaker’s] intention to produce just that effect.”8
At this point, it’s worth recalling the notion of anumāna at play.9 When
Ānanda says that we can conclude things like that someone has a desire to
perform a speech act by observing that she has spoken using words in natural
language, he is referring to a reasoner employing this form:
1. Thesis to prove (pratijñā): The speaker has a desire to perform a
speech act.
2. Reason (hetu): This is because she has spoken words in natural lan-
guage.
3. Pervasion rule (vyāpti): Every time someone speaks words in natural
language, there is a desire to perform a speech act, such as the case of
[example].
7Hutchby 2008.
8Hutchby 2008, p. 8.
9See earlier discussion in 1.4 on pages 30ff and 2.3.2 on pages 81ff.
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4. Application of rule (upanayana): This case is like [example].
5. Conclusion (nigamana): Thefore, the speaker has a desire to perform
a speech act.
The pervasion which allows us to conclude a speaker’s desire to perform a
speech act from her utterance is grounded in ordinary observation. To avoid
the fallacy of “too wide a definition” (ativyāpti), we need to restrict the case
of “speaking words in natural language.” We don’t want to include nonsense
utterances, but we want to allow for malapropisms and at least some kinds of
ungrammaticality. Assuming that such a line can be drawn and stipulating
that our pervasion only refers to the appropriate sorts of utterances, it seems
initially plausible that intentions to perform a speech act invariably accompany
the right sorts of linguistic acts.
But why think that what is expressed (directly or indirectly) by someone’s
speech act is not recoverable by anumāna? This claim may strike contem-
porary philosophers as unusual, as it is widely acknowledged that some form
of inference to speaker’s intention is essential for successful communication to
take place. There are two general motivations here. First, take denotation, or
the content of what is literally said. The picture (made simple) is something
like this: look up the lexical entries for the words in the sentence and combine
these meanings using the appropriate rules of syntax. We do not need to infer
the speaker’s intention to get denoted meaning, as a finite list of terms and
rules gives us our semantic content.
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Second, take indication, or the content of lakṣaṇā, non-literal speech. Often,
lakṣaṇā is characterized as operating through arthāpatti, or presumption. This
is a defeasible form of reasoning, similar to inference to the best explanation.
However, while we might call it “inference,” presumption is very different from
anumāṇa. The crucial difference is that in anumāna the existence of a per-
vasion relationship secures the conclusion as a piece of knowledge. Given the
inferential mark H, we can conclude S. In presumption, we assume our conclu-
sion in order to resolve an apparent contradiction. More than one way exists
to resolve conflicts, and so presumption lacks the necessity that characterizes
anumāna.
The traditional example of presumption, discussed earlier, is: if we are given
the facts that (1) Devadatta is fat and (2) Devadatta does not eat during
the day, we must presume (3) that Devadatta eats at night.10 There is no
pervasion relationship between the non-observation of someone eating during
the day and their eating at night, but given the background assumption that
fat people eat, we can assume that if Devadatta does not eat during the day,
he does at night.11 However, we could also explain the fact that he does not
eat during the day by assuming he only has a liquid diet and eats during the
day, or that he is an exception to the general rule that fat people must eat,
10See 2.3.3 on page 89.
11Some Indian philosophers argued that there is such a pervasion relationship, and that
presumption is a specific kind of inference known as “negative-only concommitance.” The
Nyāya, for example, made this claim. Abhinavagupta points this out in his Locana on 2.27,
discussing a variant of this example (in which the person is Caitra, not Devadatta). Ānanda
does not address how he would respond to the Naiyāyika’s analysis of indication.
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and so on. On this view, the utterance
(2) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day
is interpreted as meaning, through lakṣaṇā,
(3) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, he eats at night.
But since the interpretive method is presumption, Ānanda says that we do
not understand non-literal meaning through anumāna.
Ānanda claims that suggested meaning, like denoted and indicated meaning,
is also not recovered by anumāna. Again, for anumāna to be the means for
a hearer to access what is suggested, she would need to have knowledge of a
pervasion relationship, such as in the smoke/fire example. This would mean
that, given the appropriate inferential mark, an interpreter can conclude there
is necessarily a certain suggested meaning present. But, as we will now see,
Ānanda argues that this is not possible.
5.1.1 Against suggestion as anumāna
Ānanda’s argument against his opponent is simple. He says:
For if it were true that cases of the [suggestive] word-function are
inferential marks, then, for the meaning of words, there would be
agreement regarding their falsity and the like, and there certainly
would not be disputes—just like instances of what is inferred from
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an inferential mark such as smoke.12
The argument can be represented as a simple modus tollens:
Argument against anumāna: Version 1
1. If words are inferential marks for suggested meaning, then there is no
dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
2. Implied: There is a dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
3. Therefore, words are not inferential marks.13
To support his case, Ānanda presents the paradigmatic example of anumāna:
reasoning from the presence of the inferential mark smoke to the presence
of fire. Ānanda asserts that, like this instance, in true cases of anumāna,
there is no disagreement. An initial response might be to reject the argument
as unsound because the first premise is false. After all, it is obviously open
for people to (erroneously) disagree with the conclusion of a valid deductive
inference, for instance. Any first-year logic instructor is familiar with students
disagreeing when presented with a sufficiently complex, yet deductively valid
argument. If suggestion is recovered by a deductive inference, we need not
expect that the inference is so patently obvious that no one would disagree
about its conclusion (the suggested meaning).
12There is a peculiarity in the formulation of his argument. Much of the content that
Ānanda characterizes as “suggested” is not the sort of thing that would, in principle, be
true or false. Figures of speech, aesthetic moods, or implied requests are not true or false,
although perhaps one could characterize them as more or less apt. Charitably, that is how
I read the appended “and the like” (Sanskrit: ‘ādi’) to mean.
13Recall that inferential marks, as described in Chapter 2, are the indicators or “provers”
that give us a reason (hetu) to think another, unobserved property, is present.
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However, the Indian pramāṇa tradition, as discussed in Chapter 2, closely
connects psychological processes of anumāna to formal patterns of reasoning.
A cognition due to anumāna can be described (following Mohanty) as having
the form:
For any knower S, if S has a perceptual cognition Fx, and then re-
members the rule, ‘Wherever there is F, there is G’ as instantiated
in the uncontroversial case O, and then perceives in x the same F
as before but this time as figuring in the remembered rule ‘Wher-
ever there is F, there is G,’ then S will experience an inferential
cognition of the form Gx, provided there is no relevant hindrance.14
When someone draws a fallacious conclusion, on the Indian analysis one reason
they might do so is because they are employing a defective inferential mark.
To do so is to employ an incorrect universal rule, but to still follow the univeral
rules of anumāna.15 For example, if I (incorrectly) reason “This lake possesses
fire, because it possesses water,” I am relying upon a universal rule, “Wherever
there is water, there is fire,” which turns out to be a defective as it relies on
an improper inferential mark—water. The presence of water does not indicate
the presence of fire. Should I come to learn this fact, I would not draw such
an conclusion. So when Ānanda appeals to the impossibility of disagreement
in cases of anumāna, he is appealing to the impossibility of dispute once the
correct inferential marks and pervasion relationship are identified. If we all
14Mohanty 1957, p. 111. Here “Fx” is to be read as “x qualified by F.”
15Mohanty 1957, p. 113.
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agree about these things, then disagreement is impossible. Thus Ānanda’s
position is, more explicitly, as below:
Argument against anumāna: Version 2
1. If words are inferential marks for suggested meaning, then once the cor-
rect inferential mark(s) and pervasion relationship are identified there is
no dispute over the suggested meaning of words.
2. Implied: There is a dispute over the suggested meaning of words once
the correct inferential mark and pervasion relationship are identified.
3. Therefore, words are not inferential marks.
Given this reading, the objection now shifts to the second premise. Recall,
within the framework introduced earlier, that there must be a pervasion rela-
tionship between what is observed and what is to be concluded. In the case
of suggestion, the pervasion relationship likely involves not only the words of
the utterance, but a number of contextual factors. Varying these contextual
factors would change what is suggested, so that there could be a number of
very similar pervasion rules:
1. Where there is utterance U and contextual factors C1, C2, C3, there is
suggestion Sa.
2. Where there is utterance U and contextual factors C1, C2, C3, C4, there
is suggestion Sb.
3. Where there is utterance U and contextual factors C1, C2,..., Cn, there
is suggestion Sx.
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If the right contextual factors are not taken into account, it is to be ex-
pected that there would be disagreement about the suggested meaning. But,
Ānanda’s opponent can argue, the dispute is actually grounded in what perva-
sion relationship competing interpreters are (tacitly) relying upon. So many
of the subtle suggestions we generate as skillful language users are one-off and
highly context-dependent. It would be easy to overlook a relevant contextual
factor. While it is true that once we have established the pervasion relation-
ship and the inferential mark, everyone can agree about what is suggested,
difficult interpretive projects are characterized by disagreement over what to
take into account. This, concludes the opponent, does not mean the project
is any less a matter of anumāna. In other words, the second premise is false,
because the dispute is not over the meaning of words, given agreement on
the pervasion. Rather, the dispute is really over which of the pervasion rules
is at play. This move requires giving up the claim that words alone are the
inferential mark relevant for determining what is suggested.
Further, this response to Ānanda’s argument is supported by his own empha-
sis on the sahṛdaya, or “skillfull interpreter” (and recall that, dialectically, the
opponent is charging Ānanda with a view that entails he should accept that
suggestion is anumāna). One might think that part of what makes an inter-
preter skillful is her ability to determine what contextual factors are relevant
to recovering what is suggested by a speaker. Given that not everyone has
such skills, we should expect disagreement, minimally between the skillful and
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the unskilled, but also among the unskilled interpreters themselves.16 The fact
of this disagreement alone does not require that the suggested is understood
by a means other than anumāna.
Finally, Ānanda emphasizes the contextual conditions which influence the
content of what is suggested. In an earlier discussion of how suggestion is
like anumāna (though he is careful not to claim suggestion is identified with
anumāna), he observes that suggestion is “conditioned by context” and this
is why the same word can yield different suggested meanings in different in-
stances.17 Ingalls remarks, in a footnote on this passage, that being suggestive
and being an inferential mark are similar in that
They are not properties essential to an entity but properties that
appear in an entity under certain conditions, or when the entity is
set in a certain relation. The entity smoke possesses liṅgatva (the
property of being a signpost or middle term) to fire only under the
double condition that (a) we do not already know of the presence
of fire and (b) we wish to infer the presence of fire. The word gaṅgā
possesses suggestiveness of coolness and purity only under certain
conditions...but when the conditions are present, it invariably gives
those suggestions.18
Thus, the opponent’s possible objection as I have presented it above seems not
only independently plausible, but consistent with Ānanda’s own observations
16Ānanda himself points out that knowing what is suggested is not just a matter of
knowing grammar and dictionary meanings.
17The term for “conditioned by context, etc.” is prakaraṇa-ādy-avacchedena, in DV 3.33l.
18Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 579.
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about how suggestion works. Even if we expand the “inferential mark” to
include the contextual conditions, the recovery of suggestion could still be a
case of anumāna.
5.2 Recontextualizing the argument
Despite these responses to his argument, Ānanda’s objection to characterizing
suggestion as deductive inference can still be rehabilitated. There are a couple
of intuitive reasons we might agree that our understanding of discourse-level
figures of speech, emotional moods accompanying poetry, and the like are not
best explained by anumāna. These reasons rely on distinguishing between two
senses of the general concept of “inference.” The first sense is inference qua
argument. An argument is a set of propositions or statements in which there
is a relationship of implication between two or more of them. Arguments
are formal representations, abstracted away from a particular thinker who
might claim belief in one or more of the propositions in the argument. The
second sense of inference, inference qua reasoning, does not abstract away from
thinkers. Reasoning often involves arguments, in that a reasoner may conclude
q from her belief that p and her belief that if p, then q. However, as Gilbert
Harman has demonstrated, it is not apparent that the principles of implication
which drive arguments are identical to the principles of reasoning which govern
actions, belief revisions, and so on.19
19See Harman 1986. For instance, the principle of modus ponens requires that in an
argument, given p and p!q, q necessarily follows. In contrast, if I as a reasoner accept p
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The category of anumāna in Indian philosophy straddles both argument and
reasoning. On the one hand, the five-fold structure of anumāna can be rep-
resented using the familiar notation of predicate logic, even if the constituent
parts should not be taken to be abstract propositions.20 On the other hand,
anumāna requires a thinker to have mental states whose contents are such
things as the pervasion relationship, the knowledge that the inferential mark
exists. The thinker then brings these mental states together in such a way as to
generate knowledge of the conclusion, through reflection (parāmarśa). There
is thus both a causal structure (a certain collection of mental contents causes
knowledge) as well as a normative logical structure (one ought to believe the
conclusion given the facts represented by the mental states).
While these two aspects of inference (argument and reasoning) are integrated
within the Indian tradition into the single category of anumāna, they are con-
ceptually distinct.21 We can, in the spirit of Ānanda’s objection, reconceive of
and also accept p!q, it is open to me, upon reflection, to reject p rather than conclude q.
20This is para-artha-anumāna or “inference for others.” As Phillips puts it in his (forth-
coming), “In an “inference for others,” there are five “members” (avayava) to be construed
as a single statement governed by grammatical and semantic rules and designed to provoke
inferential knowledge in another.” Siderits is quite correct to say that these constituents are
“not the sorts of things which, like propositions, could be either true or false” since if one of
the constituents turns out to be false, we have a case of pseudo-inference, and not inference.
Siderits 1991, p. 305. He takes this as a reason to deny that anumāna is an argument.
However, I think this is to over-emphasize the gulf between Indian and Western logic and
epistemology. A better approach might be to distinguish between the conditional in Indian
logic and the conditional in Western logic, for instance. The first is false if the antecedent
is false, regardless of the truth of the consequent, in contrast to the material conditional.
Phillips 5.
21The tradition itself does distinguish between tarka, or counterfactual reasoning, and the
kind of factive arguments present in anumāna. Thus it is not as if the notion of formal
validity was entirely alien to Indian philosophy, simply less useful given their projects.
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his argument in two ways. First, we can ask if it is plausible that suggested
meanings are recovered through an inferential epistemic event. This is to ask
whether the process of reasoning illustrated by the if-smoke-then-fire example
would be sufficient to get an interpreter to what is suggested. Second, we
can ask if it is plausible that a given suggested meaning is justifiable by an
inferential argument. This is to ask whether, regardless of how interpreters
actually recover suggested meanings, they can appeal to a deductive argu-
ment as justification for that particular meaning being what is suggested in a
context.
Frequently the inferential reasoning which leads to a particular interpretation
and the inferential justification are not distinguished, since, as Bach and Har-
nish put it, “that the hearer arrives at a plausible candidate [for the speaker’s
illocutionary intent] is, and is taken to be, good reason to believe it to be the
correct one.”22 However, since Grice, philosophers of language have been en-
gaged in debate over how it is that hearers can recover what speakers implicate
by way of their utterance. One of Grice’s requirements for a conversational
implicature is that the speaker believes that her hearer can either work out
or grasp intuitively what is being implicated.23 However, even if the hearer
simply “grasp[s] intuitively” what is implicated, Grice thinks that there must
be some way in which the implication is derivable from the utterance. This
is important for conversational implicatures since these are implicatures that
Phillips, forthcoming.
22Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 91.
23Grice 1989, pp. 30-31.
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rely upon general principles of communication and rationality, and they are
not, like conventional implicatures, arbitrarily stipulated.
As shown earlier, Ānanda rejects the proposal that suggestion is a matter of
convention.24 Ānanda’s view, while at odds with those who think what is
suggested is inferable, is in agreement with contemporary philosophers who
reject deductive inference as a plausible account of this working-out process,
either psychologically or formally. For instance, Levinson distinguishes impli-
catures from logical inferences, saying the former “cannot be directly modeled
in terms of some semantic relation like entailment.”25 Bach and Harnish, whose
Speech Act Schema (SAS) is intended to be a psychological (as well as formal)
account of inference to speaker intentions, observe that “the SAS is not deduc-
tive, but what might be called an inference to a plausible explanation, namely
of the speaker’s utterance.”26 These philosophers emphasize the defeasibility,
flexibility, and generally hypothetical nature of the inferences involved in com-
munication. As I understand Ānanda, this is part of why he rejects anumāna
as a suitable account of how we recover suggestion.
For both of these questions—the psychological and formal—rather than taking
the fact of a dispute over what is suggested as being part of a strong modus
tollens argument, as earlier, we might take it, instead as an observation re-
quiring explanation.27 While this is not how Ānanda’s case is presented in the
24See 4.5 on pages 184ff.
25Levinson 1983, 115-116.
26Bach and Harnish 1979, p. 92.
27This suggestion is due to Josh Dever.
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Dhvanyāloka, I think it is in the spirit of his project, which is to show that the
linguistic capacities already identified by the Indian tradition are insufficient
to account for the full scope of language’s effects. We observe that there are
other phenomena, such as suggested facts, discourse-level figures of speech,
and aesthetic moods, and yet our existing framework cannot explain them.
Further, there is an element of interpretive skill involved in determining just
what is suggested, leading to controversy, especially in highly creative and po-
etic cases. Given these facts, what sort of explanation ought we give for how
interpreters succeed? Anumāna is an epistemic instrument which gives us a
necessary conclusion given certain facts already known and the application of
a universal rule. As such, it is implausible, thinks Ānanda, that it could be
the way in which we come to know what is suggested.
5.2.1 Recovering what is suggested through inferential reasoning
In this new context, suppose Ānanda’s opponent claims that we recover what
is suggested through inferential reasoning, where the form follows the five-
fold framework of anumāna. The proposal is that an interpreter reasons as
follows:
(4) There is an heroic mood suggested in this poem, Raguvaṃśa.
For there is the word ‘rākṣasa’ and contextual factors C1, C2,..., Cn.
(Wherever there is ‘rākṣasa’ and contextual factors C1, C2,..., Cn there
is the heroic mood), as in the Māhabhārata.
This is such a case (Raguvaṃśa).
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Therefore it is so, i.e., there is an heroic mood suggested in this poem,
Raguvaṃśa.
Now, one way to understand the claim made here is that there are at least
some cases in which we recover suggested meaning through anumāna. It need
not be the stronger claim that we can only understand what is suggested by
anumāna. This weaker claim is alluded to by Ānanda a little later, where he
notes that we sometimes check word meaning, for example, by other means
of knowledge (pramāṇa) than testimony, but this does not mean that words
are not paradigmatic instances of the pramāṇa of testimony.28 To elaborate,
suppose I am told the word “vermillion” means a shade of red. I may verify this
in an encyclopedia, where I see an image of the particular shade next to the
word. This would be using the knowledge source of perception (pratyakṣa),
but that I have used perception to verify the meaning of “vermillion” does
not mean that the word should now be classified as conveying its meaning by
perception.
Applying this analogy to suggestion, it is open to Ānanda to admit that we
could verify what is suggested by using anumāna, without thereby having to
conclude that suggestion is identical to anumāna. However, Ānanda does not
make this move, and in fact, explicitly rejects it, saying that since we do not
check for the truth of suggested meanings, inference does not apply. He essen-
tially characterizes such an enterprise as a category mistake, possibly implying
28DV 3.33p.
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that suggested content is not true or false.29 Whether his opponent is making
a universal claim about the relationship between anumāna and suggestion,
Ānanda certainly is: for him, there is no instance in which it is appropriate to
say that the content of what is (poetically) suggested is recovered by anumāna,
here understood as inferential reasoning.30
I take it that a stronger reason for rejecting inferential reasoning, given Ānanda’s
observations and the model of inferential reasoning available in the Indian
tradition, is that it is impossible for interpreters to have access to the kind
of pervasion relationship which would prompt the conclusion as illustrated
above. The premises that are crucial to inferential reasoning—in a genuine
case of anumāna—are veridical. Further, not only are the claims true, but
the reasoner knows they are true. So, for an interpreter to to be prompted to
conclude that there is an heroic mood suggested in this poem, Raguvaṃśa, she
would need to know that wherever there is ‘rākṣasa’ and contextual factors
C1, C2,..., Cn, there is the heroic mood.
While the literature on how we come to know such a connection is complicated,
in general, observation of similar cases is what grounds such a claim of perva-
sion between two features. Pervasion means that given an inferential mark H,
if x is an H, then x must also be an S. The pervasion relationship is one that
29He calls this employment of inference useless (‘nirupayoga) and ’a “laughable occupa-
tion” (‘upahāsya eva sampadyate’) without saying exactly why. Abhinavagupta’s Locana
does not clarify further, only adding that the practice of applying inference to poetry is
laughable because it demonstrates such a person’s heart has been so hardened by logic that
they do not understand pleasure. Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 592.
30This would be inference-for-oneself, or sva-artha-anumāṇa.
215
is said to obtain without additional conditions, or upādhi. In contemporary
parlance, to have an H is to be sufficient for having an S. So, for instance, one
could challenge the paradigmatic relationship between smoke and fire, arguing
that fire is not actually sufficient for smoke, since the presence of wet fuel is
required (and hence an upādhi). Here, we have already seen that it is unlikely
that a word on its own could be an inferential mark for suggested meaning,
but other contextual factors act as upādhi, or sufficient conditions.
The problem for ascertaining the pervasion relationship between a word and
a set of contextual factors is the complexity involved. On this reconstrued
account, the inferentialist argues that hearers have knowledge of a pervasion
rule which they apply for each instance of suggestion. However, while it may be
conceptually possible to formulate complex rules of pervasion between words
and contextual factors to a suggested content, that a human intepreter could
grasp such rules is unlikely. Further, even assuming she could observe enough
uncomplicated cases to form rules, this does not account for how we come to
understand unique cases of suggestion. One of the capacities of the poet is
to use words in a new manner, breaking established literary conventions to
generate a surprising insight, or a profound aesthetic experience. If this is
part of what we understand through suggestion, inferential reasoning of the
form described above does seems inadequate to generate an experience.
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5.2.2 Justifying what is suggested through inferential argument
Suppose instead that Ānanda’s opponent claims that we merely must be able to
justify what is suggested through inferential arguments. The proposal is that
an interpreter, who has somehow come to understand that a poem has a heroic
mood, gives justification for that belief through the argument above. Some
of the same problems touched upon earlier resurface here, albeit in a different
context. How can the hearer come to have knowledge of the pervasion rule to
use as justification for her interpretation? And will there be a pervasion rule
for all instances of creative poetry, or are these applications of a more general
rule?
Further, the role of anumāna is to provide us with a basis for actionable
knowledge, in such a way that the strong knowledge claim which secures the
premises transmits to the conclusion. So, from the fact that I know there is
smoke on a mountain, and the fact that I know that where there is smoke, there
is fire, I can then know that there is fire on that mountain. One way to read
Ānanda’s good-natured jab at the “laughable occupation” of using logic in
the context of poetry is to understand him as saying interpretation of creative
utterances is not a matter of knowledge. This is especially salient for cases
of poetry, where one might argue that it is a mistaken endeavor to ask after
reading a poem, “What have I come to know?” and answer by enumerating a
list of what the poem suggests.
Certainly some poetry has as its central effects the prompting of a particular
emotion, or the coming to picture some beautiful scenery in the “mind’s eye.”
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However, as David Hills points out, poetry is still linguistic, and as such is
a medium “designed for the formulation of determinate propositions and the
presentation of determinate arguments.”31 Of course, Ānanda might restrict
this to the literal content of a poem, and exclude it from the domain of sug-
gestion.32 However, we might think that from the discourse-level metaphor
present in As You Like It, we can come to have knowledge about the way in
which social roles are like acting parts in a play.33 Finally, even if we want to
reject this suggestion, it still seems open for someone who has read a poem to
say, “I know that this poem suggests the heroic mood,” or “I know that the
author is suggesting social roles are like acting in a play.”
The objection that knowledge is an inapplicable concept in the context of cre-
ative utterances becomes even more implausible in ordinary situations. After
all, indirect speech is frequently a way of prompting someone to act. The
infamous case of the taciturn letter-writer who says of her student,
(5) Jones has good handwriting
is a situation where what is communicated through implicature, that Jones
is not a good student, is something which the letter reader will subsequently
act upon. We can theorize about how certain the letter reader is about a
particular proposition: “Jones is not a good student” versus “Jones should
31Hills 2008, p. 14.
32This is not entirely satisfactory, of course, as he has argued that not even the denoted
content is accessible by anumāna.
33“All the world’s a stage, And all the men and women merely players; They have their
exits and their entrances...” As You Like It.
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not be admitted to your institution.” This is to admit, however, that even the
domain of creative or indirect speech, admits of rational principles.
Still, whether Ānanda overstates the case in dismissing anumāna applied to
poetry as “laughable,” the Jones case points to a serious problem in using
anumāna to justify a given interpretation: defeasibility. The argument form
above is understood to necessitate the conclusion, once it is accepted that the
premises are true. Yet, in a sense, it is central to suggestion (and to con-
versational implicature in contemporary Western philosophy) that its content
is not necessarily entailed by the expression. Take the example of (5). Sup-
pose we think that the utterance (or the utterance plus contextual features)
necessitates that the speaker must mean
(6) Jones is not a good student.
Were this the case, it would be a contradiction for the letter-writer to say
something like
(7) Jones has good handwriting. He is also the best student I have ever
seen.
However, the fact that it is not—that, in contemporary parlance, the impli-
cature (6) is cancellable–must mean that an argument from (5) to (6) cannot
be deductively valid and sound. It could be trivially valid, and simply en-
tail a contradiction, both (6) and (7). However, in the Indian context, only
sound arguments count as anumāna, so a trivially valid argument would be a
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pseudo-anumāna. In the Western context, from a contradiction, one can infer
anything at all. On neither perspective do we want this sort of thing as our
justification for an interpretation.
5.3 Beyond anumāna: concluding remarks
At this point, we might conclude that while Ānanda has won the day against
those who want to reduce suggestion to anumāna, his victory is a small one.
After all, why would we expect that our interpretive process, or our justi-
fication for our favored interpretation (regardless of how we arrive at it), is
necessitated in such a strong manner as anumāna predicts? Further, the initial
claim, that we can arrive at what is suggested from the expression itself as an
inferential mark, is far too implausible an account of the nuanced manner in
which communication works.
Let us remind ourselves of Ānanda’s overarching project. We use language cre-
atively, in ways that generate implied facts, discourse-level figures of speech,
and aesthetic moods. These creative uses of language are difficult for inter-
preters to agree upon, although there is some fact of the matter about what
poets and other language-users mean. In addition to basic linguistic compe-
tence, excellent interpreters seem to have some skills which enable them to
have access to these suggested contents. The linguistic capacities of denota-
tion and lakṣaṇā seem insufficient to account for what is suggested, as does
stipulation by convention. What could account for the skillful access to these
varieties of what is suggested? The epistemic instrument of anumāna is one of
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the last remaining answers that theorists of Ānanda’s day can give. However,
this proposal fails in the several ways described above.
What this exploration of anumāna does give us, however, is a clearer picture
of the sort of thing our access to suggestion might be, on Ānanda’s view.
We need an interpretive process which does take into account the expression
meaning, but not it alone. We want the outcome of our process to be rationally
constrained (by what, we have yet to determine). Based on cases like the Jones’
handwriting, we might think our interpretation could yield more than one
potential suggested meaning. The hearer might even have different credences
towards them, perhaps. Finally, while the five-fold framework of anumāna may
not turn out to be the best model for access to suggestion, it does incorporate
both psychological and normative elements in a way that we might expect of
our communicative endeavors.
Much of our language processing is rapid and, even in cases of highly creative
and non-literal speech, we generate interpretations without much effort. Yet
while there is a causal element in play (recall Davidson’s “bump on the head”
analogy for metaphor), at the risk of unmooring our linguistic abilities from
rationality, we want a model that also includes why we typically take our
linguistic cognitions as justified. Further, we’d like some explanation of why
some interpretations are ill-conceived. As it turns out, the Indian tradition
has some of the scaffolding for just such a model, and it involves a closer ex-
amination of the way in which presumption functions in the linguistic capacity
of lakṣaṇā. We’ve already described this form of reasoning as being closer to
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the hypothesis-generating, defeasible, inference to the best explanation famil-
iar to contemporary philosophers. The arguments above, in highlighting how
anumāna falls short as a way to access what is suggested, point us in the di-
rection of presumption. In the next chapter, I argue that this is the solution
that Mukulabhaṭṭa presents, in a largely successful manner.
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Chapter 6
Recovering Meaning through Presumption
Mukulabhaṭṭa’s thesis is that indication, or lakṣaṇā, is responsible for the
effects of the function of suggestion identified by Ānandavardhana. He is a re-
ductionist about suggestion, claiming in his monograph that “what is described
here is what is included in the proper account of indication, but is considered
by the sensitive readers to be a novel classification, due to dhvani.”1 The term
“sensitive readers” is Mukula’s way of picking out those who subscribe to the
theory of dhvani put forward by Ānanda. He claims that there are multiple
kinds of incompatibility that hearers attempt to resolve through lakṣaṇā, and
that the sub-varieties of lakṣaṇā correspond to Ānanda’s purported varieties of
suggestion. I argue that Mukula’s analysis is, in some ways, a Gricean account
of pragmatic features of language. However, his theory is not straightforwardly
comparable to a single Western model, which I demonstrate in discussion of
Mukula’s theory of sentence-meaning. Still, his view does share a potential
problem with Gricean theories: the failure of calculability. Essentially, calcu-
lability is the requirement that interpreters could reason to the meaning indi-
cated by the literal meaning. I offer a possible solution on Mukula’s behalf,
1See appended translation, 367.
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which is to weaken the requirement for calculability. However, I note that, in
the context of the epistemological goals of Mukula’s work, this solution may
be costly.
6.1 Lakṣaṇā as removing incompatibility
Mukula’s argument against Ānanda and the “sensitive readers” is embedded
within a larger proposal for how communication works as a whole. He begins
The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function, as described earlier, with a
discussion of the epistemic role of the function of language. He then discusses
competing views about the function of denotation, settling upon a view which
is closely related to the Grammarian tradition in Indian philosophy. In brief,
he claims that instead of having as their primary denotation a universal or
generic class property (as the Bhāṭṭa claim), words denote qualities, generic
class properties, actions, or obects which bear names. While he spends a
relatively small amount of time discussing lexical semantics, this section is
important in demarcating the boundaries of lakṣaṇā. This is because lakṣaṇā
picks up where the denotative function, or “word’s function,” ends: “that
meaning understood by reflection on the meaning conveyed by the word’s
function: this is the indicatory function.”2 Thus, our theory of lakṣaṇā is in
part circumscribed by our theory of denotation.3
2See appended translation, 306
3Despite Ānanda spending a portion of the Dhvanyāloka discussing the form of suggestion
which is dependent upon the sound of particular phonemes, Mukula does not address this
at all but starts with denotation. He gives no explanation as to why he omits phonemes,
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In his analysis of the varieties of lakṣaṇā, which he takes to explain the putative
function of suggestion, Mukula makes several distinctions, represented in the
table below.

























Mukula’s first example of lakṣaṇā is the traditional example also cited by
Ānanda: (15) “The village is on the Ganges.” He observes, agreeing with
Ānanda, that lakṣaṇā conveys “bank of the Ganges” because the river, which
is the literal denotation of “Ganges,” is not appropriate as a basis of support
for a village. Moving on from this case, which is metonymic, Mukula then
cites an example of a (pejorative) metaphor:
(1) The Punjabi peasant is an ox.4
but it is likely that he considers phonemic suggestion to be a phenomenon outside of the
purview of an explanation of communication, his central topic. While the text is silent as
to why this might be, I speculate that it is because whatever a phoneme may contribute
to cognitions that arise from language, its contribution is essentially explicable by other
features, such as a speaker’s overall communicative aim. In any case, his main concern is
suggestion dependent upon words and sentences as units, which, in either case, is actually
lakṣaṇā.
4See appended translation, 315
225
He again observes that there is an obstacle for the denotative function, saying
that the literal meaning is “blocked” (‘bādhita’). Due to this obstacle, he
says, we transfer qualities to the Punjabi peasant which are similar to those
belonging to the ox, namely dullness and laziness. Lakṣaṇā is also taken as
the explanation for these two sentences:
(2) A cow is to be tied up.
(3) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.
The first example, (2), is consistent with the Bhāṭṭa formulation of lakṣaṇā.
Recall that, wherever a noun is to be qualified by an action word, the Bhāṭṭa
claim that hearers understand the sentence meaning through indication as
described earlier. In this case, Mukula observes:
The property of being a cow is not appropriate for sacrifice without
the implication of an individual based on the word; therefore for
this property to be established as the meaning there is implication
of a particular.”5
He will later call this kind of lakṣaṇā “appropriation” since the meaning which
is understood through lakṣaṇā is part of the denoted meaning. In other words,
the generic class property of cowhood is present in the individual cow, which
is understood through lakṣaṇā. In contrast, in the case of (15), the bank of the
river is not part of the denotation “river,” and so is called “pure” lakṣaṇā.
5See appended translation, 316
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Pure indication can be inclusive or indirect. The latter simply pick out another
meaning, without the denoted meaning being part of the indicated meaning.
For example, ‘dvirepha’ literally means “two-r’s” and thereby refers to the
word ‘bhramara’, the Sanskrit word for bee. Therefore, ‘dvirepha’ indirectly
indicates “bee,” but a bee is not a thing with two-r’s, and so the relationship is
unlike that between cowhood and a cow. In contrast to pure indication, mixed
transfer indication is as in (1)“The Punjabi peasant is an ox,” a metaphorical
slur. In this kind of lakṣaṇā, properties of one object are taken to to be prop-
erties of another object. The metaphorical target, the peasant, is understood
to have the properties of the vehicle, in this case the ox. Here the properties
are things such as being dull and lazy.
In contrast, in the sentence (2) “A cow is to be tied up,” the particular cow
is not understood as having the qualities of the universal of cowhood, but
there is simply a shift from universal to particular. There is inclusion because
the universal cowhood inheres in the particular cow which is denoted. But
cognition of the universal as related to the particular is not necessary to un-
derstand the point, as in the case of metaphor. Mixed transfer divides between
pure and qualitative, each of which subdivides further into superimposed and
established. Briefly, the difference between pure mixed transfer and qualita-
tive mixed transfer is in the way in which the properties are shared between
the two objects. In qualitative mixed transfer, the relationship is of similarity,
but pure mixed transfer can be any other sort of relationship, such as cause
and effect. Thus, in
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(4) Ghee is long life,
, the vehicle, ghee, is the cause of long life, the metaphorical target.6 There is
no similarity in the properties of ghee and the properties of a long life.
Finally, in either qualitative or pure mixed transfer, Mukula distinguishes
between superimposed and established cases. The relevant difference here is
how salient the vehicle of the metaphor is for conceptualizing its target. In (4)
the vehicle is superimposed upon the target and the interpreter is said to be
aware of its role in understanding long life. Established cases are in contrast
to this, since we do not conceive of the target as being related to the vehicle.
Examples include ‘rājan,’ which is used to refer to a ruler who is not of the
royal class. Although there are similarities between the literal denotation of
‘rājan’ (which picks out a royal person) and its indication (which picks out a
lower class ruler or important person), hearers do not conceive of the lower
class person as a royal person. Likewise for pure mixed transfer, ‘pañcālā,’
the word indicates a geographical place, by way of the location where the
descendants of the Pañcālā tribe lived, but there is no awareness of this on the
part of the hearer. The word is said to (literally and originally) denote the
Pañcālā people, but through lakṣaṇā, indicates their territory.
Mukula goes on to gloss (3), which is an example of the form of reasoning
called arthāpatti, or presumption. As said earlier, if we are given the facts
6The metaphor relies on the belief that ghee, or clarified butter, was thought to be an
important element of diet contributing to health and longevity.
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that (1) Devadatta is fat and (2) Devadatta does not eat during the day, we
must presume (3) that Devadatta eats at night. Mukula adds that
...the possession of fatness, because of its being an effect, is sim-
ply being understood as characterized by an absence of eating, an
absence which has its existence during the day. By possessing a
self-established meaning, the existence of a cause (of the fatness)
is caused to be included because of the implication that there is
eating at night.7
He explicitly identifies (3) as being parallel to (2), by calling them both “ap-
propriation,” by transitioning between (2) and (3) with “and likewise” (‘yathā
ca’), and describing the denoted word-meanings in each case as ones which are
“established by itself” (sva-siddhi). As shown earlier, (2) is a traditional exam-
ple of lakṣaṇā by presumption, and (3) is a traditional example of the pramāṇa
of presumption. This is the most explicit identification of how hearers come
to retrieve the content of lakṣaṇā in his text, although, as we will see, the
method of presumption undergirds his conception of lakṣaṇā in general.
What indication does, by means of presumption, is to remove an apparent
conflict. However, so far, the examples that Mukula has given are ones
which Ānanda might accept as being instances of lakṣaṇā and not sugges-
tion. Mukula must expand the role of lakṣaṇā to account for the hard cases
given in the Dhvanyāloka. These cases are the ones where Ānanda argues there
is no failure of semantic fit and yet hearers recover something which is not re-
7See appended translation, 317
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ducible to denotation or lakṣaṇā. My claim is that Mukula expands the role of
presumption in lakṣaṇā to removing incompatibility that is not only sentence-
internal, but between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about the
speaker, or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance.
Mukula rejects Ānanda’s claim that indication only operates when there is
an obvious incompatibility among the literal meanings of the words within
a sentence. Instead, there may be an inconsistency between any number of
factors (speaker intention, sentence meaning, contextual facts). A hearer must
first identify where the tension lies and then which interpretive method will
best resolve it—although she need not be conscious of this process.8
The section where Mukula makes it clearest that lakṣaṇā does not operate
strictly on the basis of conflict between sentence internal word-meanings is his
comments on Verse 8, where he says,
From reflection upon the distinct forms of: speaker, sentence, and
utterance, the six kinds of indication are able to be judged correctly
by the thoughtful.9
After defining the terms “speaker,” “sentence,” and “utterance,” Mukula ar-
gues that it is from these “categorized as each on its own, or in combination,
or in conjunction with place, time, and circumstance—each on its own, or
8One could posit a mental module which processes these interpretations, or any number
of explanations. While Mukula seems to describe a conscious, reflective process, this is not
necessary for my reconstruction of his view and, indeed, it is implausible that hearers always
engage in such reasoning to interpret utterances on the fly.
9See appended translation, 329.
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in combination—that the essential six kinds of indication are distinguished
by skillful scholars.”10 He then goes on to take up several cases which would
be identified as suggestion by Ānanda, and to explain how they are cases of
lakṣaṇā.
For instance, he cites a set of verses belonging to the genre of Sanskrit love
poetry:
(5) Neighbor, watch our house here for a little while,
This child’s father will not even at all drink the tasteless
well-water.
Now I go by myself to that forest stream which is bordered
by tamāla trees,
Let the reed’s dense joints, being broken long before, scratch
my body.11
In (5), there is no lack of semantic fit among the constituent parts of the sen-
tences. And yet, Mukula notes, readers would understand this young woman
as lying, and saying that she will be scratched by reeds to mask the fact that
she will bear “telling marks” from an adulterous encounter. On Ānanda’s
conception, if there is no lack of semantic fit, there is no trigger for hear-
ers to retrieve a non-literal meaning through lakṣaṇā. However, on Mukula’s
view, this second meaning—the actual goal of the young woman, not her ly-
10See appended translation, 329.
11The verse is from the Subhāṣita-ratna-kośa of Vidyākara. These lines are not found in
the Dhvanyāloka, but Ānanda does comment upon a similar set of verses, in which a woman
deceives a monk into leaving the location of her rendezvous. See Ānandavardhana 1990a,
p.83ff.
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ing representation—is “understood through consideration of the speaker as
unvirtuous.”12 He says little about the process of understanding, simply that
untruth has a “capacity to convey the opposite of a true meaning” and so by
the untrue meaning (the literal meaning of the verses), the “truth which is
uttered is indicated by possessing a meaning which establishes itself.” He de-
scribes this kind of meaning as appropriation, like the earlier clear instances of
presumption. Further, Mukula describes this understanding as arising through
reflection (‘paryālocanayā’) on the speaker’s nature, showing that the process
of reasoning (implicitly: presumption) requires facts about the speaker.13
While not explicit in Mukula’s text, I think a helpful reconstruction of how
hearers come to understand lakṣaṇā is by means of presumption based upon
the elements he identifies (speaker, sentence, utterance, place, time, circum-
stance).
We can generalize the form of presumption as follows:
Presumption q is presumed from p and m iff:
1. p and m are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of q is required to make p compatible with m.
12See appended translation, 336.
13This case is more complicated than Mukula recognizes, due to the poetic frame. Are
we to think that the young woman herself is intending her neighbor to recognize that she
is hinting at an erotic encounter? If not, then perhaps we as readers assume based upon
literary devices that the woman is lying, and thereby come to recognize what she plans
through the poet’s attributing words to her. What counts as a background assumption and
what counts as an implied, secondary meaning, is not obvious here.
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Applying this general structure to example (5), we have:
implied meaning is presumed from speaker’s nature and literal meaning iff:
1. speaker’s nature and literal meaning are two already-established
facts
2. The presumption of implied meaning is required to make speaker’s
nature compatible with literal meaning.
The knowledge of the speaker’s nature as a lying woman could be part of
the background knowledge that a reader well-versed in the tropes of Sanskrit
poetry would have. The literal meaning would be understood through the
denotative function of words.14 Through presumption, a hearer comes to rec-
oncile the apparent incompatibility between a woman who is unvirtuous and
her apparently literal description of a trip to the river bank. The incom-
patibility is not obvious, however, unless supplemented with some additional
assumptions, to which I now turn, in the context of developing Mukula’s view
as Gricean.
6.2 Mukula’s hybrid view as Gricean
On Grice’s account of implication, first an interpreter must be able to recog-
nize that the speaker intends something beyond the strictly literal sentence
meaning. That is, we must have accessible to us some kind of “trigger” or
14Arguably, this literal meaning might require lakṣaṇā, as in the case of “A cow is to be
tied up.” More on this below in the discussion of sentence meaning.
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“clue” that the speaker wants us to understand more than, or something other
than, the literal sentence meaning. Then she must have a way to recover the
implicated speaker meaning based on her knowledge of such things as the sen-
tence meaning, context, and conversational principles. Grice claims there are
general conversational maxims in place when speakers and hearers engage in
cooperative conversations. He proposes a general principle which he takes to
guide the rationality of contributions to such a conversation:
Cooperative Principle (CP) Make your conversational contri-
bution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you
are engaged.15
The CP functions in conjunction with these more specific maxims:
Maxim of Quantity. Make your contribution as informative as
required.
Maxim of Quality. Try to make your contribution one that is
true.
Maxim of Relation. Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner. Be perspicuous.16
The “trigger” for interpreters to look for an implicated speaker meaning is
some incompatibility between the sentence meaning and these Gricean con-
versational principles. Grice’s original proposal is as follows:
15Grice 1989, p. 26.
16Some of these are further divisible into submaxims, which I do not include here. See
Grice 1989, p. 26, for details.
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Conversational Implicature S conversationally implicates that q in saying
that p iff:
1. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the
Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that S thinks that q is required to make saying
that p consistent with this presumption,
3. S thinks, and expects H to think that S thinks, the hearer can work
out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that q is required.17
The structure of Gricean conversational implicature is strikingly parallel to
the pramāṇa of presumption, save for the assumption of the conversational
maxims and Cooperative Principle. While Mukula does not explicitly appeal
to the existence of such principles, he relies on something analogous in his
reasoning to his preferred interpretation. We see this clearly in his analysis of
the case of Fat Devadatta, though such assumptions tacitly guide his analysis
of other cases, too. As said earlier, in the case of (3) “Fat Devadatta does not
eat during the day,” there is an inconsistency between the sentence meaning
and contextual facts (or background knowledge), namely, being fat and not
eating. It is accepted that one cannot be fat if one does not eat. Mukula
characterizes the inconsistency as related to cause and effect. In this sentence,
fatness is the effect of not eating during the day. The meaning obtained by
lakṣaṇā is that eating at night is required in order to explain the otherwise
17Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.
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inexplicable existence of fatness.
However, one might suggest that instead of focusing upon the time at which
he is said not to eat, an interpreter could focus upon the lack of eating. This
solution would be to understand the sentence as implicating that Devadatta
drinks during the day. Mukula says this solution is not satisfactory because the
speaker has mentioned the time of not eating. Implicit here is something like
the Gricean Maxim of Quantity—make your contribution as informative as re-
quired. The time period is in some way informative, or it would not have been
mentioned. If the sentence were “Fat Devadatta does not eat,” then perhaps
the speaker meaning “Fat Devadatta drinks” would be more salient. Mukula
does not address the possibility that (at least) two solutions to the tension are
possible, even if the interpreter might have different credences towards each as
what the speaker meant. Instead, Mukula says that the “Devadatta drinks”
solution is “blocked” (‘bādhita’) by the presence of the words “during the day.”
However, there would be nothing infelicitous about uttering, “Fat Devadatta
does not eat during the day, he drinks at night,” so “blocked” is too strong a
claim, if taken to mean necessity.
While Mukula does not explicitly identify every instance of indication as be-
ing connected to presumption, I think a case can be made that this general
structure is shared in the other cases, too. Returning to the case of (15) “The
village is on the Ganges,” Mukula gives an explanation that accounts for not
only the metonymic shift from “Ganges’ to “bank of the Ganges,” but for the
suggestion of properties associated with the river. His explanation, in full,
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is:
Here is a case of indication by relationship, as in the example, “The
village is on the Ganges.” For in this case, where the primary mean-
ing of the word is blocked, since the particular stream denoted by
the word “Ganges” is inapplicable as the locus of a village, the
meaning, whose relationship is that of contiguity–and–contiguous
things, indicates the bank as being a support of the village. And
here, the purpose of indication with regard to the bank is to com-
municate things such as holiness and beauty, which the words do
not convey but which are inherent in things related to the Ganges.
For the words are unable to contact things such as holiness and
beauty, because there is the unwanted possibility of under- and
over-extension.18
In keeping with his style, Mukula is characteristically terse regarding how
the intention and the unified meaning of “Ganges” work together to convey
holiness and beauty. One important point, in the context of making com-
parisons with Grice, is that Mukula does identify the indicated meaning with
the speaker’s intention. He seems to disagree with Ānanda that intention
consists in a particular communicative aim, but not content. This claim is
more apparent in the Sanskrit structure of this sentence, where the word for
intention (‘prayojanam’) matches case, gender, and number with the clause
“communicating of things such as holiness and beauty...”19
18See appended translation, 355.
19gaṅgātva eka-artha samaveta asaṃvijñānā pada-puṇyatvamana uharatva-ādi-
pratipādanam.
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We might think that in this case, presumption has a form as below:
the speaker’s intention is presumed from the literal meaning of “Ganges” and
the inapplicability of the Ganges as a substratum iff:
1. literal meaning of “Ganges” and the inapplicability of the Ganges as a
substratum are two already-established facts;
2. The presumption of the speaker’s intention is required to make literal
meaning of “Ganges” compatible with the inapplicability of the Ganges
as a substratum.
In this analysis, Mukula argues that cognition of the holiness and beauty
is a result of the inapplicability of the Ganges river as a substratum of the
village. So, like Ānanda, he thinks that (at least in some cases) a speaker
would not have a reason to use the locative case for “Ganges” unless she wants
to convey something more than just that the village is proximately situated to
the Ganges. However, he does not explain why it is that in some cases what is
presumed is the speaker’s intention to convey holiness and beauty, and in other
cases, what is presumed is simply a metonymic shift to “bank of the Ganges.”20
While this is a problem for Mukula’s taxonomy of varieties of lakṣaṇā (the
same example is subsumed under two different, seemingly contrary varieties),
it points to a larger problem regarding the role of presumption: the non-
necessary nature of its conclusions.
20See McCrea 2008, p. 298-300 for more discussion. McCrea observes that Mukula does
not seem especially concerned to address this, nor is Mukula’s discussion of prayojana, or
the speaker’s intention, always as clear as we would like.
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6.2.1 Mukula on sentence meaning
Before I discuss this problem regarding presumption, I briefly digress to ad-
dress an important, but previously unexamined, aspect of Mukula’s arguments.
He recognizes that while the Bhāṭṭa may be content with sentences such as
(2) “A cow is to be tied up” explained as due to lakṣaṇā, the contextualist
Prābhākara will not. Further, since he is working within the broader context
of the prevailing pramāṇa theories which emphasize the role of sentences in
generating true cognitions, he has a burden to explain how his view of lakṣaṇā
fits theories not only of lexical semantics (as he does early in the text) but of
sentence meanings. To this end, he makes an apparent digression into theories
of sentence meaning. The discussion, however, has an important connection
with the implicit claim that Mukula’s own hybrid view of sentence meaning
is superior to the Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara, in large part due to his theory of
lakṣaṇā.
Mukula describes the the Bhāṭṭa theory of sentence meaning in [47.11]:
And in the case where there is first connection-of-the-denoted, then
through the words’ natural sense, word-meanings which are re-
ferred to are subsequently denoted (together) due to the operations
of syntactic expectancy, semantic fit, phonetic contiguity. Given
this, indication is accepted as functioning upon word meanings
which are universals when there is a mutual unifying relationship
of qualified and particular. Because of the force of the word mean-
ings, what possesses an expressed meaning does so on account of
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its being later, when the meaning of the sentence is being under-
stood.21
Here, Mukula explicitly appeals to the requirements of syntactic expectancy,
semantic fit, and phonetic contiguity. Throughout his text, he describes indi-
cation as coming into play when semantic fit is blocked. For the Bhāṭṭa, this
happens frequently, any time we require a particular instead of a universal as
an object of a verb, as we’ve seen.
Mukula explains why the Prābhākara view initially seems not to require indi-
cation:
This is because the (word) meaning, which is grounded in a uni-
versal form that has an unwavering relationship with the native
meaning, is understood in harmony with the sentence meaning as
a whole entirety. In the case of such a view being understood, the
six kinds of indication according to their distinctions–indication
which is the object of this or that sentence meaning–would not
appear.22
The kinds of indication which Mukula analyzes in his text are not part of the
Prābhākara’s account, because word meaning is radically contextual. In this
way, the Prābhākara are like contemporary relevance theorists such as Robyn
Carston, who has argued that hearers construct ad hoc concepts online in
the course of utterance comprehension.23 While this contextualist explanation
21See appended translation, 349.
22See appended translation, 349.
23For details, see Chapter Five of Carston 2002.
240
does not preclude (as with the Prābhākara) there being a lexical entry for a
word, hearers construct word meanings on the basis of such factors as relevance
in a context. The Prābhākara go further than theorists like Carston, claiming
we never know the lexical entry, but that it is still the basis for contextual
meaning.
However, Mukula argues that, in fact, there is indication at a certain stage.
While the Prābhākara do not need indication to bring universals into relation
with one another, since on their view, words will extend their meaning to
whatever is contextually, necessary, there may be cases where indication is still
required. These are cases in which indication acts upon a sentence meaning.
Mukula is terse, saying only “In connection to what is the expressed meaning,
we say there is (something) preceding. Indication is situated in the stage which
is the ground prior to this expressed meaning.”24 I take him to be arguing that
while all varieties of indication are not part of the Prābhākara view, it may
be present in a case such as irony. Take a case like:
(6) One with a handsome face.25
where what the speaker wants to convey is that it is not the case that the person
has a handsome face. On the Prābhākara view, hearers could understand
what the constituent parts of the sentence mean through context, and then by
indication, they come to understand that the speaker is intending the opposite
24See appended translation, 349.
25See translation, 357.
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of the sentence meaning.
Mukula argues, in contrast, that on the “hybrid” view (‘samuccaya’), which
seems to be his own:
Now in the combined view of connection-of-the-denoted and denotation-
through-the-connected, by the act of combining the two-fold rule
earlier described, we have, from the perspective of words, indica-
tion occurring at a time subsequent to the words expressing mean-
ing. And from the perspective of sentences, it occurs after the
sentence meaning and before there is an utterance meaning.26
Mukula recognizes that we need to explain how speakers understand metonymi-
cal shifts which occur within sentence as well as meaning which operates on
an entire sentence meaning (such as irony putatively does). So he proposes
that the Bhāṭṭa have things right from the “perspective of words,” but that
the Prābhākara have things right from the “perspective of sentences.”
6.3 Failure of calculability and a solution
However much Mukula’s explanation draws attention to failures of existing
theories of sentence meaning, as we have observed, it still seems to fall short
as a viable explanation of non-literal interpretation. This problem has been
noted by Sanskrit literary theorist Sheldon Pollock, although I think he over-
states the difficulty. Pollock’s central thesis is that “the semantics of San-
skrit literary theory requires supplementation not only by a general linguistic
26See appended translation, 351.
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pragmatics but by a specific social pragmatics.”27 In other words, whichever
position you might align yourself with in regard to suggestion, Pollock argues
that Sanskrit literary theory is incomplete as an explanation of how inter-
preters understand the meanings of poetry. Whether suggestion is counted as
something additional to denotation and indication, or reduced to one of them,
neither view will give us an adequate account of pragmatics. This is because,
he says, we need a “specific social pragmatics,” something that can explain to
us the significance of thickets on riverbanks, in the sense of what people do
there, why they need privacy for it, and etc.28 Pollock’s argument is based
on the same intuition that some have argued generates a problem for Grice:
we an explanation as to how a hearer can reasonably infer as being what is
speaker-meant.29
According to Grice, a hearer ought to be able to “work out” what is implicated
by a speaker in the case of a conversational implicature. The expectation that
a hearer can do so is constitutive of a conversational implicature. The speaker
must think the hearer can either work out or intuitively grasp the necessary
implicature. For reference, I reproduce the definition of conversational impli-
cature above.
Conversational Implicature S conversationally implicates that q in saying
27Pollock 2001, 206.
28Pollock 2001, 207. These examples are based on the background of one of Ānanda’s
poetic examples, which relies on the knowledge that men and women have illicit rendezvous
in the thickets of riverbanks, and that this is commonly a theme in Prakrit poetry.
29See, for example, Davis 2007.
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that p iff:
1. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the
Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that S thinks that q is required to make saying
that p consistent with this presumption,
3. S thinks, and expects H to think that S thinks, the hearer can work
out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that q is required.30
However, there is an epistemological problem: Grice seems to think that there
is a single necessary conversational implicature q required to make sense out
of the (apparent) inconsistency between what is said, p, and the Coopera-
tive Principle and its attendant maxims. Further, not only is there such an
implicature, but it must be in principle, capable of being deduced through
application of conversational principles and reason. Grice gives an example of
such a working–out:
He has said that p; there is no reason to suppose that he is not
observing the maxims, or at least the Cooperative Principle; he
could not be doing this unless he thought that q; he knows (and
knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposi-
tion that he thinks that q is required; he has done nothing to stop
me thinking that q; he intends me to think, or is at least willing
to allow me to think, that q; and so he has implicated that q.31
30Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.
31Grice 1975, p. 31. I have reversed “p” and “q” to match my usage in the definition of
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This principle, that a hearer is at least capable of (although not required to
actually engage in) such a working–out, is called the Principle of Calcula-
bility. On Calculability, there must be some traceable relationship between
the implicature and the literal meaning.32 However, even relying on the Coop-
erative Principles and maxims, a hearer’s reasoning to any given implicature
is defeasible. If Grice is instead committed to a non-deductive inference to
the best explanation, then we must ask what constitutes the “best explana-
tion.” In either case, the general problem is while there is putatively a single
implicature which the speaker intends, the hearer must be in a position to, in
principle, reason to that very same implicature.33
This is related to Pollock’s concerns in that the Sanskrit tradition, though it
has a set of principles governing poetic interpretation (which we will explore
below), does not have an account of why thickets on riverbanks in poetry
“mean” what they do. There is no calculation we can employ from facts about
Sanskrit grammar, poetic principles, and background knowledge, to determine
what is indicated (or suggested) without a more detailed account of social facts.
And, going beyond Pollock to the worry for Grice, even were the Sanskritists to
give such a social pragmatics (perhaps a detailed catalog of social symbols and
conversational implicature.
32Grice only requires Calculability for conversational implicatures, but in principle, it
seems that conventional implicatures ought to also be calculable, although not necessarily
by reliance on the Cooperative Principle.
33The constitutive role of working-out and the epistemological role must be kept separate,
at the risk of making the hearer’s interpretation determine the content of the speaker’s
implicature!
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their origins), it might still underdetermine what is implicated.34 However, I
think there are resources to fill in Mukula’s account and, further, that Pollock
is wrong when he claims we need to give a social pragmatics. Below, I sketch
a reply to Pollock which also forms the basis of a reconstruction of Mukula
that, while it does not solve the problem of calculability, is preferable to the
Gricean story.
6.3.1 Convention, indication, and calculability
For Pollock, the problem is that whatever explanation the Sanskrit critic gives,
he leaves out crucial material that’s required to determine what has been
implicated. To take the example of the Ganges river again: while Mukula
and Ānanda say that the river cannot be the locus of a village, they do not
make explicit that villages are typically built upon dry land, as they think it
obvious. However, in some fishing cultures, villages may be built directly upon
the river on stilts which reach down to the riverbed.35 That the sentence “A
village is on the Ganges” cannot literally be true and ought to be interpreted
as metonymy requires background knowledge of the fact that villages are not
ordinarily built upon rivers.
Pollock’s complaint at first blush is that the Sanskrit literary critics did not
34Interestingly, in a brief footnote, Pollock mentions speech-act theory and Gricean con-
versational implicatures, noting that what is missing in Sanskrit poetics is also missing in
the Western tradition, although he does not elucidate this claim.
35Wikipedia lists this as occurring in places such as Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philip-
pines, and Indonesia. It isn’t necessary for the cogency of my point that this actu-
ally occur in human culture, however, just that it is a piece of background knowledge.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fishing_village.
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include these facts (which he calls “social”) in their explanation of interpre-
tation. However, while perhaps Ānanda can be faulted—he simply appeals
to “contextual factors” and leaves it at that—Mukula has made an attempt
to cite such things as “place, time, and world.” The term ‘sthita’ or “world”
is something like “circumstance” which would include facts about one’s social
context. Further, if Pollock’s complaint is that everything must be made ex-
plicit, he is asking for too much. After all, in any inference, we can continue
making assumptions explicit until we reach the bottom of logical analysis and
the law of non-contradiction, or the like.
What Pollock is asking for, however, is more than just the explicit inclusion of
general background knowledge. He says “Aesthetic suggestion presupposes and
reproduces social knowledge of, and correspondingly assent to, a structure of
social action, and without this knowledge suggestion itself often remains all but
incomprehensible.”36 This claim picks out the central role of rasa theory and
its analysis of certain emotions as being suitable for some persons and actions
and unsuitable for others (see Chapter One). That is, there are aesthetic,
emotional, and ethical norms that hearers must know in order to draw proper
interpretive conclusions. Pollock’s point recalls Ānanda’s protestation that a
sahṛdaya cannot be relying upon knowledge of convention to understand poetic
suggestion. For Ānanda, the reason is that conventions are arbitrary and this
might threaten knowledge of rasa. For Pollock, the problem is deeper. Not
only does suggestion presuppose a “structure of social action” which is also
36Pollock 2001, 223, italics mine.
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conveyed by the content of what is suggested, but suggestion also presupposes
and reproduces assent to this structure. Being a sahṛdaya, Pollock suggests,
is about “learning what is normative in the everyday world.”37 He argues that
Sanskrit literary critics and philosophers were blind to this presupposition in
their theorizing, as evidenced by the fact that they do not make it a target of
inquiry.
Pollock is asking for an account of how (contra Ānanda’s position) knowledge
of normative conventions play a role in interpretation. Pollock’s claim in the
above passage that aesthetic suggestion presupposes “assent to” a structure
of social action is too strong if read as requiring actual assent (as an out-
side interpreter of Sanskrit poetry, he need not assent to its implicit social
structure to understand its meaning). However, his point is well-taken that
an interpreter can “take on board” the putative appropriateness of a certain
emotion as being appropriate for person X and not person Y in her retrieval
of meaning. Further, in the Sanskrit poetic tradition, she likely does so by a
presupposition that it is a non-arbitrary feature of the world that X ought to
have emotion E, and not Y. And yet, it seems that it certainly is conventional
that, for example, women in the Prakrit poetic tradition arrange the location
of adulterous affairs, and not the men. Even if no one in Ānanda’s time knew
of an alternative, since they might deny that men arranging the location was
natural and claim that it could work out in practice, this does not mean that
the practice is not conventional. It could have been the case that men ar-
37Pollock 2001, 215.
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ranged affairs, and it is not in fact true that this alternative practice would
not fulfill the relevant aims.38
What Pollock is asking for, then, is an account of the relationship between
inference, presumption, and convention in the communication of suggested
meanings. While one could subsume conventions to “background knowledge”
and claim that Mīmāṃsā presumption runs on knowledge of these facts, we
would be in no better position to explain how interpreters have access to
speaker meanings, especially if we accept calculability.
Mukula’s use of presumption as the means by which hearers recover indicated
meanings is good evidence that he thinks indicated meaning can be calcu-
lated. Further evidence for this is found where he discusses the word ‘rājan’
which, literally, applies to members of a particular caste (the kṣatriya) who
are rulers. The word came to be applied metaphorically to members of an-
other caste, the śudra, who shared similar properties with a king who protects
a city.39 He observes that, over time, the qualitative relation between the
literal and metaphorical application, was not “cognized.” People directly un-
derstood ‘rājan’ in certain contexts to apply to lower-caste, śudra. However,
the relationship can be understood by “reflection” (‘vicāraṇa’). He does not
explicitly state that the relationship between literal and non-literal meaning
must be capable of being understood by reflection, as Grice does. However,
that he can explain what is indicated and how is evidence for the fact that he
38See Burge 1975, especially p. 254.
39See appendix, 6.2.
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does think indicated meaning is in fact capable of being worked out in some
way.
The list which Mukula gives is due to a much earlier Mīmāṃsā philosopher,
Bhartṛmitra. He is a Mīmāṃsā philosopher writing after Śabara (350 and
400 CE) and before Kumārila (600 and 700 CE) who argues against the his
views. We do not have his works except through citations in other texts.
Mukula accepts these relationships on the authority of Bhartṛmitra and offers
no justification for the selection.40
In fact, Mukula spends a significant portion of his text detailing the relation-
ship between the literal (or primary) and indicated meaning. It seems likely
that interpreters could use these principles to work out indicated meanings.
There are five possible relationships that he identifies: connection with the
literal meaning, similarity, association, opposition, and connection with an
action. Now, his discussion of these relationships is the context of identifying
the constitutive conditions for indication, and not epistemic principles hearers
use to understand indicated meaning. However, throughout the treatise—as
the opening emphasis on epistemology suggests—he seems to think that these
principles will map onto the constitutive conditions. Mukula’s definition of
the tripartite nature of indication is:
40According to Verpooten, Bhartṛmitra was considered “a positivist and an irreligious
thinker” who was rejected from the orthodoxy due to his views.Verpooten 1987, p. 22. Ab-
hinava quotes the same passage from Bhartṛmitra in the Locana, using two different versions
of the quote, neither of which is identical with Mukula’s quotation. See Ānandavardhana
1990a, p. 67, fn 4 for discussion.
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1. Due to an inconsistency in primary meaning—that is, its being ob-
structed as another knowledge source;
2. And due to the dependence on the primary meaning on the part of the
meaning which is being indicated;
3. And due to grasping another meaning because of an intention.41
It is the dependence relationship which admits of five possible relationships
(which he goes through in detail with examples for each).42
Yet if indicated meaning is calculable in the Gricean sense, there is a problem:
Mukula’s explanations often give the equivalent of open disjunctions as an
interpretation for metaphors and other figures. Take, for instance, his discus-
sion of the metaphor (1) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox.” He says that the
ox and the Punjabi both have the properties of dullness and laziness, using
the Sanskrit term ‘ādi,’ found at the end of compounds to indicate a list of
similar things. A similar use of the equivalent to et cetera is found in many
of his analyses. But if an open disjunction is the content of lakṣaṇā, there are
problems for using reflection to come to understand it. For one thing, there is
the problem of whether it counts as understanding the metaphor if a hearer
understands dullness, but not laziness, as what is indicated. Further, there is
the question of whether a speaker would intend to communicate such an open
41These three reasons, ‘evaṃ vidha-kāraṇa-tritaya-ātmaka-sāmagrī ’ are all together nec-
essary as a collection for indication.
42See translation, 9. This definition is not Mukula’s originally, but from Kumārila. The
five relationships originate with Bhartṛmitra, another Mīmāṃsaka, but one whose works we
only have in citations, not in their original.
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disjunction.
There is thus a tension in Mukula’s work. At the outset, he situates his theory
of indication in an epistemological context. A successful account of indicated
meaning would explain how interpreters have epistemic access to the speaker’s
meaning, so that they can further judge whether an inference is valid, or a
testimony is true. But if presumption cannot deliver a determinate meaning,
how can an interpreter have the certainty/warrant, or niścaya, that Mukula
claims she needs to reason about worldly and other-worldly things?
6.3.2 Giving up calculability
One promising answer is for Mukula to give up calculability, understood in
the strong sense of there being one interpretation that is necessarily required.
In fact, if he is to be consistent with the Mīmāṃsā perspective on presump-
tion, we cannot conflate presumption with inference in which we can spell
out the major and minor premises and deductively guarantee our conclusion.
This position—that presumption is not reducible to inference—is one of the
major differences between the Mīmāṃsā and the Nyāya schools in Indian phi-
losophy. The Mīmāṃsā, as Stephen Phillips puts it, “vindicate the educated
guess,” and do not require that we are warranted in drawing a conclusion only
when we can construct a deductive inference.43 The conclusion to presumptive
reasoning would leave the hearer with knowledge, insofar as she arrives at the
43See, for example the debate between Gaṅgeśa and his Mīmāṃsaka interlocutor in the
Tattva-cintā-maṇi. Phillips 2012.
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best possible explanation of the utterance in context.
What counts as the “best” explanation is a notoriously difficult problem and
not one that Mukula has explicitly addressed. However, a preliminary account
of best explanation that is consistent with Mukula’s views would look for con-
tent which is in line with the three conditions noted above. Such content would
be able to “repair” the apparent inconsistency between the sentence token and
its context. It would be categorizable into one of the five relationships between
primary and indicatory meaning. And it would make sense out of a putative
speaker’s intention. Now, this still leaves questions—for instance, what ought
one do when two interpretations repair the inconsistency, make sense out of
a speaker’s intention, but fall into two different relationships? Mukula in fact
addresses such a case, in the sentence:
(7) The umbrella-holders go.44
This stock example describes a situation in which a single umbrella-holder ac-
companies a royal person, attended by a retinue. Mukula explains this sentence
in two ways. First, he says, we could reason that because “umbrella-holders”
is in the plural, that word indicates all of the people associated with the sin-
gle umbrella-holder, despite knowing as part of our background knowledge,
that there is just a single person. (Association is one of the five relationships
between primary and indicatory meaning that Mukula identifies.) On this
understanding, the speaker’s intention is to express literally that there is an
44See translation, p.363.
253
umbrella-holder and, thereby through association, also that there is a crowd
of people along with him. There is also a second analysis given. On this
analysis, we reason that the referent of “umbrella-holders” must have a plural
referent, and so it refers to the entire (umbrella-less) collection around the sin-
gle umbrella-holder, including him. The individual umbrella-holder is therefore
not the intended referent, but he “comes along for the ride,” so to speak, as he
is part of the collection. The crucial difference is whether the speaker intends
to directly convey the crowd or the umbrella-holder with “umbrella-holders.”
However, Mukula gives no evaluation as to which is a better interpretation
(and under what circumstances).45
Accepting presumption as an interpretive method like inference to the best
explanation leaves Mukula with several options. First, one could agree with
Ānanda that there is a determinate fact about what single meaning is given
by a sentence in a given context. An ideal agent might be able to narrow
the range of possible interpretations, but, with presumption as her method,
she can never be sure she has gotten the correct one. This leaves us with
a significant epistemological problem, given the goal of establishing niścaya
or certainty. While such a solution in the realm of poetry might not be too
costly, Mukula has explicitly situated his project in the realm of human action
and epistemology. Insofar as he agrees with the other orthodox philosophers
45In Keating 2013a, I argue that, in fact, the interpretation on which the single umbrella-
holder is the primary referent is untenable, since we would expect to be able to construct
sentences such as “The umbrella-holders go and is carrying a blue umbrella” but cannot.
Thus determining the best interpretation might require similar kinds of tests.
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wanting to uphold the Vedic texts as a source of knowledge, he has a burden
to explain how textual meanings are ascertainable. I take it that he would
reject this kind of skepticism about meaning.
Second, one could deny that what is suggested or indicated by a sentence in
a context is a determinate meaning. Instead, one could stipulate that the
suggested or indicated meaning is what the ideal interpreter would arrive at
through presumption. I take it that this pseudo-Gricean move is closer in spirit
to Mukula’s analysis. This avoids the epistemological gap between meaning
and presumption, but it strips intention away from the concept of meaning
since the interpretive process itself determines what counts as meaning, not
the speaker’s aims. In some ways, this is consistent with the Prābhākara
Mīmāṃsā analysis of Vedic texts, at least in the sense that these texts are
supposed to be authorless and thereby immune to doubt. An ideal interpreter
who is versed in Vedic interpretive principles could then be the touchstone for
the textual meaning. However, Mukula’s project does not seem to accept such
a distinction between Vedic and human language. At least, he is agnostic on
this point, including both Bhāṭṭa and Prābhākara philosophy within his text.
And moreover, given his emphasis on the speaker as part of the contextual
elements which help interpreters ascertain meaning, it is doubtful that he
would be content setting speaker intentions aside.
Finally, a third approach, which would be a departure from the Mīmāṃsā
philosophical tradition influencing Mukula’s efforts, is to reject the requirement
that there is a single meaning necessitated. Instead, the ideal interpreter
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would need to have epistemic access to at least one of the meanings intended
by the speaker. While this is a departure from the philosophical tradition,
which emphasizes a “single idea” or “single aim,” the principle of a unified
sentence meaning need not necessarily be abandoned. Especially since the
Mīmāṃsā and Alaṅkāra both emphasize discursive unity, and a hierarchy of
hermeneutics, it might be possible for Mukula to identify a way in which a
multiplicity of meanings are unified, though not unitary.46 Recall the case of
the sentence, “The Punjabi peasant is an ox,” where the shared properties are
said to be dullness, stupidity, and the like. An interpreter might understand
(1) only dullness, or (2) only stupidity, or (3) dullness and stupidity together,
or (4) some other property like stubbornness. Mukula needs to explain which
of options (1) through (4) count as understanding the meaning, and why. The
resources for this account are not available in this text.
Conclusion
On my reconstruction of Mukula’s analysis, all that is required is that the sen-
sitive reader come up with an interpretation that makes apparently incoherent,
established facts coherent. Not only might there be multiple solutions, but,
as we have seen, there might be multiple candidates for the source of the ten-
sion which triggers interpretation. At a historical level, Mukula’s thesis, and
46As McCrea puts it, for the Mīmāṃsā, the multiple parts of the Vedas are structured
in such a way as to form a “single, functionally unified structure” that has an organization
aiming at a “single end.” McCrea 2008, p. 90. We might think of the multiple meanings of
a metaphor as a microcosm of such a structure.
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Ānanda’s, are attempts to justify particular interpretive practices and, as their
views became common in literary theory, poets relied on them, making the
interpretive practice self-perpetuating. This might strengthen the likelihood
that—especially in a poetic context—an interpreter could converge upon the
suggested meaning(s) that a poetic had intended. However, neither Mukula
nor Ānanda are able to give a convincing explanation of how it is that an in-
terpreter ought to be able to converge upon a definite range of propositions (or
whatever we understand suggested meaning to be). Mukula’s appeal to pre-
sumption is in tension with his claim that there be a single required meaning
recoverable from an utterance in a given context.
However, in contrast to Ānanda’s function of suggestion, Mukula’s function
of lakṣaṇā draws upon a widely accepted means of reasoning in Indian philo-
sophical traditions. He identifies contextual factors such as place, time, and
circumstance, and observes, if not as clearly as one might hope, that lakṣaṇā
is not only an intra-sentential phenomenon which happens when a literal
sentence-meaning is unavailable. He further identifies major ways in which
there are apparent incompatibilities which might “trigger” the method of pre-
sumptive reasoning at the basis of lakṣaṇā. While his account is not without
its problems, it is a philosophically satisfactory rebuttal to Ānanda’s proposal.
Mukula’s intuition, that non-literal speech is a pervasive part of communica-
tion, and a central way in which humans come to know things, whether for
spiritual or mundane purposes, is appreciable centuries later, while we con-
tinue to grapple with the same problems. In the final chapter, I argue that
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Mukula’s analysis can fruitfully be read as a kind of metonymic sort-shifting,
filling out his model with some contemporary philosophical resources.
258
Chapter 7
Sort-Shifting, Lexical Semantics, and Lakṣaṇā
7.1 Introduction
While Mukula’s argument that suggestion (dhvani) is equivalent to lakṣaṇā
may be successful, I conclude that his claim must be precisified: suggestion is
equivalent to only a sub-variety of lakṣaṇā, which I call “pragmatic lakṣaṇā.”1
I show this by analysis of a few of the many examples surveyed in the text. I
utilize two concepts from modern analytic philosophy in my reconstruction of
Mukula’s arguments: metonymic sort-shifting and Gricean pragmatic implica-
tion. I argue that there is an important distinction between sentence-internal
and sentence-external lakṣaṇā, although they both can be understood as em-
ploying arthāpatti, or the epistemic instrument/pramāṇa of presumption.
7.2 Mukula’s Challenge
As we’ve seen, Ānanda argues that suggestion is distinct from lakṣaṇā. He has
three major reasons for drawing such a distinction:
Argument from Primariness
“...[S]econdary usage is a non-primary (amukhya) operation of a
1Much of this chapter has been published in Keating 2013a and Keating 2013b.
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word whereas suggestiveness is a primary (mukhya) operation, for
not the slightest hint of a non-primary nature can be observed in
our apprehension of any of the three types of suggested sense...”
Argument from Kind of Operation
“...secondary usage may be called a denotative operation applied
in a non-primary way, whereas suggestiveness is entirely different
from denotation...”
Argument from Transformation
“...in secondary usage a meaning that indicates a secondary mean-
ing becomes transformed into that indicated meaning, as in gaṇgāyāṃ
ghoṣaḥ (“a village on the Ganges”); whereas in the process of sug-
gestion the meaning that suggests a second meaning is apprehended
to reveal that second meaning only by revealing itself at the same
time...”2
The Argument from Primariness is that lakṣaṇā functions by operating on the
results of the operation of denotation, and that suggestion operates on the word
itself. Thus they have different domains. For example, according to Ānanda,
if I say “A village is on the Ganges” (an example which we will investigate in
more detail later), denotation operates to yield the denotations of the words
“village” and “Ganges.” Lakṣaṇā operates on the resultant meanings, and I
come to know that the river is on the bank of the Ganges, and not directly
upon the river. The suggested meaning is that the village is cool and pure,
because the Ganges river, the literal denotation of “Ganges,” actually has these
2Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 122.
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properties.
The Argument from Kind of Operation is that the coolness and purity of the
village is suggested and not denoted. The indicated statement is true only if the
village is on the bank of the river. Thus, lakṣaṇā is like a kind of denotation. In
contrast, the suggested meaning in this statement aims at a particular aesthetic
experience. There are suggested facts and suggested figures, but Ānanda is
primarily concerned with the kind of suggestion that, when predominant in a
poem, forms the basis for an experience of beauty.
Finally, Ānanda claims in the Argument from Transformation that in process
of lakṣaṇā, the literal meaning is replaced with the indicated meaning, whereas
suggestion allows for the cognition of both a suggested meaning and a literal
(or indicated) meaning at the same time. There can be the suggestion of
beauty at the same time as the understanding of the truth-conditional content
of a statement.
Mukula’s goal is to show that purported instances of suggestion can be re-
duced to lakṣaṇā. Thus, in response to Ānanda’s Argument from Primariness,
Mukula must show that suggestion shares the same domain as lakṣaṇā. To
counteract the Argument from Kind of Operation, he must show that the kind
of suggestion whose function is the generation of aesthetic experience can be
explained by lakṣaṇā. Finally, Mukula must show that lakṣaṇā does not always
replace the literal meaning, as in the Argument from Transformation.
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In this chapter, I focus on Mukula’s replies to the Argument from Primari-
ness and the Argument from Transformation. I think that his responses to
these first two arguments are stronger than to the last (Argument from Kind
of Operation), in large part because I think it is a misstep for Mukula to grant
Ānanda’s assumption that aesthetic experience should be considered “mean-
ing” in the same way as the other two sub-varieties of lakṣaṇā. The problem
of whether aesthetic experience can be counted as “meaning” in the same way
as indicated and denoted meanings is too complex to investigate in this short
space.
7.3 Mukula’s Analysis of lakṣaṇā
As we’ve already seen, to explain the function of lakṣaṇā, Mukula distinguishes
between a speaker, a sentence meaning, and an utterance meaning. A speaker
is simply someone who speaks a sentence (vākya) in order for a hearer to
understand something. The term ‘vākya’ refers to a syntactically unified ex-
pression expressing a meaning (eka-arthaḥ). In contrast, the gerundive ‘vācya,’
literally, “that which is to be said,” refers to the meaning conveyed by either
mukya or lakṣaṇā. Mukula also distinguishes between contextual factors: place
(deśa), time (kāla), and circumstance (avasthā).
With these distinctions in hand, Mukula argues that lakṣaṇā is a matter of
deriving the utterance meaning from the sentence meaning, by making use of
these contextual factors. In terms contemporary philosophers would recognize,
utterance meaning is determined by the context, which consists of a speaker,
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place, time, and world (what Mukula calls “circumstance”). Mukula’s notion
of circumstance evidently goes beyond simply the place at which an utterance
is taking place, since it is mentioned as being separate. The term means
something like “condition,” “state,” or “situation” and is used in Sanskrit
dramaturgy to describe stages of development in a plot, but he says nothing
more about this contextual factor.
I have argued that Gricean conversational implicature and Mukula’s notion of
indication are analogous. We’ve seen this in the traditional example where, if
we come to know, through a statement, the facts that (1) Devadatta is fat and
(2) Devadatta does not eat during the day, we must presume that Devadatta
is eats at night. The general form is:
Presumption q is presumed from p and m iff:
1. p and m are two already-established facts
2. The presumption of q is required to make p compatible with m.
What lakṣaṇā does, by means of arthāpatti, is to remove the apparent inconsis-
tency between, for example, the sentence meaning and facts about the speaker,
or the sentence meaning and facts about the circumstance. I argue that this is
analogous to Grice’s analysis of conversation implicature, operating with the
Cooperative Principle in the background.
Conversational Implicature S conversationally implicates that q in saying
that p iff S implicates q when:
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1. S is presumed to be observing the conversational maxims (or the
Cooperative Principle),
2. The supposition that S thinks that q is required to make saying
that p consistent with this presumption,
3. S thinks, and expects H to think that S thinks, the hearer can work
out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition that q is required.3
In a case of lakṣaṇā, we are presented with a sentence meaning p and we must
presume that S is implicating q by saying that p. The inconsistency arises
between the sentence meaning p and some facts about the speaker, place, time,
or circumstance, represented above with m. On this reconstruction, m stands
in for the conversational maxim(s) which have to do with these contextual
facts. Thus, lakṣaṇā is essentially a form of implicature which reconciles the
sentence meaning with contextual factors. If this were indeed the case, we
could neatly distinguish between the literal meanings of the constituent words
in a sentence (such as universals, qualities, actions, and objects of proper
names) and lakṣaṇā, what is implicated by the utterance of a sentence in a
given context. Unfortunately, things are not so simple.
In what follows, I survey several examples of lakṣaṇā given by Mukula. I
demonstrate that this distinction cannot be maintained, at a detriment to
Mukula’s claim that he has given a unified account of the domain of lakṣaṇā.
However, I argue that he still has a cogent reply to Ānanda’s argument that
3Quoted verbatim from Grice 1989, p. 30-31.
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a new linguistic power must be assumed.
7.4 Sentence-Internal Lakṣaṇā
The first example of lakṣaṇā that Mukula analyzes is:
(1) gaur anubandhyaḥ. (The cow is to be tied up.)
This sentence in Sanskrit consists of a noun (‘gaur’) and a gerundive (‘anuband-
hyaḥ’). According to Mukula’s lexical semantics, these are a universal-denoting
term and an action-denoting term, respectively. The denoted meaning of the
words in composition is that cowhood is the object of the action of tying.
However, Mukula obsrves it would not make sense to instruct someone to fas-
ten the universal of cowhood to a stake in order to make a sacrifice (the con-
text for this sentence). Further, he adds that the referential function of ‘gaur’
has been exhausted by denoting cowhood. This means that we have what is
essentially a list: <cowhood, to be tied up>. On the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view,
in order for ‘gaur’ to have a syntactic relationship with ‘anubandhyaḥ,’ we must
understand it as indicating a particular (though perhaps not a definite) cow,
by lakṣaṇā. Kumārila makes a similar observation about the sentence:
(2) gam ānaya. (Bring a cow.)
Kumārila says that “bring” simply gives us the general act of bringing, not
the tense or injunctive mood. He also understands “cow” as denoting a uni-
versal. In this context, a single cow is required, though maybe not Bessie
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as opposed to another cow, hence the English translation “a cow.” Kumārila
concludes that lakṣaṇā is responsible for words having meanings (like partic-
ulars or temporally defined actions) that can be related to the other words in
a sentence. Mukula only asserts that there is indication of the particular cow,
not the particular action. The text is characteristically terse in its analysis,
so it is unclear if this is due to his Grammarian notion of word reference, or
if he thinks that the process of lakṣaṇā is clear enough that he need not deal
with the gerundive. One thing is clear: where a Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsaka would
appeal to lakṣaṇā to explain a universal-denoting word being used as a qual-
ity, Mukula would not need to make such a move. In either case, lakṣaṇā here
follows the typical structure of a arthāpatti. There is a conflict between the
known fact that “gaur” refers to cowhood (taken to as given by Mukula) and
the fact that the referent of “gaur” must be the thing tied up:
Presumption of a particular cow. a particular cow is presumed from the
fact that “cow” refers to cowhood and the fact that the referent of
“cow” must be the object of being tied up iff:
1. the fact that “cow” refers to cowhood and the fact that the ref-
erent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up are two already-
established facts
2. The presumption of a particular cow is required to make the fact
that “cow” refers to cowhood compatible with the fact that the
referent of “cow” must be the object of being tied up.
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While the solution—“cow” indicates a particular cow—initially seems to give
up cowhood as the referent of “cow,” Mukula explains that this is a kind
of lakṣaṇā known as upādana, or “inclusion.” The particular cow which is
indicated does not replace the universal cowhood, but the initial, literal
referent is now included within the meaning of the indicated referent. We have
indicated a particular cow, but all cows possess in the universal of cowhood,
and so the universal is still included in the referent of “cow.”
Here, lakṣaṇā functions in order to obtain the appropriate syntactic relations
between words, and is not pragmatic. In fact, on Kumārila’s view, sentence
meaning is invariably attained in this manner, or else we’re left with a string
of disconnected words, referring to universals but not doing much else. There
would be no sentence meaning as a basis for our pragmatic lakṣaṇā described
above. The speaker has not said that p because, until we construe the words
by lakṣaṇā as being in relationship, there is no p. I suggest that a model for
this kind of lakṣaṇā could be found in the theory of sort-shifting.
7.5 Type- and Sort-Shifting
In contemporary Western linguistics and philosophy of language, models of
sort- and type-shifting are used to represent the relationship between the se-
mantics of expressions and assumptions about the world’s ontology. “Type”
refers to a coarse-grained distinction between such categories as entities, truth-
values, and relationships. “Sort” is a further, fine-grained distinction between
such categories as universals, particulars, groups, collections, masses, persons,
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things, and so forth. Type-shifting is an approach intended to explain the flex-
ibility of semantic expressions. Expressions change their meanings as contexts
change, but it is implausible that there is a large number of lexical entries for
every single word. How would speakers learn all of these definitions? How
would they know what to do with a novel instance? Further, contexts seem
to underdetermine the meaning for many ambiguous expressions. We need an
explanation of how hearers “narrow down” the range of possibilities.
Rather than multiple lexical entries, type-shifting proposes a mechanism that
takes contextual values, ontological commitments, and principles of compo-
sitional semantics to generate the appropriate type for an expression in the
given context. Sort-shifting operates with the same principles, but at a more
fine-grained level. Type-shifting might function to resolve the conflict between
the types in the conjunct below:
(3) John and every woman arrived.
In this sentence, “John” is an individual entity, but “every woman” is a quan-
tifier expression. The fill the same argument position of a single verb, and so
must be of like types. When someone utters the sentence (3), there is no in-
ferential process that a speaker must go through in order to resolve ambiguity
between John as an entity or John as a quantifier (intuitively, most speakers
aren’t even aware that such ambiguity exists). Type-shifting functions auto-
matically to resolve the ambiguity for the speaker. The benefit of the theory is
its flexibility–the same expression can refer to various types without sacrificing
268
compositional semantics.
In formal terms, an entity is represented by “e.” One way of representing “every
woman” is by using brackets, < >, to indicate its status as a function. The
quantifier expression is a function of type < <e,t>,t> where “t” represents the
primitive notion of a truth-value. Thus, “every woman” is a function which
takes as input a function from entities to truth-values, <e,t>, and returns
a truth-value, t. We are unable to conjoin two non-like types, but this is
necessitated by the verb, and so we shift “John” from type e to the type <
<e,t>,t>.
These types are taken from Montague’s generative semantics which allows for
individuals in the discourse, possible worlds, and moments of time. A noun
such as “cow” might be understood as type <e, t>, or a function from an
individual (the cow) to a truth-value (which is true when the individual is a
cow). Such a function might itself be the input for another function, such as an
adjective, of type < <e,t>,<e,t> >. For example, “white” would take “cow”
(a function from an individual to a truth-value) and yield a function from an
individual to a truth-value. The function would map to “true” where there is
a white cow, and “false” where there is not. The motivation for this model
fits with the (implausible) Mīmāṃsā claim that all words denote universals.
Instead of multiple lexical entries for verbs which can take multiple kinds of
complements there is a single entry which shifts under contextual constraints,
coerced by the presence or absence of various compositional factors.
However attractive such a sparse ontology of types may be for set-theoretic
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modeling, recent approaches refined the kind and number of inhabitants in
the discourse model to sorts, as described above. Axiomatic relations are then
drawn between the entities in the discourse. (It is possible that the commit-
ments upon which speakers rely for meaning construction admit entities which
we would not want in our final ontology.) Shifting models are employed to
explain phenomena such as metonymy, ambiguity in genitive constructions,
and so forth. The aim of sort- and type-shifting models is to represent the
various interpretive possibilities available to a hearer for a given expression in
a context. These possibilities are understood as models which are consistent
with the context and syntax.
Below, I develop an example of sort-shifting in a genitive modifier phrase
before returning to Mukula. Genitive modifier phrases have a head noun (N)
in the nominative case and a noun phrase (NP) in the genitive case. Take the
Russian example:
(4) stakan moloka (glass of milk)4
The N is glass (stakan), in the nominative case, and the NP is of-milk (moloka),
in the genitive case. The problem with a genitive construction is how to con-
strue the “of” relationship between the N and NP. The glass is not constituted
by milk as its material, but is filled by the milk. Borschev and Partee under-
stand the genitive case in Russian as being a type which seeks out a relationship
4I use the Russian examples because they are original to the article by Borschev and
Partee which is illuminative of the model of sort-shifting I employ.
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with the head N. Which relationship is appropriate is given through the sortal
information in the lexical entry of the head N. When this fails, that same lex-
ical information, plus ontological commitments and context allow us to shift
sorts.
What the relationship is between x and y depends upon the semantic sort
of the head noun, N. The meaning of “leg” as “part of the table” is made
straightforwardly available by the context, where the reference to a piece of
furniture makes the part-whole-relationship salient. The problem is explaining
how we move from one meaning for stakan (a physical entity that is a container)
to another meaning for stakan (a quantity of something contained by such a
container). These are two different types: the first is <e,t> and the second
<e,<e,t> >, where the entity underlined, <e>, is what Borschev and Partee
call a “relational entity.” Since noun phrases in genitive constructions are
always “looking for” a noun to relate with, their referent is an entity having
some kind of relationship to another entity. One solution would be to propose
multiple lexical entries for stakan. The word is simply polysemous. In addition
to this simply pushing the problem back another level (how do we select which
lexical entry is appropriate?), this puts a cognitive load on the interpreter.
Further, as Borschev and Partee point out with their imaginative example,
“full hat of mushrooms” (meaning a hat made out of mushrooms), we need
an explanation of novel uses. Proposing that there is a lexical entry for “hat”
which has it as a container burdens our lexicon unduly.
What Borschev and Partee suggest is that sorts such as container or quantity
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function as their own quasi-lexical entries, or what they call “theories.” A
theory for the sort container might be as shown below:
Container (y)(x)
sort: physical object x
usage: x can be used to hold/keep substances of the sort y
form: x has an inner part and when it is used to keep a substance y, y is
inside of x
volume of x: the volume of x’s inner part and so the volume of substance x
can contain
Given such a theory, a shift-operater which Borschev and Partee call Quant,
can be invoked to shift the meaning of words from the sort container to be of
the sort quantity.
In the proper context, the shift-operator will take a semantic value which is of
the sort container and output the sort quantity. A sort shifting approach to
metonymic and other phenomena identifies distinctions within a given type,
rather than trying to multiply types. It is ontologically sparse, since sorts
are reducible to the standard types in Montague semantics. Thus we might
distinguish between plural individuals and groups, institutions and things,
aggregates and stuff—even though each of these pairs could together belong
to the same type. The result is that for each sort, we have a theory, like
the theory of container above. There are relationships between the sorts,
272
and internal relationships within the sorts (allowing for part-whole metonymic
shifting).
Sort-shifting is governed by axioms which give us the possible available moves
as well as which are most likely for a given sort (for example, there is a close re-
lationship between individual persons and institutions). The trigger for such a
shift could be explained by the lexical value of a word itself. Certain verbs may
take only specific sorts as their direct object, or certain adjectives may only
modify specific sorts, and so on. When there is a mismatch, what Borschev
and Partee call “sortal incorrectness,” the result is a presupposition failure or,
where possible, a coerced meaning shift.
It is important to reiterate that Mukula is not working with this framework
and we should not shoehorn his four categories of upādhi, or ontological kinds,
too tightly into a type- or sort-shifting theory. It may be possible to recon-
struct a formal semantics from the texts of the Grammarians (after all, Pāṇini
developed the world’s first generative grammar) but this particular text is
sparing with the details that would be required. My claim is simply this: that
in sentences like (1) gaur anubandhyaḥ above, the way that Mukula describes
lakṣaṇā as functioning is much more like sort- or type-shifting than Gricean
pragmatic implication.




sort: particular object x
usage: x is the locus of y’s inherence, where y is a universal
form: x has a spatio-temporal location
There could be a sort-shifting mechanism, Particular, which, when sentence
(1) is uttered in a context suitable for a particular cow, shifts a semantic value
of the sort universal to the sort particular. Because Mukula postulates that at
least one category of words refers to universals, many sentences we utter will
involve a shift from universals to particulars.
7.6 Mukula on Metaphoric Transfer
These conceptual tools in hand, I now return to Mukula’s analysis of instances
of lakṣaṇā. After introducing the distinction between denotation and lakṣaṇā
with (1), he goes on to introduce the example analyzed in terms of suggestion
by Ānanda:
(5) gangāyāṃ ghoṣaḥ. (The village is on [the bank of] the Ganges.)
Mukula categorizes this case as lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, or indirect indication, in con-
trast to (1), which he describes as upādana-lakṣaṇā, or inclusive indication.
In upādana-lakṣaṇā, the universal of cowhood is included as part of the new
meaning of “cow,” which is a particular cow. Cases of lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā, how-
ever, do not have such an inclusive nature, but rather are instances of replace-
ment.
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In (5), the word “gangāyāṃ” or “on the Ganges” is in the locative case. There-
fore, since the sentence would literally mean that the village is directly on top
of the Ganges river, we must understand by lakṣaṇā that “Ganges” means
“bank of the Ganges.” As Mukula puts it, a particular stream cannot be the
substratum of a village. We must understand something different: “bank.” In
contrast to (1), where cowhood is included as part of the meaning of a par-
ticular cow, a riverbank is not part of the meaning of “Ganges.” Therefore,
this is indirect indication. On Ānanda’s view, in the Argument from Transfor-
mation, this demonstrates that lakṣaṇā requires replacement of meaning, and
suggestion cannot be cognized. Mukula goes on to argue against this, in an
illustration of what I am calling “pragmatic lakṣaṇā”:
Presumption of the bank. the bank is presumed from the fact that the
speaker must be saying something true and the fact that the word “Ganges”
refers to a particular river iff:
1. The fact that the speaker must be saying something true and the word
“Ganges” refers to a particular river are two already-established
facts
2. The presumption of “Ganges” as instead referring to the bank of
the Ganges is required to make the two consistent.
In this case, the fact that the speaker is taken to be saying something true is
a case of Grice’s Maxim of Quality and it is implicitly appealed to by Mukula.
Later, Mukula explicitly appeals to something like the Maxim of Manner to
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explain why a speaker might not simply say “on the bank of the Ganges.”
The reason is that the Ganges is associated with sanctity and beauty, and
the speaker wants to convey that the village, by proximity, shares in these
properties. The indication of bank as the referent of “Ganges” is made salient
because of the bank’s close proximity to the river. On Ānanda’s account, in
his Argument from Primariness, we cannot derive the suggestion of holiness
from the meaning of “bank of the Ganges” because it is the river, and not
the bank which is holy. Mukula argues that because there is a relationship
of nearness between the bank and the river, our understanding of the bank is
influenced by our cognition of the river. Note, however, that the properties of
purity and beauty—which are what Ānanda argues is given by suggestion—are
a consequence of the cognition of the referent of “Ganges,” not its indicated
meaning, “bank.” Thus there is, as Mukula presents things, a mismatch be-
tween the domains of lakṣaṇā and suggestion. However, Mukula concludes
that the property of holiness, shared between the bank and the river, can,
contra the Argument from Kind of Operation, be understood through lakṣaṇā.
Further, this means that even when lakṣaṇā replaces the literal meaning, there
can be what is putatively “suggested,” contra the Argument from Transfor-
mation.
However, there is a further complication. Before we can employ arthāpatti to
recover the indicated meaning, we need to have a sentence meaning. This,
as we have seen already, must also be generated by lakṣaṇā. Even if Mukula
does not think that all words refer to universals (like the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā),
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“village” will not refer to a particular village until there has been a metonymic
or similar shift. The Ganges is the object of a proper name, but without
understanding an implicit action (“is”), there is no way for the words to have
syntactic unity.
One obvious approach would be to argue that lakṣaṇā does all of this: it func-
tions to unify the words in a sentence and recover something truth-evaluable
and then it functions to recover something which is not only truth-evaluable
but the likeliest candidate for what the speaker meant by the sentence in that
context. There has been scant discussion, either in the original Mīmāṃsā
textual tradition, or in modern commentaries, about this problem. An ex-
ception is a short series of paragraphs in a brief essay written by K.K. Raja,
primarily to compare Buddhist apoha theory and Mīmāṃsā lakṣaṇā. Raja
observes:
If an operation can effect only one result, we may have to accept
two lakṣaṇā-s. But nobody has spoken about two lakṣaṇā-s while
explaining verbal comprehension of the sentence-meaning, and the
law of parsimony (lāghava) requires the simpler approach in solving
the problem. Hence it seems preferable to assume that only one
lakṣaṇā is needed to explain the two effects...5
In support of this view, he cites the mid-seventeenth century Mīmāṃsaka,
Nārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭa, who says that the shift from universals to particulars is
required for there to be a unified sentence meaning, and that the resultant
5Raja 1993, p. 200.
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syntactic relations are also the result of lakṣaṇā. However, what Raja omits
is that lakṣaṇā is also appealed to in cases where we have syntactic unity, but
there some other inconsistency between the sentence and context. If we accept
the principle that a power is exhausted when it has attained its aim, then we
must pair each operation of lakṣaṇā to a single effect. While perhaps we could
plausibly understand a single operation that aims at an intelligible syntactic
whole as consisting in several shifts in word-meaning, the aim of intelligibility
in a context is of a different sort. And in fact, Mukula himself, in his appeal to
the difference between sentence meaning (vākya) and speaker meaning (vācya)
has admitted as much.
7.7 Fat Devadatta and arthāpatti
Complicating the situation for Mukula is the example of Fat Devadatta who
does not eat during the day. This sentence is a traditional illustration of
arthāpatti:
(6) pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkte. (Fat Devadatta does not eat during
the day.)
Mukula identifies this as another case of upādana-lakṣaṇā or inclusive indi-
cation, just like (1) above. He says that the denotion of “fat” is fatness as
qualified by not eating during the day. In this context, fatness as qualified by
eating at night is indicated by arthāpatti. The fatness includes eating at night
in itself in order to establish itself (sva-siddhy-arthatvena). For this reason,
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we have a case of inclusive indication, because we are not understanding a
new meaning for “fat” other than fatness. Instead, we simply include within
fatness the appropriate cause. Further, Mukula suggests that we understand
eating at night rather than drinking during the day because the speaker has
said “does not eat during the day.”
As with (4), Mukula has ignored the necessity of generating a syntactic unity
from a list of unconnected words. He does not have the same problem as
the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, since “fat” can refer to a quality, “Devadatta” to the
object of a proper name, and “eat” to an action (with the caveat that it
is unclear whether the action is general or particular). However, “day” is
plausibly a universal-denoting term, and lakṣaṇā may be required to quantify
over a particular range of days.
The initial problem here is in Mukula’s analysis of the case as analogous to (1)
“The cow is to be tied up.” It looks more like a case of Gricean implicature,
where an additional proposition (Devadatta eats at night) is generated from
the sentence meaning. If this is so, then Mukula classifying this case with
(1) has made a mistake. This would demonstrate that he has not carefully
distinguished between what I’m calling “semantic” and “pragmatic” kinds of
lakṣaṇā.6 In fact, while I do think that while it is conceptually better to under-
6I argued for this in a paper published from an earlier version of this chapter: “Mukula
appeals to something like Grice’s Maxim of Manner in his observation that we get “eats at
night” instead of “drinks a tonic” because the speaker has mentioned the time during which
Devadatta does not eat. Therefore, we presume that she is implicating that Devadatta eats
at night and expects us to recognize that this is the reason for her speaking in such a way.
However, as we have seen, (1) is a case of what I am calling “semantic indication,” which
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stand this as a case of implicature, Mukula might have a way of maintaining
the analogy between the two cases that is grounded in presumption. Originally
I suggested that the structure of presumption fits nicely with Grice’s definition
of a conversational implicature, which would be a case of “pragmatic” lakṣaṇā,
but now it seems that the same interpretive method can be employed in what
I’m calling “semantic” lakṣaṇā.
While Mukulabhaṭṭa does not give a detailed explanation of the mechanisms at
play in the Devadatta case, his idea is close to the generative lexicon of James
Pustejovsky.7 Pustejovsky’s goal is to explain the creativity and systematic-
ity of phenomena such as polysemy through rich lexical representations, but
without resorting to a lexicon with multiple entries to explain the ambigui-
ties in natural language. So, for example, we might propose that the lexical
item “fat” represents such things as the fact that fatness is caused by eating.
The lexical item eats would then represent such things as that food is typically
functions to unify the words in an uttered sentence in such a way as to recover a truth-
evaluable sentence meaning. It is likely, though not necessary, that, in Mukula’s theory,
semantic lakṣaṇā functions for all sentence types (as it does for the Bhaṭṭa Mīmāṃsā). Now,
sentence (7) is a case of “pragmatic indication,” which functions to remove incompatibility
between a sentence meaning (vākya-artha) and contextual elements, relying on conversa-
tional norms akin to Gricean maxims. The result is that there is an implication that Fat
Devadatta eats at night, in order to resolve what might, prima facie, be an incoherent,
though syntactically unified, utterance. Part of the motivation for Mukula’s strained inter-
pretation may be his commitment to the principle of eka-vākyatā or the requirement that
there must be a unified meaning for every sentence. Without inserting, so to speak, the
eating at night somewhere into the vākya, there is a problem: the speaker seems to mean
two things. Further, Mukula does not want the result that the speaker is only saying that




what is eaten, that eating is an event (not a state), that agents are the subjects
of the verb, and etc.
In context, although sentence (7) is perfectly grammatical, it could be taken
to be unsemantical. Pustejovsky describes his notion of semanticality this
way:
I will introduce a notion of semanticality, analogous to the view
of grammaticality...but ranging over semantic expressions rather
than syntactic structures. Semanticality refers to the semantic
well-formedness of expressions in a grammar... 8
Pustejovsky’s notion of semantically is analogous to the concept of yogyatā,
or semantic compatibility, violations of which trigger lakṣaṇā. Importantly,
Pustejovsky’s semanticality and the Indian concept of yogyatā are not re-
ducible to grammaticality or syntacticality.9 The test is not whether an
expression can yield a truth-conditional proposition, but whether there are
easily available interpretations which make the sentence acceptable.10 This
approach is consistent with the Bhāṭṭa school’s view, that it is incompatibil-
ity with speaker’s intention in a context (tātparya-anupapatti) that triggers
lakṣaṇā.
8Pustejovsky 1995, p. 40.
9For Pustejovsky, semanticality admits of degrees, but in contrast, as Mukula uses the
term, it seems that an expression either possesses yogyatā or does not. However, this is a
subject of debate in classical Indian philosophy of language.
10Pustejovsky 1995, p. 41.
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While Mukulabhaṭṭa does not explicitly identify the kind of incompatibility
operating for the Fat Devadatta case, the most obvious candidate is a conflict
between facts we know about the avasthā (the world and the causes of fatness)
and the vākya (expressed meaning). Here’s how an interpreter, call her “A,”
might use lakṣaṇā to understand “Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day”
as including the meaning that Devadatta eats at night, with lexical entries in
bold:
1. A recovers the denotation of the lexical items in context, yielding the
vākya. For example, on Mukulabhaṭṭa’s lexical semantics, fat denotes
a quality. Understanding what fat denotes might include knowing such
things as that it is a state which applies to biological entities, and is
caused by eating. Devadatta refers to a named thing, perhaps one
which speakers know is human and thus part of the larger class of bio-
logical entities, allowing it to be modified by the lexical item fat. The
action eats might be understood to take a biological entity as its subject
and a kind of foodstuff as its object. As eating is a process, it can be
qualified by the temporal span (“during the day”) as well as a negation
(“does not”).11 For example: Fat = event(state), argument(biological
entity); qualia[formal(mass); constitutive(biological property);
agentive(act of eating)]
Devadatta = argument(x:human); qualia[formal(x)]
11I leave technical issues of quantification and negation aside for the purposes of this
example.
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does not eat= argument(physical object); event(process); argument(x:biological
entity, y:foodstuff); qualia[agentive(event of x’s eating y)]
during the day= argument(x:action, y:day); event(process); qualia[formal(during(x,y)),
agentive(temporal span)
2. A observes that there is an incompatibility between the vākya and what
she knows about the causes of fatness.12 More specifically, this incom-
patibility makes the sentence unsemantical since fat is caused by the act
of eating and the negation of eat means that there is no event such that
x eats y.
3. To rectify this unsemanticality, A includes “eats at night” as part of
the meaning of the sentence. More specifically, A might understand the
lexical entry fat to include the eating at night. Or, she could insert
the expression “eats at night.” Mukulabhaṭṭa is explicitly agnostic on
which is the correct account, saying, “Let there be verbal presumption
or implication of simply the cause—of the eating at night.”
In cases of semantic lakṣaṇā, the interpreter and speaker may not be aware of
making any inference: language processing occurs rapidly and phenomenology
12It is not necessary that this process is a conscious one. Mukulabhaṭṭa’s account does
not require that interpreters are conscious of all cases of inexplicability. For example, it is
inexplicability that forces a shift from the lexical item cow as a universal to a particular,
but unless speakers and interpreters are well-versed in metaphysics, they would not be aware
of these views about word reference. These processes are likely occurring below the level
of phenomenal consciousness. Better tests for what kind of inexplicability is involved will
include analysis of lexical semantics, syntax, and etc.
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is a poor guide to underlying mental modules. But we can still understand
the information given by the sentence as filling in an inference.
Pustejovsky gives an example of this for the ambiguity in the verb “began.”
He describes the process as enthymemic abduction, as an enthymeme is an ar-
gument containing two propositions, where a third is elliptical or implicit and,
when added to the other two, a categorical syllogism results. In enthymemic
abduction, the implicit premise is not analytic, in contrast to enthymemic de-
duction. In other words, there’s nothing in the explicit premises which contains
the assumption that the speaker or hearer makes. Take the example, “Stephen
King began a new novel.” If we suppose “began” paired with “novel” literally
means “began to read” then it is most coherent (given other background con-
versational principles) that the speaker wants to convey, instead, that Stephen
King began the writing of a novel. However, as this inference is not deductive,
but abductive, it’s not a necessary inference. It’s possible that the speaker
could be describing Steven King beginning to read a new novel by a friend;
nothing in the syntax or semantics prevents this reading. Pustejovsky makes
this explicit:
A Steven King began a new novel.
B (Steven King is a writer.)
C Agentive(novel) = z x.y eT[write(eT, z, x.y)]
D Steven King began to write a new novel.
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Above, A is the sentence uttered, B is the implicit non-analytic assumption,
and C is the lexical information projected by the word “novel.” This lexical
information is that novels have agents (z) wh0 participate in an event at time
T (eT) of writing them, and that novels are objects that can be understood as
both a physical thing (x) and information (y), which he represents as x.y, or a
“dot object.” Since we assume that Steven King is a writer, the word “novel”
coerces the interpretation that “began” means “began to write” rather than
“began to read,” as in C´. This process may be one a speaker or hearer is
never conscious of, although we can often be brought to awareness of such
ambiguities.13
This inference can be classified as arthāpatti as there is a presumption of D,
that Steven King began to write a new novel (rather than to read one), as a
way to reconcile A and B. For Mukulabhaṭṭa, apparent inconsistency between
A and B arises because of privileging one reading of a word as literal.
7.8 Conclusion
As presented, Mukula’s analysis of the overlap between suggestion and lakṣaṇā
is compelling. Using the examples which I have surveyed, Mukula targets
Ānanda’s arguments from Primariness, Kind of Operation, and Transforma-
tion. He has shown that the underlying mechanism of presumption can ground
both a semantic and pragmatic kind of lakṣaṇā. I’ve argued that if he is to
13Pustejovsky 1995, p. 237-238.
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be successful in bringing suggestion completely into the sphere of lakṣaṇā, he
must show that suggestion shares precisely the same function and domain. By
Mukula’s own criteria for the demarcation of linguistic “powers,” he has more
than one kind of lakṣaṇā: a semantic lakṣaṇā which works within sentences to
repair incompatibilities, and a pragmatic lakṣaṇā which functions like Gricean
implication on the vākya, or expressed sentence meaning. In his paradigmatic
examples of lakṣaṇā, he appeals to both powers. In effect, the proponents
of dhvani could agree with Mukula that their power is pragmatic lakṣaṇā by
another name, since the reductive strategy only succeeds if Mukula can show
that he is not adding a new power to the two already-accepted powers.
However, since the dhvani theorist has, as I have shown previously, argued
that suggestion cannot be understood as an inferential process, it seems un-
likely that they would make such a dialectical move.14 If they identify sugges-
tion with Mukula’s conception of lakṣaṇā, they are admitting that inference–
although presumptive reasoning, not deductive–can lead us to recover what is
suggested. And this is something which I think they would avoid. In this way,
then, I conclude that Mukula has given a plausible rejoinder to the dhvani-
theorist, one which extends the incompatibility–repairing process of lakṣaṇā
to the sorts of cases with which Ānanda is concerned.
14In fact, there are thinkers after Mukula who argue against dhvani and propose that
suggested meanings are a matter of anumāna or deductive inference. While Mukula’s work
is taken up by Mammaṭa, as noted in the introduction, there is no textual evidence that




In the first chapter, I drew the contrast between Amelia Bedelia and Humpty
Dumpty, two characters who are deficient in their linguistic abilities. Amelia
Bedelia is hyper-literal, thinking that for every word, there is a single, invariant
meaning. She is clueless when it comes to context’s influence on meaning.
Humpty Dumpty, on the other hand, thinks that language can be molded
into any form that he desires. He, too, ignores context, but for the sake
of emphasizing his intentions as a speaker. I think both Mukulabhaṭṭa and
Ānandavardhana would have appreciated the lessons that these analogies have
for our theorizing about language. They both want to explain how language
can convey a wide variety of meanings through context and speaker intention.
In this dissertation, my goal has been to examine their debate over how we
recover meaning, both to contribute to our understanding of this exciting
period in Sanskrit poetics and to contribute to our understanding of human
linguistic capacities in general.
Ānanda revolutionized Sanskrit poetics with his theory of suggestion. Mukula,
while taking on board some of Ānanda’s observations, rejected this proposed
explanation, preferring to expand the scope of an already-accepted linguistic
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capacity: lakṣaṇā, or indication. I have argued that while a minority voice,
Mukula, through his Fundamentals of the Communicative Function, presented
a substantial philosophical opposition to Ānanda’s view. While terse and lack-
ing in some important details, this text presents its own unified theory–and
not just of kāvya, or poetry, but communication as a whole. I’ve tried to
show that Mukula’s insights are epistemological as well as linguistic. Fur-
ther, I’ve argued while the topics in his monograph might initially appear to
be unrelated—lexical meaning, the varieties of indication, sentence meaning,
etc.—in reality, each piece is part of a broader model. The structure of his
work, though it does not state this outright, can be read as arguing for the in-
terrelation between our theorizing about literal and non-literal meaning.
I’ve argued that epistemology—the pramāṇa theory of Indian philosophy—
played a larger role in these discussions than has been appreciated. Given
the continuity between Sanskrit-language philosophy and literature, this is not
surprising, but much more remains to be said on the topic. For instance, while I
have examined Mukula’s identification of lakṣaṇā and the epistemic instrument
of presumption, further questions linger. Just how revolutionary was this
claim? Venugopalan, in his translation, argues that Mukula was not only
wrong, but unusual.1 However, recently some have argued that the Naiyāyika
philosopher Gaṅgeśa makes a similar move in his work.2 Here and there in the




remark that lakṣaṇā and arthāpatti, or presumption, are connected.3 But this
connection is not made explicit in Kumārila or others writing on presumption,
and in fact, if lakṣaṇā is understood as part of the pramāṇa of testimony, this
would threaten its non-inferential nature (at least for the Bhāṭṭa).
Not only is there fruitful historical work that can be done surrounding this
identification, there are important philosophical questions. If interpretation
requires presumption or inference to the best explanation—assuming I am cor-
rect in identifying these as roughly equivalent— what is the status of knowl-
edge generated by it? Typically, both IBE and implicatures are taken to be
defeasible in the contemporary philosophical tradition. However, as we saw
in the discussion of the content of metaphors, there is a question as to how
certain we must be about what is implicated, especially if implicatures convey
multiple propositional contents. Further, is there a clash between inference
to the best explanation and an implicature consisting of several propositions?
Finally, while I have argued that presumption and IBE are roughly the same
in Mukula’s text, this may not be the case on other views. Not only do the
Mīmāṃsā have two different approaches, but the Jainas have their own anal-
ysis, as do the Advaita Vedāntins.
It is not just Mukula’s monograph which merits further philosophical explo-
ration. In my analysis of Ānanda’s varieties of suggestion, I noted that there
are some thorny questions still unanswered, not only about how to understand
3In Gerow 1977, p. 255, he says of lakṣaṇā that “an a fortiriori augment (arthāpatti)
seems to be involved.” K.K. Raja says similar things in Raja 1993.
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what he is arguing for, but whether what he argues for is correct. This is the
case in particular in his discussion of śleṣa, or double meaning. Recently Yigal
Bronner has written some on Ānanda’s analysis within a chapter about San-
skrit theories of śleṣa, but he notes in the introduction to his book that very
little has been written on the topic in general–and that, in fact, most Indolo-
gists have spent their time dismissing it as merely punning verbosity.4 This is
a shame, because Sanskrit theorists had a particular interest in the explana-
tion of polysemy and interpretation because of the prevalence and complexity
of polysemy in poetry. Western philosophy has likewise spent little effort
on punning, although more attention has been given to polysemy in general.
However, the phenomenon of double (and multiple) meanings raises impor-
tant questions about how we distinguish between homonymy and homophony,
how we process meaning, and, most broadly, how it is we distinguish between
varieties of non-literal speech.5
While I argued that Ānanda makes some unfortunate conflations—mistaking
conventionality for an arbitrariness based on individual whims, classifying
emotional effects with communicated propositional meanings—his analysis
does prompt important questions about how our emotive and aesthetic experi-
ences might be instrumental in understanding what is meant by the author or
speaker. Take the case of a discourse-level metaphor, such as the identification
of Juliet with the sun in Romeo and Juliet. Perhaps our emotive experience
4Bronner 2010, p.7-13.
5See Bronner 2010, pp. 205-210 for a discussion of these topics in classical Indian litera-
ture.
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brings to salience certain features of Juliet which Romeo considers comparable
to the sun. Or, given our aesthetic appreciation of the work, we might reject
certain interpretations in favor of others which preserve that aesthetic sense.
This is consistent with Ānanda’s rasa theory, even if some of the details of his
particular view are debatable.
Contemporary philosophers have a formidable set of technical tools with which
they can model the structures of language and the relationship between ex-
pressions and the world. Ānanda and Mukula were working with a similarly
analytic tradition whose aim was modeling (shown, for instance, in the work
of Pāṇini), although their work comes early in classical Indian philosophy,
before more nuanced distinctions were made. This does not mean that their
work is devoid of lessons for us, however. In pointing out some comparable
debates where different distinctions were made, we may come to question some
of our own presuppositions, such as our distinction between “mandatory” and
“optional” processes—or at least, work to make them more precise. Further,
insofar as we become familiar with the taxonomy of figurative speech that char-
acterizes Sanskrit poetic theory, we may become more sensitive ourselves to
the nuances of English speech, questioning some of the ready-made categories
that we subject to analysis. Many are already wondering whether “metaphor”
is a useful natural kind–the varieties of indication and suggestion may prompt
more such reflection.
As Mukula concludes in his Fundamentals, the challenge to understand the
complexities of speech is a large one, and it is not one easily confined to
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a single discipline. It pervades “the whole of ordinary use”, he says. Un-
derstanding communication involves thinking about grammar, hermeneutics,
logic, poetry—and we might add today it probably also requires reflection on
epistemology, psychology, and cognitive science. The result of this reflection
clarifies more than just the communicative function, but quite a lot about hu-
man activity in general. Thus, while there is still work to be done, and they
may disagree about theoretical details, contemporary philosophers and Ānan-
davardhana himself would likely agree with Mukulabhaṭṭa’s conclusion:
That communicative function is reflected in words, sentences, and
knowledge sources;




English Translation of the Fundamentals of
the Communicative Function
Translator’s Introduction
The Abhidhāvṛttamātṛkā (Fundamentals of the Communicative Function)of
Mukulabhaṭṭa, written in Kashmir during the late ninth to early tenth cen-
tury BCE, is not easily situated within a single genre.1 On the one hand,
Mukula is responding to the great aesthetic theorist Ānandavardhana, and
insofar the topic of figurative language is the provenance of Sanskrit poetic
theory, we might consider it a work of alaṅkāra-śāstra. On the other hand,
Mukula’s self-stated aims go beyond analysis of kāvya—Sanskrit verse—and
are grounded in epistemology and philosophy of language in general. In this
way it reads like a philosophical treatise, part of darśana-śāstra. We see this
from the opening sentences, in which he observes that certainty (niścaya) in
our ordinary linguistic practices is bound up with language having a consis-
tent denotative capacity. However, although Mukula draws on Mīmāṃsakas
1The title of this work has been given as both ‘Abhidhā-vṛtti-mātṛka’ and ‘Abhidhā-
vṛtta-mātṛka’. The difference is whether we read the second term as referring to a mātṛka
(fundamental text) which is an author’s ‘vṛtti’ (a style of commentary) or to the vṛtta
(function) of abhidhā which is the broad term for communication. Both variants are found
in the concluding lines of the text. I have chosen the reading ‘vṛtta’ because it is in keeping
with the stated purpose of the text.
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philosophers such as Kumārilabhaṭṭa and Śabarasvāmin, he also engages with
Grammarians such as Bhartṛhāri and Patañjali. In his concern with word
reference and sphoṭa theory, his work could be understood as belonging to
vyākaraṇa-śāstra, or the study of grammar. However we categorize the Fun-
damentals (and it is probably best to resist too firm a classification, but con-
sider it yet more evidence that genre distinctions are rough and ready), it is
a work which introduces the readers to a variety of classical Indian debates in
a short space. Mukula addresses word reference, sentence meaning, varieties
of metaphor, the status of dhvani or suggestion, and touches upon figures of
speech including puns, irony, and metonymy.
While Mukula’s monograph could serve as a kind of introductory text to these
topics in language, its rhetorical aim is to argue against the position of Ānan-
davardhana regarding dhvani, or suggestion. He does this through an account
of how lakṣaṇā or indication accounts for the properties of poetic language
described in Ānanda’s ninth-century work, the Dhvanyāloka. Mukula does
not quibble with Ānanda’s claim that poetry has “suggestive” capacities, if
by this term we simply mean that it conveys, among other meanings, rasa,
a particular aesthetic “flavor.” However, he differs in his account of how po-
etry manages to convey its meanings, rejecting the newly postulated capacity
of dhvani as explanatory. Instead, he argues that in the same way as words
and sentences have meanings from lakṣaṇā, so do poems and figures of speech.
To support his claim, Mukula surveys linguistic expressions taken from Vedic
sources, kāvya, as well as stock examples used by poetic theorists and philoso-
294
phers. For each example, he specifies how its meaning fits into his conception
of the communicative function, abhidhā, a function which includes mukhya,
primary meaning, and lakṣānika, indicatory meaning.
Mukula’s only extant work, the Fundamentals is influential within the disci-
pline of poetics, although not elsewhere. The Śabda-vyāpāra-vicāra of Mam-
maṭa includes sections of Mukula’s text verbatim, although the work ar-
gues for dhvani, and Mammṭa’s interpretation of dhvani, especially in the
Kāvya-prakāśa, is the de facto view for Sanskrit aesthetic theorists after him.
Further, Mukula is known to have had at least two students who studied
poetics: Sahadeva and Pratīhārendurāja. They authored commentaries on
Ālaṃkārikas—Vāmana’sKāvya-alaṅkāra-sūtra-vṛtti and Udbhaṭa’sKāvya-alaṁkāra-
sāra-saṃgraha, respectively—both mentioning their teacher.2
Given the wide range of topics and the influence of the text, it is unfortunate
that the only existing English translation, that of K. Venugopalan, is relatively
inaccessible to non-specialists.3 While the translation style is transparent with
regard to the underlying Sanskrit syntax, the result is at times cumbersome
in English. Further, Venugopalan misconstrues the relationship of Mukula
to Ānanda, claiming that Mukula tacitly accepts the dhvani theory, which
contradicts Mukula’s own arguments.4 While authors can be internally incon-
2Sahadeva notes that Mukula was responsible for bringing Vāmana’s work out of obscu-
rity. See McCrea 2008, p. 265, footnote 11 for a discussion—Sahadeva’s commentary is not
printed.
3Bhaṭṭa 1977.
4Footnotes 92 and 96 in Bhaṭṭa 1977 on pages 262 and 293.
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sistent, it is the translator’s task to be as charitable as possible in reading a
text. So, for instance, rather than interpreting the identification of arthāpatti
with lakṣaṇā as being “confusing,” as Venugopalan does, I prefer to under-
stand why Mukula might have thought this identification was helpful for his
goal–the replacement of dhvani with lakṣaṇā in an analysis of language. Once
this reading is in place, it is a further question whether he is correct. Fi-
nally, Venugopalan notes that the manuscripts and editions he has consulted
have different readings at certain places, but he does not inform the reader
which manuscripts and editions he is relying on, nor always what the different
readings are. Thus, this translation is an attempt to make Mukula’s work ac-
cessible to generalist readers interested in philosophy of language and poetics,
as well as to Sanskritists who might want to look at the original text more
closely.
In my efforts, I have relied upon a printed editions of the text in Devanāgarī,
since the 1882 manuscript is written in Śāradā.5 I primarily rely upon the
1973 Dvivedi edition.6 Throughout, I have checked my readings against Venu-
gopalan’s transliteration and footnotes, although his transliteration is fraught
with typographical errors.7 As well as comparing my translation against Venu-
gopalan, I have compared it against the excerpts translated by McCrea in his
5For details, see entry 1164, Keith and Winternitz 1905, p. 143.
6In addition to Mukulabhaṭṭa 1973, there is a more recent edition, Mukulabhaṭṭa 2007,
which differs only slightly.
7I have not included my own transliteration here, as I prefer not to contribute another
version with similar issues. It is my goal to publish an independent translation and com-
mentary of the text, at which point I will include a polished transliteration with appropriate
critical remarks.
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2008 book and Ingalls’ translation of the Dhvanyāloka, for verses cited by both
Ānanda and Mukula. Variant readings are noted throughout in footnotes. The
numbers in square brackets correspond to the Dvivedi edition page number
and line.
As I’ve said, my aim in this translation has been to produce a text which is
readable by an audience unfamiliar with Sanskrit. Thus, while I have striven
to be faithful to the Sanskrit syntax where possible, I have also avoided in-
troducing copious parenthetical insertions which interrupt the fluidity of the
reading. As Sanskrit is an inflected language, information is conveyed in the
case endings, number, and gender of pronouns which, while not strictly speak-
ing “on the surface” of the syntax, can be rendered in an English translation
without doing injustice to what is being communicated by the author. So,
for instance, in [24.22], where Mukula describes the three forms of “speaker,
sentence, and utterance,” I make explicit what is implicit in the subsequent
uses of ‘vāktṛ-ādi’ (meaning “et cetera”), rather than translating it as “speaker
and etc.”
It is appropriate to grapple with how translation impacts what is commu-
nicated when translating a treatise on communication. Given that linguistic
expressions convey more than just their strictly literal meanings, but also carry
along non-literal meanings (perhaps intended by an author) as well as conno-
tations (perhaps more like cultural accretions), what should translators aim
to capture? Should the goal be to convey the literal meaning strictly without
regard to the secondary or figurative meaning? Should the translator aim to
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introduce double-meanings where present in the original text? To what extent
may the translator leave the literal meaning to reproduce a bitextual effect,
even if it is not the same semantic effect as in the original? Given that the
semantic range of Sanskrit does not always neatly overlap with the seman-
tic range of English, no single translation may reproduce bi-textuality neatly.
Further, to aim for the literal as opposed to the non-literal requires one to
make a decision about what constitutes literal meaning—which is no small
matter. That Mukula uses poetic language with multiple shades of meaning,
and does so as motivating examples for his argument poses an additional prob-
lem. For the reader to track his arguments, the translator needs to ensure that
the reader has sufficiently understood the linguistic data upon which Mukula
is relying.
All of this is to say that I have had to make choices in translation which
serve my primary aims—readability by a philosophical audience and fidelity
to what is being communicated (literally and non-literally) by Mukula. One
case in point is the—by Mukula’s time, conventionalized—example of lakṣaṇā,
‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣhaḥ.’ This sentence is a prominent example in discussion of
lakṣaṇā, and considering its translation highlights methodological issues. Fur-
ther, in so doing, this illustrates important elements of the relationship be-
tween literal and non-literal meaning which is the topic of Mukula’s treatise.
Throughout the translation, I will rarely spend so much time laying out the
various readings for a particular expression, although I will point out places
where I diverge with other translations. An examination of this sentence,
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however, can serve as an introduction to the topic at hand.
The Sanskrit ‘gaṅgāyām,’ meaning Ganges, is in the locative case, where
‘ghoṣaḥ,’ meaning village, is in the nominative and the subject of the sen-
tence (with an implied predicative “is”). Pāṇini describes the function of the
locative as ‘ādhāro’dhikaraṇam’ or “‘location’ means locus.”8 The term ‘ad-
hikaraṇa’ used to gloss ’ādhāra’ is defined as having three meanings, according
to Patañjali: aupaśleṣika, abhivyāpaka, and vaiṣayika. In order, the three are
contact, pervasion, and context. Those theorists who say that ‘gaṅgāyām
ghoṣhaḥ’ is an example of lakṣaṇā do so because the the locative case end-
ing cannot be understood literally. According to them, strictly speaking, the
locative should be taken as one of these:
(1) The village is on (aupaśleṣika) the Ganges.
(2) The village is in (abhivyāpaka) the Ganges.
(3) The village is about (vaiṣayika) the Ganges.9
Defenders of lakṣaṇā say that the current of a river is inappropriate as the
adhikaraṇā, or locus, of a village. Because of this obstacle (bādha) to the
literal meaning, through lakṣaṇā there is inserted the word “bank” to resolve
the difficulty. Thus the sentence ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’ can convey that the village
is resting upon the bank of the Ganges (‘gaṅgasya taṭe ghoṣaḥ’ or ‘gaṅga-taṭā
8See Pāṇini 1897, 1.4.45.
9As far as I know, the is no specification as to which kind of adhikaraṇa this instance of
the locative would be read as, strictly literally. From context clues, numbers (1) and (2) are
the most likely. For reasons I will explain below, I think it is probably (1).
299
ghoṣaḥ’). Now comes the problem for the translator: how can this illustration,
so commonly used to motivate metonymy, be translated into English so as
to remain faithful to the Sanskrit and yet also serve as an illustration of the
phenomena of lakṣaṇā?
Part of the answer to this question depends on how we understand lakṣaṇā.
Just how present to the hearer’s phenomenology is the obstacle to the literal
meaning? Lakṣaṇā, according to Mukula, operates in sentences as ordinary
as “The cow is to be tied up,” in order to convey an individual cow and not
merely the class of all cows, which he takes as the literal meaning of “cow.”
Such a sentence would not, to the ordinary hearer sound inapt. Likewise,
cases of niruḍha-lakṣaṇā (frozen or conventionalized lakṣaṇā) like the word
‘rāja’ applied to a person of a non-royal caste, are felt to be literal by or-
dinary persons, and it is only through reflection that their being non-literal
is understood. Other, more metaphorical instances are would probably seem
non-literal, such as “The Punjabi peasant is a bull.” The problem is that, to
an English speaker, the sentence “The village is on the Ganges” does not feel
non-literal. Indeed, according to the Oxford English Dictionary, the prepo-
sition “on” also means “In proximity to; close to, beside, near, just by, at
the bank or coast of (a river, lake, sea, etc.).”10 So translation (1) leaves the
English speaker mystified as to why this is an example of non-literal meaning,
or why “bank” must be implicitly understood.
10”on, prep.” OED Online. Oxford University Press, December 2014. Web. 4 February
2015. This use for rivers dates back to 1009 CE.
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In contrast, translating the sentence as in (2) conveys the image of a vil-
lage submerged into the Ganges river. This is how Ingalls explains the phrase
(which he still translates as “on the Ganges” in his version of the Dhvanyāloka),
saying that “the Sanskrit phrase means literally ‘a village situated in the
Ganges,’ so that if we take the phrase literally, we will suppose that the inhabi-
tants are drowning.”11 This certainly gives an English speaker the feeling of an
obstacle to a literal reading, and she would easily see that some adjustment to
the sentence is necessary to make sense of it. However, such a translation tips
the scale too far in this direction. This sentence was not interpreted as nonsen-
sical or obviously false—at least not unanimously. On Pāṇini’s view, ordinary
use allows for extension of the meaning of the locative.12 The existence of con-
flicting intuitions means that ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’ would not necessarily strike a
Sanskrit speaker as odd as “The village is in the Ganges” would strike an En-
glish speaker. And even those who think the sentence is an example of lakṣaṇā
distinguish it from bizarre sentences like ‘agninā siñcati,’ or “She/he/it wets
with fire,” which is supposed to strike the Sanskrit speaker as obviously false
(and even nonsensical).13
Thus neither English translation of the locative is perfect as a translation
11Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 93, footnote 6. I have not found mention of a submerged
village anywhere in the Sanskrit texts—such a discussion would help narrow the interpreta-
tion of the locative. K.K. Raja takes it as a village being on top of the stream (Raja 1990,
p. 232).
12See Pāṇini 1897, 1.4.42, for the citation. For more discussion, see Raja 1990.
13Of course, just as Chomsky’s famous “Colorless green ideas sleep furiously” is now the
subject of contests for the best poetic interpretation, so this example came to be employed
metaphorically.
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which captures both the literal semantic range of the locative (a range which
is, given Pāṇini’s remarks, perhaps not clearly bounded) and the intuitions of
a Sanskrit speaker which serve as evidence for lakṣaṇā. Given the imperfection
of translation in this case, I have chosen to translate the sentence as the first
option, for several reasons. First, since the metonymical shift requires the
insertion of ‘taṭe’ or “on the bank,” I have chosen a rendering which allows
for a simple insertion without prepositional change. Rendering the sentence
“The village is in the Ganges” means construing the locative (now attached
to “bank”) differently after the insertion of “bank,” unless we want to read it
“The village is in the bank of the Ganges” (but this leaves our hapless villagers
drowning in mud). However, no one defending lakṣaṇā mentions any change
other than the insertion of a word.14 Second, I think that while “on” now
ordinarily conveys the sense of “next to” quite easily (whether or not this is a
literal meaning or not), such a reading is consistent with how lakṣaṇā works. It
is, after all, a vyāpāra.15 Not all cases of lakṣaṇā are ones where the linguistic
obstacle is present to consciousness. Finally, since I think there is room for
debate about whether ‘gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ’ is a case of secondary meaning (or
whether it is a frozen cases), this is analogous to the English translation of
“on the Ganges.” Dictionaries tell us what usage is common, and so the “next-
to” sense of “on” in English is certainly familiar. But this doesn’t yet solve
the question of whether “on” is, strictly speaking, restricted to a single literal
14Of course, there must be some other changes, including the addition of the genitive case
ending.
15I thank David Buchta for emphasizing this point in conversations on the topic.
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meaning, from a philosophical standpoint, once we’ve established what it is
for a meaning to be literal. And it is precisely this question–the distinction
between literal (mukhya) and non-literal (lakṣaṇā) which Mukula takes up in
detail.
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The Fundamentals of the Communicative Function
[1.7] In human contexts, it is true that the things words refer to—things which
are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance from the cycle of reincar-
nation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to these—are not elevated to
usefulness in everyday purposes without being known with certainty.16 Thus
all knowledge sources enjoy authority because they result in certainty, being
grounded as they are in comprehending objects of knowledge.17 And it is
through knowledge sources that there is comprehension of things referred to
by words—things which are useful for worldly enjoyment or for deliverance
from the cycle of reincarnation, and useful for avoiding what is opposed to
these. Therefore, it is only on the basis of certainty regarding what things
words refer to that there is elevation to usefulness in everyday purposes. And
certainty requires meaning being accessible through a connection with words.
And, as the word is the cause of understanding meaning by its communicative
function—either by the primary function or indicatory function—therefore a
distinction is here made between two functions of communication, the primary
function and indicatory function.18
16The term ‘pada-artha’ is translated here loosely as “things words refer to” in an effort
to maintain theoretical neutrality at the outset of just what kind of objects the referents of
words are.
17Here I follow Venugopalan in correcting ‘prāmāṇyam’ for the Dvivedi edition’s ‘prād-
hāṇyam,’ which would mean “supremacy” or “primacy.” It is common to say that pramāṇa
enjoy authority. Sanskrit: tathā hi sarvāṇi pramāṇāni prameya-avagati-nibandhana-bhūtāni
niścaya-paryavasāyitayā prāmāṇyaṃ bhajante.
18‘Abhidhā,’ which I translate as “communicative function,” is used by other writers to
mean literal or primary in contrast with the non-literal, but here Mukula is subsuming both
literal and non-literal under this term. Mukula uses ‘mukhya’ (“primary”) to denote the
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This is the question to be raised: “What is the communicative function: the
primary function on the one hand and indicatory function on the other?” The
author writes in order to delineate these two functions of words—primary and
indicated meaning—through explanation of the topic:
Verse 1
It is said: The primary function is what is apprehended from the
word’s function,
The indicatory function is apprehended in addition to that meaning
being understood.
[2.18] “The primary function is what is apprehended from the word’s function.”
Just as the face is perceived before all the limbs—like hands—likewise, the pri-
mary meaning is understood before the comprehension of all other meanings.
So that which is understood by means of word’s function is the primary mean-
ing. Therefore, by the word “face” is meant “primary like a face,” through the
ending ‘ya’ used for words like ‘śākhā.’19 An example of this:
(4) A cow is to be tied up.20
literal meaning of words, and ‘lakṣaṇā’ (“indicatory”) to denote the non-literal. Translating
‘lakṣaṇā’ with “indication,” while imperfect, is to convey that these meanings rely on an
intermediate step.
19Mukula is explaining why he uses the Sanskrit term ‘mukhya’ for “primary” and its
relationship to the word ‘mukha.’ The latter means “face,” and with the ending of ‘ya’
added onto it comes to have the meaning of “like” a face. Mukula’s explanation refers to
the Sanskrit grammarian Pāṇini. In the Aṣṭādhyāyī, rule 5.3.103, Pāṇini says ‘śākhyā-ādi-
bhyaḥ yat,’ or “The affix yat is used after “branch” and similar words.” Pāṇini 1987, p. 609.
An explanation similar to Mukula’s for why ‘mukhya’ should mean “primary” is given by
Kumārilabhaṭṭa in Tantravārttika, 3.2.1, where he says that mukhya is, like the human fetus,
the first to appear.
20The sentence could be translated as “The cow is to be tied up” or “A cow is to be tied
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Here, from the function of the word “cow” is conveyed the class whose iden-
tifying feature is cowhood, which is the efficient means for completing the
sacrifice.21 This class is the primary meaning. In this way, what is conveyed
by the word’s function is the primary meaning.
[2.24] Now, the indicatory function is that meaning understood by reflecting
on the meaning conveyed from the word’s function. This is just as in the earlier
example, since a particular is understood.22 This meaning is not understood
from the word’s function.23 This is because of the maxim,
“Denotation whose power is expended in qualification cannot reach
the property-bearer.”24
up.” On the first interpretation, there is a particular cow, say, Bessie, who is the target
of the gerundive. On the second interpretation, any (single) cow will do as the target of
the tying. Mukula’s account of indication needs only that a single cow is the denotation of
‘gaur’ in contrast to the class of cows. So the definite or indefinite article will do equally
well for his argument.
21The sacrifice cannot be completed unless something is tied up which has the properties
of a cow, so cowhood is the means by which the sacrifice is completed. Mukula echoes Pāṇini
and Patañjali in his use of this example, which is part of a longer injunction originally found
in the Aitareya-brāhmaṇa 2.24. Pāṇini cites this as a case that demonstrates words cannot
denote only individuals. If only a particular cow were denoted by “cow” here, he argues,
then once we have tied up that cow in a ritual, we would be failing to follow the command
correctly were we, in a later ritual, to tie up a new cow. For a translation of the Āṣthādyāyī
1.2.64 and discussion of this section, see Scharf 1996. We will see below that cowhood alone
cannot be the efficient means to complete the sacrifice but must always be instantiated.
However, as the ritual calls for a cow, it is in virtue of being a member of a class of cows
that the particular thing is efficacious.
22The example being referred to is (4) above.
23The term ‘ava-sīyate,’ or “derived,” describes a strong relationship, like determination.
The idea may be that the individual cow as the referent of ‘gaur’ is not required by the
lexical semantics, but the universal/class of cowhood is. The same root (ava + pso) is used
below, in explaining the maxim about denotation: ...chabdasya jāti-mātra-paryavasitatvāt.
Here, the sense is that of the determinate conclusion, or aim, expressing the fact that the
denotation of a word has as its aim the jāti and nothing further.
24Venugopalan notes that this quotation is not found in earlier texts than this one, but
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This is because a word has as its definitive aim simply a class of objects. But
a class of objects without a particular cannot be understood as the efficient
means for completing the sacrifice. Thus, that which is the substratum of
the class—in this instance the individual—is implied on account of the class
designated by a word.25 Therefore in this case there is the indicatory func-
tion.
In conclusion, this two-fold communicative function of a word is explained
through a description of the objects of the primary and indicatory functions:
an object which is uninterrupted by a meaning and an object which has an
intermediary meaning.
[4.26] Now, the four-fold rule of primary meaning is described:
Verse 2
Now, here the four divisions of primary meaning are to be investi-
gated: for example, general classes.26
it is quoted in many Alaṇkāra texts, and by Kumārila in his Tantravārttika. Bhaṭṭa 1977,
fn 7 on p.246. McCrea has traced the quotation further; see his McCrea 2008, p. 269,
footnote 17.
25“Implied,” or ‘ākṣipyate’ is a term often used in connection with the kind of reasoning
known as arthāpatti. I choose to translate ‘arthāpatti,’ which will appear later in the text,
as “presumption.” It is a sort of reasoning similar to abductive inference, where something
must be assumed to be the case in order to explain the truth of other, already known, facts.
26The term ‘jāti,’ which I have translated as “general class” is used with varying meta-
physical implications by the different Indian schools. In some instances, it means a “class”
in the sense of a collection of things (Deshpande 2003, p. 13 suggests this is how Pāṇini uses
the term). In Mīmāṃsā contexts, it typically refers to a class property or universal which
is instantiated by a particular thing (Deshpande 2003, p. 15). So, for instance, Kumārila
says in the Ślokavārttika: ‘jātim eva-ākṛtiṃ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā’ (“What is called
‘kind’ is just the ‘class property’ by which distinctions are made”). (Bhaṭṭa 1978b, p. 346.)
Since Mukula is here following the traditional Grammarian four-fold distinction between
jāti, guṇa, kriya, and yad-ṛccha, I do not translate ‘jāti’ as “universal,” but “class.” Below,
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[4.28] Of these two meanings, primary and indicatory, the primary sense
has four divisions, such as “general classes.” According to the examples in
the renowned work, the Mahābhāṣya, there are in fact four uses of words:
general-class-denoting words, quality-denoting words, action-denoting words,
and proper names.27 Accordingly, for all words which are conducive to convey-
ing their natural meaning,28 the use is dependent on distinguishing features,
since there are distinctions among objects which are determined by their at-
tributes.
[5.3] And there are two kinds of distinguishing features: those which are
speaker-imposed and those which are due to the nature of things. In some
cases, a speaker stipulates that something possesses a distinguishing feature
and, at other times, there is a property truly belonging to something.29 In the
case where it is by according to the speaker’s desire, the name is fixed by the
power whose object is this or that named thing. For example, in the case of
he explicitly rejects the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view that the primary meaning of all words is a
universal.
27The term, ‘pravṛtti,’ which I translate “use,” is often combined with ‘nimitta’ to mean
the “basis of linguistic practice” (Ganeri 2006) or “the property whose possession by an
object is the necessary and sufficient condition for the use of a given word to refer to
that object” (Deshpande 2003). The term ‘nimitta’ does not appear here, but Mukula
instead uses ‘upādhi’ to describe the external basis for the employment of particular syntactic
categories. Here Mukula is deviating from the Mīmāṃsā school, which argues for only
universals and actions, in favor of the Grammarians. He is citing Patañjali’s Mahābhāṣya,
written circa the 2nd century BCE, which is a commentary on Pāṇini’s Aṣṭadhyāyi.
28The term ‘sva-artha,’ here translated as “natural meaning,” is literally “own-meaning”
and refers to the primary or literal denotation of a word.
29The major distinction is between internal boundary conditions and ad hoc or accidental
boundaries for classes. The term ‘yad-ṛcchā’ literally means “that which is by chance or
accident,” and thus indicates a word which is contingently related to its object, in contrast
to being fixed (nitya) by essential characteristics.
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a word like “Ḍittha,” its own meaning is grasped by cognition of the last in
collected series of phonemes.30 In this case, through the manifestation of the
denotative power upon such (a cognition), there is imposed by a speaker the
possessing of an attribute upon this or that named thing.31 Therefore, proper
names such as “Ḍittha” are dependent upon this (attribute).
[5.10] And, moreover, even among those whose view is that the true nature
of the phonemic pattern of words like “Ḍittha” cannot be determined with
respect to named things—because there is no true nature of the phonemic pat-
tern, apart from the sound of the individual phonemes like “ḍ”—even among
them, it is entirely suitable that a word such as “Ḍittha” has the property
of being speaker-imposed.32 This is because a word such as “Ḍittha,” whose
unified character is conceptually imposed, is being used for the purpose of be-
ing the name of this or that thing, by the various customary word capacities,
which manifest the speaker’s desires. In conclusion, as the Grammarians have
30The word ‘Ḍittha’ is a made-up proper name in Sanskrit, used as an example of giving
an arbitrary name, with no associations, to an object. Mukula is echoing Jaimini’s view in
the Mīmāṃsā-sūtra I.1.5. According to him, the impressions of each phoneme in a word are
held in the mind of the hearer and the final phoneme triggers an artha-jñāna, or cognition of
meaning. This is in contrast to the sphoṭa theorists like Bhartṛhari, who argue that the final
phoneme triggers an understanding of the meaning which does not require the sequence of
previous phonemes to be cognized. See Devasthali 1997, p. 14 and also Raja 2000, p. 95-148.
31Although one might be tempted to understand the meaning of a proper name as fixed
by the person “baptizing” the one named, the text is clear that it is the desire of the person
speaking to call something “Ḍittha” that is responsible. See also Deshpande 1972, p. 43.
Mukula is in agreement in his analysis with Mammaṭa, who also follows the Grammarians
and rejects the Mīmāṃsā view that words refer only to jāti-s. See McCrea 2008, p. 270.
32This is the sphoṭa theory of Bhartṛhari, mentioned earlier, which postulates that there is
no phonemic pattern which prompts the understanding of a word’s meaning, but that word
meaning is understood in an “explosion” (sphoṭa) all at once, without sequence. Mukula is
arguing that this category of words is theoretically neutral.
309
previously explained, the true nature of the distinguishing feature imposed by
the speaker, is explained as being the basis of that feature.
[5.16] Now, there also are two kinds of distinguishing features based on a
thing’s properties. This is due to the difference between properties which are
yet to be accomplished and properties which already exist. In these cases,
action-denoting words are dependent upon an attribute which is yet to be ac-
complished, as in the case of “s/he cooks.”33 Now, the attribute which already
exists has two forms, due to the difference between classes and qualities. Fur-
ther, some already existing distinguishing features—such as the class—have a
life-giving quality with respect to the objects of words. For no objects ever
obtain their form without having a connection to a class. It was said in the
Vākyapadīya:
“In fact, a cow is not a cow or non-cow because of its form, but it
is a cow because of its relationship with cow-hood.”34
Further, some attributes are the basis for employing a specific word for an
object whose property already exists, for example, the quality of whiteness.
For something like a cloth does not depend upon a quality like whiteness for
its form, rather it is simply on the strength of the class alone that it has
33This division, between things and actions and, correspondingly, between nouns and
verbs, dates back to the Grammarian Yāska in his Nirukta and is also found in Patañjali’s
Mahābhāṣya II 418, 14-16. However, this division is only rough, since qualities can be
communicated with nouns. Mahābhāṣya II 356, 18f. For more discussion of the historical
development of Sanskrit grammar, see Scharfe 1977
34The Vākyapadīya was a philosophical text written by Bhartṛhari, part of the Gram-
marian school, in the 5th century CE. He expands upon the doctrine of sphoṭa described
earlier.
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obtained a form of “thingness.” Therefore, in this case the class is the basis
for employing a specific word for an object that has obtained a form. As well,
with regard to eternal qualities—for example, something having the property
of the most basic atomicity—even with regard to all these qualities, just by
their belonging to the class of qualities, they have the attribute of being a
quality.35 In conclusion, a general-class-denoting word, such as the word “cow,”
is dependent on the attribute which gives it life.36 Since the referent of the
word “white” is the basis for employing a specific word for an object which has
already obtained a form, the word “white” is a quality-denoting word.
[8.25] (Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā Objection.) It may be said: rather, all these
words which express qualities, actions, proper names, are grounded in univer-
sals.37 For instance, quality words such “white” signify a universal inherent
in multiple things, a universal whose quality is a characteristic like white-
ness, and which is inherent in substances such as milk, shells, cranes, and
etc. It is likewise, even in the case of action-denoting words, where partic-
ular actions are established as mutually different from one another. These
actions have their locus in things such as a bit of sugar, a kernel, or rice, as
in the case of “cooking.” What should be said is just that a universal is in-
35The example here of eternal atomicity is intended to show that even fundamental qual-
ities which seem to precede the things in which they inhere still count as qualities, and not
as universals.
36The term translated as “life” is prāṇa, quite literally “breath.”
37Mukula is here referring to the Mīmāṃsā view of language, so I translate ‘jāti’ as “uni-
versal” rather than “class” to highlight the ontological commitments in place and distinguish
their view from Mukula’s. This is not to imply that all Mīmāṃsakas are committed to the
same view of what constitutes a universal.
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herent in these actions. Now with regard to speaker-imposed-words such as
“Ḍittha,” there is a universal which has the property of being a Ḍittha-word
that inheres in various Ḍittha-words, in distinct utterances which are from a
parrot, a Sārikā bird, or a human.38 And the universal is denotatively ap-
plied to named things as is appropriate.39 Or, suppose that “Ḍittha”-named
things are different at various times, through their growth and decay. On the
strength of what is non-different between the tokens of “Ḍittha, Ḍittha,” there
is a non-differentiated thing which is the ground of saying “Ḍittha,” which is
lacking contradiction, and by whose form Ḍittha is named. Therefore, it is
plausible there there is a universal for “Ḍittha” inherent in objects which are
understood by Ḍittha-words. And, therefore, it is not appropriate to say that
the linguistic employment of words is fourfold with regard to quality-denoting
words, action-denoting words, and proper names, because these are actually
universal-denoting words.
[10.17] (Author’s Response.) To this we respond that individuals, proper
names, qualities, and actions do depend on a cognition of a single form expe-
riencing distinctions dependent upon this or that attribute, but which is not
a universal. This is the position of the revered author of the Mahābhāṣya. For
just like a single face is reflected in various ways in oil, a sword, water, or a mir-
ror because of differences that are grounded in how we cognize the reflection,
38The motif of birds speaking is frequent in Sanskrit literature, and sometimes is used as
an example to appeal to the importance of speaker intention. It is not clear why Mukula is
including parrots and Sārikā birds (also known as Myna birds) in his example here.
39Dvivedi has ‘abhidheyam’ (“denotatively applied to”) where Venugopalan has ‘avaseyam’
(“understood as”).
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in the same way, a single particular–for instance, white—as it is delimited by
different places and times since it has distinct substrates, such as a conch shell,
which are produced according to the collection of this or that cause, might be
variegated, having its in location in manifestations whose forms are different.40
And, therefore, words such as “white” are not universal-denoting words having
a singular particular nature of “white,” since the supposed universal has inher-
ence in different substances and because there is no universal corresponding to
the property of whiteness. In a similar way, “cooks,” words like “Ḍittha,” and
Ḍittha-named-things are to be explained. Also, in these cases, there is just
one individual action of cooking, one individual Ḍittha-word, and one named
thing that is Ḍittha. Just as cookings which occur in sequence appear to be
a single form and what is distinct about these individuals distinguishes them,
in the same way there are the multiple utterances of “Ḍittha” and particular
stages of life, such as childhood, of the person Ḍittha. So we have established
that the primary meaning is four-fold because it is grounded in linguistic use
which has four kinds of word-meanings.
[11.18] Now, with regard to indicatory meaning, the author continues in order
to survey its two divisions.
Verse 3
40Mukula here uses ‘śukla-ādi-vyaktir,’ or “a...particular—for instance, white...” even
though he has just distinguished between individuals (vyakti) and qualities (guṇa), arguing
that white is a quality. Since I take it he is not changing his mind in such a short space,
nor is he being contradictory, I take ‘vyakti’ to be used to emphasize the particularity of the
whiteness as distinct from its substrates.
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Indication is thought to be two-fold due to being transfer-less and
mixed transfer.41
Because of transfer-less indication42 and mixed transfer, indication is of two
41The term ‘upacāra’ is used by some authors as a general term, synonymous with ‘lakṣaṇā.’
Gautama, in the Nyāya-sūtra, uses it for cases where the primary meaning is close to the
indicated. (Raja 2000, p. 233.) The word is often translated as “transfer.” With the addition
of the term ‘miśra,’ which means “mixed,” the sense is that the target, indicated meaning
has carried with it some of the initial, primary meaning.
42Mukula uses ‘śuddhā’ (strictly speaking, meaning “pure” or “free of’,’ which I am trans-
lating here as “-less.”) in a few different ways. The first instance is here, in contrast to
“mixed transfer” (‘upacāra-miśra’), where the word picks out indication that has is a clear
conceptual difference between the primary meaning and what is indicated, and there is no
comparison or metaphorical identification between the two. The second instance is for a
sub-variety of mixed transfer where there is an identification, but the identification is free
from qualitative similarity. An example is where ghee is identified as long life because of
the relationship of cause and effect. The third instance is in the second analysis of indica-
tion, which analyzes the distinctness of the primary and indicated meaning. Here, “pure”
is used in the same sense, with the same divisions as the first use: transfer-less. Mukula
characterizes these as cases where there is no “conceptual coloring” between the primary
and indicated meanings. Finally, “pure” is used as a sub-variety of both superimposition
and absorption. Here, “pure” is used in the same way as the second instance, as free from
qualitative similarity. While what śuddhā modifies (mixed transfer and qualities) is implicit,
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sorts. Firstly, there is transfer-less indication:
(5) The village is on the Ganges.43
[11.21] Here, the particular river is not appropriate as a support for the village,
therefore the words “on the Ganges,” whose primary denotation is the partic-
ular river, which is near to the bank, convey the bank by indication.
[11.23] Now, mixed transfer is where one thing is designated as another thing,
as in,
(6) The Punjabi peasant is an ox.44
In this case, it is not possible to construe the word “ox” with the word “Punjabi
peasant” as having a common subject. The primary meaning being blocked,
there are transferred to “Punjabi peasant” qualities such as such as dullness
and laziness which are similar to qualities of dullness and laziness understood in
the ox. This is done through indication of qualities such as dullness and laziness
which are understood in the Punjabi peasant and similar to the ox.45 This is
rather than explicit in the original Sanskrit, to avoid confusion, I include them in my English
translation.
43See translator’s introduction for a discussion of why I have translated the locative
‘gaṅgāyām’ as “on the Ganges” here rather than “in the Ganges.”
44The word I translate as “Punjabi peasant,” ‘vāhīka,’ literally means “one who carries,”
but may also connote the Vahika area in Punjab. The metaphor is an ethnic slur against
the people in the area.
45The mention of the three pairs of qualities (rather than two) is important. The ox has
dullness and laziness qua ox (call them dullnessO and lazinessO). The peasant has dullnessP
and lazinessP . Because the way in which an ox and a peasant are dull and lazy are different,
the two qualities cannot be equated, nor can the adjectives “dull” and “lazy” be applied in
the same way to both ox and peasant. Therefore, there must be the indication of a third
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mixed transfer indication. In this way, by the division belonging to transfer-
less and mixed transfer, the two-fold nature of indication, is explained.
[12.22] Thus the author demonstrates that there is also a two-fold nature to
transfer-less indicated meaning.
Verse 4
Transfer-less indication is thought to be of two kinds: due to ap-
propriation and indirect indication.46
[12.25] What is explained as transfer-less indication has been said to be of
two kinds. Now, in some cases, by appropriating another meaning, indication
occurs. In others, (it occurs) by indirectly expressing another meaning.
[12.26] (Objection) “But how is there appropriation of another meaning? Or
how is there indication of (another meaning)?” Therefore the author contin-
ues:
Verse 5
Where, for the purpose of a meaning which is already established
by itself, there is implicated another thing, that is appropriation.
Now, indirect indication is thought to be the opposite of this.
[13.3] Where another thing is implied for the sake of a meaning which is already
pair of qualities, dullnessI and lazinessI . In this way, dullnessI , for instance, is similar to
dullnessO and dullnessP , but and can be understood as metaphorically applying to both the
ox and the peasant.
46These two kinds of lakṣaṇā correspond generally to the terms ‘ajahal-lakṣaṇā’ and ‘jahal-
lakṣaṇā,’ respectively. As Mukula will explain, the first is where the primary meaning is
partially retained and becomes part of the indicated. When the primary meaning is largely
rejected, this is ‘lakṣaṇa-lakṣaṇā.’
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established by itself, this is appropriation, as in the case
(4) A cow is to be tied up.
For in this case, the word whose aim is the ceremony is not appropriate with-
out the implication of an individual based on the word; therefore, there is a
particular implied in order for this property to be established as the meaning.
And likewise:
(7) Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.
[13.6] Now in this case, the possession of fatness, since it is an effect, is un-
derstood as characterized by an absence of eating, an absence which has its
existence during the day. In order to establish itself (as what is meant), “fat-
ness” incorporates, through the implication that there is eating at night, the
existence of a cause of the fatness. For it cannot be the case that the fatness
is brought about by consuming a tonic or the like, because this is an example
of indicatory meaning only when we can determine that there is an absence
of a cause through another knowledge source.47 And the fatness is the reason
that something such as consuming a tonic is blocked as the thing which lack
of daytime eating qualifies.48 Further, because there is the completion of an
47Devadatta’s drinking would be potentially observable, but we resort to arthāpatti to
postulate x only when we cannot observe x.
48Mukula is alluding to the requirement that in order for our knowledge of Devadatta’s
eating at night to be through language, we should not be able to appeal to perception or
inference, for instance, to explain the missing cause. If Devadatta is fat because he drinks
something with sustenance, we would be able to see this and the sentence would make sense
without indication. But, since we do not see Devadatta eating or drinking, the sentence
is strange. Thus indication fills in the cause of Devadatta’s fatness, which is otherwise
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incomplete means of knowledge, there is here the previously presumed phrase,
“eaten at night.” This can be verbal presumption or presumption of the cause
alone, viz, the eating at night.49 Whichever is the case, appropriation is a
suitable explanation because there is another, earlier, meaning implied for the
sake of a meaning which is already established by itself.
[13.15] In contrast, there is indirect indication for combinations which have a
structure opposite from appropriation, which is described earlier. This hap-
pens when no other meaning is implied for the sake of establishing the natural
meaning, but instead there is a giving up of the natural meaning to establish
another meaning. This is just as in the earlier example, (5) “The village is on
the Ganges.” Now in this case, since the riverbank supports the village, the
word “Ganges” gives up its natural meaning for sake of the riverbank related
to the action of support. Therefore, in order to understand another meaning,
“bank,” the word “Ganges,” whose natural meaning is a particular stream, is
inexplicable. The fact that Mukula says that we can use another pramāṇa, or knowledge
source, to determine that there is such an absence, is another illustration of his affinity with
the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā, who claim that knowledge of absences is an irreducible knowledge
source. This is in contrast to the Prābhākara, who deny such an independent pramāṇa and
explain knowledge of absences through inference, or anumāna.
49In addition to the previous reason why we refrain from the interpretation that Devadatta
drinks a tonic, Mukula now adds another. He tacitly relies on a principle that the phrase
“eating at night” is relevant to the presumption of what is indicated. There are two ways
to understand how this presumption works. The first is that a phrase like “he eats at
night” is presumed as part of the utterance meaning. This is śruta-arthāpatti, one of two
kinds of presumption recognized by the Mīmāṃsā. The other possibility is that what is
presumed is the fact that Devadatta eats at night, a presumption which then makes sense
out of the sentence. In contemporary terms, the distinction is between the implicature of
a sentence that is uttered and a presupposition of a sentence that is uttered. Mukula is
agnostic about which is the correct explanation, concluding that both fall under indicatory
meaning, demonstrating that he has a broad conception of lakṣaṇā.
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given up in this instance, since there is the giving up of the primary meaning
for the sake of a meaning which establishes another one. And therefore, here,
indirect indication has a nature opposite from appropriation which was earlier
discussed. Therefore, transfer-less indication is classified into two kinds.




[15.27] Now, in order to delineate the four divisions of mixed transfer, the
author says:
Verse 6
Mixed transfer has four kinds due to the two kinds of transfer,
quality-free transfer and qualitative transfer, each being divided into
superimposition and absorption.50
[16.1] Mixed transfer is divided into two: quality-free transfer and qualitative
transfer. There is quality-free transfer where, through indication, the subject of
comparison is transferred onto the object of comparison—for instance because
50Absorption, or ‘adhyavasāna’ is classified in Gerow 1971, p. 98 as a variety of atiśaya-
ukti, or “expression involving an exaggeration,” a hyperbole. He characterizes it as a kind of
hyperbolic comparison in which, “one thing is characterized as another so as to exaggerate a
quality which they in some degree share.” The examples which Mukula need do not involve
explicit comparison, as in “Pañcāla,” nor do they require shared qualities, as this variety can
be either quality-free or qualitative. The crucial point is that there is a lack of distinction
between the two compared objects.
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of the relationship of cause and effect. This transference occurs because of the
impossibility of indication based on qualities understood as similar between
the subject and object of comparison, since there exists no such relationship.
For example:
(8) Ghee is long life.
Now here, where ghee is the cause of long life, both the cause of long life
and the word for the cause, “ghee,” are applied as an instance of the above-
described indication characterized by the relationship of cause and effect, and
are understood as long life. Therefore this is quality-free transfer.
[16.6] In contrast, qualitative transfer is where there is indication based on a
conjunction of similar qualities with qualities understood to be in the standard
of comparison, through an existing relationship between a subject and object
of comparison. Now this transfer is denoted by the word “qualitative” because
it is understood by qualities. For example, (6) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox.”
Here there is transfer onto the Punjabi peasant of the nature of an ox and the
word “ox,” because of the conjunction of dullness and laziness in the peasant
with the similar qualities, such as dullness and laziness, of an ox.
[16.11] Now it is thought by some that when there is a transfer, there is no
transfer of meaning, but only a transfer of words.51 This is incorrect. After
51This comment is terse and it is not clear precisely what the view is, nor who would have
held it. Mukula has been explicit that both the words and their meaning are transferred in
the examples of both the peasant and the ghee. He has not explained whether, and how,
the transfer of words and meaning differ. One clue to this is the contrast between these two
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all, transfer of words does not occur without transfer of meaning. Therefore,
this has been shown: transfer has a two-fold division into quality-free transfer
and qualitative.






[18.1] And each category is divided into superimposition and absorption. Where
one thing (call it x) is transferred onto another (call it y), without x’s distinc-
tion from the object of superimposition being concealed, there is superimpo-
sition since the true form of the second thing which is being superimposed on
the first is not concealed. This is just like the earlier discussed example, (8)
“Ghee is long life.” After all, in this case, since ghee is understood simply by
the word’s natural meaning, there is no apprehension of ghee—the cause—as
inherent in its characteristic effect—life. Ghee is understood as long life sim-
ply by the word’s natural meaning, because it is understood as the cause of
long life. Therefore, this case is superimposition. It is the same thing, too,
in the case of (6) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox” because the true form of
the subject being compared (the peasant) with the object of comparison (the
cases and the ones which follow, which are single words. For the cases of the peasant and
the ghee have the sentence structure, “X is Y,” in which one thing is predicated of another.
In the cases which follow, a single word is described as containing a suppressed relationship
between two meanings. Here, there is only a transfer of meaning.
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ox) is not concealed. In this way, where the word’s natural meaning, which
is being superimposed by the superimposing meaning, is not concealed, then
there is superimposition.
[18.9] But there is absorption where a word’s natural meaning is concealed be-
cause what is intended to be expressed is a subject of superimposition merged
together with an object that is being superimposed.52 In the case of quality-
free transfer, there is an example of absorption:
(9) Pañcālā
[18.11] For here the word “Pañcālā” is uttered as as an intermediated indirect
indication for the Pañcāla people, based on the location where the Pañcāla
descendants dwell.53 By “Pañcāla” is meant, through indication, the descen-
dents and the location inhabited by the people’s descendants. And here there
is no awareness of the object of superimposition (the place) through distinc-
tion from that which is being transferred. This is because the awareness of the
object of superimposition is simply absorbed in that which is being superim-
posed (the people). In this way, that which has been superimposed upon (the
place) is regarded to be, as it were, lost through prevalent conventional use.
52Mukula uses, for the first time, the term ‘vivakṣita,’ or “what is intended to be ex-
pressed.” This is a term used by the dhvani theorists for a category of dhvani. Here and
other intances, Mukula is alluding to these categories and explaining them in terms of
lakṣaṇā instead.
53The kind of ‘lakṣaṇā’ described by “intermediated indirect indication” (‘lakṣita-
lakṣaṇayā’) is where the primary meaning and the non-literal meaning are related via an
intermediate word or concept. Traditionally, ‘dvirepha’ is an example of this, since the word
literally means “word having two r’s” and has come to mean “bee” because the Sanskrit for
“bee” is ‘bhramara.’ Raja 2000, p. 254.
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Therefore, this is an instance of quality-free transfer in which superimposition
is embedded.
[18.16] Now for the case of qualitative transfer, there is an example of super-
imposition.
(10) Ruler
After all, the word “ruler,” through observing its use—which is the use whose
primary meaning is ‘kṣatriya’—is used qualitatively, as seen earlier, for a śū-
dra, as indication which is used for someone who guards a community like
a kṣatriya who guards a community.54 And here its being qualitative is not
understood instantly because its meaning is caused to be established through
reflection. Therefore the qualitative relation is not understood instantly since
it has disappeared, and it is rightly understood by careful reflection. Therefore
this is an instance of qualitative transfer in which superimposition is embed-
ded.
[18.23] In this way there are four divisions of transfer. By the four-fold division
of transfer, with the earlier two divisions of lakṣaṇā, the classes to be spoken
of are collected into six distinctions.
[20.11] And indication has three branches because of being transfer-less, super-
imposed, and inclusive. The transfer-less branch has two parts: appropriation
54The term ‘kṣatriya’ and ‘śudra’ refer to different castes within the social order of
Mukula’s time. The idea here is that ‘rājan,’ or “ruler,” is literally applicable to some-
one from the warrior class, kṣatriya, but only derivatively to the lowest, laborer class, the
śudra.
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and indirect indication, already discussed. The branches absorption and super-
imposition are also, each one, divided into two as has been explained, because
of quality-free transfer and qualitative transfer. The author goes on in order
to explain the differences in scope with regard to these three branches.
Verse 7
In cases of extreme distinction, indication is transfer-less. It is
superimposed in the cases where it is not far. In the cases where
it is swallowed, it is absorbed because of being conventional and
nearer in meaning.
[20.17] That which is transfer-less indication is of two sorts, which is explained
as having the natures appropriation and indirect indication. Transfer-less in-
dication is to be considered as such when the indicated meaning is understood
as extremely distinct, due to there being no conceptual coloring from the in-
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dicating meaning.55 For in this case, there is no cognition of the indicated
meaning as being conceptually colored by the indicating meaning. Take the
example (5) “The village is on the Ganges.” Here, by connection to the indirect
indication of the bank as the supporting locus of the village, when employing
the word “Ganges” in the sense of
(11) The village is on the Ganges, not the Vitasta,
no conceptual coloring is understood by its use, just the implication of a par-
ticular stream through (the village) being right on a bank, since there is a
conception of the bank. It is the same way in the case of appropriation, as in
the sentence (7) “Fat Devadatta does not eat by day.”
[20.24] Now, when what is intended to be expressed is the bank as being con-
ceptually colored by the particular stream whose own nature is not concealed,
and as not being far from the particular stream that is denoted by the word
“Ganges”, then in the earlier example there is superimposition. The village
is on the bank, which, having a form related to that particular stream, is
understood as conceptually colored by the particular stream.
[21.1] But when used to make us understand the close proximity of the village
with respect to the particular stream, and “bank,” having been concealed
through incorporation into the particular stream, the sentence is understood
as
55The “indicating meaning,” or lakṣaka, is the primary meaning.
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(12) The village is on the Ganges itself directly and not anywhere else,
and this is appropriation. Now, just as the examples of superimposition and
absorption based upon transfer-less indication have been so discussed, we must
also discuss qualitative transfer.
[22.18] Now just like (6) “The Punjabi peasant is an ox” is the sentence
(13) This one is a ox.
and
(14) This one is really directly an ox.
Now in (13), through connecting qualities similar to the qualities understood
in a ox, due to the intention to express that the peasant is not much different
from a ox, there is superimposition of “oxness” in (6). But in (13), as the
qualities understood in a ox are much greater, there is absorption on the part
of the peasant into oxness.56 And as the earlier (cases of) absorption were
distinguished according to their proximity, in this same way conventional use
is distinguished.
[22.23] It is the same with the two examples seen earlier, (9) “Pañcālā” and
(10) “ruler.” Because of this it is said: “because of nearness and conventional
56Venugopalan and Dvivedi differ in their Sanskit editions of these few sentences. Venu-
gopalan omits ‘vivakṣitatvād,’ “due to the intention to express,” but Dvivedi includes it,
and given the earlier mention, I do as well. Further, Venugopalan’s text reads ‘gotva-
ādhavasānam’ (“established”) rather than Dvivedi’s ‘gotva-ādhyāropa’ (“superimposed”).
Because the gloss is that the peasant is not much different (‘adūrage’) than the ox, I accept
Dvivedi’s reading. Finally, the last sentence is found only in Dvivedi’s edition.
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use.” This means: because of “lengthy conventional use” meaning is swallowed
in absorption.














[24.4] (Objection)57 “Your position is not correct. Where there is the primary
meaning, it is correct that the word has the capacity to communicate meaning
because there is a determinate relationship (between word and meaning). But
this is not in the case of the indicatory function, since it is the opposite of that.
For in discerning the determinate relationship between word and meaning, to
the extent that the two agents (speaker and hearer) understand the object
through the word’s employment, it is first as based in the sentence meaning and
the sentence, described as non-distinct, that there is an awareness of their being
in the relationship of cause and effect.”58 Later, after three or four observations,
57The objection is not obviously identifiable with any particular philosophical school,
though it could be the Prābhākara Mīmāṃsā, who deny lakṣaṇā, arguing instead for a kind
of contextualism. In any case, the central point is that unlike the primary meaning, where
there is a direct relationship between word and meaning (where meaning is a referent which
is one of four major types), indication does not admit of such a direct relationship. But if
indication is understood derivatively from the invariant primary meaning, it seems that it,
too, should not vary, and thus in every context the indicated meaning would be the same.
This is not the case.
58This is a description of how people learn language, first by hearing words in context
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using inference based upon positive and negative correlations, in understanding
the difference between what is referred to by the meaning of the sentence and
the sentence, which are understood as a meaning which is connected with a
word, based upon this knowledge there is the restrictive application of cause
and effect.59 And in the later stage, by the agent’s understanding otherwise
being inexplicable, there is cognition of the relationship between word and
meaning. And this cognition is only primary, in the case of meanings such
as universals and etc., in the four divisions, but not as in the six kinds of
indication. For there is not a relationship with the meaning from an indicatory
function of the word. Meaning is observed simply by the primary meaning
function. Therefore, in this way there is only the primary meaning function
and not an indicatory function.
[24.14] Now, what is denoted would be thus: a relationship is observed between
two meanings–the meaning which is being indicated and the primary meaning
of a word. From the word, through this relationship, there is understanding
of the indicated meaning. In this way, it would be the case that if the word
is an independent thing, by its denoting the primary meaning, then the indi-
cated meaning would be understood all the time! But indicated meaning is
and observing to what things they can and cannot be applied. there is no awareness that
the sentence, as object, is anything distinct from its meaning, which is the cause for the
utterance, initially.
59Inference based upon positive and negative correlations (anvaya-vyatireka) is a process
of determining what particular words mean by comparing sentences uttered in context and
extrapolating to determine which word refers to what thing. For details, see Raja 2000,
p. 196-98 and Staal, 14. Raja translates it as “mental process of inclusion and exclusion”
and Staal calls this “distributional analysis.” The process is described as one that children
employ in learning a language, albeit without awareness of the inferential patterns.
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dependent, so on what does it depend?”
[24.17] To this doubt, the author replies:
Verse 8
From reflection upon the distinct forms of speaker, sentence, and
utterance, six kinds of indication are able to be judged correctly by
the thoughtful.
[24.20] The one who utters a sentence to make another to understand some-
thing is a speaker. That combination whose single meaning is made up of
words with syntactic expectancy is a sentence. That which is within the scope
of dependence on the communicative function—either the surface or indicatory
function of words–is an utterance.
[24.22] It is from these three (speaker, sentence, and utterance)—categorized
as each on its own, or in combination, or in conjunction with place, time, and
circumstance that the essential six kinds of indication are distinguished by
reflective and skillful scholars. Thus, merely by dependence on the collection
of speaker, sentence, utterance, etc., words which convey their natural meaning
have a relationship with the meaning which is being indicated, considering the
conventional use of elders. This is what is said: It is not the case that words,
whose relationship with the indicated meaning is unknown (by the speaker) can
cause understanding of the indicated meaning. And neither is the relationship
grasped directly. Then how? It is by dependence upon the collection of such
things as the speaker, sentence, utterance, etc., indirectly through the word’s
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natural meaning.60
[25.5] That is what is said by Ācārya Śabarasvāmin:61
“How does one meaning change into another? We say: It is through
the natural meaning’s denotation.”
For in this case, there is said to be an entering into the meaning which is being
indicated through the natural meaning of words.
[25.8] And again, on this very topic, the author (Śabara) says:
“Further, indication is just customary speech.”62
Now, here, what is said is that there is use of words which depend on un-
derstanding the relation (between word and meaning) in the case of meaning
being indicated. Further, by custom is implied those valid sources of evidence
such as perception which gain their status as proof through people’s conven-
tional use. This means that just custom is the customary understood through
60Mukula now begins to explain how it is that indication can convey a meaning indirectly,
through the primary meaning in combination with contextual factors. The presence of these
contextual factors will allow him to avoid the charge that given a certain word, it must in
every context convey the same indicated meaning if this meaning is to be related to the
denoted meaning, which is context-invariant.
61Śabara was a Mīmāṃsaka living somewhere between 350 and 400 CE, famous for the
Śābara-bhāṣya, a commentary on various citations from the Vedic and post-Vedic eras. These
include commentary on theMīmāṃsāsūtra-s of Jaimini and extensive discussion of exegetical
problems regarding the sentences of the Veda. It is in this context that he presents three
interpretive constraints on the sentence, or vākya: eka-vākyatā (treat syntactically related
words as a single sentence), anuṣaṅga (sentences can be extended by ellipsis to maintain
their unity), and vākya-bheda (sentences which have more than a single aim must have a
hierarchical relationship between these aims to preserve their unity). See Verpooten 1987,
p. 8ff.
62Quotation is from Śabara’s commentary on MS I.2.22
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people’s conventional use grounded in words whose relationship (with their
meaning) is grasped.63
[25.12] This is said by Kumārila Bhaṭṭa:
“Some figures are conventional because they have a capacity like the
primary denotation; Some are made in the present time (novel),
some are even without (indicative) power.”64
The cases of conventional figures are like (10) “ruler.” The novel creations are
those which are dependent on such things as the conventional use of elders
and the speaker. These are observed in other cases of a suitable nature, such
as:
(15) White cranes are moving, the cloud is stretched,
Smeared with radiantly dark color
Winds sprinkle water.
The friends of the clouds joyfully make melodious cries.
Let it be. The vessel of my heart is hard. I am Rāma. I
bear it all.
But Vaidehī, how will she live? Oh, alas, queen, be reso-
63Mukula explains here that indication is “customary speech,” He will go on to explain that
this does not preclude novel uses but only shows that indication is grounded in knowledge
of the conventional meanings of words.
64Kumārila Bhaṭṭa lived sometime between 600 and 700 CE, and is the author of the
seminal Mīmāṃsā works the Śloka-vārttika and the Tantra-vārttika, both commentaries
on Śabara’s Śābarabhāṣya. See Verpooten 1987, p. 22ff. This quote is found in Kumārila
Bhaṭṭa’s Tantravārttika, 3.1. He uses different examples than Mukula for the three cate-
gories. For conventional, he gives śukla (white) and aruṇa (red); for novel, ratha-anganāman
(for the cakra-vāka bird, since ‘ratha-anga’ is the wheel of a chariot and ‘cakra’ means
“wheel”); for without potency, rūpa and rasa. See Bhaṭṭa 1924, p. 977ff.
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lute!65
[27.28] Now, here, the word
(16) smeared
with regard to the splendor (of the sky) has its primary meaning blocked
because of (the sky’s) ineffectiveness for smearing (things) like saffron and
etc. Therefore, this indicates a meaning incorporated into splendid because
its relationship with the property of slightly removing the brilliance is similar
to what is conveyed through the primary meaning, which is here “slightly
removing the brilliance.”
[28.3] In this way, also, with the word
(17) friends
the primary meaning of the word is blocked, as the non-sentient clouds have no
relationship with friendship. In this case, qualities like “fondness” understood
by “friend” indicate peacocks whose faces are turned towards the clouds. They
are related to qualities like “fondness” since they are similar to the qualities
in friends.
[28.5] It is likewise with regard to the word
65This is an anonymous verse also quoted in theDhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana. Ānanda
describes it as an example of artha-antara-saṅkramita-vācya dhvani, or suggestion where the
primary meaning is shifted. He identifies only “Rāma” as the locus of suggestion, but the
Locana of Abhinavagupta discusses the examples that Mukula analyzes. He post-dates
Mukula. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 204-206.
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(18) Rāma
because the primary meaning is blocked for the named thing.66 Therefore,
by this word also is indicated things such as the loss of a kingdom, being a
forest dweller, kidnapping Sīta, or the death of a father, since they are incor-
porated into the specific causal collection with properties whose causes are an
unusual sorrow, and are understood as one meaning with the primary mean-
ing.67 Therefore, in this way cases of novel indication are to be explained.
[29.11] However, the following cases are not novelly-created indication, since
they lack the functional capacity (of indication): those cases of indication
which are not seen to be conventionally used by elders, those words which are
not seen to be like (10) “ruler,” and, further, those which are not in the class
of words like (16) “smeared.”
For example:
(19) From the middle of the ocean,
The brilliance of the gold earth seeming like reddish peaks,
It jumps out, having pierced the water
Like the oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare.68
66According to the Dhvanyāloka, the suggested meaning of “Rāma” includes “various
suggested qualities.” (Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 204). The person speaking here is Rāma,
but what is intended is not a tautologous claim (“I am me”) but a reference to Rāma’s
character (“I am like this...”).
67These are events which happen to Rāma in the famous Sanskrit epic poem, the
Rāmāyana of Valmīki.
68This is an excerpt from the epic poem, the “Śiśupālavadha,” written by Māgha, who
lived in the 7th century CE. His work is frequently quoted by treatises on poetry, and he
is well-known not only for his skill in meter, but his punning word play. The verse itself
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[29.16] (Objection) Now, here, the words oblation fire with the face of my
beloved maremean by indication, “sacrificial fire with the face of a horse.”69
[29.17] (Author’s Response) But here, “sacrificial fire with the face of a
horse” is not a conventional figure. Further, it is not a word belonging to that
class of words that by being penetrated by the causal complex responsible for
the qualified meaning, is seen to absorb a meaning, either penetrated or not
penetrated.70
[29.19] (Objection) From words such as
(20) two-r’s (meaning “bee”)
by means of indication, a word like ‘bhramara’ (bee), is understood, as it has
two r’s.71 As in the application of the six divisions (of indication), in the same
is taken from III.33 of the “Śiśupālavadha.” See Winternitz and Winternitz 1987, p. 722ff.
The term ‘turaṅga-kānta-ānana-havyavāha’ refers to the fire below the ocean with the face
of a mare, a fire which is described by some as due to Aurva throwing his anger into the
ocean.
69The text lacks very explicit marks that would distinguish between an author and an in-
terlocutor, but as Venugopalan points out, Mukula cannot be saying that there is indication
in this passage, since he agrees with Kumārila that this is a case without indicative power.
Thus I have made explicit that he is replying to another viewpoint.
70The idea is that this is not a case of conventional metaphor like ‘rājan’ or “ruler,” where
the meaning has been absorbed, nor is it a novel metaphor. The words in Mukula’s gloss
are simply synonyms for the terms in the compound. There is a difficulty in the text here.
Venugopalan’s printed text reads ‘viddha-aviddha-artha-avagāhitvam’ which he says “means
nothing,” although it literally means “possessing the property of being absorbed in a meaning
which is penetrated (viddha) or not penetrated (aviddha).” He notes that a manuscript which
he consulted reads ‘tathā-vidha-artha-avagāhitvena’ which he takes to mean “the implication
of such (i.e., previously described) Secondary Sense.” Bhaṭṭa 1977, p. 255, fn. 55.The Dvivedi
edition reads ‘viddha-aviddha-artha-avagāhitvena’ or “as possessing the property of being
absorbed in a meaning which is penetrated or not penetrated.”
71The text is terse and trades on the a single word as both used and mentioned: bhramara.
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way why couldn’t it be that through indication from words like oblation fire
with the face of my beloved mare“horse” and “face” are understood by means
of indication of a word like “mare”? For in classes of words like “two-r’s,”
words which indicate secondarily are seen.
[29.24] (Author’s Response) This is not so. That (word) which is under-
stood as possessing indicative properties is this way since it is observed to be a
word belonging to that class of words accepted as part of the conventional use
of the elders—but it is not so in all instances. Otherwise, in fact every word
would have the capacity to convey all meanings, as words which indicate by
means of some tiny property. There would not be any word which could not
convey any meaning. But when, due to acceptance or rejection of the conven-
tional use of the elders, a distinction regarding the intended object is made,
“oblation fire with the face of my beloved mare” is simply defective when there
is no motive that is apparent.72 But when there is a motive—for example, the
communication of a hidden meaning in the speech—then, in contrast, these
kinds of indication are not defective. Therefore, due to their being accepted
as part of the practice of the conventional use of elders, these words are in the
scope of these kinds of indication.
The term ‘bhramara’ means “bee,” and as a word which has two r’s, the word becomes the
referent of “two-r’s” (dvirepha), as does, by extension, the insect.
72This is the first instance of ‘prayojana,’ translated as “motive,” in the text. Mukula now
addresses the motive for employing various expressions in order to distinguish between uses
which involve indication and those which do not. I do not translate the term ‘prayojana’
as “intention” to avoid confusion with Gricean speaker intention, which is (broadly) the
meaning of an utterance. Mukula’s concept here is not identical to intention in this sense.
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[30.7] In this way, this is demonstrated: words which give up their natural
meaning for another meaning by their being totally permeated by a collec-
tion of causal features such as the speaker and etc., when employed with the
conventional use of elders—either by their own character or by the word as
being part of a certain class—it is established that they possess the indicatory
function.
[31.22] A case where indicated meaning is understood by a relationship with
the speaker is in this example:
(21) O neighbor, will watch our house here for a little while?
This child’s father will not at all drink the tasteless well-
water.
Now I go by myself to that forest stream which is overrun
with tamāla trees,
Let the reed’s dense joints, having been broken long before,
scratch my body.73
[31.27] Now, here, a young woman whose desire is for an erotic encounter with
a another woman’s husband, who is wandering to the arranged location, has a
motive for the utterance which is having an agreed-upon location for an erotic
encounter with another woman’s husband, because she suspects she will bear
telling marks from the encounter—wounds from teeth and fingernails. So, she
73The verse is from the Subhāṣita-ratna-kośa of Vidyākara. These lines are not found in
the Dhvanyāloka, but Ānanda does comment upon a similar set of verses, in which a woman
deceives a monk into leaving the location of her rendezvous. See Ānandavardhana 1990a,
p.83ff.
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speaks this way for the purpose of dissembling, that she is bringing drinkable
water from the river fit to quench her husband’s thirst and that there will be
marks of injury on her limbs caused by the hollow points of the dense reeds,
broken long before. And here, the dissembling is understood through consider-
ation of the speaker as unvirtuous.74 And because the dissembling’s nature is
communicating untrue things and because of untruth’s having the capacity to
convey the opposite of a true meaning, now by an untrue meaning, the truth
which is uttered is indicated by possessing a meaning which establishes itself.75
Therefore, here understanding occurs because of indication whose nature is in-
clusive of the true meaning, which is gotten by reflection on the character of
the speaker. For certainly in this case neither the sentence nor the utterance
have the capacity (to convey the true meaning). If the speaker were a virtuous
woman, these two (the sentence nor the utterance) would not be able to imply
this kind of meaning.
[33.9] Now, an indicated meaning can be grasped through reflection on the
particular form of the sentence, as in this example:
(22) “As one whose glory [whose wife Śrī] is already obtained,
why must he, even again, press churning affliction upon
74Dvivedi’s edition reads ‘sā ca art apahnutir asādhyā...’ (32), or “incomplete,” but
Venugopalan emends it to ‘asādvyā’ (210), or “unvirtuous,” as does McCrea (288). I follow
this emendation because a later line describing what the woman might have been like (but
is not) describes her as ‘sādhvyā.’
75Dvivedi edition’s edition reads ‘tv asatya-uktaḥ’ (“said by a false woman”) which Venu-
gopalan emends to ‘saty-arthaḥ’ (“the true sense”), because he says the sentence has no
subject. I emend Dvivedi’s edition to ‘satya-uktaḥ’ or “the truth which is uttered.” The
Hindi commentary in Dvivedi supports this emendations.
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me?76
Nor can I believe that one whose mind is active would seek
his earlier sleep.
And why, when attended by the lords of all the islands,
would he again build a bridge?”
It is as if the ocean’s tremblings holds doubts, when your
Majesty comes nearby.77
[33.15] For here, the king is addressed in poetic composition by a flattering
verse. That which is described exaggeratedly by tremblings is the ocean’s nat-
ural condition of agitation because of the king’s own great army. The word
“trembling,’’ which is characterized as hyperbole, is the cause of the ocean’s
holding doubting actions in the ascriptive comparison here: “as if...holds
doubts.”78 And the doubts, by such (phrases as) one whose glory / wife Śrī
76There is a double–meaning in the text, which I have indicated by use of the square
brackets.
77This verse is in the Dhvanyāloka, in the context of figures of speech which are suggested.
Ānanda calls this ‘rūpaka-dhvani,’ or the suggestion of metaphor. The original author of the
verse is not known. For a discussion of this poem’s meaning, see Ānandavardhana 1990a,
p. 330-31 and McCrea 2008, p. 107-108. In brief, the doubts are those that the personified
ocean has, regarding the deity Viṣṇu. The first three lines describe Lord Vāsudeva’s actions
towards the ocean: drawing Śrī from it with churning waters, sleeping upon the ocean, and
building a bridge over it to Lankā. The poem is written to praise a king, and so the king is
implicitly identified with Viṣṇu, who is also known by “Vāsudeva.”
78The term “ascriptive comparison” translates ‘utprekṣā,’ a figure which is something like
a metaphor. There are many kinds of utprekṣā distinguished by aesthetic theorists. Gerow’s
definition is “a figure in which a property or mode of behavior is attributed to a subject
literally incapable of sustaining that property...” He says that this figure “probably comes
closer than any other to capturing the sense of the vague term metaphor.” These figures are
constructed usually by there being “a noun, representing the subject of comparison, followed
by a verb or predicate which literally must be understood with the objects of comparison.”
He also notes that in utprekṣā, the subject of comparison “remains explicit, usually as the
subject of the sentence.” See Gerow 1971, p. 131ff for details.
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is obtained, are the objects which are characterized as the specific actions of
Lord Vāsudeva. And while there is no equality between lord Vāsudeva and the
king, then how can there be doubt regarding the content of Lord Vāsudeva’s
actions? Therefore, where the trembling of the ocean being crossed by a
great army has been superimposed because of its similarity to the meaning of
“trembling”—although it is not trembling—there is a qualitative transfer of
the kind “superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer.” Although the
ocean is not trembling, because of superimposition it is understood as an ob-
ject which is trembling.79 And therefore, this is said to be a hyperbole whose
nature is such: where (things) that really have a distinction (are understood
as) without distinction. Due to their doubts, in sentient beings a head-tremble
is often seen. Because of its similarity with head-shaking which is caused by
doubt in sentient beings, there is transfer of the nature of the ocean’s trem-
bling. And thus, here, also, the transfer is of the sort “superimposition which
embeds qualitative transfer.”
[33.26] And as well, although these are two kinds of trembling, because of
superimposition this is said to be a hyperbole whose nature is such: where
(things) that really have a distinction (are understood as) without distinction.
That hyperbole is connected with this ascriptive comparison: as if it holds
doubts.80 Now, here, because of the perception of trembling as the effect,
79Mukula uses ‘artha’ here, a word which can be translated as “meaning” or “object.”
Since he is talking about the ocean as cognized through indication, I use “object” for clarity,
even though meanings can be objects, on a realist conception of the referential function of
language.
80The figure identified as “poetic fancy” is in Sanskrit utprekṣa, which is a figure of speech
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the bearing of doubts as a cause is employed figuratively as an impossible
comparison whose form is a false conception. And here too, the holding of
doubt belonging to the ocean—because of the connection with the holding of
doubt—is said to be a hyperbole whose nature is such: where (things) having
a distinction (are understood as) without distinction.
[34.5] As it has been said in defining ascriptive comparison:
When there is an utterance whose intention is to express that (two
things have) a similar form, by words such as “like,” because there
are not qualities or actions shared by the things, there is joined
with hyperbole the figure of ascriptive comparison.81
[34.8] Due to the qualities or actions shared on the part of the thing which
is pointed out, therefore, here, too, there is “superimposition which embeds
qualitative transfer.”82 But in words such as one whose glory [whose wife Śrī[
is already obtained, in the three doubts, and in the character of Lord Vāsudeva,
since it is appropriate that these things are included as reasons in contradiction
to this or that action (of the king), it is implied that the king is the Lord
Vāsudeva. Therefore here indication has the nature of absorption.83 And here,
attributing qualities of x to y, usually when it is impossible for y to have such qualities (as
in the case of anthropomorphizing inanimate objects). See also Gerow 1971, p. 131ff.
81This is found in Udbhaṭa’s Kāvya-alaṅkāra-saṃgraḥ III.3. Udbhaṭa was prior to Ānan-
davardhana and Mukula, living circa 800 CE, also in Kashmir. See Gerow 1977, p. 233ff.
82Mukula takes Udbhaṭa’s definition as evidence for his claim that there is hyperbole
and ascriptive comparison in these verses in the identification of the ocean’s movement with
trembling. He then adds that the identification between Viṣṇu and the king being addressed
is qualitative because they do share qualities, in contrast to the ocean and trembling.
83There is indication in these verses because we must presume that the king is being
identified with Lord Vāsudeva, as the descriptions in the poem are in conflict with the
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by means of the nature of Lord Vāsudeva, due to the superimposition on the
part of the king, there is superimposition which embeds qualitative transfer.
And therefore, what is understood here is the inapplicability–otherwise of the
syntactic relation of words employed in sentences taken as a whole; therefore,
indication is here grounded in sentences.
[37.18] Now, here follows indication grounded in an utterance:
(23) The arrows of passion are hard to resist.
Spring blossoms here and there.
The moon’s bright splendor makes the heart intoxicated.
The cuckoos captivate the mind.
This young age is a hard burden to bear, having swollen
breasts.
these difficult–to–bear five fires–how now, my friend, are
they to be endured?84
[37.23] For here, that the enlivening experience of the remembered arrows
which are sacrificial fires superimposed on the five (fires), have an intolerable
character—this is the meaning of the sentence. Therefore, this is the utterance
king’s actual actions.
84There is no clear origin for these verses, nor are they found in Ānandavardhana. The
“five fires” allude to a myth which describes the origin of human beings. Each fire changes
a particular substance into an element important for the human life–cycle. The fires are
identified as the sun, thunder, earth, man, and woman. Discussion of these fires is found
in the Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa, the Śabara Bhāṣya, as well as other places. For a lengthy
discussion of the myth and its importance in Vedic ritual, see Hayakawa 2014, pp. 93ff.
Further, there is an aesthetic practice involving the five fires, which is also likely being
invoked by the poem. Pārvatī, a goddess, is said to have performed such a practice and as
a result, won the heart of the god Śiva.
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meaning. And due to the illuminating capacity of the sentence purport, the
erotic sentiment, “love in separation,” is implied. Therefore indication has the
nature of absorption, being grounded in the utterance meaning.85 For here
there is no engagement in the study of the speaker’s nature apart from the
words, nor further, on the part of the words of the sentence, could there be the
possibility of sentential connection without the implying of love in separation.
Through reflection on the utterance’s own nature, indication occurs with the
nature of absorption, grounded in the utterance meaning.86 And although it is
being implicated, the love in separation is predominant as the implicated utter-
ance meaning, because it is implicated as the predominant cause of refreshing
the sensitive listener’s heart.87
85Here, Mukula appeals to ‘tātparya,’ or “sentence purport” for the only time in his
text. The term can mean “speaker’s intention,” and is used in this way frequently by
the Naiyāyika-s. For the Mīmāṃsāka-s, this term refers to the meaning conveyed by the
collection of words together, independent of a speaker. See Raja 2000, p.180. Since Mukula
uses ‘prayojana’ elsewhere to refer to speaker’s motive, and he is influenced strongly by
Mīmāṃsā theory, I translate this as “sentence puport.” The term “love in separation,” or
‘vipralambha-śṛṅgāra,’ refers to one of the rasa-s, or aesthetic sentiments which are said to
be produced by works of art.
86Unlike the earlier example, (21), where we have access to the speaker’s character as an
unvirtuous woman as an interpretive guide, here the sentence meaning tells us about the
speaker. In turn, this sentence meaning is what is being expressed (in contrast to (5), where
what is expressed is its opposition). However, Mukula further claims that without assuming
the fact of love in separation as an interpretive guide, we could not understand the sentence
meaning.
87Mukula here addresses the predominance (prādhānyam) of the indicated meaning.
Ānanda has argued that where the suggested meaning, is not the predominant meaning,
we should not say there is dhvani present. (For example, Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 137).
Mukula does not directly engage with this claim, but he does characterize indication as
what is predominant and what refreshes the sensitive reader’s heart. Grammatically, the
term “sensitive reader” or sahṛdaya derives from ‘sa,’ meaning “with,” and ‘hṛdaya,’ mean-
ing “heart.” The idea is that the “heart” of the reader aligns with the poet. It is the term
Ānanda uses for literary critics and readers who are sensitive to the presence of dhvani.
Thus, in this passage Mukula has displaced dhvani with lakṣaṇā.
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Now, concerning makes the heart intoxicated, the letter ī is not employed
(to signify feminine gender) because there is an ac-affix instead of a ṭa-affix,
although moon’s bright splendor has a feminine gender.88 This is because there
88Here, Mukula is trying to explain why what appears to be a grammatical error is actually
an acceptable use. To elaborate: the apparent error is that the compound ‘unmāda-karā’
(“makes the heart intoxicated”), which qualifies ‘śaśāṅka-rucīnām’ (“moon’s bright splen-
dor”) should have an ‘ī ’ to mark the feminine gender, not an ‘ā.’ Mukula refers to affixes
(pratyaya) from Pāṇini’s Āṣṭādhyāyī, a collection of sūtra-s which describe the morphol-
ogy of Sanskrit. In essence, these affixes are shorthand ways of referring to morphological
changes. There are two sūtra-s in the Āṣṭādhyāyī which would be used to determine the
ending for ‘kara’: 3.2.1 and 3.2.20. In both of these sūtra-s, ‘kara’ is formed from ‘pkṛt’
as an upapāda. Further, both of these sūtra-s are governed by another sūtra, 4.1.15, which
explicitly mentions the root from which kara is formed and says it should take a long ī
ending. Thus, Mukula explains why the ‘kara’ found here is not governed by either of them.
Mukula’s first observation is that there is no ṭa-affix, which is the affix in 3.2.20. Pāṇini says
this affix is found ‘hetu-tāt-śīlyā-anulomyāneṣu,’ or in cases where the object of ‘pkṛt’ de-
notes final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence. According Mukula’s interpretation,
then, the moon’s bright splendor is not the final cause (hetu)of the heart’s madness. Nor is
it usually the cause (tāt-śīlya) of the heart’s madness. Finally, the heart is not acquiescing
(anulomyāna) to the moon by becoming mad, in the way that someone who does what they
are directed would (see examples in Pāṇini 1897, p. 416ff).
Mukula next alludes to 3.2.1 with his mention of the aṇ-affix. He says that there is no
intention to express a connection between the cases (‘karma-saṃbandhasya’). This refers to
situations where a verbal root (such as ‘pkṛt’) is in composition with another word, and is
an upapada. (However, the changes which occur in 3.2.1 would yield kāra, not kara, so this
sūtra could not explain the form in the poem, even if it did allow for an ‘ā’ ending.)
The solution is to take kara as being a word on its own, not an upapāda. This is what
Mukula is alluding to in his mention of the ac-affix. In sūtra 3.1.134, certain words which
occur in a list (a gaṇa-pada referred to by ‘paca-ādi’) will take the ac-affix. This ac-affix is
not listed in 4.1.15, and so does not take the ‘ī ’ ending for the feminine. Thus, if kara is in
this particular list of words, there is a Pāṇinian justification for it taking a long ā ending.
Unfortunately, it is not listed. However, the list is an ‘ākṛti-gaṇaḥ,’ which means it is a
partial list of examples, not an exhuastive list. So it is still possible that kara could be
formed like the words in this list. For evidence that it is, Mukula says ‘śiva-śamariṣṭasya
kare,’ which is an allusion to Pāṇini using kara as a word, not an upapada, in 4.4.143. So,
even though there is no explicit rule allowing for karā as a feminine form for kara, that
Pāṇini has used kara as a word means that it could be declined as karā rather than the
expected karī for an upapada.
Finally, Mukula says that even if the poet were aiming to describe final causation, habitual
action, or acquiescence, because this is not an upapada with a ṭa-affix like in 3.2.20, there is
no grammatical fault in using ‘ā.’ This observation is probably because the moon’s bright
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is no intention to express final causation, habitual action, or acquiescence. And
earlier here, since there is no intention to express a connection between the
cases, therefore there is no aṇ-affix. There is instead an ac-affix, just as in
“...the words śiva, śam, ariṣṭa in the genitive when meaning “he does.”’89 And
for just this reason, where there is an intention to express such things as final
causation, habitual action, or acquiescence, still, because there is no ṭa-affix
there is no grammatical fault.
[40.26] Thus, by that relationship of each one to another—speaker, sentence
meaning, and utterance meaning—there are three divisions, so much has been
illustrated so far. And also, there are others. Combining the speaker together
with one or the other of them—speaker with sentence meaning and speaker
with utterance meaning—just like combining sentence meaning with utterance
meaning, there are three divisions, each division consisting of two. In the same
way, there is the threefold division consisting of the triple: speaker, sentence
meaning, utterance meaning, also by mutual combination—and therefore the
triple is understood as one. In this same way, the four divisions are delineated
and are to be illustrated as within the scope of the six kinds of indication by
the knowledgeable person’s own understanding.
splendor is regularly described as a cause of emotional distress in Sanskrit poetry, and so
denying that it is ‘tāt-śilyā’ is a strained interpretation. I thank Jo Brill for illuminating
the subtleties of Pāṇini in conversation, and for R.K. Sharma’s helpful introduction to the
work of Pāṇini at Ananda Ashram.
89This partial quote is from the Āṣṭādhyāyī, IV.4.143. In its entirety: “The affix ‘tātil’
comes in the Chandas after the words śiva, śam, ariṣṭa, in the sixth case (genitive) in
construction when the sense is “he does.” Pāṇini 1987, p. 849. The idea is that an abstract
suffix (‘tāti,’ as the ‘l’ is a Pāṇinian marker) is added to some words in certain contexts—
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Figure 9.6: Analysis of Contextual Factors
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Example
Speaker – – (21)
– Sentence Meaning – (23)
– – Utterance Meaning (22)
Speaker Sentence Meaning – N/A
Speaker – Utterance Meaning N/A
– Sentence Meaning Utterance Meaning N/A
Speaker Sentence Meaning Utterance Meaning N/A
[41.1] And with regard to these divisions, their use—which has been laid out
in combination and separately as having its characteristics of place, time, and
circumstance—should be sought out with regard to its characteristics. Thus,
the four divisions of primary meaning have been delineated.90 And indication
has been explained as six-fold.
[42.9] Now, there is connection-of-the-denoted, there is denotation-through-
the-connected, there is the combination of these views, there is the rejection
of both views.91 The author continues in order to elucidate the range and
structure of indication among these four alternative views.
Verse 9
these are words from the Vedic Saṃhitas.
90Mukula is summarizing what he has shown so far in the text. He is not saying that the
past few examples have been to delineate the divisions of primary meaning.
91Mukula now begins to address the question of sentential relation in connection to word
meaning, presenting several major views on the topic. The terms I translate as “connection”
and “the connected” are anvaya and anvita, respectively. Derived from anu and the verb
root pi, these terms can be used to refer to syntactic, semantic, or logical relationships,
as well as mere association. How this relationship functions for the two views of anvita-
abhidhāna and abhihita-anvaya is explained by Mukula in what follows. I choose relatively
broad terms rather than translate the entire theory into the label for the view.
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When there is connection among those things designated by words,
indicated meaning is thought to be after this expressed meaning.92
But when what is connected constitutes the expressed meaning, in-
dicated meaning is at the stage preceding the expressed meaning.93
Verse 10
Now in the two-fold view, indication is of two kinds. But for the
unified whole view, the sentence is what is ultimately the bearer of
meaning, and there is no indication. But when there is a postu-
lated meaning, indication cannot be distinguished, as on the earlier
views.94
[42.12] Now, according to some, when words are exhausted simply by their
natural meanings—which are the universals understood by the process of in-
ference from positive and negative correlations—through the power of seman-
tic fit, contiguity, and syntactic expectancy applied to the meanings of words,
then the sentence meaning is not something which refers, but is to be under-
stood only as, for example, joy and sorrow. For this is like the examples: “O
priest, your son is born,” and “O priest, your unmarried daughter is preg-
92On the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsā view, indication functions to unify words denoting universals
into a syntactically connected sentential unity.
93On the Prābhākara view, words do not denote except within a particular context of
utterance, and so indication is unnecessary to generate a sentential unity, but it operates
on a sentence before we understand the expressed meaning. “Expressed meaning” (‘vācya,’
literally ‘’to be expressed”) is ambiguous here, depending upon what is being qualified by
it. In the first line, it describes the meaning to be expressed by the words (universals et
al). In the second line, it describes the meaning to be expressed by the sentence (such as
an ironic utterance).
94This is the view of the sphoṭa theorists, on which divisions between words and phonemes
are merely hypothetical fictions.
346
nant.” While what is occasioned by, respectively, the birth of a son and the
pregnancy of an unmarried daughter, viz, joy and grief, is undenoted by these
very words (of the examples), there is, however, implication (of joy and grief)
due to the capacity of the thing which is expressed by the word.95 In this way
it is apparent that the very thing undenoted by the sentence-meaning is what
is implied by the meaning of the words. And among those with this view,
their opinion is that for those things which are denoted, because of the mutual
connection of one constituent to another, subsequently there is connection-of-
the-denoted.
[44.1] But others say: there is understanding of the relationship between word
and meaning from the conventional practices of elders. And this conventional
practice is characterized by use and non-use (of words).96 And application
and non-application are grounded things as qualified entities.97 Therefore, the
relationship among words in the (sentence) meaning is understood simply as
that thing which is qualified. And therefore, word meanings are simply quali-
fied entities, and there does not need to be relationally of the word meanings.98
95The word for young woman, ‘kanyā,’ typically denotes someone who is single. It is
tacitly understood that in a default context the birth of a son would be the cause of joy and
the pregnancy of an unmarried woman would be grievous. The sentences themselves make
no reference to joy or grief; it is the state of affairs denoted by the sentence which brings
about the emotional response.
96Use and non-use, or ‘pravṛtti’ and ‘nivṛtti’ are terms used by Pāṇini refer to applica-
tion/suspension of a rule. More broadly the idea is of voluntary acting and refraining from
acting—we apply words in some situations and not in others, and from these regularities
can determine what words mean.
97This points to the realism in Indian philosophy of language in general, where the objects
of words, or artha, are qualified by properties.
98In other words, a word attains its status as having a “meaning” or “referent” only by
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And thus, there is denotation-through-the-connected due to the words causing
to make known the relationships of mutual connection of one constituent to
another, whose native meanings are grasped by means of their being clothed
with this or that universal.
[45.15] But in the view of others, words have an expression meaning which is
the universal of this and that thing. But sentence meaning has the meanings
of the words in mutual connection one to another. This is connection-of-
the-denoted, seen from the standpoint of words, but it is denotation-through-
the-connected from the standpoint of the sentence. And thus, there is a
combination of the two, connection-of-the-denoted and denotation-through-the-
connected.99
[46.17] Now those with the view that sentence meaning is a unified whole say:
Suppose it is agreed to that a sentence meaning is a qualified entity. A partic-
ular does not possess a sentential connection because a particular is contrasted
with universals which is the opposite of it. It is impossible to grasp this con-
nection by the native meanings of the qualified entities, since their nature is
clothed with the universal meaning which is their actual meaning.100 There-
denoting an entity understood as qualified. It does not first denote something unqualified
(the universal in the Bhāṭṭa view) which is then understood, though indication, as qualified
in relationship with another word. It is important to remember that in the realist conception
of meaning under discussion, the meaning of a word is a thing in the world. Thus what is
qualified is an entity, as having certain properties, etc.
99This seems to be Mukula’s preferred view.
100The interlocutor here is a follower of Bhartṛhari, who argues that if we take the Bhāṭṭa
view that a sentence meaning is a single qualified entity, we are unable to understand sen-
tence meaning. As support for this view, the opponent notes that particulars are not unified
in a sentence (viśeṣasya ananvitatvena) and that a particular is different from, or opposed
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fore, because of indivisibility of the meaning of a sentence and the sentence,
the thing which ultimately is “meaning,” is not connection-of-the-denoted, nor
is is it denotation-through-the-connected, and neither is it as a combination of
these brought together, because the meanings of the words are unknown.101
Both views, by being dependent upon word meanings which are hypothetically
posited, are useful hypothetically posited—separately or together.
[47.11] And in the case where there is first connection-of-the-denoted, then
through the words’ natural sense, word-meanings which are referred to are
subsequently denoted (together) due to the operations of syntactic expectancy,
semantic fit, phonetic contiguity. Given this, indication is accepted as func-
tioning upon word meanings which are universals when there is a mutual
unifying relationship of qualified and particular. Because of the force of the
word meanings, what possesses an expressed meaning does so on account of
its being later, when the meaning of the sentence is being understood.
[47.15] Now in the case of the denotation-through-the-connected view, what
to, a universal (tad-viparīta-sāmānya-viruddhatvāt). In his translation, Venugopalan notes
that, “The meaning of the sentence is not quite clear” but that somehow the argument
is intended to refute both the other views simultaneously. I translate ‘avachādita’ in this
context as “clothed” (MacDonell 96) because the universal contains the particular (perhaps
as the member of a class, depending on one’s ontology), and it is this universal which is
said to be the true meaning. However, there is a problem in a hearer understanding how
the particulars in a sentence might be related to one another if all we have access to are the
particulars as “clothed” with universals.
101The reason here, ‘pada-arthānām avidyamānatvāt,’ could also be translated as “because
the meanings of words are non-existent,” depending upon how one takes ‘pvid.’ As the
above argument is epistemological, I have translated it as “unknown,” but since the context
is a Bhartṛharian view, “non-existent” would also be plausible, since they deny the existence
of words as anything other than useful abstractions. Perhaps Mukula is playing on both
meanings.
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is unified in mutual qualification is just the expressed meaning of the word-
meanings possessing denotation. It is not the case that there is mutual qualifi-
cation of what has already been denoted, as the word-meanings are universals.
In this view, the things undergoing qualification do not attain the condition of
being word meanings. This is because the (word) meaning, which is grounded
in a universal form that has an unwavering relationship with the native mean-
ing, is understood in harmony with the sentence meaning as a whole entirety.
In the case of such a view being understood, the six kinds of indication ac-
cording to their distinctions–indication which is the object of this or that
sentence meaning–would not appear.102 Therefore, on the denotation-through-
the-connected view, the word-meanings as qualified are the sentence-meaning.
In connection to what is the expressed meaning, we say there is (something)
preceding.103 Indication is situated in the stage which is the ground prior to
this expressed meaning.104
102The conclusion of the argument is that qualified constituents of a sentence–universals–
are not yet what we could call “word meanings” because we need something that is, unlike
a universal, going to be contextually appropriate. A universal is “unwavering” (‘avyabhi-
carita’) but a word meaning needs to be understood as in relationship with other parts of
the sentence. “Cowhood” cannot be the object of the verb “to tie,” and so another meaning
must be inserted which can undergo qualification. Therefore, even if the meaning of the
word “cow” in a sentence depends on “cowhood” (as the Prābhākara would admit), the
meaning cannot simply be “cowhood,” full stop. Mukula does not here explain why it is
that the six kinds of indication would not appear if we took the Prābhākara view. I take it
that the understood reason is that examples like “A village is on the Ganges” would not need
to be understood through indication as meaning “A village is on the bank of the Ganges,”
since “Ganges” would in context denote “bank of the Ganges” simply through the power of
mukhya.
103Mukula is citing Verse 9 above when he says ‘puraḥ’ or “preceding.”
104For the Prābhākara, indication does not function, as it does for the Bhāṭṭa, as a way
of bringing together words which first denote universals into a particular-qualified relation.
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[47.23] Now in the combined view of connection-of-the-denoted and denotation-
through-the-connected, by the act of combining the two-fold rule earlier de-
scribed, we have, from the perspective of words, indication occurring at a time
subsequent to the words expressing meaning. And from the perspective of
sentences, it occurs after the sentence meaning and before there is an utter-
ance meaning.105 Therefore it has been said: In two, there is two. In two
means having the nature of a combination of connection-of-the-denoted and
denotation-through-the-connected. There is two means the indication meaning
occurs after and before there is an expressed meaning.106
[48.3] Now in the case of the view that the sentence meaning is undivided, there
is no indication as far as the ultimate meaning. This is because divisions among
word meanings do not really exist—with regard to what is ultimately the
denoted meaning—and indication is dependent upon such divisions. However,
in dependence on hypothetically posited word meanings, indication is based
in constituents which are to be distinguished, by hypothesizing, as in the
earlier views, connection-of-the-denoted, denotation-through-the-connected, or
their combination, according to one’s theoretical liking.107 This is because
Words do not truly denote universals, but they denote whatever is appropriate for the
context. Subsequent to this single stage, but before the utterance meaning, indication
functions. Indication works to produce such things as ironic speech acts, which have an
utterance meaning opposed to the sentence meaning.
105The phrase, “And from the perspective of sentences” is inserted into the Dvivedi text,
and I accept the interpolation for clarity.
106The “combined view” appears to be Mukula’s attempt to expand the role of indication
to account for metonymic uses (as in “The village is on the Ganges”) as well as metaphorical
uses (“The Punjabi is a ox.”)
107The phrase translated as “theoretical liking” is ‘yathā-ruci’ or “according to taste.” The
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there is convention (regarding division constituents) established by the speech
community and established by the factors of place and time which interact
mutually one with another.
[48.9] In this way, the range and structure of indication in the four views—
connection-of-the-denoted, etc.—has been explained.








































[49.29] In cases where there is an impossibility in primary meaning there is an
intentional object directed at something dependent upon the primary mean-
ing, when there is a purpose.108 The author continues in order to present an
theorist who denies words as having a status as meaning-bearers can still allow for word
divisions to be useful in theoretical pursuits (like lexicography or aesthetics).
108I understand the ‘evam abhihita-anvaya-ādi-pakṣa-catuṣṭaye lakṣaṇāyāḥ’ as a kind of
dittography from the line above, and so exclude it, as does Venugopalan. However, Venu-
gopalan inserts ‘idānīm etasyā’ before ‘yatra’ and as Dvivedi lacks this, I omit. Also, Dvivedi
has ‘viṣayāṃ’ where Venugopalan has ‘viṣaye’ (“object”). The latter is locative singular mas-




Because there is an inconsistency in primary meaning, because of a
cause which is dependent on the primary meaning, or because of es-
tablished convention or because of a particular intention, indication
is found to obtain in conventional practice.
[50.3] And the previously discussed indication of six kinds is observed in the
conventional use of the elders because it is grounded in a collection which has
the nature of three kinds of reasons:
1. Due to an inconsistency in primary meaning—that is, its being ob-
structed as another knowledge source;
2. And due to the dependence on the primary meaning on the part of the
meaning which is being indicated;
3. And due to grasping another meaning because of an intention.109
[50.9] And that dependence the primary meaning is shown by the teacher
Bhartṛmitra to be fivefold:110
case it is locative singular feminine, or ‘viṣayam’ accusative singular masculine. I take it as
the last.
109These three reasons, ‘evaṃ vidha-kāraṇa-tritaya-ātmaka-sāmagrī ’ are all together nec-
essary as a collection for indication.
110Bhartṛmitra is a Mīmāṃsā philosopher writing before Kumārila (600 and 700 CE) who
argues against the Mīmāṃsaka Śabara (350 and 400 CE). We do not have Bhartṛmitra’s
works except through citations in other texts. According to Verpooten, Bhartṛmitra was
considered “a positivist and an irreligious thinker” who was rejected from the orthodoxy
due to his views. Verpooten 1987, p. 22. Abhinavagupta quotes the same passage from
Bhartṛmitra in the Locana, using two different versions of the quote, neither of which is
identical with Mukula’s quotation. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 67, fn 4 for discussion.
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Because of the relationship with that which is to be denoted, be-
cause of being similar, because of being associated, because of being
opposed, because of relationship to an action, indication is thought
to be five-fold.111
[50.14] By this verse intention is further divided into two.112
[50.15] In some cases, when a different meaning is grasped, because it has a
nature following convention which is grounded in the beginningless, conven-
tional use of the elders, the intention has the nature suitable to convention, as
in the case of (20) “two r’s.” For by the term “two r’s,” by its being connected
to having two r’s, through indication of the word ‘bhramara,’ in this manner,
compliance with convention is generated.
[50.18] Now, different from what was described as a motive whose nature
follows convention, is when a word for the named thing conveys another object
which is distinct from it, and yet causes understanding of the particular’s form,
just as in the earlier mentioned example, (18) “I am Rāma.”113
[50.21] And therefore, two kinds of intention should be understood according
111While ‘samavāyaḥ’ can mean “inherence,” the sort of perpetually existing relationship
between a substance and its qualities, the later example is of a collected assembly of per-
sons, so the meaning here is of a (not necessarily permanent) combination, conjunction,
association, or collection.
112The Dvivedi edition has ‘tena prayojanasya api dvaividhyam’ but the ‘tena’ does not
make sense as a discourse marker connecting the five-fold relationship to the two-fold division
of intention.Venugopalan omits it on the authority of one of the manuscripts. Rather than
omit it, I read the punctuation in the Dvivedi edition as being incorrect and take ‘tena’
with ‘ślokena’ as a reference to a part of the śloka that Mukula is paraphrasing.
113Mukula explains this example in detail below. It is a case where “Rāma” denotes the
person of Rāma but by way of descriptions of his character. One might characterize it as
“Rāma” used as a definite description rather than a name.
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to their contents–in the case where there is an impossibility of primary mean-
ing, by close dependence upon the primary meaning, and when the indicated
meaning is understood to have five kinds of relationship which has been shown
earlier.
[53.17] Here is a case of indication by relationship, as in the example, “The
village is on the Ganges.” For in this case, where the primary meaning of the
word is blocked, since the particular stream denoted by the word “Ganges” is
inapplicable as the locus of a village, the meaning, whose relationship is that
of contiguity–and–contiguous things, indicates the bank as being a support of
the village. And here, the purpose of indication with regard to the bank is
to communicate things such as holiness and beauty, which the words do not
convey but which are inherent in things related to the Ganges. For the words
are unable to contact things such as holiness and beauty, because there is the
unwanted possibility of under- and over-extension.114
[53.26] An example of indication by similarity:
(24) Bee, in all your buzzing about the spacious sky,
Have you anywhere touched, seen, or heard
—now speak the truth without bias—
114Mukula uses an unusual turn of phrase in this sentence: ‘na...sva-śabdaiḥ spraṣṭuṃ
śakyate.’ The infinite ‘spraṣṭum’ literally means “to touch” He could easily have used other
words for denotation such as ‘abhidyate.’ He is speaking figuratively or loosely. Perhaps this
is to avoid making the self-negating claim that words cannot denote holiness and beauty. His
point seems to be that the word “Ganges” cannot strictly, speaking, denote holiness, since
the river is not co-extensive with holiness. Under– and over–extension in Indian philosophy
are flaws that make, for instance, a definition invalid when it does not apply to a ll cases or
applies to too many cases, respectively.
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If there is a flower which is equal to the jasmine blossom?
[54.3] Now here, the words “bee” and “flower,” due to their being impossible
otherwise in the vocative case indicate another meaning, one which is con-
nected to qualities similar to the qualities understood by the words.115 This
is because there is a similarity with the primary meaning’s denotation—the
denotation which is blocked. And here, the purpose is to communicate the
understood actions and qualities of the words “bee” and “flower,” which are
similar to actions and qualities belonging to the bee and the flower.
[54.7] Indication by inherence is just as in the example,
(25) The umbrella-holders go.116
In this case, the the primary meaning of the word is blocked by the use of
the person plural. For in the case of a single umbrella-holder the use of the
plural is not appropriate. Therefore, here, where there is an action which
indicates “going” with the umbrella-holder, even the ones without an umbrella
are understood through indication by the word “umbrella-holders.” This is on
account of the person associated with the umbrella-less collection. And here,
115There is nothing grammatically infelicitous about the use of the vocative in the verse,
but one might think that there is something inappropriate about addressing unspeaking
bees and flowers with a question. For example, “bee” literally means an unspeaking insect,
but the word indicates an anthropomorphic insect, which shares qualities of the ordinary
bee.
116This sentence, a stock example of lakṣaṇā also used by Kumārila and others, describes
a royal retinue in which the important person has an umbrella-holder to shield them from
the sun. Following along in the process are other, umbrella-less people. Therefore, there is
only one umbrella-holder, despite the plural noun.
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the purpose is to communicate through their connectedness to the royal person
near the umbrella all those who are umbrella-less.
[56.6] Indication which is due to opposition is just as in,
(26) One with a handsome face.
Because here, due to its being used when face is not handsome, the natu-
ral meaning of “handsome face” is blocked. Therefore because the utterance
meaning consists of what has the opposite of an unhandsome face, that is,
handsomeness, the utterance implies the face as being unhandsome through
the relationship of opposition. And here, indication’s purpose is to convey the
hidden true meaning. For these kind of cases, the hidden truth is ordinarily
communicated by speakers on account of their having some such aim.
[56.13] An example of indication which is from being joined with an action is
as in,
(27) You are ‘Enemy-Killer’/‘Śatru-ghna’ in the great battle.117
This is because here there is an obstruction of the primary meaning due to
the use of the word “Enemy-Killer” in the case of one who is not Śatru-ghna.
117The example here is of a pun, or śleṣa. The proper name of the youngest Rāma’s brothers
in the Rāmāyana is “Śatrughna” which means “Enemy-Killer.” In the verses Mukula cites,
the word is being used, along with other proper names, to refer figuratively to the central
character who is not the original Śatrughna. While describing punning as “connection with
an action” seems inapt, McCrea points out that one might take ‘kriyā’ in a broad sense
to mean “being and/or becoming.” McCrea 2008, 297. Whether this is how Bhartṛmitra
understood the term is impossible to know without his original texts.
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And the word “Enemy-Killer” in the case of one who is not Śatru-ghna is said
to be indication because of the relationship which an agent possesses with the
action of killing an enemy. And the speaker’s intention here is to communicate
the nature of a king which is denoted by the word “Enemy-killer.” And in this
way:
(28) You are Pṛthu in qualities. In fame you are Rāma, You are
Nala and Bharata in character,
You are Śatrughna in the great battle, from your standing
in the world, you are Janaka,
Since by your good deeds you bear renown born by the an-
cients
How is it you are not lord Māndhātā, from being victorious
over the three worlds also?118
The one who is painted as a king is being extolled as having kingliness in the
nature of Śatrughna. Thus has been described the tripartite indication which
arises out of the three kinds of relationships.
118All of the proper names in this verse have double meanings and refer to famous figures
in Sanskrit literature. “Pṛthu” = the earth as well as greatness. The god Pṛthu is said to
have subdued the earth, and is the first king. “Rāma” = beauty. He is the central figure
in the Rāmāyana, idealized as a perfect human being. “Nala” and “Bharata” are likely not
trading on the literal meanings of the names, but the famous characters in theMahābhārata.
“Janaka” = ‘one who begets as well as father. He is a famous king in the Rāmāyana who
rules a great empire. Lord Māndhātā = he will suckle me. He was named by the god Indra,
who gave him his finger to suckle as a youth. He was said to be very powerful, and the
“three worlds” is a way of indicating the expansiveness of his reach. Venugopalan translates
Māndhātā as derived from ‘mad’ (in compound for first person pronoun) and ‘dhā,’ meaning
“to sustain” or ”to bear,” but the gloss in the Mahābhārata is of ‘mad” and ‘dhe,’ or “to
suckle.” Possibly a further play on words is intended in the verse, incorporating all of these
meanings.
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[58.11] Now, as for the the very close connection (between indicated and pri-
mary meaning) which consists of the five kinds of relationship described earlier
in detail, in some cases the utterance meaning is entirely displaced, in some
cases it is intended, and in some cases it is unintended. In this way there are
the three kinds which the sensitive reader perceives.119 The author continues
in order to demonstrate the classification of its objects:
Verse 12
In cases of similarity and opposition, the expressed meaning is
entirely displaced.
There is intention and lack of intention (with regard to the expressed
meaning) in the two cases of connection and association.
Verse 13
In cases of appropriation, there is intention (with regard to the
expressed meaning), but in the cases of indirect indication, there is
lack of intention (with regard to the expressed meaning).120
In cases where there is connection to an action, there is setting
aside (of the expressed meaning), and sometimes the opposite of
this.121
119The list of relationships between the utterance meaning and the speaker’s intention
comes from Ānanda’s classification of kinds of dhvani. Mukula will try to show that indica-
tion can be marshalled as an explanation for all of these purported instances of dhvani.
120These categories were introduced above. As stated then, these two kinds of lakṣaṇā
correspond generally to the terms ‘ajahallakṣaṇā’ and ‘jahallakṣaṇā,’ respectively.
121Mukula presents a three-fold division without any hierarchical structure: the primary
meaning is either discarded, unintended, or intended. In contrast, Ānanda has two major
divisions, intended or unintended, and within unintended there are two further distinctions:
meaning which is shifted (‘artha-antara-saṅkramita’), meaning which is entirely discarded
(‘atyanta-tiras-kṛta’). Mukula presents Ānanda’s meaning which is shifted and its broader
category, meaning which is unintended as both being “unintended.” He treats meaning
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Figure 9.8: Analysis of Expressed Meaning
Discarded Unintended Unintended orIntended Intended
Similarity IndirectIndication Connection Appropriation
Opposition Association
[58.18] Because of the relationship with that which is to be denoted means that
where what is uttered takes one of the five forms of very close (relationship),
then when there is similarity or opposition the expressed meaning is entirely
discarded. For instance, in indication that depends upon similarity, the ex-
pressed meaning is entirely discarded. This is because the expressed meaning
has the character of being a comparans aiming at a comparandum, through a
word signifying the comparans.122
which is entirely discarded as its own categorization. See Ānandavardhana 1990a, p. 358ff
and McCrea 2008, p. 302-03 for more detail. In what follows, Mukula analyzes the five
relationships of proximity to the primary meaning in terms of three possibilities: where the
primary meaning is embedded within the new indicated meaning, where it is intended in
some manner, and where it is unintended. The latter two options (intended or unintended)
are understood to be cases where the primary meaning is not embedded, but it is not
necessarily because the speaker always intends to convey the primary meaning. Mukula is
again using the broad term, ‘vācya’ in the sense of meaning which is expressed rather than
utterance meaning in distinction from sentence meaning, the vākya. What is expressed can
be what is expressed by a word, a sentence, or a speaker. The particular examples below
make clear in what sense meaning is expressed.
122This will be further explained in the next sentence, but we can illustrate the principle
generally using a stock English metaphor: “Juliet is the sun.” The word “sun” literally refers
to a gaseous orb. This is the comparans or subject of comparison (Sanskrit: upamāna. The
comparandum or object of comparison (Sanskrit: upameya) is Juliet. In contrast to this
sentence, the examples that follow have the comparandum suppressed. The comparandum,
by being indicated, replaces the literal meaning of the word. It is as if, after having uttered
this sentence, Romeo were to use the word “sun” in another sentence. We would know that
he is implicitly comparing Juliet to the literal sun, and the natural meaning of “sun” would
be entirely discarded.
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[58.20] This is just like the example (16) “Smeared with splendid thick bright
color” and (17) “friends of the clouds.” Since here the words “smeared” and
“friends” aim at the comparandum through their natural meanings, the two
are made to lack any close connection with a natural meaning.123
[58.24] As well, in the dependence relationship of opposition, the expressed
meaning is completely displaced due to fact that another meaning is applicable,
one which is opposed to the expressed meaning. Take, for example, (26) “One
with a handsome face.” Now here, having a handsome face is entirely displaced
due to the person’s having an unhandsome face. Thus the expressed meanings
of similarity and opposition are entirely discarded.
[59.28] But in connection and association, the expressed meaning—whether
it is intended or unintended—is not entirely discarded. Now, in these cases,
given that appropriative indication has the nature of appropriation, where
there is the intention to convey the expressed meaning, the expressed meaning
is intended. For in just this way, the expressed meaning has been explained in
the poetic domain by sensitive readers as aiming at another, intended meaning.
But in the case of indicated meaning, because it is transferred to another
123The explanation here expands upon the explanation above. “Smeared” normally means
spreading something like saffron. But in the poem, the word is used to describe skies
darkening. The natural meaning of spreading is similar to skies darkening in that both
will remove brilliance. However, Mukula argues that the natural meaning of spreading is
now embedded within the new meaning. Likewise, with “friends” which normally does not
signify peacocks. Mukula’s point is that there is not a tight connection between the literal
referent, or natural meaning, of “friends” and peacocks, not that there is no resemblance
relationship between friends and peacocks.
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meaning, the expressed meaning is not intended.124
[60.4] Now, therefore, when expressed meaning is transferred to another mean-
ing, as in appropriative indication based on the relationship (with the primary
meaning), where the expressed meaning is intended there is this example: (7)
“Fat Devadatta does not eat during the day.”125 Now here, the intended effect
is Devadatta’s characteristic of fatness. It is intended by Devadatta’s being
qualificied by the absence of eating in the daytime. The effect implies the
cause, which is eating at night, through indication based in the relationship
(with the primary meaning), by the meaning having a naturally established
meaning.
124The Sanskrit in this section varies among printed editions. Venugopalan, says, “The
printed text reads ‘tatra hy upādāna-ātmikāyāṃ lakṣaṇāyām upādāne vācasya vivakṣāyāṃ
vācyasya vivakṣitatvam’ and the phrase ‘upādāne vācasya’ is redundant. Hence it is omitted.
One of the manuscripts does so as well.” The Dvivedi edition does not omit the ‘upādāne
vācasya and instead of ‘tatra hy upādāna-ātmikāyāṃ reads ‘tatra hy utpādāna-ātmikāyāṃ.’
However, nowhere has Mukula described appropriation as having a productive (utpāda)
nature. Rather than read it as redundant, I read it as emphasizing the nature of this kind
of indication (hence “has the nature of appropriation.”) There is also a phrase missing
from Dvivedi and Venugopalan’s: ‘[lakṣaṇe tu] vācyasya avivakṣitatvaṃ tasya artha-antara-
saṃkramitatvāt.’ McCrea notes that without this phrase, the text “makes Mukulabhaṭṭa
give ‘transformation into another meaning’ (artha-antara-saṃkramitatva) as a reason for
regarding expressed meanings as vivakṣita...when it would, on the contrary, be a reason for
regarding it as avivakṣita.” McCrea 2008, p. 303.
Venugopalan also says, “Mukula here definitely accepts the view of Dhvani indirectly” (p.
262). However, as the entirety of his text is aiming to show that dhvani can be understood as
within the scope of indication, this is unlikely. Rather, his point is that the sensitive readers
are right to observe that there is a different and intended meaning in the provenance of
poetry. They are incorrect to attribute this to dhvani, however. This section describes how
it can be understood through lakṣaṇā.
125While Mukula here begins to discuss appropriation and indirect indication, two cat-
egories which earlier were subsumed under the ‘śuddhā’ or “pure indication,” here he is
addressing the first of Bhartṛmitra’s categories. This is where indication functions based on
some relationship with the primary meaning of the word or phrase.
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[60.10] In the case of appropriation dependent upon association, the expressed
meaning is intended—just as in (25) “The umbrella holders go.” For here,
“umbrella holder,” because of its being declined in the plural, also implies
the umbrella-less people, since this meaning is established as syntactically
connected with its own plural. When this occurs, then, the expressed (singular)
meaning “umbrella-holder” is intended in dependence upon association, as
there is appropriation of those people who are umbrella-less. In this way, the
expressed meaning is said to be intended in the two indications whose natures
are appropriative: the dependence relationships of association and relationship
(with the primary meaning).
[63.17] Now there are two kinds of indication in which the expressed mean-
ing is neither unintended nor entirely discarded. This is due to the indicated
meaning having a connection with the effect, in some way, by means of what is
being indicated. In cases of indication which are dependent upon relationship
(with the primary meaning), there is expressed meaning which is unintended,
as in the example, (18) “I am Rāma.” For here, the expressed meaning of
the word “Rāma” has the form the son of Daśaratha, due to its being trans-
formed into a different property which is “suggested,” it is not employed for its
usual purpose.footnoteBy using “suggested” (‘vyaṅgya’ here, Mukula should
not be understood to be implicitly accepting Ānanda’s account of dhvani, as
Venugopalan claims (footnote 92). He is explicitly arguing that suggestion
is identical to indication. Instead, since he is here pointedly responding to
the dhvani-vadins, he appropriates their own terminology, but gives an ex-
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planation in terms of indication or lakṣaṇā. This is the way I would apply
the principle of charity to what is otherwise an “odd and seemingly rather
careless” (McCrea 2008, p. 304) use of the term. The idea is that the word
“Rāma” is not being literally applied (‘svaparatena’)to the speaker in the sense
that he is the son of Daśaratha, but figuratively in that he is a person who has
certain properties. These properties arise in the same way as in other cases of
indication, and so there is no need for an additional operation. Therefore it
is unintended and it is not entirely discarded. This is because there is some-
how a unifying connection in the meaning of the sentence, by the “suggested”
properties. In the same way, (5) “The village is on the Ganges” and, etc. is
to be explained.
[63.25] Now in the case of indication which is dependent on the relationship of
association, (25) “The umbrella-holders go”—this very example is an expressed
meaning which is unintended. For instance, “umbrella-holder,” by its being
inapplicable otherwise to attain sentential unity in the plural, is appropriated
as being about the collection. When this occurs, then, because of the collection
being intended, the expressed meaning is unintended. And in this way also,
because of being contained within the collection, by means of the collection,
the umbrella-holder is also connected to the action and is in this way easily
obtained (as part of the meaning).126 And just for this reason, the expressed
126The referent of “umbrella-holders” must have a plural referent, and so it refers to the
entire (umbrella-less) collection around the single umbrella-holder, including him. The in-
dividual umbrella-holder is therefore not the intended referent, but he “comes along for the
ride,” so to speak, as he is part of the collection.
364
meaning is not entirely discarded—because of its connection with the action,
by being contained within the boundaries of the collection. In this way it is
shown that the expressed meaning of two kinds of indication dependent on
the relationship of association, whether intended or unintended, is not entirely
discarded.
[65.24] In the case of indication which is dependent on a connection with
action, the indicated meaning has the word’s capacity as its foundation. This
conforms to the capacity of the constituent parts that make up the word. And
there the expressed meaning is discarded, just as in
(29) The man is a man.127
For here, through one word—“man”—having an accepted meaning which is a
generic class, another word—“man”—assumes the meaning as being superior,
in contrast. This is by contrast with the word’s own natural meaning, through
indication which is dependent on connection with an action.
[65.29] But where the expressed meaning is certainly intended due to there
being a collection of factors—and through another word’s capacity a different
established meaning is made non-different—in that case, there is the oppo-
site of this (earlier analysis). There is the opposite of the action which is the
127McCrea suggests this may be an excerpt from a larger verse by Hemacandra. If so, the
wider context is, “A hero who moves in battle, at the forefront, killing a great many enemies:
that person [‘puruṣa’] is like a puruṣa [“one who goes in front,” “one who protects”].” The
second use of “puruṣa” can be taken in an etymological sense, an agentive form of either of
the verbs ppṛ, “to protect,” or p)pur, “to go in front.” McCrea 2008, p. 307-08.
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meaning of the expression.128 Here, it is certainly not the case that there is
discarding of the expressed meaning, but it is instead intended—just as in the
example, (27) “You are ‘Enemy-Killer’ in the great battle.” For here, the word
“Śatru-ghna” (“Enemy-Killer”), through its connection with the action under-
stood through indication, accomplishes as its meaning: the actor whose action
is killing an enemy, its natural meaning, as well as the thing being compared,
viz, “son of Daśaratha.” Therefore its natural meaning is also intended.
[66.6] And suppose sensitive readers accept the category of entirely discarded
expressed meaning as within the purview of this unintended sort of meaning
due to the compared thing’s appropriation. By its being about the subject of
comparison, when there is an object of indication dependent upon an action
the expressed meaning is not discarded, because of the category which is the
object of comparison of the expressed meaning.129
[66.10] Therefore in this way, on the topic of the dependence relationship in
connection with action, it is demonstrated that, on account of the meanings
coming together, sometimes the express meaning is discarded but sometimes
it is intended.
128In the earlier example (29), the second instance of “man” does not denote a class of
human beings, but indicates someone performing the action expressed by its verbal etymo-
logical constituents. In the example Mukula will next develop, the etymological reading and
literal readings are both present in the same word, simultaneously.
129Here, Mukula alludes to the fact that Ānanda subsumes atyanta-tiraskṛta within the
purview (viṣaye vidhe) of when the express meaning is unintended (avivakṣita), in contrast
to his view in which they are distinct. He claims that even if they accept this hierarchy, they
must admit that in some figurative cases dependent upon verbal etymological constitutents,
the expressed meaning is not entirely discarded—which effectively is a counterexample to
their structure.
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Similarity (16) smeared,(17) friends – –
Opposition (26) One with ahandsome face – –
Based on
denotation –





Appropriation – – (25) Umbrellaholders go
Association – (25) Umbrellaholders go –
Relationship
with action




[66.12] And, because there is much to be said, not everything is investigated
in this text. What is described here is what is included in comprehending the
ways of indication but is considered by the sensitive readers to be a novel clas-
sification, that is, dhvani. Therefore we give the general idea in order to open
your eyes. And this is to be investigated by wise persons with intellects sharp
as the point of kuśa grass. But now, enough prolixity to avoid entanglement
in verbosity. Thus, in this way, there has been outlined a classification of the
objects of utterance meaning which are discarded and intended.
[69.8] Now, when the language principle—which has the character of a unity
among all words—is manifest as having a threefold form of the relationship
between word and meaning, like mistaking a rope for a snake, then this com-
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municative function is suitable to rise to the level of ordinary use—which has
ten kinds.130 But it is not suitable when the language principle is aimed at
the nature of speech as a collected whole.131 Therefore, the author, to show
this, says:
Verse 14
The nature of speech, unfolding in use, is analyzed as divided into
ten kinds.
But when the divided succession of words is collected together, how
can it be understood in this manner?
[69.14] The language principle whose nature is unity among all the words has
a relationship with the ten-fold communicative principle that has just been de-
lineated. It does so though its four-fold nature of knower, knowledge-source,
object of knowledge, and cognition of knowledge, each of which participates in
the multiplicity of the expressed meaning, the word, and their relationship. In
this way it unfolds in use like a rope mistaken for a snake.132 But concerning
these ten-fold communicative functions, how are they understood when the
130The analogy of a snake and a rope is common in Indian philosophy as an example of two
things which are mistaken for one another. What is being mistaken here is multiplicity for
unity, at least as Bhartṛhari understands things. The language principle is undifferentiated,
but in everyday use (vyavahāra) we distinguish between such things as parts of speech and
phonemes. However, as things truly are, there is no division. Mukula is trying to present a
theory which can be accepted by all major viewpoints in philosophy of language, including
the Grammarians who hold the sphoṭa theory.
131The ‘śabda-tattva,’ or “language principle” is an allusion to the ‘sphoṭa’ theory of
Bhartṛhari, who thinks that we understand language in a flash of insight (pratibhā) as
a unified whole, without parts.
132The relationships which Mukula has painstakingly outlined are, to the Grammarians in
the tradition of Bhartṛhari, ultimately illusory. To take them as real would be to mistake a
rope for a snake.
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nature of speech unfolding—being non-manifest—has no hypothetical descrip-
tions? After all, taken altogether, there is an divided progression. Certainly,
therefore, there is no expression (of the language principle).
[72.1] Now the author summarizes the purpose of the work:
Verse 15
Therefore, the communicative function has here been investigated
as a ten-fold division.
[72.3] Four divisions into kinds of the primary meaning’s communicative func-
tion and six with regard to indication—in this way the ten kinds of the com-
municative function have here been distinguished.
[72.12] Now the result of this investigation is shown:
Verse 16
That communicative function is reflected in words, sentences, and
knowledge sources;
The intelligence of the one who employs it in composition becomes
bright.
[72.15]Wordsmeans grammar because it is the means for understanding words.
Sentences means hermeneutics (Mīmāṃsā) because it is the means for deter-
mining the sentential unity of sentences. Knowledge sources means reasoning
(tarka) because it is employed as a procedure for determining valid knowl-
edge sources. There is a reflection in these subjects—Grammar, Mīmāṃsā,
Reasoning—which are a means for understanding all of the four kinds of un-
dertakings and all of the sciences, being divided into three kinds. This reflec-
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tion’s form represents the uninterrupted succession of phonemes. One in due
time becomes a lord of luminous speech by completely understanding the en-
tire ten-fold communicative function of speech from its being employed in the
four sciences of Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and Composition. From an
undertaking of these four sciences, this reflection entirely pervades the whole
of world’s use.133
[73.15] This is because the ten-fold communicative function entirely pervades
the ongoing movement of speech, because it is usefully engaged in the four
sciences—these being Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and Composition—
and because it stretches out among all these sciences which are the root of
ordinary practice in its entirety. The ten-fold communicative function which
pervades the entirety of ordinary practice has been explained.
Verse 17
The fundamentals of the communicative function have been ana-
lyzed by Mukula, the son of Bhaṭṭa Kallata, for the purpose of Sūri’s
knowledge.
133The numbering of the sciences—three and then four—looks to be in tension at first. The
reason is that Mukula is glossing the first part of the verse (which has three sciences) and then
goes on to discuss the full scope of the communicative function’s applicability (including the
second half). The verse that Mukula glosses describes the communicative function as being
“reflected” in three areas: words, sentences, knowledge sources. He analyzes each of these
as representing an area of investigation or śāstra: Grammar (words), Mīmāṃṣā (sentences),
and what he calls tarka, probably a reference to Nyāya or the Logic school, which focused on
the pramāṇa (knowledge sources). He then says that each of these are important for the four
kinds of undertakings, which include religious duty (dharma), worldly aims (artha), sensual
desires (kāma), and the highest aim of liberation (mokṣa). He concludings observing that the
communicative function is useful in Grammar, Mīmāṃsā, Reasoning, and also Composition
as a way to make one’s intellect bright (echoing the imagery of the mirror here).
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[73.7] Thus concludes the Fundamentals of the Communicative Function, writ-
ten by Mukula Bhaṭṭa, son of Śrī Bhaṭṭa Kallaṭa, an inhabitant of the place






To help the reader unfamiliar with Classical Sanskrit grammar, below is a brief
overview of some important features.1
1.1 Nouns, Pronouns
Sanskrit is a case-declined language which admits of three genders (masculine,
feminine, neuter), three numbers (singular, dual, and plural), and eight cases.
The cases and some of their ordinary uses are:2
1. Nominative - sentence subject
2. Accusative - direct object of transitive verb; English: “to,” “at”
3. Instrumental - means, instrument; English: “with,” “by”
4. Dative - indirect object of verb; English: “to,” “for,” “in order to”
5. Ablative - separation, removal, expressing reasons; English: “from,” “be-
1I touch only on major features of the grammar. Further, I omit Sanskrit grammatical
terms for simplicity’s sake. Readers interested in a fuller picture should see Whitney 2005
and MacDonnell 1986 for more detail.
2The descriptions of the cases exclude a number of uses to which they may be put, in
the interest of being succinct. See the grammar texts cited above for more detail. Sanskrit
also employs postpositions such as ‘prati’ (“towards”).
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cause”
6. Genitive - possession, superlative relation, often substituted for other
cases; English: “of”
7. Locative - location, situation, also reference to something; English: “in,”
“at,” “among,” “on the topic of”
8. Vocative - signifies direct address; English: “O Rāma!”
Nouns are declined by adding case endings to the stem, corresponding to the
appropriate gender, number, and case. Depending on the stem, there are
different morphological patterns for these case endings—patterns which need
not concern us here, but for which see e.g. MacDonnell 1986, pp. 34ff.
Sanskrit has a variety of pronouns: personal, demonstrative, interrogative,
relative, and reflexive/correlative. These pronouns decline in gender, num-
ber, and case. Demonstrative pronouns can be used to distinguish between
degrees of proximity. Thus, ‘asāu’ (“yonder”) is used for things in the dis-
tance (temporal or spatial) whereas ‘eṣas’ (“this”) is used for things which are
nearby. The pronoun ‘tat’ (“that”) can be used as a demonstrative pronoun
but is also employed as a definite article: ‘tat pustakaṃ mama,” (“The book
is mine.”)
However, strictly speaking, classical Sanskrit does not have a definite or indef-
inite article, and Sanskrit authors do not use demonstrative pronouns. There-
fore, a noun is frequently used in a sentence without a qualifier, and it is from
context that readers determine whether the noun is being used definitely or
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indefinitely and generically or non-generically. Below are examples of all four
cases:
1. Definite generic: gauḥ sāsna-ādimān. (The cow has a dewlap, etc.)
2. Indefinite generic: gaur gāṃ janayati. (The cow produces a cow.)
3. Definite non-generic: kauṇḍinyasya gauḥ. (The cow belongs to Kauṇḍinya.)
4. Indefinite non-generic: gāṃ ānaya. (Bring a cow.)3
1.2 Verbs
Verbs in Sanskrit are inflected from a root, represented frequently with the
square-root symbol: pbhū. Morphological changes to the root as well as the
addition of prefixes and suffixes indicate voice, tense, mode, number, and
person. The verbs in Sanskrit can be analyzed in several ways:
1. Voice: active, middle, passive
2. Tense: present, imperfect, perfect, pluperfect, aorist, future, conditional,
periphrastic future
3. Mode: optative, imperative (modes of the present); optative (mode of
the aorist, also known as precative or benedictive); participles (modes of
the present, perfect, future)
4. Number: singular, dual, plural
3These examples are taken from Ganeri 2006, p. 10-11, which has an excellent discussion
of this phenomenon and its relationship to Indian theories of reference.
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5. Person: first, second, third
Each Sanskrit verb is identified by its verb class, of which there are ten. The
classes are distinguished by their conjugational morphology. There are two
categories of conjugations, each with several classes which vary slightly in
how they change. The first conjugation admits of no change to the verb root
(which ends in ‘-a’) while in the second conjugation, the verb root (which ends
in letters other than ‘a’) changes based on its vowel strength.
The distinction between active and middle voice does not map onto a system-
atic semantic difference. That is, while one might think that the transitive
verbs conjugate in the active voice and intransitive or reflexive verbs in the
middle, this is not so. Some verbs roots can be conjugated as both active and
middle. As Whitney notes, it is likely that a semantic distinction between ac-
tive and passive was the reason for the different forms, but we do not have any
written records which reflect it.4 The passive voice is marked by the addition
of a ‘-ya’ to the verb stem and the use (generally) of the middle verb ending.
It is considered a secondary or derivative conjugation.
While the tenses share names with Greek tenses, they do not correspond in
semantic value. Thus there is no true “imperfect” in Sanskrit, but the imper-
fect is a simple past or preterite. Likewise, there is no true “pluperfect” in
Classical Sanskrit (although there is in Vedic Sanskrit).
4Whitney 2005, p. 200.
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The imperative mode, which is important for the Mīmāṃsā analysis of Vedic
commands (though as we will see, it is not the only mode used for commands),
conveys that something is an injunction. Whitney notes that it is the “most
unchanged in use in the whole history of the language,” although it has some
nuanced semantic shades:
...the command shades off into a demand, an exhortation, an en-
treaty, an expression of earnest desire. The imperative also some-
times signifies an assumption of concession; and occasionally, by
pregnant construction, it becomes the expression of something con-
ditional or contingent...5
The table below illustrates the imperative conjugation for the verb pgam,
meaning “go.” Note that it is syntactically possible to use the imperative to
issue an order to oneself—the imperative is not restricted only to the third
and second persosn.
Sg Du Pl
3rd gacchatu gacchatām gacchantu
2nd gaccha gacchatam gaccha
1st gacchani gacchāva gacchāmaa
Likewise, while the optative conveys a wish, “the optative becomes a softened
imperative...comes to signify what is generally desirable or proper, what should
or ought to be, and so becomes the mode of prescription...”6 As well, the
5Whitney 2005, p. 215
6Whitney 2005, p. 215.
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future indicative can be used to convey commands. Below is the optative for
pgam.
Sg Du Pl
3rd gamyet gametām gameyuḥ
2nd gameḥ gametam gameta
1st gameyam gameva gamema
In addition, Sanskrit has infinitives which takes a single frozen (accusative
case) form, and is considered distinct from the tense-systems noted above. As
well, there are secondary conjugations: passive (described above), intensive,
desiderative, and causative.
1.3 Word Order and Sentence Construction
As a case-declined language, word order is less important in Classical Sanskrit
than English, but there are still typical patterns helpful for interpretation.







Rāma goes to the forest.
When dealing with non-verbal predicates, word order can be important in dis-
tinguishing between what is the qualifier and what is qualified. The predicate













The preceding sentences also illustrate an important aspect of Sanskrit: sandhi.
“Sandhi” simply means “conjunction” or “combination” and refers to the
changes which occur when phonemes come into contact with each other. Take
a simple English example: one does not say “a apple” but rather “an apple.”
This is because of a rule which requires that when the indefinite pronoun comes
into contact with a vowel, one must insert an “n.” In Sanskrit, there are many
such changes which occur when phonemes come into contact—either at the
boundaries of words or within words, as in verb conjugation with the addition
of suffixes.
Here is a simple example. The masculine nominative singular of ‘Rāma’ is
‘Rāmaḥ.’ There is a sandhi rule that says when a word-final ‘ḥ’ preceded by
an ‘a’ comes into contact with a voiced consonant, the ‘a’ drops and the ‘ḥ’













The same process occurs with ghaṭaḥ in sentence (2 and nīlaḥ in sentence (3.
As Sanskrit sandhi-rules are complex, I do not include them here. However,
the phenomenon itself is important to take note of, as it allows for multiple
meanings to be encoded into a single sentence, since there are often multiple
ways to disambiguate sandhi. This is especially the case since Sanskrit admits
of lengthy compounds (see below) and words are frequently written without
spaces marking word–boundaries. It is then up to the reader to determine
where the word boundaries lie, and often there may be several ways to do
so. For instance, coming across a (pseudo) phonetically–written sentence like
this:
(6) Thestuffenoescanleadtoproblems.
an English reader could disambiguate it in two different ways:
(7) The stuffy nose can lead to problems.
(8) The stuff he knows can lead to problems.8
Further, Sanskrit words often have a broad semantic range (made even broader
by poetic dictionaries which stipulate new word meanings). So, for example,
‘hastin’ means “having hands” but can also mean “elephant” (as an elephant
8Example taken, with some adaptations, from Bronner 2010.
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is an animal with a “hands”—a trunk). These two features together open up
a broad range of ways to read multiple meanings out of a single text.
Finally, an important feature of the Sanskrit language which must be remarked
upon is its extensive use of compounds. The use of compounds increases
in complexity as the language develops. Take, for instance, the following
sentence, in which the compound (the string of hyphenated words ending with
‘kāṅcaiḥ’) is the instrumental term in a relatively simple sentence construction
where ‘prabhāte’ is a verb meaning “shines”:
(9) manda-smita-sundara-iśvara-mahā-cāpa-mukta-bāṇa-dagdha-asura-pura-
kalpita-hiraṇya-maya-kiṅkaṇī-śiñcita-kāñcaiḥ tanulayāyā gaṅḍa-bāṣpa-
ambu rātri-jalam iva pūjā-kadamba ullasati prabhāte.
A compound is constructed by combining elements in their stem or root forms
(sometimes words have a particular form they take for compounds) and ap-
plying rules of sandhi internally. The compound above has its sandhi disam-
biguated to be a useful example, but, for instance, ‘sundara-iśvara’ would be
written as ‘sundareśvara.’ Each element of the compound has a relationship
with the other terms in the compound. For instance, there may be a case
relationship implied, such as the instrumental:
(10) daiva-hataḥ
fatestem struckPastPassvP tc;MascNomSg
One who is struck by fate.9
9The word ‘daiva’ is derived from ‘deva,’ meaning “god,” and is an example of San-
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These are just two of the many kinds of compounds—others include com-
pounds that end with a verbal derivative (‘veda-vit’, “knower of the Vedas”),
that contain lists of terms (‘sukha-duḥkham’, “pleasure and pain”), that con-
tain numerals (‘tri-bhuvanam,’ “the triple worlds”), and so on. The last ele-
ment of a compound is declined and can adjectivally qualify other sentential
elements, act as the subject, instrument, and so on. Returning to (12), the
sentence including the full expanded compound (in bold) reads:
(12) manda-smita-sundara-iśvara-mahā-cāpa-mukta-bāṇa-dagdha-
asura-pura-kalpita-hiraṇya-maya-kiṅkaṇī-śiñcita-kāñcaiḥ tan-
ulayāyā gaṅḍa-bāṣpa-ambu rātri-jalam iva pūjākadamba ullasati prab-
hāte.
On the cheek of a girl slender as a vine, whose jingling girdle is
formed with gold fashioned from the city of the evil demons
which was burned by arrows freed from the great bow of
skrit’s ability to form abstract terms through small morphological changes. Here, through
strengthening the vowel, the meaning changes from “god” to “related to the gods,” in this
context, “fate.’
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the beautiful lord with a gentle smile, tears shine like dew on a
kadamba flower presented at the dawn ceremony.
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